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THE DETERMINANTS OF THE FORMS OF INCOME TAX LEGISLATION 
1907-65: THEIR ASCERTAINMENT AND IMPORTANCE 
ABSTRACT 
In 1907, income tax was unequivocally declared permanent; and, in 1965, the 
introduction of corporation tax affected the scope of that tax.  This thesis 
investigates the forms of income tax legislation between those dates with the 
aim of ascertaining the determinants of those forms and assessing their 
importance.  The forms of income tax legislation are divided into primary and 
subordinate legislation; and (within primary legislation) into Finance Acts, 
programme Acts, Consolidation Acts and Codification Acts. 
The government had insufficient parliamentary time to enact all the primary 
legislation that it wished; and some forms of primary legislation were better 
placed for enactment than others.  The result was that the United Kingdom 
polity (an expression used to denote the state considered as a political entity) 
operated with a default setting under which the government’s legislation was 
enacted only in part, and with the different forms of primary legislation being 
used to a very unequal extent.  This default setting was overridden only rarely; 
and only in part could subordinate legislation make good the shortfall in primary 
legislation. 
It is concluded that the business that the United Kingdom polity could usefully 
transact exceeded its capacity to transact that business.  Business was likely to 
be favoured if it was easy to implement, urgent, or had important champions; 
and decisions to be taken for short-term reasons.  These conclusions explain 
the lopsided manner in which income tax was enacted and other features of the 
law and practice relating to income tax.  The conclusions may also hold good 
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for other areas of government activity where there was much legislation; and 
are consistent with the view that the two world wars were of major importance 
for the development of the United Kingdom polity during this period. 
 
  
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
5 
 
LIST OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF STATUTES .................................................................................... 7 
TABLE OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION .................................................. 12 
TABLE OF CASES ......................................................................................... 15 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................ 16 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................... 16 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 17 
CHAPTER 2: THE CONSTRAINT OF INSUFFICIENT PARLIAMENTARY 
TIME ............................................................................................................... 60 
CHAPTER 3: DETERMINANTS WITHIN GOVERNMENT: THE INLAND 
REVENUE .....................................................................................................100 
CHAPTER 4: DETERMINANTS WITHIN GOVERNMENT: THE OFFICE OF 
THE PARLIAMENTARY COUNSEL ..............................................................147 
CHAPTER 5: THE ROLE OF THE TEMPORARY DIRECTING ELEMENT: 
POLITICAL MINISTERS ................................................................................201 
CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE PLAYED BY DETERMINANTS FORMING PART OF 
AMERY’S ‘NATION’ ......................................................................................250 
CHAPTER 7: THE LIMITED AND UNEVEN ROLE PLAYED BY 
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION ....................................................................299 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION .........................................................................358 
APPENDIX 1: PRIMARY LEGISLATION RELATING TO INCOME TAX ......382 
APPENDIX 2: NUMBER OF STATUTORY RULES & ORDERS (1895-1947) 
NUMBER OF STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS (1948 ONWARDS) .................387 
APPENDIX 3: SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION RELATING TO INCOME TAX 
AND NOT INVOLVING ANY FOREIGN ELEMENT .......................................392 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
6 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...........................................................................................397 
 
 
  
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
7 
 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
1689 Bill of Rights  (1 Will & M Sess 2 c 2)   51 
1842 Income Tax Act 1842  (5 & 6 Vict c 35)   17, 30, 102, 369 
1849 Inland Revenue Board Act 1849  (12 & 13 Vict c 46) 100 
1853 Income Tax Act 1853  (16 & 17 Vict c 34)  102 
1870 Irish Land Act 1870  (33 & 34 Vict c 46)   206 
1870 Stamp Act 1870  (33 & 34 Vict c 97)   159 
1870 Stamp Duties Management Act 1870  (54 & 55 Vict c 98) 159 
1876 Customs Consolidation Act 1876  (39 & 40 Vict c 36) 159 
1880 Taxes Management Act 1880 (43 & 44 Vict c 19) 159 
1882 Bills of Exchange Act 1882  (45 & 46 Vict c 61)  206-7 
1883 Bankruptcy Act 1883  (46 & 47 Vict c 52)  207 
1890 Inland Revenue Regulation Act 1890  (53 & 54 c 21) 103, 159 
1890 Partnership Act 1890  (53 & 54 Vict c 39)  206-7 
1891 Stamp Duties Management Act 1870  (54 & 55 Vict c 38) 159 
1891 Stamp Act 1891  (54 & 55 Vict c 39)   159 
1892 Short Titles Act 1892  (55 & 56 Vict c 10)  159 
1893 Rules Publication Act 1893  (56 & 57 Vict c 66)  299, 300 
1893 Sale of Goods Act 1893  (56 & 57 Vict c 71)  206-7 
1896 Short Titles Act 1896  (59 & 60 Vict c 14)  159 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
8 
 
1906 Marine Insurance Act 1906  (6 Edw 7 c 41)  206-7 
1907 Finance Act 1907  (7 Edw 7 c 13)    22 
1908 Finance Act 1908  (8 Edw 7 c 16)    100 
1909 Revenue Act 1909  (9 Edw 7 c 43)   79 
1910 Finance (1909-10) Act 1910  (10 Edw 7 c 8)  22, 116, 221 
1910 Finance Act 1910  (10 Edw 7 & 1 Geo 5 c 35)  79 
1911 Revenue Act 1911  (1 & 2 Geo 5 c 2)   79, 80 
1911 Perjury Act 1911  (1 & 2 Geo 5 c 6)   90 
1911 Parliament Act 1911  (1 & 2 Geo 5 c 13)   71, 73, 79 
1913 Provisional Collection of Taxes Act  (3 & 4 Geo 5 c 3) 72, 81, 84, 223 
1913 Forgery Act 1913  (3 & 4 Geo 5 c 27)   90 
1913 Finance Act 1913  (3 & 4 Geo 5 c 30)   80 
1914 Finance Act 1914  (4 & 5 Geo 5 c 10)   81, 223 
1914 Defence of the Realm Act 1914  (4 & 5 Geo 5 c 29) 309 
1915 Finance (No 2) Act 1915 (5 & 6 Geo 5 c 89)  317, 347-8 
1916 Larceny Act 1916  (6 & 7 Geo 5 c 50)   90 
1918 Income Tax Act 1918  (8 & 9 Geo 5 c 40)        
21, 30, 92, 93, 94, 102, 103, 109,138, 160, 184, 277, 330, 366, 368, 369 
1920 Finance Act 1920  (10 & 11 Geo 5 c 18)   22 
1920 Government of Ireland Act 1920  (10 & 11 Geo 5 c 67) 329 
1922 Finance Act 1922  (12 & 13 Geo 5 c 17)   374 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
9 
 
1922 Irish Free State (Consequential Provisions) Act 1922     
 (13 Geo 5 sess 2 c 2)     329 
1926 Finance Act 1926  (16 & 17 Geo 5 c 22)   330 
1927 Finance Act 1927  (17 & 18 Geo 5 c 10)   243, 330, 374 
1928 Finance Act 1928  (18 & 19 Geo 5 c 17)   316 
1931 Abnormal Importations (Customs Duties) Act 1931     
 (22 & 23 Geo 5 c 1)      304 
1932 Import Duties Act 1932  (22 & 23 Geo 5 c 8)  304, 305 
1933 Local Government Act 1933  (23 & 24 Geo 5 c 51) 96 
1936 Public Health Act 1936  (26 Geo 5 & 1 Edw 8 c 49) 96 
1939 Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939      
 (2 & 3 Geo 6 c 62)      304, 309 
1939 Income Tax Procedure (Emergency Provisions)   
  Act 1939  (2 & 3 Geo 6 c 99)   78, 84, 318, 329 
1940 Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1940 (3 & 4 Geo 6 c 20) 308 
1940 Finance (No 2) Act 1940  (3 & 4 Geo 6 c 48) 282, 319, 338, 350 
1943 Finance Act 1943  (6 & 7 Geo 6 c 28)   85 
1943 Income Tax (Employment) Act 1943  (6 & 7 Geo 6 c 45)  
     78, 84, 85, 231, 294, 343, 351, 353-4, 378 
1944 Income Tax (Offices and Employments) Act 1944    
 (7 & 8 Geo 6 c 12)   78, 84, 231, 343, 351, 354, 378 
1944 Finance Act 1944  (7 & 8 Geo 6 c 23)   86 
1944 Education Act 1944  (7 & 8 Geo 6 c 31)   64 
1945 Income Tax Act 1945  (8 & 9 Geo 6 c 32)    
      78, 84, 85, 272, 274, 275, 282 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
10 
 
1946 Statutory Instruments Act 1946  (9 & 10 Geo 6 c 36) 300 
1946 Finance Act 1946  (9 & 10 Geo 6 c 64)   281 
1947 Town and Country Planning Act 1947  (10 & 11 Geo 6 c 51) 148, 376 
1949 Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act 1949     
 (12, 13 & 14 Geo 6 c 33)     27, 179, 180 
1950 Statute Law Revision Act 1950  (14 Geo 6 c 6)  319 
1952 The Income Tax Act 1952  (15 & 16 Geo 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c 10)  
   21, 22, 30, 92, 102, 113, 114, 192, 193, 194, 368, 369 
1952 Customs and Excise Act 1952        
 (15 & 16 Geo 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c 44)    96 
1958 Import Duties Act 1958  (6 & 7 Eliz 2 c 6)  305 
1959 Income Tax (Repayment of Post-War Credits) Act 1959    
 (7 & 8 Eliz 2 c 28)     78, 84, 294, 296 
1960 Finance Act 1960  (8 & 9 Eliz 2 c 44)   75, 136 
1961 Finance Act 1961  (9 & 10 Eliz 2 c 36)   305 
1964 Income Tax Management Act 1964  (1964 c 37)   
   48, 78, 84, 85, 86-7, 113, 145, 191, 230-1, 234-7, 281, 367 
1964 Finance Act 1964  (1964 c 49)    305 
1965 Finance Act 1965  (1965 c 25)    19 
1967 Finance Act 1967  (1967 c 54)    93 
1968 Capital Allowances Act 1968  (1968 c 3)   22, 93 
1970 Taxes Management Act 1970  (1970 c 9)  22, 93 
1970 Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970  (1970 c 10) 22, 93 
1978 Interpretation Act 1978  (1978 c 30)   25 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
11 
 
2005 Revenue and Customs Act  (2005 c 11)   103 
 
  
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
12 
 
TABLE OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION 
SR & O   STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS 
1909/197 Excise Transfer Order 1909    100 
1914/1863 [1914-15]  [No provision for citation]   330 
1916/202 [Weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 348 
1916/887 [Weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 348 
1920/1991 [Weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 348 
1922/80 Government of Ireland (Adaptation of the Taxing   
  Acts) Order 1922]      329 
1923/405 Irish Free State (Consequential Adaptation    
  of Enactments) Order 1923    329 
1923/453 Irish Free State (Consequential Adaptation   
   of Enactments) Order 1923]    329 
1925/702 [Weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 348 
1927/81 Income Tax (Schedule V Amendment) Order 1927 330 
1928/582 [Weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 348 
1931/827 [Weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 348 
1940/1520 [Weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 348 
1940/1776 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) Regulations  
   1940        348, 350 
1941/1378 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E)     
  (Amendment) Regulations 1941    350 
1941/1379 [Weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 350 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
13 
 
1941/1667 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E)     
  (Amendment No 2) Regulations 1941   350 
1942/1324 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E)     
  (Amendment No 3) Regulations 1942   350 
1942/1970 Seasonal Employments (Income Tax)     
  Regulations 1942      348 
1943/397 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E)     
  (Amendment No 4) Regulations 1943   350 
1943/1024 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E)     
  (Amendment No 5) Regulations 1943   350 
1943/1310 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E)     
  (Merchant Navy) Regulations 1943   350 
1943/1669 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E)     
  (Amendment No 6) Regulations 1943   352 
1944/251 Income Tax (Employments) Regulations1944   
        301, 331, 343, 355 
1944/1015 Income Tax (Employments) (No 2) Regulations 1944 355 
1945/365 Income Tax (Employments) (No 3) Regulations 1945 355 
1946/163 Income Tax Procedure (Emergency Provisions) Act   
  (Expiry) Order 1946      329 
1946/458 Income Tax (Employments) (No 4) Regulations 1946 355 
1947/582 Income Tax (Employments) (No 5) Regulations 1947 355 
1947/1295 Income Tax (Employments) (No 6) Regulations 1947 355 
 
SI   STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS 
1948/3 Statutory Instruments Act, 1946 (Commencement) Order  300 
1948/464 Income Tax (Employments) (No 7) Regulations 1948 355 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
14 
 
1948/1519 Income Tax (Employments) (No 8) Regulations 1948 355 
1948/1819 Income Tax (Employments) (No 9) Regulations 1948 355 
1950/453 Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1950  355 
1951/836 Income Tax (Employments) (No 2) Regulations 1951 355 
1952/1004 Income Tax (Employments) (No 3) Regulations 1952 355 
1952/1758 Income Tax (Employments) (No 4) Regulations 1952 355 
1954/1577 Income Tax (Employments) (No 5) Regulations 1954 355 
1955/835 Income Tax (Employments) (No 6) Regulations 1955 355 
1956/1230 Income Tax (Purchased Life Annuities)     
  Regulations 1956      330 
1958/1166 Income Tax (Employments) (No 7) Regulations 1958 355 
1960/2308 Income Tax (Purchased Life Annuities)     
  (Amendment) Regulations 1960    330 
1961/591 Income Tax (Employments) (No 8) Regulations 1961 355 
1961/1596 Income Tax (Employments) (No 9) Regulations 1961 355 
1962/1003 Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1962  355 
1963/1082 Income Tax (Employments) (No 2) Regulations 1963 355 
1965/516 Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1965  355 
  
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
15 
 
TABLE OF CASES 
Absalom v Talbot (HM Inspector of Taxes)      
 [1943] 1 All ER 589; (1943) 26 TC 166 (CA)   373 
A-G v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd  [1920] AC 508 (HL)    311 
A-G v Wilts United Dairies Ltd        
 (1921) 37 TLR 884 (CA); (1922) 38 TLR 781 (HL) 52-3, 303, 305 
A-G for Canada v Hallet & Carey Ltd [1952] AC 427 (PC)    303-4 
Bowles v Bank of England        
 [1913] 1 Ch 57; (1912) 6 TC 136 (Ch)   84, 183, 267 
Farrell v Alexander  [1977] AC 59 (HL)     27 
Great Western Railway Co v Bater       
 [1922] 2 AC 1; (1922) 8 TC 231 (HL)    94 
IRC v Frere  [1965] AC 402; (1964) 42 TC 125 (HL)     373 
IRC v Hinchy  [1960] AC 748; (1960) 38 TC 625 (HL)    136 
IRC v Sneath  (1932)  17 TC 149 (CA)     23 
Lionel Sutcliffe Ltd v IRC  (1928) 14 TC 171 (KB)   374 
R v Special Commissioners of Income Tax (ex p Elmhirst)    
 [1936] 1 KB 487; (1935) 20 TC 381 (CA)    23 
Ronnfeldt v Phillips  (1918) 35 TLR 46 (CA)    308 
Slaney (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Kean      
 [1970] Ch 243; (1969) 45 TC 415 (Ch)    24 
Wicker v Fraser (HM Inspector of Taxes)  (1982) 55 TC 641 (Ch)  24 
  
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
16 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
1918 Act The Income Tax Act 1918 (8 & 9 Geo 5 c 40) 
1952 Act The Income Tax Act 1952 (15 & 16 Geo 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c 10) 
TNA  The National Archives, Kew 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1:  The standard rate of income tax: 1842-43 to 1964-65  20 
Figure 2:  Expenditure of public authorities as a percentage of  
  the national income: 1880-1954     36 
 
 
  
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
17 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
‘The chaotic condition of the Statute Book has been the subject of 
complaint for at least five hundred years, and it must be 
acknowledged that the long history of the intermittent attempts 
made to improve its form and arrangement is, in the main, a story 
of failure’.1 
 
1. The income tax background 
Income tax was proposed by the younger Pitt and introduced in 1799.2  The tax 
was abolished in 1802 during a temporary cessation of hostilities in the 
Napoleonic Wars; but the United Kingdom was soon at war with France again – 
and income tax was reintroduced in 1803.  On its reintroduction, the tax had 
significantly different characteristics and was more effective operationally;3 but, 
following the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, income tax was again 
abolished in 1816.  Then, in 1842, income tax was reintroduced by Peel,4 with a 
view to its helping to eliminate a deficit in the public finances; and income tax 
has been in continuous existence ever since.  It was, however, the official view 
of Peel, and then of Gladstone, that income tax was temporary only.5  It 
followed, on this view, that any major investigations into the principles of the tax, 
and any major amendments of it, were matters that had no entitlement to 
priority so far as government was concerned.  Indeed, it could be argued that 
any such actions might be harmful: for these might imply that the merely 
                                            
1
  TNA (The National Archives, Kew) file T 162/911 (E 17496/1).  ‘Statute Law Reform’.  
Memorandum by the Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury (Sir Granville Ram), 30 January 
1946, para 1 (opening sentence).   
2
  The standard general history of income tax remains BEV Sabine, A History of Income Tax 
(London, George Allen & Unwin, 1966). 
3
  These matters are argued convincingly in A Farnsworth, Addington: Author of the Modern 
Income Tax (London, Stevens, 1951). 
4
  In the Income Tax Act 1842 (5 & 6 Vict c 35). 
5
  In 1853, Gladstone said of income tax that ‘it is not adapted for a permanent portion of your 
fiscal system, unless you can by reconstruction remove its inequalities’.  (HC Deb 18 April 1853, 
vol 125, col 1364). 
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temporary was in reality permanent.  The obvious course of action (or, rather, 
inaction) was to leave the tax in the state in which it currently existed.  In a 
memorandum providing a brief history of income tax, which the Inland Revenue 
(the government department responsible for the administration of income tax) 
provided to the Royal Commission on the Income Tax appointed in 1919, the 
department took the view that, from 1880 to 1905, ‘the history of the tax offers 
no very striking features’.6 
The opening date of 1907 for the investigation carried out in this thesis has 
been chosen by reference to an event in the history of income tax – the public 
and unequivocal abandonment of the view that income tax was temporary only.7  
In that year, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Asquith), in his Budget speech, 
started from the proposition ‘and a most important proposition it is’ that income 
tax ‘must now be regarded as an integral and permanent part of our financial 
system’.8  Once that proposition was enunciated and admitted, Asquith thought, 
it became impossible to justify the incidence of income tax as it stood at that 
time.9  The way was accordingly open for major legislative changes – and these 
began to be undertaken.  It was the Inland Revenue’s view, towards the end of 
the first world war, that developments since 1907 had had the overall result of 
‘transforming the old and comparatively simple structure into a financial 
instrument of extraordinary complexity, subtlety and power’.10  The Royal 
Commission on the Income Tax, which reported in 1920, took the same view: 
                                            
6
  Royal Commission on the Income Tax, Appendices and Index to the Minutes of Evidence 
(1920) Appendix 1, para 14. 
7
  Sir John Clapham commented that ‘[a] foreigner might have admired the swift English resolve 
to make permanent a tax which had existed continuously for sixty-five years’.  JH Clapham, An 
Economic History of Modern Britain: Machines and National Rivalries (1887-1914) with an 
Epilogue (1914-1929) (CUP 1938) 404. 
8
  HC Deb 18 April 1907, vol 172, col 1199. 
9
  ibid. 
10
  TNA file IR 75/89, fos 1-9, ‘Brief History of the Income Tax’.  This document was produced in 
1917 or 1918.  
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for it considered that ‘[i]t is from 1907 that the modern Income Tax counts the 
years of its life’.11 
The closing date of 1965 has also been chosen by reference to an event in the 
history of income tax: for the Finance Act 1965 provided for corporation tax to 
be charged in place of income tax on the profits of companies – and so effected 
a major change in the scope of the tax. 
The period from 1907 to 1965 was one of very great importance in the history of 
income tax.  During this period, the government’s finances came to be carried 
out on a greatly increased scale; and income tax played a major role in that 
expansion.  In the financial year 1907-08, central government revenue 
amounted to some £156 million.  In the financial year 1964-65, that revenue 
amounted to £7,727 million (nearly a fiftyfold increase).12  Even when inflation is 
taken into account, that expansion was very great indeed.  Receipts from 
income tax in 1907-08 amounted to £32.4 million: in 1964-65, receipts from 
income tax and surtax amounted to £3,272.0 million (more than a hundredfold 
increase).  An income tax required to produce vastly increased receipts also 
had higher rates of charge.  In 1907-08, the standard rate of income tax was 
one shilling in the pound (5%).  In 1964-65, the standard rate of income tax was 
seven shillings and nine pence in the pound (38.75%); and the highest rate at 
which surtax could be charged was ten shillings in the pound (50% – making a 
cumulative total of 88.75%).  Figure 1 shows the standard rate of income tax 
from 1842-43 to 1964-65; and there can be no doubt about the overall rise in 
the standard rate at which income tax was charged.  
                                            
11
  Royal Commission on the Income Tax, Report (Cmd 615, 1920) 2, para 9. 
12
  Statistics relating to the public finances may conveniently be found in BR Mitchell, British 
Historical Statistics (CUP 1988) 581-6. 
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Figure 1 
The standard rate of income tax: 1842-43 to 1964-65 
Increased receipts from income tax also led to a large increase in the number of 
taxpayers.  At no time was there ever any official counting of those who paid 
income tax: but, in the years between 1900 and the first world war, it was 
officially estimated that the number of individuals chargeable to income tax 
increased from slightly fewer than one million to slightly more than that number 
(about 2.5% of the population).13  For 1962-63, it was officially estimated that 
there were slightly more than 20 million such individuals (about 37.8% of the 
population).14  It was during this period that income tax ceased to be a ‘class 
tax’ and became a ‘mass tax’.15 
                                            
13
 During March 1914, the estimates provided, in replies to parliamentary questions, were 
950,000 payers of income tax in 1903-04; 1,150,000 in 1912-13; and 1,150,000 in 1913-14.  
See HC Deb 3 and 4 March 1914, vol 59, cols 225 and 434. 
14
  Inland Revenue, Report of the Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Inland Revenue for the year 
ended 31st March 1964: Hundred and Seventh Report (Cmnd 2572, 1965) 42. 
15
  For this terminology see CC Jones, ‘Bonds, Voluntarism and Taxation’ in J Tiley (ed), Studies 
in the History of Tax Law: Volume 2 (Oxford, Hart, 2007) 428. 
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Income tax also assumed greater importance relative to other government 
imposts.  The various taxes levied by central government were not equally 
capable of responding to the challenge of producing increased receipts.  If the 
economy was characterised both by economic growth and by inflation – and this 
was the case for the majority of the time – the relative percentage of central 
government tax revenue attributable to income tax could be expected to rise.  
Income tax was more responsive to economic growth than estate duty; it was 
more responsive to inflation than customs duties and excise duties.  In the 
absence of action to counteract this disequilibrium, it could be expected that the 
relative importance of income tax would grow – and so it did.16  In 1907-08, 
income tax raised £32.4 million for central government: this was 24.9% of tax 
revenue – slightly less than the contributions made both by customs duties and 
by excise duties.  In 1964-65, income tax and surtax raised £3,272 million for 
central government: this was 44% of tax revenue – well ahead of the 27% 
raised by customs duties – the next largest contributor. 
During the period from 1907 to 1965 also, the leading features of income tax 
changed greatly.  Following the abandonment of the view that the existence of 
income tax was temporary only, the quantity of legislation in existence grew 
more rapidly – and reached a point where that quantity was very great indeed.  
In the annual volumes published of Public General Acts, the Income Tax Act 
191817 (a consolidation Act) took up 180 pages.  The Income Tax Act 195218 
(the next consolidation Act) took up 508 pages; and was, at that time, the 
                                            
16
  On these matters see R Rose and T Karran, Taxation by Political Inertia: Financing the 
Growth of Government in Britain (London, Allen & Unwin, 1987). 
17
  8 & 9 Geo 5 c 40. 
18
  15 & 16 Geo 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c 10. 
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longest statute ever to have been enacted.19  The next group of consolidation 
statutes, the Capital Allowances Act 1968, the Taxes Management Act 1970 
and the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970, took up a total of 877 pages.  
Although some provisions in these statutes were not relevant for income tax, 
there can be no doubt that the quantity of income tax legislation had increased 
– and was continuing to increase.  ‘What is most wrong with the Income Tax 
Acts’, the drafter of the 1952 Act, Sir John Rowlatt, observed on one occasion, 
‘is that there is more of them than anybody can possibly absorb, and this is 
quite certain to get worse every year’.20 
The structure of the income tax also underwent a fundamental transformation 
during the first half of the twentieth century.  At the beginning of 1907, income 
tax was essentially a flat rate tax – although an individual with a small income 
could claim exemption or an abatement in appropriate circumstances.21  The 
Finance Act 190722 introduced differentiation in favour of earned incomes; and 
the Finance (1909-10) Act 191023 introduced graduation.24  The Finance Act 
192025 then made provision for income tax to be computed in a new manner, 
with deductions from assessable income being given to taxpayers for the 
various personal reliefs to which they were entitled.  The overall result of these 
                                            
19
  When the Consolidation Bill enacted as the Income Tax Act 1952 was in committee, its 
drafter, Sir John Rowlatt, was asked ‘[i]s it true that this is the longest Bill there has ever been?’ 
The answer given was ‘I know of no longer one’. (Joint Select Committee on Consolidation Bills, 
First Report [on the Income Tax Bill] (1951-52, HL 17, HC 62) 44 (question 214).)  
20
  TNA file IR 40/14566.  Letter, Rowlatt to Bridges, 11 January [1952].  (In the letter itself, the 
year is specified as ‘1951’, but that is clearly an error, with ‘1952’ being intended.) 
21
  The matters referred to in this paragraph are considered in more detail in JHN Pearce, ‘The 
Rise and Development of the Concept of “Total Income” in United Kingdom Income Tax Law: 
1842-1952’ in J Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 2 (Oxford, Hart, 2007). 
22
  7 Edw 7 c 13. 
23
  10 Edw 7 c 8. 
24
  Following the definitions adopted by the Royal Commission on the Income Tax appointed in 
1919, in this thesis ‘differentiation’ means ‘the principle of distinguishing between one kind of 
income and another by means of different rates of tax’; and ‘graduation’ means ‘the principle of 
increasing the rate of the tax as the income increases’.  (Royal Commission on the Income Tax, 
Report (Cmd 615, 1920) 24, para 105.) 
25
  10 & 11 Geo 5 c 18. 
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developments was that income tax could no longer be considered to be 
essentially a flat rate tax.  ‘The history of income tax in this country’, the Royal 
Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income declared in its Second 
Report, in 1954, ‘is the history of a change from what was virtually a flat rate tax 
charged uniformly on all incomes to a progressive tax charged at increasing 
rates as income increases’.26 
The administration of income tax was also transformed during the first half of 
the twentieth century.  On the re-introduction of income tax in 1842, the process 
for determining liability to the tax in England and Wales depended (as it had 
done earlier during the Napoleonic period) upon the Commissioners for the 
general purposes of the income tax (the ‘General Commissioners’).27  As part of 
that overall process, the General Commissioners heard and determined 
appeals against assessments to income tax.  They accordingly exercised a 
function of a judicial nature, but for an administrative purpose;28 and there is 
judicial authority, dating from the first half of the twentieth century, that, in doing 
so, they were acting administratively rather than judicially.29  During the period 
between 1907 and 1965, however, the process for determining liability to 
income tax in England and Wales was transferred to central government.30  As 
one official put the matter in 1941 ‘[t]he modern aim is, I think, to leave the 
                                            
26
  Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Second Report (Cmd 9105, 1954) 
42, para 137. 
27
  On the General Commissioners see also generally C Stebbings, ‘The General 
Commissioners of Income Tax: Assessors or Adjudicators’ [1993] British Tax Review 52; and JF 
Avery Jones, ‘The Special Commissioners after 1842: from administrative to Judicial Tribunal’ 
[2005] British Tax Review 80. 
28
  C Stebbings, ‘”A Natural Safeguard”: The General Commissioners of Income Tax’ [1992] 
British Tax Review 400. 
29
  IRC v Sneath (1932) 17 TC 149, 164 and 168 (CA) and R v Special Commissioners of 
Income Tax (ex p Elmhirst) [1936] 1 KB 487, 493; (1935) 20 TC 381, 387 (CA). 
30
  The stages of this transfer are traced in JHN Pearce, ‘The Role of Central Government in the 
Process of Determining Liability to Income Tax in England and Wales: 1842-1970’ in J Tiley 
(ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 3 (Oxford, Hart, 2009). 
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Commissioners with only the very important job of hearing appeals against 
assessments’;31 and there is judicial authority, dating from the years after 1965, 
that the functions of the General Commissioners should now be considered to 
be judicial and not administrative.32  The period from 1907 to 1965, therefore, 
began with the General Commissioners exercising an overall administrative 
function, which included a judicial function within it; the period ended with the 
General Commissioners still exercising the judicial function, but with the Inland 
Revenue now exercising the overall administrative function. 
During the period from 1907 to 1965, therefore, receipts from income tax rose – 
and so did the rates at which the tax was charged.  At the beginning of this 
period, income tax was a flat-rate, class tax with an essentially local 
administration; at its end, income tax was a graduated, mass tax and was 
administered centrally.  The overall result of these developments was that 
income tax moved from being one tax among a number of taxes in a state 
where central government was conducted on a small scale to being the 
government’s flagship tax in a state where government was conducted on a 
large scale.  The happening of all these developments within the same half 
century has enabled the opinion to be advanced that it is, perhaps, the first half 
of the twentieth century that is the crucial half century in the modern history of 
income tax in the United Kingdom.33 
2. The forms of income tax legislation and determinants of them 
This thesis investigates one aspect of income tax law during the important 
period from 1907 to 1965: the determinants of the forms of income tax 
                                            
31
  TNA file IR 76/43.  Note dated 15 December 1941.  (Underlining in original.)  
32
  Slaney (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Kean [1970] Ch 243 251; (1969) 45 TC 415, 420 (Ch) and 
Wicker v Fraser (HM Inspector of Taxes) (1982) 55 TC 641, 649 (Ch). 
33
  Pearce (n 30) 357. 
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legislation during that period.  It is necessary, therefore, to specify the forms of 
income tax legislation that will be investigated; and the meaning to be given to 
the word ‘determinant’. 
The forms of income tax legislation that will be investigated may be classified in 
two different ways.  The first classification distinguishes between primary 
legislation and subordinate legislation.  During the first half of the twentieth 
century, the primary legislation relating to income tax consisted of Acts of the 
United Kingdom Parliament.  The expression ‘subordinate legislation’ will be 
used in accordance with the definition given in section 21(1) of the Interpretation 
Act 1978, where it is defined to mean ‘Orders in Council, orders, rules, 
regulations, schemes, warrants, byelaws and other instruments made or to be 
made under any Act’.  Taking its lead from this provision, the expression 
‘subordinate legislation’ will be used in this thesis, as opposed to the 
expressions ‘secondary legislation’ and ‘delegated legislation’. 
The second classification relates to the various types of primary legislation 
relating to income tax that existed during the twentieth century.34  At any 
particular time there was always a principal Act: that is to say, an Act dealing 
comprehensively with this area of the law.  During this period, there were also 
amending Acts, which merely altered an area of the law without dealing with 
that area comprehensively.  Amending Acts relating to income tax, in their turn, 
may be divided into two categories: Finance Acts and programme Acts.  
Finance Acts resulted from the enactment of Finance Bills:35 and Finance Bills 
                                            
34
  The types of legislation mentioned are specified in the terms which the expressions in 
question have at the present day.  The detailed wording of this paragraph has been influenced 
by O Jones (ed), Bennion on Statutory Interpretation; A Code (6th edn, London, LexisNexis, 
2014) 156.  
35
  This specification of Finance Bills follows that given in the pamphlet entitled The Preparation 
of Bills, dated March 1948, para 37.  There is a copy of this pamphlet in TNA file CAB 21/4693.  
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were required, by a long-standing practice of the House of Commons, to 
originate, wholly or mainly, with resolutions of the Committee of Ways and 
Means.  Bills that had to originate in this manner (known colloquially as ‘Ways 
and Means Bills’) were Bills whose main object was to provide money for the 
public service – an object which included the imposition of taxation.36  Most 
Ways and Means Bills (including Finance Bills) might be recognised by an 
enacting formula which had a preface beginning with the words ‘Most Gracious 
Sovereign’.  It was also the case that many Finance Bills came into existence in 
accordance with a well-known and well-established sequence of events, which 
included the Budget speech and the passing of the government’s Budget 
resolutions.37  Having regard to this specification of Finance Acts, the 
specification of the other type of amending Act that will be considered – 
programme Acts – necessarily has a residuary character: for it consists of all 
amending Acts other than Finance Acts.  The expression ‘programme Act’ is 
accordingly used in this thesis in a special and technical sense, which is not co-
extensive with an Act of Parliament coming into existence as part of the 
government’s legislative programme for a particular parliamentary session.38 
A principal Act may be replaced in any one of three ways.  The first way is by 
the enactment of a new principal Act containing different provisions (to a greater 
                                                                                                                              
The pamphlet was written by Sir Granville Ram, who had recently retired as First Parliamentary 
Counsel. 
36
  Other categories of Ways and Means Bills included Consolidated Fund Bills and 
Appropriation Bills. 
37
  It was perfectly possible for there to be more than one Finance Act in any one particular year.  
In particular, this could happen if there was a general election or a financial crisis. 
38
  In 1911, the distinction between the Revenue Bill then presented to Parliament (a 
programme Bill on this classification) and a Finance Bill was explained by saying that ‘This Bill is 
called a Revenue Bill and not a Finance Bill ... as ... it contains clauses which deal with general 
amendments of financial law, and not with the financial arrangements of the year.  The 
provisions absolutely necessary for the financial arrangements of the year, namely, those 
imposing the tax on tea for the year, and income tax for the year, became law last November’.  
(TNA file AM 2/103, fo 400.  Notes on Revenue Bill with backsheet dated 21 February 1911.) 
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or lesser extent).  The second way is by the enactment of a codification Act.  An 
Act of this type restates the whole of the law on a particular topic, whether that 
law consists of statute law, case law or the common law.  A codification Act may 
also deal with custom, prerogative and practice.39  The third way is by the 
enactment of a consolidation Act: that is to say, an Act restating provisions 
contained in various earlier Acts dealing with the same subject matter.  
Consolidation is accordingly a less ambitious undertaking than codification: for 
consolidation is concerned only with existing statute law.  Consolidation Acts, in 
their turn, may be divided into two types.  ‘Pure’ consolidation consists of 
reproduction of the original wording without significant change: all other 
consolidation consists of consolidation with amendments.  At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, pure consolidation was the only type of consolidation 
permitted: but consolidation with amendments came to be permitted under the 
Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act 1949;40 and, after 1965, the scope 
for this type of consolidation was extended by a further procedure under which 
amendments were proposed by the Law Commission.41 
The term ‘determinants’ is used, in this thesis, in accordance with dictionary 
definitions – a determinant is ‘that which serves to determine’; ‘a defining 
element’.42  Determinants, accordingly, may vary greatly in their characteristics.  
The nature of parliamentary procedure; initiatives undertaken by particular 
individuals; the United Kingdom’s participation in the two world wars; a state of 
                                            
39
  Jones (n 34) 558. 
40
  12, 13 & 14 Geo 6 c 33. 
41
  Jones (n 34) 554-7.  ‘There are three sorts of consolidation Act: (1) “pure” consolidation (i.e., 
re-enactment); (2) consolidation under the Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act 1949, 
which allows consolidation with “corrections and minor improvements” ... ; (3) consolidation 
“with Law Commission amendments” under a procedure adopted by Parliament in 1967’.  
Farrell v Alexander [1977] AC 59 (HL) 82 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale). 
42
  These definitions are in accordance with the word’s Latin derivation, which points towards 
the meaning ‘methodically to set bounds to’. 
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affairs in which the United Kingdom’s government had more business to 
transact than time in which to transact that business – all are capable of being 
determinants of the United Kingdom’s income tax legislation during the first half 
of the twentieth century. 
This thesis investigates the determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 
between 1907 and 1965: and, in general, it is a statute or an item of subordinate 
legislation (such as a statutory instrument) that is studied.  The enactment in 
question is studied as a whole.  This general statement, however, is subject to 
two significant qualifications.  The first qualification is that much may also be 
learned about the determinants of the forms of income tax legislation by 
investigating legislation that was prepared but not enacted.  As a matter of logic, 
this draft legislation suffered from one or more defects which prevented its 
enactment; and the ascertainment of those defects is capable of providing much 
information for ascertaining the determinants of the form of the income tax 
legislation.  This draft legislation, therefore, has also been investigated.43  The 
second qualification relates to the distinction between primary and subordinate 
legislation.  It was possible for provisions that enabled subordinate legislation to 
be made to be expanded or contracted during the period beginning with 
discussion of the proposed primary legislation and ending with its enactment.44  
In such a case it is relevant to investigate why changes to the detailed content 
of the primary legislation were made: for the ambit of the subordinate legislation 
relating to income tax was affected. 
                                            
43
  Two important items of draft legislation which were prepared but were not enacted were the 
Revenue Bill of 1921 and the draft Bill prepared by the Income Tax Codification Committee and 
published in 1936.  Both are investigated in the body of the thesis – and particularly in chapter 6 
below. 
44
  One area in which this happened is investigated in chapter 7, section 3, below. 
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3. Research aim and research questions 
The aim of this thesis is to ascertain the determinants of the forms of income tax 
legislation during the period from 1907 to 1965 and to assess their importance.  
To achieve this aim six specific research questions will be addressed in the 
body of the thesis.  The first five research questions investigate the role played 
by different elements in the United Kingdom polity in determining the form of 
that legislation during that period.  The word ‘polity’ is used in this thesis to 
denote a state as a political entity.  The elements investigated follow on from an 
analysis of the United Kingdom polity; and that analysis is set out later in this 
chapter.45 
The first research question addressed is whether the need to enact primary 
legislation in Parliament relating to income tax affected the form of the income 
tax legislation.  The second research question addressed is the role played by 
the Inland Revenue (the government department responsible for administering 
income tax) in determining the form of the income tax legislation; and the third 
research question addressed is the role played by the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel (the office responsible for drafting government primary 
legislation).  The fourth research question addressed is the role played by 
government ministers; and the fifth the role played by elements outside the 
government.  The sixth and final research question addressed is the role played 
by subordinate legislation: for the relationship between the primary legislation 
and the subordinate legislation relating to income tax was not straightforward.  
During the first half of the twentieth century, the United Kingdom witnessed a 
great expansion in the use of subordinate legislation; but, in the case of income 
                                            
45
  See section 6 of this chapter below.   
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tax, comparatively little subordinate legislation was made: and the reasons for 
this limited use are investigated.  On the other hand (and sounding in a different 
key), an appreciable amount of subordinate legislation (some of it of great 
operational importance) came into existence: and the reasons why this 
appreciable amount of subordinate legislation was made are also investigated. 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation, when ascertained, 
should explain why the primary legislation enacted was distributed very 
unequally amongst the forms of legislation distinguished.  That primary 
legislation is listed in Appendix 1 to this thesis.  There were 68 Finance Acts, 
but only eight programme Acts.  There were two Consolidation Acts.46  A draft 
Income Tax Codification Bill was published in 193647 – but no Codification Act 
and no new principal Act relating to income tax was enacted. 
The primary legislation relating to income tax enacted between 1907 and 1965 
may also be described as producing an overall outcome which was ambiguous 
and indecisive.  In 1907, the principal Act was still the Income Tax Act 1842,48 
supplemented by Finance Acts and by programme Acts.  In 1918, the 1842 Act 
and primary legislation supplementing it were replaced by the Income Tax Act 
191849 (a Consolidation Act).  In 1952, the 1918 Act, in its turn, was replaced by 
the Income Tax Act 195250 (another Consolidation Act); and the 1952 Act also 
consolidated provisions of Finance Acts and programme Acts which 
supplemented the 1918 Act.  In 1965, the principal Act was still the Income Tax 
                                            
46
  These two Acts were the Income Tax Act 1918 (8 & 9 Geo 5 c 40) (referred to as ‘the 1918 
Act’ in this thesis) and the Income Tax Act 1952 (15 & 16 Geo 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c 10) (referred to as 
‘the 1952 Act’ in this thesis). 
47
  Income Tax Codification Committee, Report: Volume II: Draft of an Income Tax Bill (Cmd 
5132, 1936). 
48
  5 & 6 Vict c 35. 
49
  8 & 9 Geo 5 c 40. 
50
  15 & 16 Geo 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c 10. 
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Act 1952, supplemented by Finance Acts and by programme Acts.  There had 
certainly been activity: but, to adapt language associated with di Lampedusa’s 
novel The Leopard, it was possible to take the view that everything had 
changed, but that everything was still the same.51  The determinants of the 
forms of income tax legislation produced inertia as well as change; and those 
determinants, when ascertained, should explain this ambiguous and indecisive 
overall outcome. 
The assessment of the importance of the determinants of the forms of the 
income tax legislation will be undertaken by considering the importance of those 
determinants when placed in wider contexts: and three contexts will be 
considered.  The first context is the law and practice of income tax in the United 
Kingdom during the period from 1907 to 1965; and the second context is that of 
the general workings of the United Kingdom polity during that same period.   
So far as these two contexts are concerned, one hypothesis that may be 
formulated is that, in this period, a contrast may be drawn between the 
particular decisions that were taken and the overall result of those decisions.  
Kay and King, in their study of the United Kingdom tax system, referred to ‘[t]he 
mess into which the present British tax system has drifted’.52  Anyone who 
came to that system for the first time, they thought, would regard it with some 
incredulity.  There was a maze of taxes on different kinds of income, each tax 
with its own rules for determining taxable income and liability.  The interaction 
between those taxes was difficult to comprehend, and, accordingly, was rarely 
brought out into the open when tax changes were discussed.  ‘No one would 
                                            
51
  ‘ ... all will be the same though all will be changed’.  G di Lampedusa, The Leopard (A 
Colquhoun, tr, London, Collins, 1960) 35. 
52
  JA Kay and MA King, The British Tax System (OUP 1978) 246. 
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design such a system on purpose and nobody did’.  Only a historical 
explanation of how it came about, the authors thought, could be offered as a 
justification – and that was ‘not a justification, but a demonstration of how 
seemingly rational decisions can have absurd effects in aggregate’.53  The 
contrast between the particular and the aggregate also impressed Rose and 
Karran: for they wrote that ‘[a]nyone who has ever contemplated the national 
tax system as a whole is immediately struck by how unsystematic it is’.54  
Different taxes appeared to have been introduced for different reasons at 
different times, and each to have grown without plan or direction, more or less 
reflecting forms of political inertia.  Rose and Karran then went on to make a 
point of great importance for the investigation carried out in this thesis: ‘[t]he 
more that critics of a tax system attack the alleged faults, the more it is made 
apparent that the forces accounting for this “unsystematic” system must be 
strong and only imperfectly understood’.55  The ascertainment of the 
determinants of the forms of income tax legislation may enable a contribution to 
be made towards understanding not only the law and practice of income tax in 
the United Kingdom, but also the general workings of the United Kingdom polity. 
The third context considered is that of understanding major developments in the 
history of the United Kingdom during the period from 1907 to 1965 – and three 
major developments are now considered.56 
                                            
53
  ibid. 
54
  Rose and Karran (n 16) vii.  (Italics in original.) 
55
  ibid. 
56
  It is possible, of course, to enumerate other major developments in twentieth century British 
history.  In a recent history of Britain since 1900, Skidelsky referred to the collapse of Britain’s 
‘hard’ power; the increase in the prosperity of the British people; the stuttering economy; the 
unbroken preservation of the constitution; and the end of empire.  R Skidelsky, Britain Since 
1900: A Success Story? (London, Vintage Books, 2014) 2-3. 
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During the first half of the twentieth century, there was a major expansion of the 
activities carried on by central government.57  The night-watchman state of the 
nineteenth century was replaced by the welfare state of the twentieth century.  
(In this thesis the working definition of the welfare state offered by Marwick will 
be adopted.  The state which emerged in the 1940s was ‘one in which full 
community responsibility is assumed for four major sectors of social well-being: 
social security, which means provision against interruption of earnings through 
sickness, injury, old age, or unemployment; health; housing; and education’.)58  
A welfare state implied more government expenditure – and with a higher 
percentage of that expenditure being referable to social expenditure – than did 
a night-watchman state.  Such was the case.  In 1910, government expenditure 
on the social services was £89.1 millions (32.8% of total government 
expenditure).  In 1955, the corresponding figures were £2,739.0 millions and 
44.6%.59  It has been calculated that 3.1% of the gross domestic product was 
spent on social services in 1907, but 16.5% in 1964.60 
Explanations of the expansion of the activities carried on by central government 
have, as their foundation text, the study by Dicey entitled Lectures on the 
relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth 
Century first published in 1905.61  It was Dicey’s view that ‘the beliefs or 
                                            
57
  One work on social history from 1914 to 1945 opens its concluding chapter with the words 
‘What then were the most significant features of British society in the years between 1914 and 
1945?  One which certainly stands out is the widening role of government which, like some 
“new Leviathan”, was playing a greater part both in the running of the economy and the 
provision of social services’.  J Stevenson, British Society 1914-45 (originally published 1984, 
London, Penguin Group, 1990) 462. 
58
  Quoted in Stevenson (n 57) 296. 
59
  AT Peacock and J Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom (OUP 
1961) 82 and 86. 
60
  R Middleton, Government versus the Market: The growth of the public sector, economic 
management and British economic performance, c.1890-1979 (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 
1996) 91. 
61
  AV Dicey, Lectures on the relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the 
Nineteenth Century (London, Macmillan, 1905).  The passage quoted directly is at 9. 
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sentiments which, during the nineteenth century, have governed the 
development of the law have ... been public opinion’.  Dicey was also clear that, 
from at least 1830, if not before, the relationship between law and public opinion 
was very close.  If, therefore, there was legislation relevant for the growth of the 
state (and there was), Dicey’s views had the consequence that there must have 
been some current of public opinion favourable to that growth.  Dicey called that 
current of opinion ‘collectivism’; and mentioned the year 1865 as an opening 
date for what he called the period of collectivism. 
For many years Dicey’s explanation has been compared and contrasted with 
that of MacDonagh.  In an article published in 1958, MacDonagh put forward a 
five stage ‘model’ of what he described as a ‘legislative-cum-administrative 
process’.62  This model postulated that ‘internal dynamism’ played a crucial role 
in the growth of central government.  For example, the fourth stage of the 
process, as MacDonagh viewed it, witnessed the substitution of a dynamic, as 
opposed to a static concept of administration on the part of administrators, with 
improvement being seen ‘as a slow, uncertain process of closing loopholes and 
tightening the screw, ring by ring, in the light of continuing experience and 
experiment’.  In the fifth and final stage of the process, executive officers ‘now 
demanded, and to some extent secured, legislation which awarded them 
discretions not merely in the application of its clauses but even in imposing 
penalties and framing regulations’.  MacDonagh’s model implied that, once 
there had been legislation on a particular subject, there would be more 
legislation – and that, during this process, the powers of central government 
                                            
62
  O MacDonagh, ‘The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal’ (1958) 1 
Historical Journal, 52.  MacDonagh’s five stage model is set out at 58-61. 
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would grow.  ‘The momentum of government itself’ could be used to explain the 
process of government growth. 
A second major development in the history of the United Kingdom during the 
twentieth century was the growth of public expenditure.  Government 
expenditure at current prices increased from £272.0 millions in 1910 to £6,143.0 
millions in 1955 (and from £263.6 millions to £1,390.0 millions at 1900 prices).63  
It has been calculated that total public expenditure amounted to 10.9% of the 
gross domestic product in 1907, but 38.9% in 1964.
64
  This growth of public 
expenditure, however, did not take place at a steady and uniform rate.  Figure 
2, which shows the expenditure of public authorities as a percentage of the 
national income during the period from 1880 to 1954,65 indicates that, during 
each world war, public expenditure increased very rapidly, only to fall back after 
the war was over (although not to its pre-war level).66 
                                            
63
  Peacock and Wiseman (n 59) 42. 
64
  Middleton (n 60) 91. 
65
  This graph has been copied from AJP Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (OUP 1965) xxvii. 
The underlying figures are those in UK Hicks, British Public Finances: Their Structure and 
Development 1880-1952 (OUP 1954) 11.  
66
  For a graph showing total public expenditure as a percentage of domestic product from 1900 
to 1979 (with a pattern similar to that shown in Figure 2) see Middleton (n 60) 89. 
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Figure 2 
Expenditure of public authorities as a percentage of the national 
income:1880-1954 
 
 
Explanations of this growth of public expenditure have, as their foundation text, 
the study by Peacock and Wiseman entitled The Growth of Public Expenditure 
in the United Kingdom, which was published in 1961.67  In that work, the authors 
propounded the view that the two world wars had had what they called a 
‘displacement effect’.  Each world war caused government expenditure on a 
scale that was quite unprecedented.  After each war ended, government 
expenditure fell, but not to its pre-war level.  In the result, therefore, government 
expenditure was higher during the inter-war period than it had been in the years 
preceding the first world war, and was higher in the 1950s than it had been 
                                            
67
  Peacock and Wiseman (n 59). 
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during the inter-war period.  On this approach, therefore, the United Kingdom’s 
participation in the two world wars was of central importance for the growth of 
central government expenditure.  Figure 2 also shows quite clearly that public 
expenditure before the first world war was lower than during the inter-war 
period, which, in its turn, was lower than after the second world war. 
A third development in the history of the United Kingdom during the first half of 
the twentieth century was that the country participated in the two world wars.  
AJP Taylor commented that ‘[t]he British were the only people who went 
through both world wars from beginning to end’.68  That participation was costly.  
Government expenditure during the six years beginning with the outbreak of the 
first world war exceeded government expenditure during the period from the 
revolution of 1688 until that war’s outbreak.69  The extent of government 
expenditure during the two world wars may also be seen in Figure 2, where the 
impact of those two wars is exceedingly obvious. 
Participation in the total wars of the twentieth century had an impact not only 
upon the United Kingdom’s economy,70 but upon its government.  The contrast 
between wartime and peacetime was stressed by Sir Donald Fergusson, a 
senior civil servant, in a memorandum dating from 1950 with the title ‘The 
Essential Functions of Government in the Economic Field’ – an unexpectedly 
                                            
68
  Taylor (n 65) 600.  At 600 n 1, Taylor makes the necessary minor qualifications to his general 
statement. 
69
  Sir J Stamp, The Financial Aftermath of War (London, Ernest Benn, 1932) 41.  ‘It has been 
pointed out by one well-known American authority that our expenditure in six years exceeded 
the aggregate of our expenditure in the previous 226 years, which included eight major wars’.  
(Stamp did not name the ‘well-known American authority’.) 
70
  As far as the economy was concerned, Robbins argued, shortly after the second world war, 
that, in the circumstances of total war, private consumption, which was normally an end in itself 
so far as economics was concerned, was a matter of importance for operational reasons only.  
‘If the people are not in good health and good heart, the conduct of the war may be 
endangered.  But beyond that point, in this calculus of hell-fire and desperation, the value of 
additional private welfare is zero; direct operations claim everything’.  L Robbins, The Economic 
Problem in Peace and War (London, Macmillan, 1947) 47-8. 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
38 
 
general title for a civil service memorandum.  In that memorandum, Fergusson 
stated that ‘[t]he position in peace is ... totally different from that which existed 
during the war’.  In the war, he went on, there had been one main objective of 
government policy, namely, to win it: the country’s parliamentary constitution 
had been in abeyance; the national government had been given all possible 
powers for the sake of saving the country and winning the war; the War Cabinet 
had accepted full responsibility for all policies to that end, and departmental 
ministers had been merely executants doing what was regarded as necessary 
in their sphere for achieving or facilitating the main objective.  In peace, 
however, the situation was entirely different.  There was no one main objective 
of government policy.  Even in the sphere concerned with, or affected by, 
economic policies, there were many objectives – often conflicting objectives – 
and many different ideas about which were the main objectives.  The position of 
Parliament had been restored and the country was back to party government.71 
Although the proposition that war brought rapid change in government may only 
have been implicit in Fergusson’s memorandum, that proposition was explicitly 
accepted by others.  Seebohm Rowntree, writing in 1918, thought that, as a 
result of the first world war, people had completely revised their notions as to 
what was possible or impossible.  They had seen accomplished, within a few 
                                            
71
  TNA file T 273/188.  Memorandum by Fergusson, ‘The Essential Functions of Government in 
the Economic Field’, 27 June 1950.  Whether accidentally or not, Fergusson’s argument has 
some similarities with points made earlier by Robbins: ‘[i]n total war there is only one prime 
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characteristic of the wars of other times, are inappropriate here.  Total war is a matter of death 
or victory.  It is the nature of the case that there is no intermediate position’.  Robbins (n 70) 47.  
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total war and we did not’.  Quoted in WH Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition: Volume 1: 
The Rise of Collectivism (London, Methuen, 1983) 63. 
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brief months or years, reforms to which they should previously have assigned, 
not decades, but generations.72  Beveridge, in a lecture delivered in 1919, 
believed that ‘[t]he work to be done by the Civil Service was entirely 
transformed during the war by the wide extension in the scope of government 
action’.  Government departments had not merely done more things of the 
same general class as before the war; they had been required to take the 
initiative in finance and trading.  ‘We have, indeed, under the stress of war 
made practical discoveries in the art of government almost comparable to the 
immense discoveries made at the same time in the art of flying’.73 
The United Kingdom’s participation in the two world wars accordingly prompts 
consideration of the functions and priorities of government; and, on this matter, 
an article by Rose was published in 1976.74  Rose began by asking what 
activities were, by definition, necessary if a modern state was to be said to exist.  
Once this question had been dealt with, it was then possible to ask what else 
states actually did besides ensuring their own existence.  Rose answered his 
own first question by saying that three clusters of activity were necessary by 
definition for the existence of a state: (first) defence of territorial integrity, 
whether by diplomacy or armed force; (secondly) the maintenance of internal 
order; and (thirdly) the mobilising of finance (including, obviously, taxation) – for 
a state needed to have resources to take action.  Rose then went on to propose 
a simple model of the evolution of the modern European state, with three stages 
of development.  In the first stage, the state sought to secure its own existence 
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  J Stevenson, ‘Planners’ moon? The Second World War and the planning movement’ in HL 
Smith (ed), War and Social Change: British Society in the Second World War (Manchester UP, 
1986) 60.  Rowntree then added that ‘I do not believe for a moment that in the future we shall 
allow millions of our fellow-countrymen, through no fault of their own, to pass through life ill-
housed, ill-clothed, ill-fed, ill-educated’. (ibid.) 
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  Sir W Beveridge, The Public Service in War & in Peace (London, Constable, 1920) 4-5. 
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  R Rose, ‘On the Priorities of Government: A Developmental Analysis of Public Policies’ 
(1976) 4 European Journal of Political Research 247. 
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through the creation of institutions of government that could defend its territorial 
integrity, maintain internal order, and manage its finances.  Once this had been 
done, it was open to the state to engage in other activities; and in Rose’s 
second stage, the state was concerned with resource mobilisation.  The state 
was well-placed to engage in activities such as building canals, roads and 
railways, or creating a postal and telegraphic service.  In Rose’s third stage, a 
state began to emphasize activities intended to provide social benefits for the 
sake of its citizens.  This shift from a producer orientation to a consumer 
orientation, concerned with the well-being of citizens, might follow from the 
achievement of greatly increased political influence by the mass of the 
population following extensions of the franchise.  As citizens acquired the right 
to vote, and voiced demands for government action, they might be expected to 
use their influence to press politicians to use the resources that could now be 
mobilised to benefit them – by providing social benefits, free education, health 
care and full employment (a welfare state).  At this stage, politics ceased to be 
concerned with the survival of the state or its glorification, but rather with the 
distribution and redistribution of benefits to citizens through the powerful 
institutions of the state. 
4. State of scholarship  
‘Statute law is now the predominant feature of law in all parts of the United 
Kingdom’, Lord Hailsham wrote on one occasion, ‘and any critical examination 
of the form, as well as of the contents, of statutes can only assist both 
legislators and users and ultimately the administration of justice’.75  The period 
from 1907 to 1965 was a most important period in the history of the income tax 
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  Lord Hailsham, ‘A Message’ [1985] Statute Law Review 1.  It has also been said that 
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– but the history of income tax during that period has been studied only to a 
limited extent.76  The enactment of different forms of legislation is also a subject 
that has been little studied.  This thesis accordingly investigates a little-studied 
question in the context of an important subject during an important period of its 
history. 
Works relating to taxation do not deal directly with the matter investigated in this 
thesis.  The one and only history of income tax was written by Sabine fifty years 
ago;
77
 and that history covers the whole of the period from the introduction of 
the tax until what was then the present.  It may be conjectured that the later 
chapters, dealing with the twentieth century, were written more hurriedly than 
the earlier chapters; and that the author, then a serving member of the Inland 
Revenue, skated over inconvenient matters – in particular the failure to enact 
the Revenue Bill of 1921 and the failure to deal with the report of the Income 
Tax Codification Committee in 1936.  The two volumes by Daunton are 
fundamental.78  The focus in those volumes, however, is not the same as in this 
thesis.  The subtitles of Daunton’s two volumes, ‘The Politics of Taxation in 
Britain’, indicate the scope of those works: the focus is on taxation as a whole 
(and not just income tax) and upon the politics of taxation (and not on the form 
taken by legislation on the subject).  There are also, following on from the work 
of Buxton,79 four volumes on British Budgets, first by Mallet and George, and 
then, later and separately, by Sabine:80 but it is only rarely that these works 
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contain any remarks going beyond an account of the Budget and Finance Bill 
cycle for each financial year reviewed.  Stebbings’s work on the Victorian 
taxpayer contains valuable material on the early part of the twentieth century81 
and Sayers has provided a valuable account of the introduction of the PAYE 
system:82 but otherwise there are few studies dealing with the history of taxation 
which contain material relevant for the investigation carried out in this thesis. 
Studies of aspects of the law contain material of great value for two of the topics 
investigated.  The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel is a subject that is 
(perhaps surprisingly) well covered: for at various times during the twentieth 
century, a considerable number of the Parliamentary Counsel either wrote 
books or delivered addresses which were subsequently printed.  There is 
material from Ilbert,83 Graham-Harrison,84 Ram,85 and Hutton.86  This published 
material is of very great value for the composition of this office; for the office’s 
approach to its work; and for the general condition of the statute book.  (The 
expression ‘statute book’ is used in this thesis to denote the statute law enacted 
at any one particular time.)87  On the other hand, this published material has no 
particular concern with the legislation relating to income tax or why one form of 
                                                                                                                              
Mallet and CO George, British Budgets, Third Series, 1921-22 to 1932-33 (London, Macmillan, 
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University of London Press, 1912); The Mechanics of Law Making (New York, Columbia Press, 
1914) (based on lectures delivered at Columbia University during October 1913). 
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  Sir WM Graham-Harrison, ‘An examination of the main criticisms of the statute book and of 
the possibility of improvement’ [1935] Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 9. 
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  Sir G Ram, ‘The Improvement of the Statute Book’ [1951] Journal of the Society of Public 
Teachers of Law 442. 
86
  Sir N Hutton, ‘Mechanics of Law Reform’ (1961) 24 Modern Law Review 18. 
87
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that legislation might be preferred to another.  The topic of subordinate 
legislation has also been the subject of considerable scholarship.  The history of 
the use of this form (and of the controversy relating to its use) has been very 
fully charted by Greenleaf and Taggart.88  There are also detailed monographs 
on aspects of this subject.89  However, subordinate legislation is only one of the 
forms of legislation investigated in this thesis; and none of these works has any 
particular concern with subordinate legislation relating to income tax. 
More general works relating to legal history, however, have been found less 
helpful.  The work most directly relevant for the matters investigated in this 
thesis is that by Hughes entitled The British Statute Book, which appeared in 
1957.90  This work has information on the various different forms of legislation, 
but nothing systematic on the forces that might cause some forms to be used to 
a greater extent than others.  Hughes, in his turn, began with the statement that 
there was only one recent work on this subject: Ilbert’s work Legislative 
Methods and Forms – and that had appeared more than half a century earlier.  
The substance of Ilbert’s book, Hughes also noted, had been embodied, in an 
altered form, in one of the volumes of Holdsworth’s History of English Law.91  
Plucknett’s Concise History of the Common Law contains the statement that 
‘[f]ew topics in legal history are more interesting than the rise and progress of 
legislation’; but the chapter in that work devoted to legislation does not mention 
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any date later than 1823.92  It has been said that ‘quite simply, English legal 
history scholarship has tended to run out by the end of the nineteenth 
century’.93  Manchester’s work on legal history contains hardly any material on 
statute law in the twentieth century and none on statute law relating to income 
tax.94  The work by Cornish and Clark on law and society in England from 1750 
to 1950 is described by its authors (in one place) as dealing with ‘the history of 
substantive law and legal practice’ and (in another place) as dealing with ‘the 
history of legal institutions and doctrines within the economy and society which 
generated them’95 – and was also found to contain nothing directly relevant.  
The same was also found to hold true for the volumes of the Oxford History of 
the Laws of England dealing with the period ending in 1914.96 
Works relating to the history of the United Kingdom during the twentieth century 
were also found to have little material that was directly relevant.  Works on 
broad themes have many other matters to consider of course; but, even so, little 
material was found that was capable of being directly used.  This was found to 
hold good for general histories, such as Taylor’s classic volume;97 for general 
works on economic history, such as another work by Daunton;98 for general 
histories of the civil service, such as the recent major work by Lowe;99 for works 
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on the coming of the welfare state, such as that by Thane;100 and for works on 
the growth of the public sector, such as that by Middleton.101  Another work 
which promises much, but unfortunately delivers little, is Cronin’s work on the 
politics of state expansion.102  Cronin wrote that the expansion of the state was 
one of the grand themes of twentieth-century British history, but that the 
process of expansion had for the most part escaped serious analysis; and 
described the purpose of his own work as being to focus directly on this 
transformation and to see what forces and interests shaped it, propelled it 
forward, delayed, deflected or occasionally reversed it.103  Cronin clearly held 
the view that the United Kingdom’s participation in the two world wars was of 
great importance when considering the expansion of the state;104 but, beyond 
this point, it cannot be said that he had any real success in accomplishing his 
own overall purpose.  It is often difficult to relate specific matters discussed to 
the overall purpose of the work; and the narrative framework adopted for the 
book may well have been unsuited for directing attention to the forces and 
interests accomplishing the transformation. 
5. Methodology 
The investigation undertaken was principally carried out by research in the 
National Archives, although printed primary material and printed secondary 
material were also used extensively.  The value of relying on the public records 
has, however, been questioned.  In an article appearing in 1979, Booth and 
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Glynn were critical of the value of the public records as a source for 
historians.105  The authors pointed out that the public records were incomplete; 
and that, as a source, they were not neutral.  Others, however, notably 
Roper,106 Cox,107 McDonald108 and Lowe,109 have been prepared to reach a 
more positive overall verdict.  It must be accepted, however, that the use of 
official records is not without its problems: and, following Lowe, it is useful to 
draw a distinction between problems of size and problems of judgment.  
The size of the documentation in existence gives rise to a fundamental problem 
for historians – ‘the oceans of evidence threatening to engulf them’.110  During 
the 1980s it was estimated that, at that time, the Public Record Office received 
a little less than one mile of paper each year from the government.111  This 
immense amount of material was nevertheless only a small fraction of the 
material once existing.  During the 1980s it was also estimated that, at that time, 
the British government produced about 100 miles of paper each year: so, on 
that basis, less than 1% of what was being produced was being retained.112  
The possibility that there are documents dealing with a particular point in 
material that no longer exists must accordingly be kept in mind.  It is sometimes 
possible to infer the existence of such material.  It may be inferred, for example, 
that, following the publication, in 1936, of the report produced by the Income 
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Tax Codification Committee,113 the Inland Revenue created files for the 
comments made on that report by various bodies – but there is now no trace of 
files with the references specified.114  
Very occasionally, the disappearance or survival of material is particularly 
noted: and, if this happens, a point which is far from obvious may be brought 
into focus.  An Inland Revenue file relating to the legislation enacted in 
connection with the introduction of the PAYE scheme has a prefatory page 
stating that ‘[t]he greater part of the papers dealing with the development of the 
P.A.Y.E. scheme could not be found after the 1944 air attacks’.115  From one 
point of view, this remark may be considered baffling: for there is a very 
considerable amount of useful material relating to the development of the PAYE 
scheme in the National Archives.  The working hypothesis reached was that the 
missing material consisted of the working files of Paul Chambers, the Inland 
Revenue official principally responsible for dealing with the operational aspects 
of the proposed PAYE scheme.  If that is so, however, it must be borne in mind 
that Chambers’s activities may well have been more important than the 
surviving records disclose.  A different collection of Inland Revenue files, 
relating to the preparation of the Income Tax Management Act 1964, includes a 
typed note at the top of one part of this collection recording that this part had 
been supplied by the Office of the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, and 
formed one complete set of all the papers relating to the Income Tax 
Management Bill which the Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Alan Green) 
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had received.116   It was thought that there was some point in keeping those 
papers together, and placing them with the department’s own records, even 
though this entailed overlapping in the documents retained.  These further 
papers reveal that Green played a major role in the series of events that caused 
the Income Tax Management Bill to be included in the government’s legislative 
programme – and so to be enacted.  The extent of Green’s role might not 
otherwise be capable of being known.117 
Some matters of interest may never have been committed to writing.  While he 
was Prime Minister, Attlee commissioned Bridges and Plowden to sound out 
various cabinet ministers on their choice for the post of Chancellor of the 
Exchequer if Cripps had to stand down.  When the discussions had been 
completed, Bridges said to Plowden that the kind of talks they had been having 
with ministers in the last few days were an example of why no civil servant 
should ever keep a diary.  ‘The temptation to publish eventually would be too 
great and the result, the destruction of trust between civil servants and 
ministers’.118 
Problems of judgment arise because a particular document (a paper presented 
to the Cabinet for example) may reflect the contributions of several different 
government departments and negotiations among those departments.  A 
document with a single author, by contrast, may reflect the view of the relevant 
government minister, the relevant department or the official in question – or any 
combination of the three.  It should also be remembered that the surviving 
documents may not give a complete account of the circumstances in which they 
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came into existence.  One civil servant, at work during the inter-war period, 
recorded that little business of difficulty or importance was settled by official 
letters from one department to another: the real work of government and 
administration was done by word of mouth – sometimes by telephone, more 
often by interview.  Official letters, sometimes lengthy ones, were in fact written; 
but in most cases they were written as a matter of record, and merely set down 
in black and white for the benefit of future generations what had already been 
settled by oral discussion.  ‘The idea that Government Offices do their business 
by long official letters to one another is now completely wrong, if it ever was 
right’.119 
Problems of size and judgment certainly exist.  However, bearing in mind that 
the subject studied in this thesis was one where the primacy of government not 
only existed but was exceptionally pronounced, the view taken is that the 
existence of these problems does not displace – indeed cannot displace – the 
value of studying the subject from the original working papers of government as 
it conducted its business.  In McDonald’s opinion, the doubts of Booth and 
Glynn should be measured against the work of scholars who had shown that 
the exploration of departmental archives could yield enlightening accounts of 
the development of policy.120  The quality of those departmental records was 
uneven, but many provided a wealth of evidence on the preparation of policies, 
their discussion within and across departmental boundaries, their submission to 
ministers and their presentation to Cabinet.  McDonald went on to add that 
opportunities for the study of policy formulation through research on 
departmental records were continually expanding; and gave as an example the 
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fact that, between 1977 and 1990, both the Board of Inland Revenue’s Budget 
papers from 1869 to 1959121 and nearly 8,500 files of the Board of Inland 
Revenue’s Stamps and Taxes Division122 had been transferred to the National 
Archives.  His conclusion was that ‘[u]sed critically and in conjunction with non-
governmental sources, these records hold out the prospect of an improved 
understanding of British taxation policy’.123  McDonald also recorded that the 
papers of Sir Edward Bridges constituted ‘an indispensable source for research 
on the conduct of high policy in the Cabinet Office and the Treasury from 1939 
to 1956’; and that those papers were also now available to be consulted in the 
National Archives.124  It may now be added that the papers of the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel have recently been transferred to the National Archives 
where many of them are now available – with the consequence that it has 
become much easier to study the role played by that office.125  The 
ascertainment of the determinants of the forms of income tax legislation from 
the original working papers of government may indeed be a task that presents 
problems – but it is also a task that presents opportunities. 
6. An analysis of the United Kingdom polity 
It was stated earlier126 that the elements of the United Kingdom polity 
investigated in the body of this thesis followed on from an analysis of the polity; 
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and that analysis is now presented.  The imposition of taxation is considered; 
and then the role played by different elements in the United Kingdom polity. 
During the period from 1907 to 1965, the imposition of taxation, a matter of 
fundamental constitutional importance, took place in accordance with matters 
that were very firmly settled.  Following the constitutional conflicts of the 
seventeenth century, a first matter that had become very firmly settled, well 
before the twentieth century, was that the legal basis of the right to tax and the 
liability to pay was Parliamentary authority.  The right to tax could not be 
imposed on any other basis.  The Bill of Rights 1689 had declared that ‘levying 
money for or to the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, without grant 
of parliament, for longer time, or in other manner than the same is or shall be 
granted, is illegal’.127  A second matter that had become very firmly settled, well 
before the twentieth century, was that, within Parliament, the primary role in the 
imposition of taxation was that taken by the House of Commons.  ‘The most 
important power vested in any branch of the legislature’, Erskine May wrote in 
his treatise on Parliament, ‘is the right of imposing taxes upon the people, and 
of voting money for the exigencies of the public service’.128  A later edition of 
this treatise then went on to note that the exercise of this right by the Commons 
might be said ‘to give to the Commons the chief authority in the state’.  ‘In all 
countries the public purse is one of the chief instruments of political power’; but 
in England ‘the power of giving or withholding the supplies at pleasure is one of 
                                            
127
  1 Will & M Sess 2 c 2. 
128
  Quoted from Sir TE May, A Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of 
Parliament (7th edn, London, 1873) by V Cromwell, ‘The Losing of the Initiative by the House of 
Commons, 1780-1914’ (1968) 18 Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 1, 20, and 20 n 1.  
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absolute supremacy’.129  A proposal affecting public finance had to be 
introduced in the House of Commons – this was part of the custom of 
Parliament, and one of the privileges of the Commons.130  A third matter that 
had become very firmly settled, well before the twentieth century, was that, 
within the House of Commons, the initiative in financial matters rested with the 
Crown.  Any proposal for a ‘charge’ could not be taken into consideration unless 
demanded by the Crown or recommended by the Crown.  This rule, first 
embodied in a standing order of the House of Commons in 1713,131 preserved 
to Ministers of the Crown a virtual monopoly of the parliamentary initiative in 
proposing increases in taxation or in public expenditure.  ‘On common subjects’, 
wrote Bagehot, ‘any member can propose anything, but not on money – the 
Minister alone can propose to tax the people’.132  The imposition of taxation, it 
may be noted, although taking place in accordance with very firmly settled 
principles, did not depend upon law alone.  The subject of the financial control 
exercised by the House of Commons, according to Jennings, was ‘a realm 
where law, parliamentary privilege, and parliamentary custom are almost 
inextricably intertwined’.133 
The process by which taxation was imposed was referred to in the judgment of 
Atkin LJ in A-G v Wilts United Dairies Ltd.134  After quoting the relevant passage 
from the Bill of Rights, Atkin LJ went on to say that: 
                                            
129
  Lord Campion (ed), Sir Thomas Erskine May’s Treatise on the Law, Privileges Proceedings 
and Usage of Parliament (15th edn, London, Butterworth & Co, 1950), 39.  The passage quoted 
from the 7th edn (n 128) also appears on this same page. 
130
  In the monarch’s speech on the opening, prorogation or dissolution of Parliament, the 
Commons were separately addressed when estimates or supply were mentioned. 
131
  There is an account of this rule in G Reid, The Politics of Financial Control (London, 
Hutchinson, 1966) 36-41. 
132
  W Bagehot, The English Constitution (London, Chapman and Hall, 1867) 170. 
133
  WI Jennings, Parliament (CUP 1939) 282. 
134
  A-G v Wilts United Dairies Ltd (1921) 37 TLR 884 (CA).  The passage quoted directly is at 
886.  
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Though the attention of our ancestors was directed especially to 
abuses of the prerogative, there can be no doubt that this statute 
declares the law that no money shall be levied for or to the use of 
the Crown except by grant of Parliament.  We know how strictly 
Parliament has maintained this right – and, in particular, how 
jealously the House of Commons has asserted its predominance 
in the power of raising money.  An elaborate custom of Parliament 
has prevailed by which money for the service of the Crown is only 
granted at the request of the Crown made by a responsible 
minister and assented to by a resolution of the House in 
Committee. 
The imposition of taxation, therefore, was a process in which a number of 
different elements within the United Kingdom polity played different roles.  It 
was also a process that involved the enactment of legislation – necessarily 
taking one of the forms distinguished earlier.135  The investigation of the 
determinants of the forms of income tax legislation carried out in the body of this 
thesis has accordingly been conducted by reference to different elements within 
the United Kingdom polity. 
The elements that will be investigated are consequent upon an analysis of the 
constitution of the United Kingdom as it operated during the first half of the 
twentieth century.  The analysis follows that made by Amery136 in his lectures, 
published in 1947, with the title Thoughts on the Constitution.137  In King’s later 
book on The British Constitution, Amery was one of the six writers described as 
‘the Canonical Sextet’.138 
                                            
135
  See section 2 above. 
136
  LS Amery (1873-1955) was an MP from 1911 to 1945.  He was First Lord of the Admiralty 
from 1922 to 1924, Colonial Secretary from 1924 to 1929 and Secretary of State for India from 
1940 to 1945. 
137
  LS Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution (OUP 1947).  Amery’s book consists of four 
lectures; but it is the first lecture which is of particular relevance for the purposes of this thesis.  
‘I take this opportunity of acknowledging my debt to this brilliant analysis’ JAG Griffith, ‘The 
Constitutional Significance of Delegated Legislation in England’ (1950) 48 Michigan Law Review 
1079, 1081 n 5. 
138
  A King, The British Constitution (OUP 2007) ch 2, and especially 28-31.  (The other 
members of ‘the Canonical Sextet’ were Walter Bagehot, AV Dicey, Sidney Low, Harold Laski 
and Ivor Jennings.) 
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The proposition at the core of Amery’s analysis was that the United Kingdom’s 
constitutional arrangements should be understood in terms of a dialogue, taking 
place in Parliament, between the ‘government’ and the ‘nation’: 
Our constitution is still, at bottom, based on a continuous parley or 
conference in Parliament between the Crown, i.e. the Government 
as the directing and energizing element, and the representatives 
of the Nation whose assent and acquiescence are essential and 
are only to be secured by full discussion.  ...  The combination of 
responsible leadership by government with responsible criticism in 
Parliament is the essence of our Constitution.139 
Amery believed that the key to the United Kingdom’s constitutional evolution 
was to be found in the interaction between the Crown (the central governing, 
directing, and initiating element in the national life) and the nation in its various 
‘estates’ (its classes and communities) as the guardian of its written and 
unwritten laws and customs.140  In Amery’s view, however, government and 
Parliament, although closely intertwined, were still separate and independent 
entities, fulfilling two distinct functions: leadership, direction and command on 
the part of government; and critical discussion and examination on the part of 
Parliament.141  According to Sir Edward Boyle, a Cabinet Minister during the 
early 1960s, ‘the most important distinction in our whole national political 
system is the distinction between the Government and the non-Government’.142  
More recently, Tomkins has argued that ‘far from being based on a separation 
of powers between legislature, executive, and judiciary, to the extent that there 
is a separation of powers in English public law it is a separation between the 
Crown on the one hand, and Parliament on the other’.143 
                                            
139
  Amery (n 137) 10 and 32. 
140
  ibid 10.  This proposition was quoted with approval in Lord Boothby, My Yesterday, Your 
Tomorrow (London, Hutchinson, 1962) 16. 
141
  Amery (n 137) 10 and 28. 
142
  Sir E Boyle, ‘Who are the Policy Makers?’ (1965) 43 Public Administration 251, 255. 
143
  A Tomkins, Public Law (OUP 2003) 44. 
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It was Amery’s view that, of the two elements he had distinguished, the 
‘government’ was more important than the ‘nation’: for he considered that the 
starting-point and mainspring of action had always been the government.  It was 
the government which, in the name of the Crown, made appointments and 
conferred honours without consulting Parliament; and it was the government 
which, in the name of the Crown, summoned Parliament.  ‘Our whole political 
life, in fact, turns round the issue of government’.144  This view had implications 
for the legislative process: for Amery considered that the function of legislation, 
while shared between ‘King, Lords and Commons in Parliament assembled’, 
had always been predominantly exercised by government.  It was the 
government that settled the programme of parliamentary business and directed 
Parliament with a view to ensuring that the programme was secured.  
Government, indeed, ‘has never allowed Parliament as such to take any 
initiative in one of its most important fields, that of finance’.145  The working 
hypothesis arising, therefore, is that, in the case of the form of the income tax 
legislation, the primacy of ‘government’ over ‘nation’ was particularly 
pronounced.   
A primacy of ‘government’ over ‘nation’ did not go unnoticed by others.  In 1901, 
it was the opinion of Sir Courtenay Ilbert, that ‘[t]he Executive Government of 
the United Kingdom exercises greater control over legislation than probably the 
Executive Government of any other country with representative institutions’.146  
In a work first published in 1938, Keir believed that ‘an extended executive, able 
to make, enforce, and interpret law, has come into being, under imperfect 
                                            
144
  Amery (n 137) 15 and 16. 
145
  ibid 12. 
146
  Sir C Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms (n 83) 209.  Ilbert was First Parliamentary 
Counsel from 1899 to 1902. 
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parliamentary and judicial control’.147  Yardley, writing some 30 years later, and 
having noted that the ‘most striking peculiarity’ of the English system of 
government, when compared with a Presidential system (in a country such as 
the United States of America), was ‘that Parliament and the Executive are inter-
dependent’, went on to say that ‘the overall picture is one of a genuine primacy 
of the Executive in England’.148  More recently, Hennessy considered that the 
twentieth century ‘has belonged to the executive, not the legislature.  Ours is 
very much the executive’s Constitution’.  He took the view that ‘the central 
feature’, in relation to the role played by Parliament within the British 
Constitution since 1902 (when Balfour consolidated the reforms made to the 
procedure of the House of Commons during the late nineteenth century), ‘is that 
the century has belonged to the executive.  Everything else is overshadowed by 
that fact’.149 
It was also Amery’s view that government, in its turn, should be understood in 
terms of two components: a permanent administrative element (the civil service) 
and a temporary directing element (political ministers).  Immediately after 
reaching the point that government and Parliament were still separate and 
independent entities fulfilling distinct functions, Amery went on to consider the 
continuity of government.  This was maintained in substance by the fact that the 
vast majority of the servants of the Crown carried on their duties permanently.  
A change of government (so called) was, in fact, ‘only a change in that small, if 
                                            
147
  DL Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain 1485-1937 (London, Adam and 
Charles Black, 1938) 520. 
148
  DCM Yardley, ‘The Primacy of the Executive in England’ (1967-68) 21 Parliamentary Affairs 
155, 155 and 157. 
149
  P Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring: Unearthing the British Constitution (London, Victor 
Gollancz, 1995) 142 and 146. 
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important, element which is required to direct the general policy, while securing 
for it parliamentary and public support or at least acquiescence’.150 
Amery also made the point that the ‘permanent’ element in government – the 
civil service – might be compared with a fleet of ships, with an individual 
department being regarded as one such separate ship.  After quoting another 
author,151 who had stated that a change of government meant that the ‘vessel of 
state’ was entrusted to other hands and proceeded on a different course, but 
that it was essential to the success of the operation both that the crew should 
be skilled in their work and that they should render due obedience to their 
commander for the time being, whoever he might be, Amery went on, in a 
striking passage which throws much light on the working of government, to say 
that: 
The parallel perhaps, suggests a much greater freedom than does 
in fact exist to change the ship’s course – or, rather, the course of 
a fleet composed of a number of separate ships.  Each of our 
great departments of State has its own tradition and policy, 
founded on long experience.  Its crew has an accumulated 
knowledge ... by which a new captain is inevitably guided.  It has 
its own private cargoes and destinations152 which a new captain 
soon tends to make his own and to advocate with vigour and 
conviction at the captains’ conference.  It may have projects for 
which the last captain could not secure that conference’s assent 
and may return to the charge with better hope.  In any case, by far 
the greater part of the field of administration, and even of policy, is 
governed by factors which cannot be changed by party theories or 
prepossessions ... .153 
                                            
150
  Amery (n 137) 28-9.  For a seminal article on the civil service during the inter-war period see 
M Beloff, ‘The Whitehall Factor: The Role of the Higher Civil Service 1919-1939’ in G Peele and 
C Cook (eds), The Politics of Reappraisal (London, Macmillan, 1975). 
151
  At this point Amery identifies this other author only as ‘Hearn’; but it may be inferred from 
other references provided in the first chapter of Amery’s work that the work in question was WE 
Hearn, The Government of England (London, Longmans, 1867). 
152
  The ‘private cargoes and destinations’ of the Inland Revenue and of the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel appear below, in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. 
153
  Amery (n 137) 28-9.  Lord Salter, writing of the period before the first world war, made a 
different comparison.  Civil Service departments were such that the service, as a whole, ‘was 
like a University with separate Colleges as in Oxford or Cambridge, as distinct from an 
integrated University like Manchester – without even the measure of unity that is given in the 
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On Amery’s analysis, therefore, the constitution of the United Kingdom 
depended upon a continuous conference in Parliament between ‘government’ 
and ‘nation’.  In this conference ‘government’ was the more important element; 
and government, in its turn, also had two components: political ministers and 
the civil service. 
The structure of this thesis follows this analysis.  Chapter 2 has the continuous 
conference in Parliament as its background; and investigates whether the need 
to enact primary legislation relating to income tax in Parliament affected the 
form of the income tax legislation.  The next three chapters deal with three of 
the elements within ‘government’ as determinants of the form of income tax 
legislation.  Chapter 3 is concerned with the Inland Revenue: the department 
with the responsibility for administering income tax.  Chapter 4 is concerned 
with the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel: the office responsible for drafting 
government primary legislation in general, and primary legislation relating to 
income tax in particular.  Chapter 5 is concerned with government ministers.  In 
each case, in order to show the extent to which each of these elements 
determined the form of income tax legislation, the same three questions are 
addressed: the extent to which that element was capable of determining the 
form of income tax legislation; the extent to which that element wished to 
determine that form; and the extent to which that element succeeded in 
accomplishing such aims as it may have had.  Chapter 6 turns from the 
‘government’ to the ‘nation’ and investigates determinants of the form of the 
income tax legislation that existed outside government.  Chapter 7 then 
investigates the limited, but appreciable, role played by subordinate legislation.  
                                                                                                                              
former case by University Professors and institutions’.  Lord Salter, Memoirs of a Public Servant 
(London, Faber and Faber, 1961) 37. 
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Chapter 8, the final Chapter, then draws conclusions from the evidence 
presented in the body of the thesis to demonstrate how the research aim has 
been achieved. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CONSTRAINT OF INSUFFICIENT PARLIAMENTARY 
TIME 
‘Legislation may not be the only function of Parliament, but only in 
Parliament can legislation be enacted’.154 
 
Introduction 
Amery took the view that the essence of the United Kingdom’s constitution was 
based on the balance and adjustment between the two elements of government 
and nation.155  The arena in which the two conducted their continuous parley or 
conference was Parliament; and, in particular, in the House of Commons ‘the 
central and predominant element in the parliamentary system, the point of 
junction between the Government and a politically organized nation, the pivot of 
our system of responsible government’.156  The government of the day carried 
on its work of administration and legislation in Parliament subject to the advice 
and criticism of the nation’s representatives.157 
The aim of this chapter is to ascertain whether the need to enact primary 
legislation relating to income tax in Parliament affected the form of the income 
tax legislation.  In order to achieve this aim, two questions will be addressed: 
whether all the primary legislation relating to income tax that the government 
wished to see enacted could be enacted; and whether, when decisions had to 
be taken about the enactment of legislation, some forms of income tax 
legislation were better placed for use than others. 
1. The overall constraint of insufficient parliamentary time 
                                            
154
  Viscount Blakenham speaking in the House of Lords during January 1964.  (HL Deb 15 
January 1964, vol 254, col 693.) 
155
  LS Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution (OUP 1947) 33. 
156
  ibid 68. 
157
  ibid 33. 
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All primary legislation had to be enacted in Parliament; and Parliament had its 
own procedure by which primary legislation had to be enacted.158  Compliance 
with the requirements of parliamentary procedure, therefore, constituted an all-
important sufficient condition before primary legislation on any subject (including 
income tax) could be enacted.  The expression ‘parliamentary procedure’ will be 
used to mean the rules regulating the conduct of business in the two Houses of 
Parliament.159 
Parliamentary procedure was of great antiquity.  A major work on the procedure 
of the House of Commons, written over a century ago, stated in its opening 
sentence that ‘[n]o writer upon the historic procedure of the House of Commons 
can fail to point out its most striking feature – the great antiquity of the forms 
and rules on which it is based’.160  The procedure on a Bill, for example, with its 
three ‘readings’, was already in existence before 1547, when the House of 
Commons began to record its proceedings in its Journals;161 and the practice of 
three readings for a Bill, with no debate on the first reading, and the committee 
and report stages taking place after second reading, has been said to be ‘more 
or less established’ by the end of the reign of Elizabeth I.162  ‘The Parliament at 
                                            
158
  On the subject of parliamentary procedure see generally Sir Thomas Erskine May: A 
Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament (various editions since 
1844); Lord Campion, ‘Parliamentary procedure, old and new’ in Lord Campion (ed), 
Parliament: A Survey (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1952); and P Norton, ‘Parliamentary 
Procedure: The Hidden Power?’ in D Butler, V Bogdanor and R Summers (eds), The Law, 
Politics and the Constitution: Essays in Honour of Geoffrey Marshall (OUP 1999). 
159
  This is the opening statement made in DM Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law (OUP 
1980) 1002 (entry for ‘Procedure, parliamentary’).  A Clerk of the House of Commons stated 
(parenthetically) that the procedure of that House consisted of ‘the methods and machinery by 
which the House carries out its functions’. (Campion (n 158) 141.)  (Sir Gilbert Campion was 
Clerk of the House of Commons from 1937 to 1948.  He subsequently became Lord Campion.)  
It has also been said that procedures ‘comprise those rules and mechanisms that the House [of 
Commons] utilizes to process its business’.  (Norton (n 158) 161.) 
160
  J Redlich, The Procedure of the House of Commons (London, Constable, 1908) vol 1, 3. 
161
  Campion (n 158) 142. 
162
  JE Neale, The Elizabethan House of Commons (London, Jonathan Cape, 1949) 369. 
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Westminster is not only a busy workshop; it is a museum of antiquities’ Sir 
Courtenay Ilbert wrote near the beginning of the twentieth century.163 
Since parliamentary procedure was of great antiquity, it was also deeply 
entrenched and difficult to change.  This was the case for parliamentary 
procedure in general; it was also the case for the financial procedures of the 
House of Commons in particular.164  The two committees of the whole House of 
Commons dealing with financial matters were both established by the early 
seventeenth century;
165
 and, in that House, the three standing orders with the 
longest histories all found their first expression early in the eighteenth century.  
All three related to finance.  All other standing orders (and there were 114 other 
standing orders in the mid 1960s) had an origin later than 1832.166  In 1960, in 
the context of a standing order in force since 1707 and relating to financial 
procedures, the leader of the House of Commons (Butler) warned that ‘if we 
were to depart unduly from these guardrails and these sorts of guides ... which 
have guided and looked after the liberties of our ancestors, we should be 
making a mistake’.167 
The great antiquity of parliamentary procedure also reflected the history of 
Parliament itself.  The formative period of parliamentary practice, it has been 
said, was the first half of the seventeenth century, when the majority of the 
House of Commons had been in chronic opposition to Charles I.
168
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  In his preface to Redlich (n 160) vol 1, vi. 
164
  On the subject of parliamentary procedure relevant for financial legislation see generally G 
Reid, The Politics of Financial Control (London, Hutchinson, 1966) and M Ryle, ‘Supply and 
other financial procedures’ in SA Walkland (ed), The House of Commons in the Twentieth 
Century (OUP 1979). 
165
  Campion (n 158) 142.  The two committees were the Committee of Ways and Means and 
the Committee of Supply. 
166
  Reid (n 164) 20. 
167
  HC Deb 8 February 1960, vol 617, col 44. 
168
  Campion (n 158) 142. 
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Parliamentary procedure, during that period, had acquired the characteristics of 
‘the procedure of the opposition’; and those characteristics had been 
permanently retained.  The traditional procedure was leisurely, ceremonious 
and cumbersome; it was individualistic, giving wide scope to the initiative of 
MPs; and it was designed to protect the rights of minorities in debate and to 
encourage opposition to the executive.169  In terms of the basic distinction 
drawn by Amery between government and nation, parliamentary procedure, 
historically, had been designed to protect the interests of the nation and not 
those of the government.  ‘The primary function of Parliament’, it was stated in 
an edition of a student’s textbook published in 1946, ‘is the control of the 
executive’.170  As late as 1957, one parliamentarian’s comment on the 
proposition that it was the business of Parliament to make laws, was that ‘[s]o 
far as any generalization about Parliament can be accepted it would be more 
correct to say that it is the business of Parliament to prevent laws being 
made’.171 
One consequence of a parliamentary procedure with these characteristics – a 
consequence in evidence well before 1900 – was that the government had 
insufficient time to enact its legislation.172  In 1860, Lord John Russell lamented 
that the government, which had three-quarters of the whole legislative business 
of Parliament in its hands, had only one-quarter of Parliamentary time at its 
                                            
169
  ibid. 
170
  Quoted from the 1946 edition of ECS Wade and GG Phillips, Constitutional Law by Lord 
Nolan in Lord Nolan and Sir S Sedley, The Making and Remaking of the British Constitution 
(London, Blackstone Press, 1997) 6. 
171
  Foreword, by S King-Hall, to J Eaves, Emergency Powers and the Parliamentary Watchdog: 
Parliament and the Executive in Great Britain, 1939-1951 (London, Hansard Society, 1957) 1.  
Stephen King-Hall was an MP during the second world war.  In 1944, he founded the Hansard 
Society for Parliamentary Government, holding major posts in that society until 1963. 
172
  For nineteenth century developments see generally P Fraser, ‘The Growth of Ministerial 
Control in the Nineteenth-Century House of Commons’ (1960) 75 English Historical Review 444 
and V Cromwell, ‘The Losing of the Initiative by the House of Commons, 1780-1914’ (1968) 18 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 1. 
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disposal;173 and, at the end of 1880, Gladstone found himself confronting ‘the 
heavy inconvenience of prolonged and manifold legislative arrear’.174 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, in peacetime,175 the legislation 
that the United Kingdom government wished to enact on all subjects (including 
income tax) exceeded the legislation that could be enacted in the time available.  
The United States political scientist, AL Lowell, writing in 1908, had no doubt 
‘that the legislative capacity of Parliament is limited, and the limit would appear 
to be well-nigh reached, unless private Members are to lose their remnant of 
time, or debate is to be still further restricted’.176 
This state of affairs continued during the inter-war period.  One writer pointed 
out that Parliament was subject to its own conventional requirements.  Three 
readings of a Bill in both Houses was a procedure which necessarily took time.  
If the opposition of political opponents and the great pressure of competing 
business were also both taken into account, it was not difficult to understand 
that there were very real limits to the practical legislative activity of Parliament; 
and those limits were yearly becoming more stringent.  Legislation was 
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  HC Deb 2 April 1860, vol 157, cols 1731-2. 
174
  Quoted in E Hughes, ‘The Changes in Parliamentary Procedure, 1880-1882’ in R Pares and 
AJP Taylor (eds), Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier (London, Macmillan, 1956) 295. 
175
  The position is likely to have been different in wartime.  For example, there is evidence that, 
during some periods of the second world war, there was ample time to deal with the legislation 
proposed for enactment.  In 1943, James Chuter Ede, the Labour Minister at the Board of 
Education, who was heavily involved in the measure enacted as the Education Act 1944 (7 & 8 
Geo 6 c 31), recorded that the government Chief Whip had told Butler, the President of the 
Board of Education, that ‘[h]e would expect us to have the major legislative place in the King’s 
Speech & he was relying on us to provide business for the House in the next Session’.  Later in 
1943, Ede reported that the Chief Whip had told Butler ‘that no one else had a Bill anything like 
ready.  For that reason he will take the Committee stage on the floor of the House’.  K Jeffreys 
(ed), Labour and the Wartime Coalition: from the Diary of James Chuter Ede, 1941-1945 
(London, the Historians’ Press, 1987) 146 and 152 (entries for 6 September and 18 November 
1943).  See also on this, P Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World 
War (London, Jonathan Cape, 1975) 238.  It has been stated that, during the second world war, 
there was normally a three-day parliamentary week.  K Theakston, Winston Churchill and the 
British Constitution (London, Politico’s, 2004) 150. 
176
  Quoted in SA Walkland, ‘Government Legislation in the House of Commons’ in SA Walkland 
(ed), The House of Commons in the Twentieth Century (OUP 1979) 247, 254. 
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necessarily a cumbrous business, and in the modern extension of state activity, 
even important measures agreed upon by all parties might have to be 
postponed indefinitely, so great was the pressure on the legislative machine.177  
The same writer had earlier written that there was a ‘very real restriction of time 
for legislative measures’; and that ‘legislative processes are too slow and 
unwieldy to be lightly undertaken in these days of congestion’.178  The 
‘commonest official excuse in sidetracking some proposal’, it was said shortly 
after the beginning of the second world war, was that it would require legislation 
for which no parliamentary time was available.179 
After the second world war, the position continued to be the same.  In 1949, one 
of the Parliamentary Counsel recorded that ‘parliamentary time is in “short 
supply” and ministerial competitors for an allocation numerous’;180 and, in 1961, 
the First Parliamentary Counsel, Sir Noel Hutton, recorded that ‘[t]here is 
always hot competition for places in the [government’s legislative] programme 
for any session’ and that ‘[t]he number of days available for legislation in a 
session is strictly limited, and these must on no account be wasted’.181  Finally, 
during September 1963, in an article with the headline ‘Many Bills compete for 
priority in next parliamentary session’, the Times commented that ‘the difficulty 
does not lie in scraping together enough legislation to keep the two houses 
occupied but in making choices between Bills competing hotly for priority’.182 
Some action was taken to deal with this difficulty, both within Parliament and 
within the government – but the action taken did not solve the underlying 
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problem.  So far as Parliament was concerned, the House of Commons, during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, underwent procedural changes 
designed to facilitate the production of more, and speedier, legislation.  
Campion described the three reducing processes involved as the ‘slimming 
process’, the ‘squeezing process’ and the ‘purging process’.183  The ‘slimming 
process’ consisted of the elimination of superfluous stages during the progress 
of a Bill; and the ‘squeezing process’ was effected by ‘allocation of time’ orders 
(generically nicknamed the ‘guillotine’).  The ‘purging process’ consisted of the 
relieving of the House of Commons itself of business that could be done by 
smaller bodies.  Until 1882, the committee stage of nearly every Bill had been 
taken in a committee of the whole House; but the use of committees then grew 
over the decades that followed.  Campion made use of a ‘rough-and-ready 
method’ to compare the relative speed of the legislative process at two different 
periods.  By dividing the number of pages in the statutes passed during a 
session by the number of days spent in the House of Commons on the 
consideration of Bills, it was possible to find the average number of pages 
disposed of on each ‘legislative day’.  On this basis, the speed of legislation 
increased from an average of five pages per legislative day during the period 
from 1906 to 1913 to an average of 16 pages per legislative day in the 1945-46 
Session.184  Another calculation produced the results that, comparing the period 
from 1906 to 1913 with that from 1929-30 to 1937-38, the number of statutes 
enacted annually rose from 50 to 57, the number of pages from 335 to 995, and 
the average length of a statute from 7 to 17 pages.185  ‘The procedural reforms 
have much eased the situation’ Jennings commented in 1941.  Three or four 
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Bills were passed every Session, each of which would have required a whole 
Session under the rules in force while Lord Salisbury was Prime Minister.  
‘Nevertheless, there is always a shortage of time’.186 
The government, for its part, was at a particular disadvantage, during the first 
part of the twentieth century: for insufficient attempts were made to plan the 
parliamentary Session by relating the production of government Bills to the time 
at which Parliament was likely to be able to deal with them.  The consequence 
was that many Bills were drafted (or partly drafted) which never saw the light of 
day.  The time in the session at which a Bill was introduced depended chiefly on 
when the Parliamentary Counsel could get the Bill ready – and that, in turn, 
depended partly upon chance and partly upon the ability of the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel to make reasonably good guesses about what the 
government would want.187  The abandonment, at the end of the parliamentary 
session, of the measures which the government despaired of being able to 
enact was known as the ‘massacre of the innocents’.188 
Under the Labour Government in power from 1945, the planning of the 
parliamentary session by relating the production and introduction of government 
Bills to the time available for their enactment received systematic attention.  
Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of 
Commons, was very active in this area.
189 
 Having discovered, late in 1945, that 
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only one of the major Bills in the government programme was ready for 
introduction at the beginning of the 1945-46 Session, Morrison wrote to the 
Prime Minister, Attlee, urging that the planning of the next parliamentary 
Session should be put in hand: for ‘it is only by planning ahead in this way that 
we shall make the best use of the time of Ministers, officials and draftsmen, and 
be ready with an adequate number of major Bills at the beginning of [the] next 
Session’.190  Attlee thought this suggestion ‘admirable’; and the Future 
Legislation Committee was set up.191 
A proof of the proposition that the government had more legislation to enact 
than time in which to enact it was then provided.  Comparisons were made, 
during the early months of 1946, between the time thought likely to be required 
for the enactment of the government’s legislative programme and the 
parliamentary time likely to be available for its enactment.  The result, set out in 
a memorandum sent to Morrison by the Chief Whip (Whiteley) was that the time 
available for government legislation was 73 days, but that the government’s 
legislative programme would take 90 days to enact ‘or 17 days more than is 
available’.  Morrison’s annotation on this document was that ‘[t]his is a shock 
and I don’t want to believe it!’192 
The arrangements made under the Labour government were continued by the 
Conservative governments in power from 1951 to 1964 – and the shortage of 
time to enact government legislation also continued.  A circular, dating from 
April 1957 and prepared on behalf of the Cabinet Committee on Future 
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Legislation, placed Bills proposed for inclusion in the legislative programme for 
the next parliamentary Session in five Lists.  List A consisted of ‘Bills known to 
be essential’; List A.1 consisted of ‘Bills which may become essential in 
particular circumstances’; List B consisted of ‘Bills with very strong claims to 
inclusion in the programme’; List C consisted of ‘Other Bills with claims to 
inclusion in the programme, from which some might be selected if 
Parliamentary time permits’; and List D consisted of ‘Bills which will probably 
have to be deferred for a later Session’.  The circular also commented that as 
was usually the case, more Bills had been put forward than could be handled in 
the time likely to be available.  The Bills in List A and List B, together with those 
from List A.1 which might become essential, would probably suffice by 
themselves, with the consequence that Bills from Lists C and D could not be 
promoted to higher lists without corresponding relegations.193 
There was, accordingly, insufficient parliamentary time to enact all the 
legislation that the government wished to see enacted.  There were more 
government Bills potentially available to be called than could be chosen.  
Viscount Blakenham, speaking in the House of Lords in 1964, considered that, 
although, so far as the enactment of statutes was concerned, ‘at the end of 
every Session of Parliament we manage to chalk up an impressive score’, there 
was nevertheless no reason for complacency.  ‘At the end of every Session 
there remains a number of useful non-controversial Bills which lie neglected for 
want of Parliamentary time’.194  One of the ‘permanent features of the 
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constitutional process’, according to Hailsham, writing at the end of the 
twentieth century, was ‘the chronic shortage of parliamentary time which results 
in the indefinite postponement of measures crying out for action to meet the 
immediate legislative needs of a modern industrial society’.195 
2. The differential operation of the overall constraint 
In the context of the insufficiency of parliamentary time in which to enact all the 
legislation which the government wished to see enacted, parliamentary 
procedure operated in a manner in which some forms of legislation were more 
likely to be utilised than others.  The differential operation of the constraint of 
insufficient parliamentary time on Finance Bills, programme Bills, Consolidation 
Bills and Codification Bills is accordingly now analysed.  In each case, three 
questions are addressed: how likely it was that such a Bill would be introduced 
into Parliament; how likely it was that such a Bill would be enacted; and how 
much such a Bill could accomplish. 
(1) Finance Bills 
The first type of primary legislation consisted of Finance Acts.  The Finance Bills 
from which these Acts derived were Bills making provision for the nation’s 
finances; and these Bills had their own parliamentary procedure, which was 
highly distinct. 
It was practically certain that a Finance Bill would be introduced into Parliament 
each year.196  From the point of view of the public finances, income tax, 
throughout the twentieth century, was charged for the current financial year 
only: so a Finance Bill would be needed, among other reasons, for the charge 
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to income tax to be imposed for that year.  From the point of view of the working 
of the United Kingdom polity, it was well understood that, each year, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer would make his financial statement (the Budget 
speech) and that the debate on the financial statement would be concluded with 
the passing of the last of the financial resolutions brought forward at the time of 
the Budget.  In accordance with that last resolution, the House of Commons 
would then order a Bill to be brought in founded on those financial resolutions; 
and, somewhat later, the Finance Bill would be presented.  After the second 
world war, in the lists prepared on behalf of the Cabinet Committee on Future 
Legislation, Finance Bills were always placed in List A (‘Bills known to be 
essential’).197 
It was also practically certain that a Finance Bill, once introduced into 
Parliament, would be enacted (especially after the enactment of the Parliament 
Act 1911).198  Twentieth century governments had ministers drawn from the 
political party (or parties) that could command a majority in the House of 
Commons; and, in a period of strong party discipline, governments could rely 
upon the enactment of a measure that was essential for the government’s own 
continued existence.  ‘The Finance Bill, however long, has got to pass’ wrote 
the Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Powell) in 1957.199  It followed that if 
provisions relating to revenue law generally, and to the law of income tax in 
particular, were to be enacted, Finance Bills were the ideal vehicles for their 
enactment. 
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The time available for the enactment of a Finance Bill, however, was severely 
limited.  Following the enactment of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 
1913,200 the government had the benefit of the limited legal authority conferred 
on House of Commons resolutions: but that authority expired during the 
summer.  So, having regard to the annual financial cycle, legislation making 
fiscal changes was likely to be enacted, from start to finish, in the few months 
authorised by that statute.  The ‘practical effect’, of the 1913 Act, it was noted in 
April of that year, was to compel a Chancellor of the Exchequer ‘to get the 
Royal Assent giving effect to his Budget before the summer prorogation of 
Parliament’.201  In the period immediately after the second world war, it was 
considered that the House of Commons devoted about 15 days a year to 
taxation matters – about 10% of the session;202 and, in the 1970s, it was 
calculated that Parliament had about 18 days a year, on average, in which to 
deal with all fiscal changes.203  The limited time available, furthermore, could not 
necessarily be used particularly efficiently: for Finance Bills had been subjected 
to the three reducing processes specified by Campion to a much lesser extent 
than other government Bills.204  A Finance Bill still originated in Budget 
resolutions which were discussed in a committee of the whole House for most 
of a week; the Finance Bill was considered in a committee of the whole House; 
progress on the Bill was not interrupted at the normal hour for the conclusion of 
business; and Finance Bills were rarely subjected to a guillotine.205 
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The answer to the question how much Finance Bills could achieve, therefore, 
was much less satisfactory from the government’s point of view: for, given the 
constraint of insufficient parliamentary time, Finance Bills reproduced, on a 
smaller scale, the general problem faced by government when determining its 
legislative programme.  There was a shortage of parliamentary time: and this 
had the consequence that not all the provisions the government wished to place 
in Finance Bills could be included.  ‘We cannot have the Finance Bill 
overloaded’ Churchill remarked in 1926.206  There was accordingly a shortfall; 
and a constant tension between the wish to include material in a Finance Bill 
and the constraints that applied to the enactment of a Finance Act.  The greater 
the amount of material that was included in the Finance Bill, the more the 
Finance Act could accomplish: but the inclusion of additional material might 
imperil the status of the Finance Bill as a Money Bill within the meaning of the 
Parliament Act 1911,207 and might make the Finance Bill liable to exceed the far 
from generous time limits relevant for its enactment. 
There is abundant evidence of the excess of candidate items for enactment.  
Early in 1959, for example, and ‘[f]ollowing the custom of the last few years’, the 
Inland Revenue provided a note ‘designed to give the Chancellor a preliminary 
view of the possible Inland Revenue items for the Finance Bill’.  The note then 
grouped these items in five categories: items on which legislation had been 
promised or was of high priority; matters brought forward from the previous 
year; other matters on which recent representations had been made; minor 
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matters; and other matters under review.208  It was implicit in this classification 
that some items might not give rise to legislation in the next Finance Act – and 
that was the case.209 
It is possible to demonstrate this same point in a different way by showing that a 
particular candidate item might only be enacted after a significant period as an 
unsuccessful candidate: and one example is the ultimate enactment of an 
income tax relief in favour of visiting forces from NATO countries.  The Inland 
Revenue reported, early in 1956, that the department had been giving these 
reliefs, which were due under international agreement, for a number of years; 
and the necessary legislation had already been postponed several times.  The 
department wished to obtain statutory sanction for its practice as soon as 
possible.210  In 1956, however, it was decided that this item should be 
postponed again.211  Early in 1959, when considering the possibility that the 
revenue departments might be displaying insufficient zeal in enacting extra-
statutory concessions, a Treasury official noted that those departments tended 
to defend themselves against this charge by reference to the difficulty of 
securing a place for minor and not strictly essential items in the Finance Bill – 
and that there was force in this.  In the previous year, for example, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer had been under heavy pressure to shorten the 
Finance Bill; and, in the process, the Inland Revenue proposal to give statutory 
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cover to a concession in favour of visiting foreign forces had been dropped.212  
The legislation envisaged was finally enacted in 1960.213 
Despite the virtual certainty, therefore, that Finance Bills would be introduced 
and enacted, the evidence demonstrates that Finance Bills could not deal, to 
the extent that the government wished, with revenue legislation in general and 
with income tax legislation in particular.  Sir Geoffrey Howe, writing in the 
1970s, took the view that the ‘archaic ritual’ by which Parliament dealt with 
financial matters was ‘about as appropriate to a modern industrial democracy as 
tally sticks to the international money market’.214  Inland Revenue officials, the 
Parliamentary Counsel and political ministers all had to operate in a context in 
which only part of what was wanted could be obtained. 
(2) Programme Bills 
The second type of primary legislation consisted of programme Acts.  The Bills 
from which these Acts derived amended the law in particular respects, but were 
not Finance Bills. 
The question how likely it was that a programme Bill would be introduced into 
Parliament must be answered by making chronological distinctions.  The period 
from 1907 to 1965 needs to be divided into three unequal parts: a first part 
consisting of the years from 1907 to 1912; a second of the years 1913 and 
1914; and a third consisting of the remainder of the period. 
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The years from 1907 to 1912 were the final years of a longer period beginning 
in 1861.215  During these years, it was envisaged that, every year, there should 
be one Bill that contained the government’s proposals that were essential for 
the national finances.  From 1894 onwards, the title of this Bill was the Finance 
Bill.  It was also recognised, however, that various minor amendments of the 
Revenue Acts were also required: and so, from time to time, a Revenue Act 
was enacted.  During these years, also, the distinction between the Finance Bill 
and the Revenue Bill was the distinction between the senior partner and the 
junior partner.  If the government could not carry its essential programme for the 
national finances, embodied in the Finance Bill, it could expect to fall.  If, on the 
other hand, the government failed to make minor amendments of revenue law, 
there was no particular reason to expect major adverse consequences.  An 
operational corollary of this state of affairs was that a Finance Bill could be 
expected to be introduced fairly soon after the Budget speech – and to be 
enacted.  A Revenue Bill, on the other hand, could only expect to be introduced 
much later on in the parliamentary Session – and very possibly near the 
Session’s end. 
Against this background, it followed that it was not particularly likely that a 
Revenue Bill would be introduced into Parliament during these years.  A Bill of 
this type was unlikely to receive any great priority in the government’s legislative 
programme.  It also followed that any Revenue Bill, if it was to be enacted, 
could usefully be drafted with a view to consuming as little parliamentary time 
as possible – and, accordingly, should be drafted to be as uncontroversial as 
possible.  Events that took place in 1909 demonstrate this.  On 3 February 
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1909, a Treasury official wrote to the First Parliamentary Counsel (Arthur 
Thring) to say that the Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Hobhouse) was 
anxious, if he could, to take the Revenue Bill through the House of Commons 
during the early part of the session when he thought that there might be a good 
chance of getting it through quickly.  ‘But the success of this manoeuvre will he 
thinks depend almost entirely on the amount of opposition which its several 
Clauses will be likely to arouse’.  Thring, accordingly, was asked not only to 
consider a number of specific points but also to give his opinion ‘on any other 
matter which may seem to you to be of doubtful value in the Bill or likely to lead 
to controversy’.216  ‘Mr. Hobhouse is no doubt right in his view’, commented the 
Chairman of the Board of Customs and Excise.217  ‘It is practically impossible 
now-a-days to pass any proposal in a Revenue Bill to which there is serious 
opposition’.218  Revenue Bills were introduced in 1909 and 1911.219 
The years 1913 and 1914 saw a government initiative relating to the enactment 
of financial legislation which made it practically certain that, in these years, a 
programme Bill would be introduced.  The initiative was introduced by Lloyd 
George in his 1913 Budget speech.  The Chancellor stated that amendments 
moved to the Finance Bill had increased in recent years;220 and that the 
Provisional Collection of Taxes Bill (then before Parliament) imposed what was 
practically a timetable for taxation Bills.  It was quite impossible, in Lloyd 
George’s opinion, for any government in the future to carry through its taxation 
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proposals, and to give facilities for a full discussion of every revenue proposal in 
the middle of the session, without dislocating all other business.  ‘It would have 
the effect of strangling the business of every Government’.  The government 
had therefore decided ‘to recur to a practice ... of having two Bills’.  It proposed 
to confine the Finance Bill ‘to the renewal of temporary taxes and to introduce a 
Revenue Bill on the basis of a Resolution for the general amendment of the 
law’.221  The initiative, therefore, consisted of an explicitly formulated intention 
on the part of the government to aim at enacting both a Finance Act and a 
Revenue Act in each parliamentary Session; and, in 1913 and 1914, a Revenue 
Bill was introduced.  However, Lloyd George’s initiative failed.  Neither Revenue 
Bill was enacted;222 the first world war then intervened; and, after that war, no 
attempt was made to revive the initiative.  The government’s taxation proposals 
were placed in the Finance Bill. 
After the first world war, the question how likely it was that a programme Bill 
relating to income tax would be introduced into Parliament was one aspect of 
the government’s possession of insufficient time in which to enact all the 
legislation it wished.  During these years, it was not particularly likely that a 
programme Bill would be introduced.  A programme Bill relating to income tax 
was necessarily in competition with Bills on all other subjects on which the 
government wished to legislate – and only six programme Acts relating to 
income tax were enacted during this part of the period.223 
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The answer to the question how likely it was that a programme Bill, once 
introduced into Parliament, would be enacted, must also be answered by 
making a distinction.  Programme Bills whose scope was general must be 
distinguished from those whose scope was specific.  
The evidence is that, during the first half of the twentieth century, programme 
Bills relating to revenue matters whose scope was general might well not be 
enacted.  Five such Bills were presented to Parliament.  The first two Bills were 
enacted as the Revenue Acts of 1909
224
 and 1911.
225
  The Revenue Bill of 1909 
was viewed at all times by government ministers as a Bill whose successful 
enactment depended upon its being uncontroversial; and was drafted with this 
consideration very much in mind.226  At a later stage, the Liberal government 
had informal discussions with the Conservative opposition about the contents of 
the Bill.  The opposition took exception to three clauses; and these were ‘at 
once’ withdrawn ‘in order that nothing of a controversial character should be 
present’.227  The statute finally enacted was short.  It had 12 sections only; took 
up less than four printed pages; and did not deal with income tax.  The Revenue 
Act 1911 reached the statute book during the period of the constitutional crisis 
that ended with the enactment of the Parliament Act 1911;228 and must be 
viewed within that context.  At the time the Liberal government decided on the 
holding of the general election of December 1910, the Finance Bill following on 
from the 1910 Budget speech had not been enacted.  That Bill was then split 
into two.  Some provisions were enacted as the Finance Act 1910229 before 
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Parliament was dissolved; the remainder were enacted as the Revenue Act 
1911 in the next Parliament.230 
The three later Bills – the Revenue Bills of 1913, 1914 and 1921 – were not 
enacted and had to be withdrawn.  The Revenue Bills of 1913 and 1914 formed 
part of the initiative announced by Lloyd George in 1913.  The extent to which 
the failure to enact these Bills may be traced to Lloyd George himself is 
considered later.231  From the parliamentary point of view, however, the 
Revenue Bill of 1913 failed because it was given serious attention too late in the 
parliamentary Session (when there was insufficient time to ensure its 
enactment); and because it was insufficiently uncontroversial.  Lloyd George’s 
Budget speech, in which he announced the government initiative, was made on 
22 April; but it was not until the second half of July that the text of the Bill was 
available for MPs to study.232  The Prime Minister (Asquith) and Lloyd George 
both hoped that the Bill could go through as an agreed measure.233  Lloyd 
George also made the point that the government could not give the Bill very 
much time ‘and looking at the amendments carefully it would be quite 
impossible if they were discussed at any length, to find time to get the Bill 
through’.234  However, no agreement could be reached; and, on 12 August 
1913, the Bill was withdrawn.235 
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In 1914, also, the Revenue Bill also had to be withdrawn because there was 
insufficient parliamentary time in which to enact it.236  Lloyd George delivered 
his Budget speech on 4 May 1914; but it was only on 18 June 1914 that the text 
of the Revenue Bill became available for MPs to study.237  The government had 
parliamentary difficulties with its financial proposals; changed its plans; and, in 
doing so, altered the balance of the material to be placed in the Finance and 
Revenue Bills.  By early June it had been decided that the vital Finance Bill 
would be given priority; the Revenue Bill would have to be lightened and 
possibly postponed.  The government’s parliamentary difficulties continued; 
and, among other matters, the members of the Cabinet came to realise that, 
among other matters, they had misunderstood the timetable for which the 
Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1913238 provided.  The Finance Bill had to 
be enacted by 5 August and not 5 September (as had been believed).  It was 
impossible, Asquith wrote to a correspondent, to enact both the Finance Bill and 
the Revenue Bill by the earlier date.239  The Finance Bill was enacted;240 but, on 
17 July, Asquith told the House of Commons that the Revenue Bill would be 
dropped.241  So in 1914, as in 1913, Lloyd George’s initiative failed to produce a 
Revenue Bill that was actually enacted. 
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In 1921, a final Revenue Bill of a general nature was presented to the House of 
Commons – with the primary purpose of giving effect to some of the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Income Tax, which had 
reported in 1920.242  The Royal Commission’s report had been signed shortly 
before the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Austen Chamberlain) delivered his 
Budget speech, in which he said that it was quite clear that he could not deal 
with all the report’s recommendations in the Finance Bill; and that he had 
therefore decided that the general reform of income tax was a matter calling for 
a separate Bill – to be introduced as soon as possible.243  Progress on the 
drafting of this Bill was nevertheless slow.  On 22 February 1921, the Revenue 
Bill was still due to appear; and Chamberlain was asked whether it would be 
taken on the floor of the House of Commons.  He replied ‘No.  I shall ask the 
House to send it upstairs.  That is the only hope of passing it.  If the House 
treats it as a contentious measure it will not be proceeded with’.244  He also 
added, a little later, that ‘the House must understand that if it is to be treated as 
a contentious measure I cannot possibly hope to make progress with it this 
Session’.245  When eventually presented to Parliament on 6 April 1921,246 the 
Revenue Bill became the subject of hostile criticism and a campaign in the 
Press.247   It also became known that the Bill’s Second Reading was likely to be 
opposed.248  The Revenue Bill, therefore, was due to be treated as a 
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contentious measure – the state of affairs likely to be fatal for its enactment – 
and the government withdrew it.249  Once again, therefore, there was insufficient 
parliamentary time to enact a Revenue Bill – and, once again, a Revenue Bill 
was abandoned. 
It was stated in a later work that the Revenue Bill of 1921 was dropped owing to 
the opposition aroused; and that this was the last occasion on which the 
practice of introducing a separate Revenue Bill was followed.250  Such a Bill had 
been a great convenience for dealing with administrative matters, but difficulty 
had always been experienced in finding the necessary time for its progress, and 
for that reason the Treasury had, since that time, adopted the practice of 
covering all necessary measures in one Bill – the Finance Bill.251  It is not 
known whether the authors of this work were in possession of any special 
information when writing this passage; but the proposition advanced was 
certainly true.  The Revenue Bill of 1921 was the last Bill presented to 
Parliament whose provisions ranged generally over revenue law, but which was 
not a Finance Bill.  ‘There is one great difference between a Revenue Bill and a 
Finance Bill’ said one MP in 1927.  ‘A Revenue Bill need not be passed in any 
year; a Finance Bill must be’.252 
Programme Bills whose scope was specific, however, enjoyed more success 
than those whose scope was general.  Seven such Bills were introduced; and 
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all were enacted.253  The specific scope of such a Bill improved its 
parliamentary prospects (for the ability to move amendments was much 
diminished) and government officials and ministers were well aware that this 
was the case.  On the day following the judgment in Bowles v Bank of 
England,254 two of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue attended upon the 
Parliamentary Counsel ‘to talk over with him the Bill rendered necessary by the 
previous day’s judgment’.  One of the points discussed was that it would be 
advisable that the Bill should only deal with the specific point for which it was 
introduced, as the Chancellor desired to avoid other revenue matters being 
brought up for discussion in connection with it.  On this point Parliamentary 
Counsel ‘thought that the Bill now proposed should not be a Revenue Bill.  This 
would preclude amendments being put down which had nothing to do with the 
result of the Gibson Bowles case’.255  It was on this specific basis that the 
Provisional Collection of Taxes Bill was prepared – and enacted. 
The seven programme Bills that were specific in their scope may be divided into 
two categories.  Five of those Acts (the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 
1913, the Income Tax Procedure (Emergency Provisions) Act 1939, the Income 
Tax (Employments) Act 1943, the Income Tax (Offices and Employments) Act 
1944 and the Income Tax (Repayment of Post-War Credits) Act 1959) were 
enacted because the government was willing to give them the necessary 
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political priority.  The other two programme Acts (the Income Tax Act 1945256 
and the Income Tax Management Act 1964) were enacted because they were 
politically uncontroversial, and because their enactment could be 
accommodated within the government’s other priorities.  One statute, taken 
from each category, will now be considered in order to show the forces 
determining whether a particular item of proposed legislation received priority or 
was enacted for other reasons. 
The Income Tax (Employments) Act 1943, containing provisions enabling the 
PAYE Regulations to be made, falls into the first category.257  By 1943, the 
Inland Revenue was under pressure to devise a scheme for deducting income 
tax from the current earnings of employees; and it was against that background 
that the Inland Revenue came forward with such a scheme in a departmental 
report dated 21 May 1943.258  The most suitable day for the introduction of a 
scheme utilising the current year basis was 6 April (the beginning of the income 
tax year) – and this implied a commencement date of 6 April 1944.  On this 
basis, it was quite clear that much work needed to be done quickly: and, among 
other matters, legislation would be needed to deal with various points raised by 
the scheme.259  Once this point was reached, however, it was clear that the 
Finance Act 1943260 would be enacted too early.  The scheme devised still 
needed to be considered by others; and it was only on 29 July 1943, one week 
after the Finance Act 1943 had received the Royal Assent, that the Chancellor 
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of the Exchequer explained the proposed PAYE scheme to the War Cabinet.261  
It was equally clear, however, that the Finance Act 1944262 would be enacted 
too late.  It followed, accordingly, that if the PAYE scheme was to become 
operative on 6 April 1944, a programme Act was a necessity: and the 
departmental report accordingly stated that if, as was envisaged, the scheme 
was to come into force on 6 April 1944 ‘legislation before that date is absolutely 
essential and acceptance of the scheme would involve the introduction, at a 
very early date, of a special Bill, all the stages of which would have to go 
through within the next three or four months’.263  The matter proceeded 
accordingly. 
The Income Tax Management Act 1964, by contrast, falls into the second 
category.  The proposition that income tax administration could usefully receive 
legislative attention was not contested; and the principal matter dealt with in the 
Act – that assessments to income tax should be made by inspectors of taxes – 
had been recommended in the Final Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Taxation of Profits and Income in 1955.264  An initial proposal to codify the 
administrative provisions relating to income tax was received well in the 
Treasury.  ‘The only trouble, of course, is that if the Parliamentary timetable is 
crowded it may not be easy to convince the Legislation Committee – and the 
Whips – that this sort of legislation deserves a place’.265  Nothing was 
accomplished at that time; but, in 1959, a Treasury Official considered a 
suggestion that it might be useful to introduce a tax administration Bill later that 
                                            
261
  TNA file T 171/366, item 8.  W M (43) 107th, Conclusions, 29 July 1943.   
262
  7 & 8 Geo 6 c 23.  Royal Assent was given to this Act on 13 July 1944. 
263
  TNA file IR 63/163, fo 3 (para 6 of the Report). 
264
  Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Final Report (Cmd 9474, 1955) 
282 and 339, paras 943 and 1090(60).  
265
  TNA file T 233/1081.  Treasury Minute, 18 August 1955. 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
87 
 
year; and had the ‘feeling’ that if the next Parliamentary session were to start 
with a great lack of legislation, there were probably useful, if quite 
unspectacular, things to be done in this field, ‘but that if there were other more 
interesting proposals this would inevitably get crowded out – and it would not be 
possible for us to say that it was more than a pity’.266  In the various lists 
prepared for the Cabinet Committee on Future Legislation, the Income Tax 
Management Bill never appeared in a list higher than List C (‘Other Bills with 
claims to inclusion from which some might be selected if Parliamentary time 
permits’).267  The introduction of a programme Bill (not a Codification Bill) into 
the House of Commons in February 1964 may be attributed to the zeal and skill 
with which the Bill was championed by Inland Revenue officials and by Alan 
Green, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury.268 
The evidence, therefore, is that programme Bills could not be used to 
accomplish a great deal.  During nearly all of the first half of the twentieth 
century, it was not particularly likely that a programme Bill would be introduced.  
Even if introduced, a programme Bill of a general nature was unlikely to be 
enacted.  The programme Acts relevant for income tax which reached the 
statute book were nearly all specific in scope – and dealt with matters on which 
the government was keen to legislate, or which could be dealt with in the 
interstices of the parliamentary timetable. 
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(3) Consolidation Bills 
The third type of primary legislation consisted of Consolidation Acts.  The 
Consolidation Bills from which these Acts derived were Bills to restate the 
existing legislation on a particular subject without changing that legislation. 
Consolidation Bills were unlikely to be introduced into Parliament: for there was 
a shortage of champions, both for consolidation statutes in general and for a 
statute consolidating the income tax legislation in particular.  This absence of 
enthusiasm may be observed both outside and inside government.  
Birkenhead’s view was that ‘[t]o facilitate the work of consolidation, it is highly 
desirable that public opinion should be stimulated in its favour’.  He then had to 
admit, however, that ‘[a]t present, the work excites no enthusiasm’.269  If the 
electorate was indifferent, MPs could be expected to be indifferent too.270  So 
far as those inside government were concerned, Birkenhead also believed that 
consolidation, although not actively opposed, had to encounter ‘passive 
resistance’ from those skilled in the administration of the branch of the law to be 
consolidated.  This was ‘not unnatural, for such persons are thoroughly 
conversant with the existing Acts, however confused they may be, and shrink 
from the trouble of having to learn their way about a new Act’.271  Writing 
somewhat later, Carr agreed, saying that consolidation had a number of ‘natural 
enemies’.  One of these was a shortage of drafters.  Another was the 
departmental preoccupation with day-to-day administration.  Departments might 
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be reluctant to provide the personnel to give the necessary technical support in 
the case of major Consolidation Bills – such as the Bill that became the 1952 
Act.272  Political ministers, in their turn, were most unlikely to make consolidation 
one of the matters to which they gave significant attention.  It was the 
experience of Sir Granville Ram, the First Parliamentary Counsel from 1937 to 
1947, that, bearing in mind that parliamentary time was limited, it was unsafe to 
introduce Bills which contained both consolidating and amending provisions; 
and Ram’s own experience was that ministers would not introduce 
Consolidation Bills on subjects of little political importance unless they could be 
fully assured that all debate (except on the one point – ‘to be or not to be’) was 
definitely out of order on the floor of the House.  ‘It is for this reason especially 
that the Statute book is in the deplorably untidy condition which at present 
disgraces a civilized country!’273 
Consolidation Bills were also unlikely to be introduced into Parliament for 
another reason: for, at the end of the nineteenth century and again in the years 
following the first world war, the parliamentary process for enacting 
consolidation legislation produced difficulties.  At the end of the nineteenth 
century, the Joint Select Committee, which considered Consolidation Bills, took 
the view took the view that it had greater liberty to amend the law than would be 
allowed at later times.  The Joint Committee might report that a particular 
Consolidation Bill ‘reproduces the existing enactments, with such alterations 
only as are required for uniformity of expression and adaptation to existing law 
and practice, and does not embody any substantial amendment of the law’.274  
In 1897, however, a Post Office Consolidation Bill, which had been reported in 
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these terms, met with strong opposition from Gibson Bowles in the House of 
Commons.275  Although many of Bowles’s criticisms could be contested, there 
were seven cases where the Post Office Consolidation Bill made minor 
amendments of the law.  The government were not prepared to put on the 
whips; and the Bill was lost.276  Those (such as the drafter, the First 
Parliamentary Counsel, Sir Henry Jenkyns) who considered that the functions of 
the Joint Select Committee, when dealing with Consolidation Bills, properly 
included the making of minor amendments of the law, had lost to those such as 
Bowles, who considered that the Committee should not act in this way.  It was 
recorded, many years later, that, after this failure, the Lord Chancellor 
(Halsbury) was said to have sworn that he would have nothing more to do with 
consolidation.277 The result, as Ilbert noted in 1901, was that ‘the work of 
consolidation has, for the time being, come to a standstill.  This is far from 
satisfactory’.  However, there was ‘no doubt that it ought to be resumed and 
carried on in a systematic manner’.278  It was the case, however, that no 
Consolidation Bill was introduced for 12 years after 1897.279 
In the years following the first world war, by contrast, a proposed Consolidation 
Bill failed not because it was not conservative enough, but because it was too 
conservative.  Lord Loreburn, when Lord Chancellor, set up a project, carried 
out separately from the normal government machinery, which resulted in the 
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enactment of a number of statutes restating areas of the criminal law.280  The 
project nevertheless came to an unhappy end.  A Bill to consolidate and simplify 
the enactments relating to fraud, falsification and kindred offences was 
introduced in the House of Lords in 1922.  The Bill was referred to the Joint 
Committee on Consolidation Bills, which criticised it severely, and reported, in 
effect, that it was useless to proceed with it.  The main line of criticism was that 
the drafter, instead of stating the law in a generalised form, had merely cut out 
snippets from the existing Acts and pasted them together.  The Joint Committee 
invited the Lord Chancellor to substitute another Bill, drafted on different lines, 
but nothing further was done.281 
For the vast majority of the twentieth century, however, the prospects for the 
enactment of any Consolidation Bill actually introduced into Parliament were 
good.  During the early part of the nineteenth century there had been no special 
procedure for the enactment of Consolidation Bills; but, during the second half 
of that century, the work of consolidation began, for the first time, to be held up 
by lack of Parliamentary time; and by 1890, at the latest, it was realised that 
Consolidation Bills would not pass if they were subjected to the same procedure 
as other Bills.282  In 1894, the Joint Committee of the two Houses of Parliament 
which considered Statute Law Revision Bills began to consider Consolidation 
Bills as well;283 and the convention became established that a Consolidation Bill 
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recommended by this Joint Committee should pass without debate at 
subsequent stages.284 
These developments had an important result.  The all-important time-
consuming technical question (whether or not the proposed consolidating 
statute stated the existing legislation without changing it) was removed from the 
floor of the two Houses of Parliament and transferred to the Joint Committee.285  
It followed that Consolidation Bills absorbed very little time on the floor of either 
House of Parliament.  ‘Consolidation’, said the Lord Chancellor (Jowitt) in 1949 
‘is a most desirable thing because it involves little or no parliamentary time’.286  
It followed, accordingly, that a Consolidation Bill actually presented to 
Parliament had excellent prospects of being enacted.  In the case of the 
consolidation of the income tax legislation, therefore, parliamentary procedure 
did not constitute a formidable obstacle to the enactment of any Consolidation 
Bill that was actually prepared: and statutes consolidating the Income Tax Acts 
were passed in 1918 and 1952. 
In the context of income tax, the evidence is that the Joint Committee did not 
rubber-stamp the text of draft Bills placed before it.287  In the case of the Bill 
enacted as the 1918 Act, the Committee required a substantial re-arrangement 
of the contents.  The lawyer in charge of the preparation of the Bill later wrote 
that it might be considered unusual to find that the first section of the Act 
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promptly referred the reader to a schedule in order to find matters with which he 
was most vitally concerned, and which were without doubt the most important 
provisions in the Act.  However, for reasons derived from the earlier Acts 
themselves, the Joint Committee had decided to transfer these very important 
provisions to the first Schedule.  It was thought inadvisable to discard the old 
familiar titles of Schedule A, Schedule B, Schedule C, Schedule D and 
Schedule E.  Strictly speaking these were not schedules, but categories or 
classes of property or profits on which the tax was levied in the manner 
described under each head.  If, however, the name ‘Schedule’ was to be 
retained, the committee had considered, after much discussion, that the proper 
place for those provisions was in a schedule and not in the body of the Act, in 
spite of the fact that very important provisions were being dealt with.288  Very 
considerably later, in 1967, the Joint Committee reported that the Capital 
Allowances Bill was not pure consolidation, and ought not to proceed as a 
Consolidation Bill.  That Bill was dropped.  The law was then amended in the 
Finance Act 1967;289 and the amendments made disposed of the difficulties 
which had prevented the Joint Committee from certifying the Bill as a 
Consolidation Bill.  A similar Bill was then introduced in the next session; and 
this later Consolidation Bill was enacted as the Capital Allowances Act 1968.290  
Two years later, two further consolidating statutes dealing with income tax law 
were enacted: the Taxes Management Act 1970 and the Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act 1970. 
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Consolidation Acts could accomplish a certain amount only, and not more: for 
they consisted of the restatement of the existing legislation – and nothing else.  
Jowitt, in 1949, after praising consolidation for its modest consumption of 
parliamentary time, went on to say that the process was ‘simply putting together 
into one Statute what is already in a series of Statutes, so as to make it a matter 
of convenience for everybody to refer to’.291  During the course of the 
preparation of the 1918 Act, Cox, the Solicitor of Inland Revenue, had to 
consider the suggestion that amendments should be made to the existing law.  
Cox would have none of it.  ‘If we ... started making sensible amendments the 
bill would cease to be a consolidation bill & would never have a chance of 
getting through’.292  Consolidation might indeed have real advantages for setting 
out the existing legislation relating to income tax – but any change to that 
legislation could only be made by some other means. 
The proposition that the enactment of a Consolidation Act did not provide an 
opportunity to make major improvements to the existing legislation was 
emphasised by Lord Wrenbury in his speech in Great Western Railway Co v 
Bater.293  Lord Wrenbury referred to his presence on the Joint Committee which 
had considered the Bill enacted as the Income Tax Act 1918.  He had striven to 
find some way ‘in which we could deal with the language of confusion and 
unintelligibility of the Acts to be consolidated’.  That, however, had proved to be 
impossible.  The Committee could only consolidate ‘and could not substitute 
plain words to express a plain meaning without going beyond the limits of 
consolidation.  The Act of 1918 therefore reproduces the old language with all 
its faults and has done little more than improve matters a little by some 
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rearrangement’.294  Lord Wrenbury went on to say that the law of income tax, 
‘which now so vitally affects the subjects of the Realm, ought as speedily as 
possible to be expressed in a new Statute which should bear and express an 
intelligible meaning’.  There was, however, a vital precondition: ‘[i]f Parliament 
had the time, which it has not’.295 
(4) Codification Bills 
The fourth type of primary legislation consisted of Codification Acts.  The 
Codification Bills from which these Acts derived were Bills to restate the existing 
law on a particular subject without changing that law.  Codification Bills, 
however, had a wider ambit than Consolidation Bills (which dealt with legislation 
only), for Codification Bills dealt with additional material – notably case law. 
Codification Bills were unlikely to be introduced into Parliament.   The absence 
of interest shown to Consolidation Bills by the public, MPs, senior civil servants 
and government ministers was also shown to Codification Bills.  There were 
also additional problems.  Birkenhead mentioned ‘an acute divergence of 
opinion as to the expediency of converting unwritten into written law’ and ‘the 
great practical difficulty of making sure that the written code correctly 
reproduces the existing law’.296  Codification Bills, furthermore (unlike 
Consolidation Bills), did not have the benefit of the special procedure that 
resulted in a great shortening of the time taken on the floor of the two Houses of 
Parliament.  A Codification Bill, therefore, had to be introduced and enacted as 
part of the government’s general legislative programme; and, given a general 
insufficiency of parliamentary time, any Codification Bill in existence was an 
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obvious candidate for sacrifice.297  Hailsham, in the 1980s, believed that, in the 
case of codification legislation, ‘the real enemy of progress is the consumption 
of Parliamentary time involved’.298  A Codification Bill dealing with income tax 
law was certain to be large.  It would include many matters capable of being 
discussed; and it was completely foreseeable that it would absorb a large 
amount of scarce parliamentary time.  In a note prepared in connection with the 
Finance Bill of 1913, the Inland Revenue recorded that contentious and 
protracted discussion in Parliament would undoubtedly attend any effort to 
amend or codify the Income Tax Acts.  Taxpayers generally were full of fictitious 
and fanciful grievances against the existing law, and many would eagerly take 
the opportunity of pressing their own schemes and amendments, however 
impractical, to the front.  ‘A whole session of Parliament might hardly suffice for 
the passage of any important measure on the subject into law’.299  The 
parliamentary prospects for the introduction of a Bill which was without 
champions, and which (in the case of income tax) was certain to be long and 
likely to absorb a large amount of parliamentary time were poor in the extreme. 
The obvious inference arising is that the prospects for the enactment of any 
Codification Bill actually introduced into Parliament were also poor in the 
extreme.  Three statutes constituting major restatements of the relevant area of 
                                            
297
  This consideration was already causing difficulties well before the twentieth century.  In 
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law were, however, enacted between 1933 and 1952: the Local Government 
Act 1933,300 the Public Health Act 1936301 and the Customs and Excise Act 
1952.302  In the case of all three statutes, however, the Bill presented to 
Parliament was one that had already received detailed scrutiny from those 
concerned with the practical working of the legislation in question – both inside 
and outside central government.  In 1953, it was the view of the First 
Parliamentary Counsel (Ellis) that experience showed that an essential stage in 
the process was that, before introduction of the Bill, a draft should be 
considered in detail and approved by an expert Committee which included 
representatives of the organised interests concerned, and was constituted so as 
to command the respect of MPs and of the public.  If this were done, the Bill 
introduced into Parliament could be represented as having an authoritative 
status, entitling it to be enacted.303  In these circumstances, the government had 
a defence against criticisms of the Bill as introduced, and against proposals for 
amendment; and, in the events that happened, the enactment of each of these 
three statutes did not involve significantly more time than the enactment of a 
Consolidation Bill.  If, therefore, the Bill presented to Parliament already had the 
approval of all significant interests operating in the relevant area of the law, the 
enactment of a codification statute was not an unreasonable dream. 
No such codification statute relating to income tax was enacted.  On the other 
hand, a committee to codify the law of income tax was set up in 1927; and, in 
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1936, that committee produced a draft codification Bill.304  The work of the 
Codification Committee and the reasons why its draft Bill was not enacted are 
considered later.305  The Codification Committee’s draft Bill, however, did not 
have the approval of organised interests generally: and no Bill deriving from the 
committee’s work was introduced into Parliament – let alone enacted. 
Codification, like consolidation, was a process that could accomplish only a 
certain amount – and not more.  A Codification Act could produce a better 
statement of the existing law on a particular topic; but, here too, that better 
statement constituted only a limited gain.  As in the case of consolidation, if the 
change wanted was the incorporation of new material, that change could only 
be made by some other means. 
Conclusion 
The evidence demonstrates that, during the period from 1907 to 1965, the need 
to enact primary legislation in Parliament had consequences for the form of the 
income tax legislation that were of the utmost importance.  The government had 
insufficient parliamentary time to enact all the legislation, including legislation 
relating to income tax, that it wished to enact.  It followed that the legislation that 
the government wished to see enacted would not be enacted in its entirety.  
There would be casualties.  The evidence also demonstrates that, so far as 
legislation in general and legislation relating to income tax in particular were 
concerned, some forms of legislation were better placed to be enacted than 
others.  Finance Acts were virtually certain to be enacted, and were used a 
great deal; programme Acts were used much less frequently and accomplished 
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much less.  It was possible for Consolidation Bills to be enacted occasionally; 
but, during the period from 1907 to 1965, no Codification Bill relating to income 
tax was ever presented to Parliament. 
The result – a result of the utmost importance – was that, during the period from 
1907 to 1965, the United Kingdom polity operated with a default setting so far 
as the enactment of primary legislation relating to income tax was concerned.  
That default setting had two essential characteristics: the primary legislation 
relating to income tax actually enacted used the different forms of legislation 
very unequally; and the primary legislation relating to income tax that the 
government wished to see enacted was enacted only in part.  A default setting 
may nevertheless be overridden.  The chapters that follow investigate the 
capacity, wish and ability of elements of the United Kingdom polity, both inside 
and outside government, to do this. 
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CHAPTER 3: DETERMINANTS WITHIN GOVERNMENT: THE INLAND 
REVENUE 
‘... generally speaking we confine ourselves to suggesting 
appropriate corrections of the anomalies and inequities’.306 
 
Introduction 
Income tax, throughout the twentieth century, was administered by the 
department known as the Inland Revenue.  That department was headed by the 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue, who, collectively, constituted the Board of 
Inland Revenue.  The department had acquired that name in 1849, when the 
Board of Excise and the Board of Stamps and Taxes were consolidated into the 
Board of Inland Revenue;307 and the Board of Stamps and Taxes, in its turn, 
was itself the result of an earlier consolidation, in 1833, of the Board of Stamps 
and the Board of Taxes.  In 1909, the management of excise duties was 
transferred from the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to the Commissioners of 
Customs, who were then to be styled the Commissioners of Customs and 
Excise.308  From this time onwards in the twentieth century, Customs and Excise 
and the Inland Revenue were the two departments of central government with 
the responsibility for obtaining the sums that government wished to obtain. 
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It might be conjectured that the departmental Treasury309 might also wish to 
determine the form of the income tax legislation: but the evidence is that this 
was not the case.  It has been said of the Conservative government from 1951 
to 1955 that it was the Treasury (and, more specifically, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Butler)) who decided how much taxation should be imposed, and of 
what kind, leaving Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue to provide the 
technique;310 and, in 1958, the departmental Treasury took the view that ‘[t]he 
administration and policies of each Revenue Department in their respective 
fields of direct and indirect taxation are very largely self-contained’.311  One year 
later, a Treasury Official considered a suggestion from the Financial and 
Economic Secretaries to the Treasury that it might be useful to introduce a tax 
administration Bill later that year.  ‘In general, I think that we must look to the 
Revenue Departments ... to advise Ministers on this question’.312 
The aim of this chapter is to ascertain the role played by the Inland Revenue in 
determining the form of the income tax legislation.  The department undoubtedly 
had the capacity to act as such a determinant.  It was not forbidden to consider 
that form; and, at all times, the department had quite sufficient staff to deal with 
the subject.  There were 9,750 staff in 1914; 22,850 in 1935; 51,565 in 1956; 
and 58,022 in 1964313 – an expansion that formed part of the general expansion 
of central government.  A capacity to act, however, was by no means the same 
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thing as a wish to act – or success in taking action.  The two questions that will 
be addressed in this chapter in order to ascertain the role of the Inland Revenue 
in determining the form of the income tax legislation are, accordingly, how far 
the Inland Revenue wished to be a determinant of that form; and the extent to 
which it achieved success in pursuing its wishes. 
1. The department’s wish to act as a determinant 
As no senior Inland Revenue official is known to have provided an extended 
analysis of the department’s general approach to the exercise of its functions 
during the first half of the twentieth century,314 the question how far the 
department wished to determine the form of the income tax legislation cannot 
be approached by means of some document prepared within the department.315  
The department’s wishes must be ascertained from other material, beginning 
with its functions as specified in legislation. 
Enactments, consolidated in 1918 and 1952, provided for income tax to be 
under the ‘care and management’ of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 
who were entitled to ‘do all such acts as may be deemed necessary and 
expedient for raising, collecting, receiving and accounting for the tax’.316  Similar 
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  For one account of Inland Revenue policy work, written many years later by a Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue, see AJG Isaac, ‘Policy Guide’.  The date ‘February 1993’ appears on the 
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wording could also be found in another Act in force throughout the twentieth 
century – the Inland Revenue Regulation Act 1890.317  That statute provided for 
the appointment of ‘persons to be Commissioners for the collection and 
management of inland revenue’; and the Commissioners, in their turn, were 
under a duty to appoint officers ‘for collecting, receiving, managing, and 
accounting for inland revenue’.  ‘Inland revenue’, in its turn, was defined to 
mean ‘the revenue of the United Kingdom collected or imposed as stamp 
duties, taxes, and duties of excise, and placed under the care and management 
of the Commissioners’318 – a definition that included income tax. 
The statutory duties imposed upon the department formed the natural starting 
point for the Inland Revenue’s approach to the exercise of its functions.  In 
1919, Sir Thomas Collins, the Chief Inspector of Taxes, when giving evidence 
to the Royal Commission on the Income Tax, read a statement which referred 
to the statutory provisions relating to the department’s functions; and went on to 
state that the Board of Inland Revenue ensured ‘the continuous and consistent 
application of the machinery of administration’ provided by the Income Tax Act 
1918.319  In 1948, an internal document stated that ‘[t]he primary function of the 
Board of Inland Revenue is the management and collection of the direct 
taxes’;320 and, in the 1960s, Sir Alexander Johnston’s work, The Inland 
Revenue began with the statement that ‘[t]he Inland Revenue is responsible for 
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the administration of the direct taxes’.321  The work then made the points that 
the most important and best known of the direct taxes was income tax; and that 
all direct taxes were imposed by Parliament.  ‘The Revenue’s business is to 
administer them: that is, to ascertain in each case the amount of tax payable 
under the law and to secure its payment’.322  ‘It will not be overlooked’, the First 
Parliamentary Counsel (Sir Granville Ram) wrote in 1945, when the future form 
of the income tax legislation was under discussion, ‘that whatever Act is 
ultimately passed, it will be the Board of Inland Revenue that will have to work 
it’.323 
The Inland Revenue’s view that it was responsible for the administration of the 
direct taxes had consequences.  It was the opinion of Sir Cornelius Gregg, 
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue from 1942 to 1948, that ‘[o]ur work ... 
is generally regulative’.324  It was also Gregg’s view that the nature of the 
department’s work could be related to an internal organisation which he 
considered unusual: for the day to day executive work of assessment was 
carried out through branches and not by administrative staff at headquarters.  
Around 1965 (the time at which Johnston was writing), out of the total staff of 
nearly 60,000, more than 50,000 were employed in the Valuation Branch, in the 
Accountant General’s Branch, and in the branch headed by the Chief Inspector 
of Taxes.  In addition to these three branches, several smaller Offices also 
existed, such as the Solicitor’s Office, the Estate Duty Office and the Surtax 
Office.  As Johnston described the department’s organisation, the executive 
work was entrusted to a number of ‘branches’, while policy was handled in a 
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small central unit which had no substantial executive functions, but maintained 
close contact with the heads of the branches and their headquarters staffs.325  
The Inland Revenue, although one of the largest government departments, had 
one of the smallest staffs at its administrative headquarters.326 
An internal organisation with these characteristics had the consequence that the 
consideration of tax policy formed part of the official duties of a very small 
percentage of the department’s total workforce.  At the centre of the 
department, the Board of Inland Revenue was supported, in its care and 
management of income tax, by the Secretaries’ Office.  In the early 1960s, that 
Office consisted of some 780 staff and had three Divisions.  The Statistics and 
Intelligence Division produced the statistics and estimates required by the 
Board; and the Establishment Division dealt with general organisation and 
efficiency and with matters of personnel.  It was the final Division, the Stamps 
and Taxes Division, which carried out the general administration of the Inland 
Revenue taxes; and this Division had a total staff of about 120.  In that Division, 
the Inland Revenue taxes were divided up among the Assistant Secretaries.  
Thus, one Assistant Secretary dealt with all matters arising in connection with 
Estate Duty and another with stamp duties.  Income tax, on the other hand, had 
to be divided into a number of different subjects, such as PAYE and double 
taxation relief.327  If not Commissioners of Inland Revenue themselves, it was 
overwhelmingly probable that the officials with responsibility for advising on tax 
policy would be located in the Stamps and Taxes Division of the Secretaries’ 
Office and would work directly to the Commissioners. 
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The Inland Revenue, therefore, was a department where nearly all the staff was 
engaged in work in which they did not have to consider the form of income tax 
legislation at all; and this subject was of relevance only for a small and highly 
finite number of individuals.  Furthermore, even for those individuals, work 
associated with the form of the income tax legislation was unlikely to be a major 
preoccupation.  The department’s administrative staff, according to Gregg, 
devoted themselves to the consideration of new issues that might arise in the 
executive branches and to the general surveillance of how the work of the 
executive branches was being carried out ‘together of course with the particular 
duty of advising the Chancellor on changes in the taxation law’.328  This 
formulation carried the implication that work arising in the branches had pride of 
place, with advice on changes in taxation law following on behind, as 
necessary. 
The overall result, therefore, was that the Inland Revenue was a department 
that was primarily concerned to administer existing arrangements.  It followed 
that the form of the income tax legislation was not, in itself, of primary concern 
to it.  Another matter that was not of primary concern to the department was the 
bringing into existence of other, different, arrangements. 
The form of the income tax legislation was, accordingly, a peripheral matter so 
far as the Inland Revenue was concerned – but it did not follow that the form of 
that legislation was a subject in which the department was uninterested.  The 
department could be expected to take such an interest if its general approach 
prompted it to do so.  There is evidence that the Inland Revenue held the view 
that the basic structure of the income tax was good; that income tax was well 
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administered by departmental officials; and that income tax law and practice 
were large and complicated subjects. 
The basic structure of the income tax, according to some speakers and writers 
in the early years of the twentieth century, was a matter that should be 
considered as part of an examination of the entire structure of income tax law 
and practice; and, shortly before the outbreak of the first world war, the 
government had taken the decision that there should be a major investigation of 
income tax law.
329
  No further action was taken until after the war; but a Royal 
Commission was appointed in 1919 and reported the following year.330  On the 
subject of the basic structure of the income tax, that Report made highly 
satisfactory reading for the department.  The Commission’s recommendations, 
though numerous and far-reaching, did not amount to a suggestion for any 
fundamental change in the nature of the tax.  There was ‘no attempt whatever 
to overturn the whole framework of the tax and set up in its place something 
else bearing the same name’.331  More than forty years later, it was Johnston’s 
opinion that, whatever the changes in the department’s organisation, there 
seemed to be no reason to expect any change in the basic structure of the 
taxing process.  The Inland Revenue would be responsible for assessing and 
collecting the direct taxes; and taxpayers would continue to discuss their 
liabilities with Inland Revenue officers.  It was likely that agreement would be 
reached; but the taxpayer would always have the right of appeal to an 
independent authority.  The arrangements for appeals worked well, and it 
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seemed safe to say that no one, and certainly not the Inland Revenue, would 
wish to disturb them.332 
These views were not confined to the Inland Revenue, but were held more 
widely.  They were held, for example, by ERA Seligman,
333
 an academic 
working in the United States, who published a work on the income tax in 1911.  
Seligman concluded the part of his work devoted to the United Kingdom by 
observing that income tax had become a ‘mighty fiscal and social engine’.  The 
tax was a signal example of how ‘sound theory and admirable administration’ 
might combine to overcome long-continued prejudice and opposition.  The 
United Kingdom’s income tax was ‘a phenomenal success, because it is 
recognised by the public as a loyal and well-considered effort to accomplish that 
which the people desire, and in a way which commands their sympathetic 
approval’.334  Seligman’s work was known within the Inland Revenue a few 
years later: for a brief quotation from it appeared in the evidence presented by 
the department to the 1919 Royal Commission.335 
One aspect of the structure of the income tax was singled out for special 
attention and praise: the principle of deduction at the source.336  In 1919, Sir 
Richard Hopkins, the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, when giving 
evidence to the Royal Commission, explained that, when it was possible to do 
so, income tax was usually collected at the source by deducting it before it 
reached the person to whom it belonged; and this method of deduction at the 
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source was applied, with certain exceptions, to every class of income which 
could be so treated – and no less than 70% of the whole of the income tax was 
so secured.  He had ‘no hesitation in saying that it is this feature of the Income 
Tax which constitutes its peculiar distinction and has been responsible for the 
success which has attended the collection of the tax throughout its history’.  It 
was a subject ‘vital to the success of the Income Tax as a practical vehicle of 
taxation’.337  At that same time, another Inland Revenue official described the 
principle of deduction at the source as one ‘which has been of incalculable 
benefit to the revenue of this country, and which in spite of some modern 
encroachments remains the great buttress of Income Tax stability and 
efficiency’.338  The Royal Commission also agreed, stating that ‘[t]axation by 
deduction at the source is of paramount importance lying as it does at the very 
root of our Income Tax system’.339  A good many years later, in 1940, when 
asked to comment on suggestions originating from Keynes,340 it was to the 
centrality of the principle of deduction at the source that Hopkins referred.  Most 
countries, according to Hopkins, ‘raise their income taxes in a primitive way by 
direct assessment’.  In the United Kingdom, however, income tax was collected 
at the source.  ‘This fact completely transforms the technical picture.  I cannot 
believe Keynes would have had the audacity to represent his proposal as a 
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perfectly simple and straightforward operation if this fact had been properly 
present in his mind’.341 
Support for the principle of deduction at the source gave rise to a departmental 
aim.  The evidence is that, over a period of many years, the Inland Revenue 
favoured compulsory income tax deductions from the earnings of employees – 
the extension of the principle of deduction at the source to an exceedingly 
important category of income.  In 1916, for example, when the department had 
to consider an amendment tabled to that year’s Finance Bill imposing a 
compulsory deduction from employees’ earnings, it noted that, from a revenue 
and administrative point of view, the proposal would no doubt be advantageous; 
but probably all that could be done at that time was to encourage and facilitate 
voluntary arrangements between employers and employees which might, in the 
course of time, lead to some general acquiescence in a system of deduction 
from wages – either in the first instance or the last resort.342  Then, shortly after 
the first world war, the Royal Commission received evidence from ER Harrison, 
an Assistant Secretary with the department.  Harrison’s written evidence was 
that, from the department’s point of view, ‘the suggestion that tax should be 
deducted at the source from wages would, if practicable, have many 
advantages’.  His oral evidence was that ‘[s]peaking purely from a Revenue 
point of view, anything which assisted in the deduction of Income Tax at the 
source would be helpful to us as a principle’.  The recent history of this subject, 
however, did not encourage the department at that time.343  During the years 
between the wars, both employers and employees continued to be uninterested 
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  TNA file IR 40/6602.  Note headed ‘Note on some technical aspects of the Keynes Plan’ (12 
March 1940). 
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  TNA file AM 6/2, fo 501.  ‘Notes on Amendments and New Clauses relating to income tax’. 
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in the compulsory deduction of income tax from earnings.344  The Inland 
Revenue’s aim of extending the principle of deduction of income tax at the 
source to payments of employment income nevertheless remained – and was 
one of the most important of the department’s ‘private cargoes and destinations’ 
to which Amery referred.345  In 1940, the department was able to make progress 
in obtaining its wish.346 
The Inland Revenue also held the view that income tax was well administered 
by departmental officials; and this view was also supported by the Royal 
Commission that reported in 1920: for it took the view that ‘the practical 
administration of the Income Tax is in a highly efficient state’.347  The witnesses 
who had appeared before the Commission had testified to the general 
excellence of the Board of Inland Revenue’s administration.  The financial 
position of over six million people was brought under review annually for the 
purpose of determining the income tax they should pay: and the main direction 
and control of the great machine necessary to accomplish this end devolved 
upon the Board.  If any considerable amount of dissatisfaction existed with the 
administration of the tax, the Commission believed that it would have been 
alerted to that point; but the absence of adverse criticism, and, still more, the 
opinion the Commission had been able to form during its inquiry, compelled it to 
endorse the testimony of witnesses as to the general efficiency of the work 
carried out by the Board and by the officials for whom they were directly 
responsible.  The growth and development of the tax in the years before the 
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 As the matter was put in 1931, ‘[t]he deduction by employers of Income Tax from wages has 
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Commission was set up, and especially during the first world war, had thrown 
great burdens upon the administration, but the system had shown no sign of 
giving way under the strain.  The growth in the yield and pressure of the tax had 
not been accompanied by any serious complaint against the administration.348  
‘In short, the Income Tax is successfully administered’.349  ‘I hold no special 
brief for the bureaucracy’, Lord Macmillan wrote in his autobiography, ‘but I 
think I should record my very high opinion of the fairness and competence of 
the Inland Revenue Department, after these years of close consultations with its 
officials.  No other department is in such intimate contact with the affairs of 
every one of us, yet how seldom do we hear any complaints of their 
administration!’350 
The administration of income tax also gave rise to a departmental aim.  The 
report of the Royal Commission, in 1920,351 made many recommendations for 
changes in the manner in which income tax was administered; and those 
recommendations would have increased the powers of departmental officials at 
the expense of the General Commissioners of Income tax.  The Revenue Bill of 
1921, which provided for such changes to be made, was, however, 
withdrawn.352  The department would nevertheless have welcomed the 
enactment of those provisions; and a wish to increase the department’s powers 
(with the department taking the principal role, in law as well as fact, in the 
administration of the tax) was another of the important ‘private cargoes and 
destinations’ which the department wished to see accomplished.  In 1964, the 
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department achieved success in obtaining its wish when the Income Tax 
Management Act 1964 reached the statute book. 
The Inland Revenue also held the view that income tax law and practice were 
large and complicated subjects.  The evidence presented by Sir Thomas 
Collins, the Chief Inspector of Taxes, to the 1919 Royal Commission was that 
income tax had reached such a point, both in importance and complexity, that 
many parts of the work of its administration could only be carried out by highly 
trained officials who devoted their whole time and energy to the task.  Long and 
special training resulting in an intimate acquaintance with the law and practice 
relating to the tax was essential to the efficient performance of many of the daily 
operations connected with the work of assessment.353  At that same time, the 
Solicitor of Inland Revenue expressed the view that few individuals, except 
those who had ‘to administer the law of income tax all day and every day of 
their lives could walk with any certainty through the tangled jungle of confused 
provisions, and even they were occasionally caught tripping by the Courts’.354  
‘The growing volume and complexity of the tax law will make increasing 
demands on the knowledge and ability of the staff, and particularly of inspectors 
of taxes’ Johnston noted in 1965.355 
The department’s work on the preparation of the Income Tax Act 1952356 
provides evidence that income tax law and practice were large and complicated 
subjects and that income tax was well administered.  Experienced officials were 
well placed to play a valuable role in the preparation of a large and complex 
Consolidation Bill; and Sir John Rowlatt, one of the Parliamentary Counsel and 
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the drafter of the Bill, praised the Inland Revenue’s technical expertise in a 
handwritten letter to the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue.357  Rowlatt 
thought it ‘only decent that I should put on record the exceedingly high view I 
formed of the Revenue performance’ in preparing the Bill and assisting in its 
enactment by Parliament.  The members of a committee that had worked with 
him over the detail of the clauses of the Bill were singled out for particular 
praise.  ‘They were ideally placed to gum the whole thing up, and nothing would 
have been easier than to do so’.  The committee members, however, had kept 
their heads and their tempers – and Rowlatt did not believe that much had been 
missed.  ‘Whether the thing will work or be an improvement on the existing 
chaos remains to be seen, but if it doesn’t, or isn’t, it isn’t the Revenue’s fault.  
Indeed, with any other Department, I don’t believe the thing would have stood a 
chance of getting on its feet at all’.  That last sentence may be noted 
particularly.  There is no need to discount these compliments on the basis that 
such politeness lubricated the inner workings of government.  There was no 
necessity for Rowlatt to have sent his handwritten letter; and the detailed 
contents of that letter may be taken to express views that he genuinely held.  
There is no reason to dispute Rowlatt’s view that departmental officials played a 
major role in the successful preparation of the 1952 Act – and were essential for 
its successful enactment. 
When attention is turned from the department’s general approach to the 
department’s approach to change, the implications of the general approach may 
be observed.  There was a tension between the view that income tax law and 
practice were large and intricate subjects (with the implication that legislative 
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changes were capable of bringing simplification and improvement – and should 
accordingly be supported) and the views that the structure of the tax was good 
and that the tax was well administered (with the implication that legislative 
changes were capable of giving rise to operational inefficiencies – and should 
accordingly be opposed).  According to Johnston, who described the dilemma in 
the early 1960s, the department found ‘no joy in an elaborate and complicated 
code’.358  The department’s interest lay in adherence to first principles and in 
simplification.  These might make for ease of administration, for ease in staff 
training and for a better tax yield to be expected from a generally understood 
and widely accepted scheme of taxation.  ‘But the road to simplification is a 
hard one and many factors operate in the other direction’.359  So, on the one 
hand, the department alleged that it was entirely willing to consider major 
changes in income tax law and practice – and, accordingly, in the form of 
income tax legislation as well.  That was the theory.  On the other hand, 
however, the department was capable of finding that any particular change 
actually proposed had more operational disadvantages than advantages.  That 
was the practice. 
The evidence is that the Inland Revenue was suspicious of major change in 
general – and, accordingly, of major changes to the income tax legislation in 
particular.  In the life of Sir Richard Hopkins360 he wrote for the Dictionary of 
National Biography, Sir Wilfrid Eady, a leading Treasury Official, stated that 
Hopkins’s work at the Inland Revenue ‘had taught him that taxation was not a 
fantasy but a practical affair and he knew the two great secrets of his old 
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department: what could be managed, and how far the taxpayers could be 
pushed’.361  No other statement is known to the effect that these two matters 
were ‘the two great secrets’ of the Inland Revenue during the first half of the 
twentieth century; but there is much evidence that these two matters were 
present in the minds of senior Inland Revenue officials, who could, and did, 
view them as constraints when new policies were put forward – with the 
consequence that changes in the form of income tax legislation were not 
favoured.  The two matters, however, were perfectly capable of being discussed 
in the same document – and so, rather than discussing the two matters in turn, 
the existence of ‘the two great secrets’ will be demonstrated by considering a 
number of official documents produced by the department. 
In 1919, the Inland Revenue produced a long memorandum on the subject of 
the land values duties imposed by the Finance (1909-10) Act 1910362 – a 
memorandum that pointed to their abolition.363  According to the department, 
those duties were complex.  Taxpayers were highly unlikely to be able to 
estimate their own liability or to understand the computations when received; 
and there was an organised opposition which had extended to the assessment 
and collection of the duties.  Three of those duties had resulted in a negligible 
yield of revenue; had been received with widespread hostility by the public; and 
had been found extremely difficult and laborious to work – even in a partial 
manner.  They were either wholly or partially in suspense.  ‘The smooth 
administration of taxation must to a great extent depend upon the consent of the 
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public to bear the taxes imposed upon it’;364 and, in the case of the land values 
duties, such consent had never been apparent on the part of the bulk of the 
taxpayers affected.  The Inland Revenue was also concerned that its difficulties 
with the land value duties might adversely affect the attitude of taxpayers 
towards the other taxes that it managed: the department was responsible for 
raising an enormous revenue from taxpayers who, following the end of the first 
world war, were, as a body, becoming more critical and less disposed to pay.365 
Sir Percy Thompson,
366
 the Deputy Chairman of the Board, voiced similar 
concerns when considering the direct taxation of the wealthy during the financial 
crisis of 1931.  If direct taxation were to be increased further, there would be 
more avoidance and evasion.  Those consequences could only be counteracted 
by an increase in the department’s staff, endowed with wider powers of inquiry 
and of coercion of the taxpayer.  ‘It is almost certain that in the effort to enforce 
efficiently the collection of increased taxation we should lose that willing co-
operation of the great majority of taxpayers on which the success of the tax 
machine depends, with disastrous results to the yield of revenue’.367 
The ‘two great secrets’ may also be observed to be present in the mind of Sir 
Gerald Canny,368 the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue at the beginning 
of the second world war – a time when he was asked to consider possible new 
taxes.  In dealing with the possibility of a levy on war wealth, Canny considered 
whether such a tax could be successfully administered.  ‘The answer to this is 
“yes”, subject to two main points which it is necessary strongly to emphasise’.  
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The first point was that no tax could be successfully administered which did not 
commend itself as a fair and reasonable proposition (although a regrettable 
necessity) to the bulk of the taxpayers who were subjected to it.  A levy on 
increases of capital wealth was a novelty in the United Kingdom’s taxation 
system and its burden would be one of peculiar severity: it was essential that 
the proposals should carry with them, if not whole-hearted approbation, then at 
least a recognition of the necessity for their imposition and of general principles 
of equity underlying them.  The second point was that there must be adequate 
trained staff available to administer the levy.  The public was accustomed to 
expect a high standard of efficiency in tax administration.  This would especially 
be required in the administration of a novel and heavy levy; ‘and it would be little 
short of disastrous if the assessment and collection were inefficiently and 
unfairly carried out’.369 
Two months later, Canny was also required to consider income tax suggestions 
originating with Keynes;370 and those suggestions, Canny believed, ‘would 
introduce complications into the income tax assessment which we simply could 
not deal with’.  ‘The practicability of these suggestions has to be considered in 
relation to assessment and collection’;371 and here Canny could see operational 
problems.  It was not a good thing (he alleged) to use the income tax for any 
purpose other than that for which it was intended: that of raising from every 
individual his fair contribution towards the national expenditure.  It would be 
dangerous to use it for any other purpose if that use involved tampering with the 
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characteristics of the income tax (graduation and differentiation) which made it, 
above all other taxes, the tax which represented a scientific measurement of the 
taxpayer’s ability to pay.  ‘The successful administration of the Income Tax 
depends upon the willingness to pay of the taxpayer’; and, unless the new use 
of the income tax could command the taxpayer’s willingness to pay, income tax 
administration would be prejudiced.372 
The department’s suspicion of major change was also noted by Samuel Brittan, 
a journalist writing in the early 1960s.  Brittan’s view was that the Inland 
Revenue opposed many reforms – a state of affairs he attributed to the 
department’s ‘rather limited notion of equity.  Tax collection, in its view depends 
on general acceptance of the system as a fair one’ (Europe being littered with 
the ruins of tax systems, undermined through lack of popular consent).  Behind 
a great deal of the department’s talk of equity, however, Brittan thought, was the 
unchallenged assumption that the status quo was ‘fair’ – and, accordingly, not in 
need of change.  ‘Unfortunately “let sleeping dogs lie” proves a very prudent 
maxim in this country’.373 
The Inland Revenue’s general attitude towards legislative changes arose in the 
context of correspondence dating from 1951 and 1952.374  In April 1952, in a 
letter to Bamford, the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, Rowlatt (one of 
the Parliamentary Counsel and the drafter of the 1952 Act) reflected on the 
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department’s general role in the legislative process relating to income tax.  
Against the immediate background of a letter critical of Rowlatt’s belief that 
progress in improving the form of income tax legislation was impossible, Rowlatt 
went on to say that the increasing complexity of the Income Tax Acts was not 
curable, or capable of significant mitigation, by anything that a drafter could do – 
it simply reflected the complication of the results which he was instructed to 
produce.  There then followed a most perceptive analysis of the department’s 
approach to legislative change: 
The instructions he [i.e. the drafter] gets depend, mostly, on the 
submissions which you make to the Chancellor of the day.  In 
framing these submissions, you regularly aim at simplicity, in the 
sense of removal of inequities and anomalies in so far as they 
give trouble in practice, but, so far as I can see, you couldn’t care 
less about them so far as they don’t, and you never make a clean 
sweep if, by not making a clean sweep, you can avoid controversy 
on a point which does not matter in practice.  This, though it 
sometimes shortens and simplifies the clause in the particular 
Finance Bill, inevitably complicates the general picture and the 
effects are cumulative.  Don’t think I’m blaming you – you should 
know what is possible and how far the increasing complication of 
the Acts matters better than I do – but I do say that nobody but 
you can do anything effective about it.375 
Having marked the first sentence quoted, Bamford sent the letter to another 
Commissioner, Verity, with the comment ‘I suppose ... [this] is not far from the 
truth?’  Verity’s endorsed reply was ‘That is so.  In other words we only make 
submissions to the Chancellor on points which are of real practical importance, 
& generally speaking we confine ourselves to suggesting appropriate 
corrections of the anomalies and inequities’.  Verity’s endorsed reply, therefore, 
indicated that the matters which the department considered should receive 
priority were those of practical importance for the administration of the direct 
taxes.  The form of the income tax legislation was not, in itself, a matter of 
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practical importance to the department.  It followed that, for the Inland Revenue, 
a general wish to determine the form of the income tax legislation was not a 
departmental priority. 
2. The extent of the department’s success in acting as a determinant 
There were, however, a number of contexts in which the Inland Revenue may 
be seen to be giving direct consideration to the form of the income tax 
legislation.  In some contexts the department acted as a determinant producing 
inertia, in others as a determinant producing change: and these two categories 
are now examined in order to assess the extent to which the department 
achieved success in acting as a determinant of that form. 
(1) The department as a determinant producing inertia 
The Inland Revenue constituted a determinant producing inertia in the form of 
the income tax legislation in dealing with the wish of one Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Churchill) to simplify the income tax system; in dealing with the 
proposal that the entirety of income tax law should be codified; and in dealing 
with the proposal that the law relating to the administration of income tax should 
be codified. 
Churchill was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1924 to 1929 and wished to 
simplify the income tax system – an aim that had obvious implications for the 
form of the income tax legislation.  This aim was considered both by the 
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue (Sir Richard Hopkins) and by an 
Inland Revenue Departmental Committee.  On 27 October 1925, Hopkins sent 
Churchill a memorandum which contained ‘some observations as desired by 
you on the complexity of the Income Tax system and the practicability of 
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remedial measures’;376 and, during the period from 1907 to 1965, this is the 
memorandum, prepared by an Inland Revenue official, which contains the most 
sustained analysis known of the complexities of the income tax system and of 
how those complexities might be dealt with. 
The complexity of the income tax system, in Hopkins’s view, had three major 
causes.  The first was that the ascertainment of ‘income’ involved the 
consideration of many difficult problems: and, with ‘the ever-changing methods 
of the business world’, fresh problems were always arising.  The second major 
cause of complexity arose from taxation at the source.  A sum from which 
income tax was deducted at the source was liable to income tax at the time the 
income was received: and income tax was accordingly levied on current 
income.  In the case of other gains liable to income tax however (trading profits 
for a particular period for example), those gains could only be ascertained after 
that period had ended: and income tax was accordingly levied on past 
income.377  Hopkins’s third major cause of complexity was to be found in the law 
and practice relating to the administration of the tax.  An account was then 
given of the law introduced in 1842; of the manner in which the law did not 
accord with practice in 1925; and of the failure to enact the Revenue Bill in 
1921. 
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Hopkins’s approach to ‘remedial measures’, on the other hand, was far less 
incisive.  In the case of administrative matters, the Revenue Bill of 1921 had 
been withdrawn; and ‘[it] appears useless even to consider its re-introduction at 
the present time’.  So far as complexities deriving from the system of taxation at 
the source were concerned, and subject to one qualification,378 ‘these matters 
are not susceptible of remedy except by abolishing the system of taxation at the 
source, a remedy which undoubtedly would be altogether worse than the 
disease’.  On this matter, therefore, the status quo was not in need of change. 
On the question of the complexities arising from the ascertainment of ‘income’, 
Hopkins thought that ‘[the] only question which seems to arise in this connection 
is whether this mass of rules could be expressed in more logical order or in 
clearer or more concise form’.  The question of the form of the income tax 
legislation accordingly arose directly.  Hopkins then went on to discuss whether 
a significant advantage would be gained by a re-arrangement and re-expression 
of the Income Tax Acts.  As the problem presented itself at that time, the 
suggested attempt to re-express the existing legislation still had, no doubt, 
some attractions.  There was, however, practically no public demand for it.  If it 
were taken in hand, it seemed very doubtful whether, at any date in the near 
future, the large amount of parliamentary time necessary for the revising 
measure could be found.  It also had to be borne in mind that the existing 
statutes had been so frequently under the review of the Courts that most of their 
ambiguities (so Hopkins hoped) had now been removed by case law.  ‘This 
undertaking would be a work of years rather than of months and one which 
would call for the best brains of the Department, though they could not easily at 
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present be spared’.  It was, however, a task which could be undertaken should 
Churchill so wish. 
This was advocacy of the most tepid kind.  Indeed, the overall impression left by 
Hopkins’s memorandum is that, while he was acutely aware of the complexities 
inherent in the income tax system, the useful changes he could envisage were 
few – and these might well not be worth the effort involved in bringing them into 
existence.  On this basis, therefore, Hopkins may be said to have favoured 
inertia and not change.  He was most certainly not exerting himself to bring 
about change in the form of the income tax legislation.  ‘I approached this quest 
at the outset with only modest hopes of success’ he wrote to Churchill one year 
later, when the prospects for a scheme to simplify the income tax system were 
much improved.379 
Churchill’s wish to simplify the income tax system was considered not only by 
Hopkins, but also by an Inland Revenue Departmental Committee; and, during 
his early years at the Exchequer, Churchill’s relations with this committee were 
poor.  A critical report on one of Churchill’s proposals, dated 18 December 
1925,380 was followed by a minute from Churchill criticising the committee.  
Churchill, at one point, accused the committee of holding the view that ‘a 
system of taxation so complicated and elaborate that very few tax payers can 
understand it, the collection of which requires an Inland Revenue Department 
costing upwards of 6 million sterling a year, is the last word in efficiency and 
simplicity’.381  The departmental reply, given by Hopkins, was that Churchill had 
‘quite misapprehended the attitude from which the Committee approached this 
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380
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 3-40 (Report) and fos 41-109 (Appendices to the Report). 
381
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 109-14.  Minute, Churchill to Hopkins, 27 December 1925. 
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subject.  No body of officials continually in touch with the working of the Income 
Tax imagines that it has no anomalies or is readily understood and followed by 
taxpayers as a whole’.382  Hopkins then counter-attacked, pointing out that the 
problem of finding a superior alternative was an exceedingly perplexing one – 
and had baffled many enquirers in the past.  What the Departmental Committee 
felt was that the particular proposals which they had under consideration 
mitigated few, and aggravated many, of the existing troubles.  As that was their 
conclusion, it followed that their report must in the main be directed to indicating 
the increased difficulties with which they expected the taxpayer would be 
confronted.  In the spring of 1926 the situation was still difficult; and Churchill 
told the Attorney-General (Hogg) that ‘[a] Committee of officials ... at Somerset 
House’ had ‘up to the present ... not met with the success that I had hoped’.383  
The inference to be drawn is that, during the early period of Churchill’s 
Chancellorship, there was a mismatch between Churchill (who, his critics might 
allege, had insufficient technical knowledge and an excess of reforming zeal) 
and Inland Revenue departmental officials (who, their critics might allege, had 
an excess of technical knowledge and insufficient reforming zeal).  The short 
term consequence was that progress towards income tax simplification was not 
made.384 
The Inland Revenue is also seen to be a determinant producing inertia during a 
period from 1936 until the early 1950s when the department had to deal with the 
proposal that the entirety of income tax law should be codified.  The department 
first set out its views in 1936 and the following years, when it had to respond to 
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  TNA file T 171/255, fos 115-22.  Memorandum, Hopkins to Churchill, 5 January 1926. 
383
  TNA file IR 63/114, fos 698-9.  Letter, Churchill to Hogg, 31 March 1926. 
384
  By the end of 1926, however, progress had been made.  The later history of Churchill’s 
simplification scheme is considered in chapter 5, section 3(2), below. 
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the publication of the Report of the Income Tax Codification Committee and of 
the draft Bill which the committee had produced.385  When the contents of the 
draft Bill were examined in detail, the department had many observations.386 
So far as the contents of the draft Bill were concerned, the Inland Revenue’s 
general view was that the Bill, considered as a whole, would prove of great 
value – but that the draft Bill also required many alterations.  Legislative change 
was supported as a matter of general principle – but was found to give rise to 
difficulties in its operational detail.  At the end of 1937 the alterations proposed 
were grouped under a number of broad headings;387 and, in addition, there 
were three matters where the department considered it necessary to obtain a 
decision from the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the modifications that 
would be proposed to the draft Bill.  One of those matters was ‘the classification 
of income for the purposes of the actual charging of the tax’;388 and this matter 
was elaborated in a draft memorandum, which was prepared during January 
1938, with a view to its being submitted to the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(Simon).  The draft memorandum explained that the department’s detailed 
examination of the committee’s treatment of this topic had forced it to the 
conclusion that the committee’s aim at intelligibility had fallen a long way short 
of realisation.  Far from securing simplicity, the committee had actually 
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  Income Tax Codification Committee, Report: Volume 1: Report and Appendices (Cmd 5131, 
1936)  and Report: Volume 2: Draft of an Income Tax Bill (Cmd 5132, 1936).  For the work of 
the Codification Committee and the fate of its draft Bill see chapter 6, section 1, below. 
386
  TNA files IR 40/19419 and IR 40/19420 are two bound volumes in which the Inland 
Revenue’s observations are collected. 
387
  Those headings were the correction of accidental errors; the modification of some provisions 
relating to the machinery of administration; the alteration, in details only, of some of the new 
provisions introduced for the protection of the taxpayer; the amplification of some provisions 
designed to codify case law and existing practice; the amendment of some provisions involving 
departures from existing practice; and modification of the provisions relating to penalties. 
388
  TNA file T 172/1860.  Submission, Canny to Chancellor of the Exchequer [Simon], 17 
December 1937.  The other two matters were the definition of residence and the allowance for 
wear and tear of machinery and plant. 
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introduced complexities.  Indeed, the anomalies, the circumlocution and the 
needless complexities were so serious that corrective amendments were 
absolutely necessary.  The actual classification of income was considered to be 
open to two particular objections: it was cumbrous and circumlocutory; and the 
kinds of income to which the charge to income tax was in fact to be applied had 
to be grouped later on in the Bill for the purpose of applying machinery and 
other provisions.  The department’s overall verdict on the Codification 
Committee’s classification of income was that it was ‘unsuitable to an Income 
Tax an essential feature of which is taxation at the source’.389  So far as the 
parliamentary prospects of any Codification Bill actually presented were 
concerned, however, the department took a remarkably optimistic view.  It 
argued that, although such a Bill would differ at many points from the draft Bill 
prepared by the Codification Committee, serious opposition was unlikely – 
either from the members of the former Committee or from MPs.390 
These views were contested within government: in particular by the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel.  The draft memorandum on classification of income was 
shown to Stainton, one of the Parliamentary Counsel, who felt ‘compelled to 
attack it ... violently’.391  Stainton considered that the Codification Committee’s 
classification had given him a clearer picture of income tax law than he had ever 
had before; and he agreed with the Committee that it was an improvement on 
the existing system to which the department wished to revert.  The ‘gulf’ 
between Stainton and an Inland Revenue Committee which had considered the 
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  TNA file IR 40/5274.  This piece contains both the draft Memorandum on ‘Classification of 
Income’ and a draft covering note.  A marginal annotation on the draft covering note ‘Memo on 
Reclassification – sent to Stainton January 1938’ establishes the date at which these 
documents came into existence. 
390
  TNA file T 172/1860.  Submission, Canny to Chancellor of the Exchequer [Simon], 17 
December 1937.  
391
  TNA file IR 40/5274.  Letter, Stainton to Canny (marked ‘Personal’), 5 February 1938. 
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Codification Committee’s draft Bill seemed ‘unbridgeable’ – mainly, Stainton 
thought, because the Departmental Committee ‘have such a profound 
understanding of the form in which the existing law is expressed that they 
cannot appreciate the difficulties it presents to people who have not devoted 
most of their lives to studying it’.  ‘I wish to goodness I could convince you of the 
righteousness of my cause, but I am afraid this seems past hope’.392  So far as 
the Bill’s parliamentary prospects were concerned, the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel took the view that it was completely foreseeable that 
there might be hostility to an Income Tax Codification Bill that differed 
substantially from the one prepared by the Codification Committee – both from 
the members of the former committee and from MPs.  In those circumstances, 
the Bill’s parliamentary prospects might be expected to plummet.393  The view 
that the Inland Revenue was minimising the parliamentary difficulties involved in 
enacting the Bill that the department wished to see introduced was also taken 
by Hopkins, now the Second Permanent Secretary at the Treasury, and by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Private Secretary, JHE Woods.394  In the events 
that happened during the first half of 1938, work on preparing a Codification Bill 
for presentation to Parliament stopped – and was never resumed.395  The result 
was inertia – and not change. 
Several conclusions may be drawn from the Inland Revenue’s actions during 
these events.  The department was unquestionably one determinant of the final 
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  TNA file IR 40/5274.  Letters, Stainton to Canny, 1 February 1938 and 5 February 1938 
(twice). 
393
  TNA file T 172/1860.  Letter, Stainton to Canny, 8 December 1937. 
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  TNA file T 172/1860.  Memorandum by JHE Woods, dated 10 January 1938; and 
manuscript note (by Woods).  The official papers once in the possession of Sir Richard Hopkins 
include carbon copies of the major documents submitted to Simon; but no contribution in writing 
from Hopkins himself (See TNA file T 175/92 (Part 2)).  The obvious inference is that Hopkins 
communicated his views orally. 
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  These events are further considered below in chapter 6, section 1.  See also Pearce (n 329) 
158. 
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outcome: for it was accepted throughout that any legislation introduced into 
Parliament must be acceptable to it.  The department, however, was not a 
decisive determinant.  Its opposition to the committee’s classification of income 
and its analysis of the parliamentary prospects of any Bill actually presented 
were both criticised; and the actual outcome did not depend on the 
department’s arguments.  In retrospect, furthermore, the department’s 
arguments do not appear impressive.  As regards the contents of the Bill, the 
department’s wish to defend the effective administration of the tax was entirely 
comprehensible – but opposition to a different classification of income may have 
been unnecessarily conservative.  The department’s optimistic arguments about 
the prospects for the enactment of any Bill actually presented to Parliament also 
look much less convincing than the pessimistic arguments deployed by others. 
The Inland Revenue also set out its views on the codification of the entirety of 
income tax law shortly after the second world war, during a period beginning 
late in 1945, after Terence Donovan, a newly-elected Labour MP, supported by 
the Attorney-General (Shawcross), proposed that work on the Codification 
Committee’s draft Bill should be resumed.396  The department was asked to 
state its opinions.397  (The Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, Sir 
Cornelius Gregg, was quite clear that the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Dalton) 
should also obtain the views of the First Parliamentary Counsel, Sir Granville 
Ram: so, when Dalton came to consider the matter for himself, he had before 
him not only a substantial report from Gregg, but also one from Ram.)398 
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  TNA file IR 40/8554.  Letter, Shawcross to Attlee, 11 October 1945. 
397
  TNA file IR 40/8554.  Letter, Gregg to Trend, 2 November 1945; and Report, Inland 
Revenue (Gregg) to Chancellor of the Exchequer (Dalton), 2 November 1945, para 12. 
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The report from Gregg399 may be described as minimalist.  The draft Bill 
produced in 1936 would require many alterations; there was much new 
legislation requiring to be incorporated; and, with ‘the existing pressure of work’, 
it was difficult for Gregg to see how the department could provide a new 
committee with the assistance it would require.  Taking his cue from Somervell, 
the Attorney-General during the second world war, Gregg recommended that 
any future committee should consist primarily of Parliamentary Counsel and of 
Inland Revenue officials.  ‘If there is to be a Committee representing the outside 
world it should come in rather to consider the Bill produced departmentally’.  
Gregg went on to consider the rival merits of codification and consolidation.  
Codification was a wider issue; and carried within it the risk of unwelcome 
amendments being made during the course of parliamentary proceedings.  
Consolidation would not be contentious, but codification might well be.  Gregg’s 
own view was that ‘there is a lot to be said for attempting only a consolidation of 
the Income tax law’.  The 1918 Act had gathered together the legislation then in 
existence; ‘and if we had a similar consolidation to embrace all Income Tax law 
since 1918 we would not have the main complaint as to the difficulty of finding 
readily the relevant law in the existing multitude of Acts’.  In any event, 
consolidation should precede codification ‘if only to provide a working basis 
upon which codification can proceed’.  In dealing, therefore, with a proposal that 
income tax law should be codified (a proposal involving the possibility that 
individuals outside government might play a substantial role), Gregg’s response 
was to propose that the income tax legislation should be consolidated (with 
individuals outside government playing a role which, at its highest, was 
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  TNA file IR 40/8554.  Report, Inland Revenue (Gregg) to Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(Dalton), 2 November 1945. 
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supplementary, and, at its lowest, non-existent).  The surviving material, 
furthermore, permits the comment that even this modest proposal was made 
only that it might be said that the government had met ‘the main complaint’. 
The reports submitted by Gregg and Ram did not have a decisive impact.  
Dalton discounted a good deal written in the two submissions – but admitted 
that ‘we can’t spare Parliamentary Counsel just yet’.400  The task of updating the 
Codification Committee’s draft Bill was accordingly placed to one side – with the 
consequence that the rewriting of the Income Tax Acts was postponed.  The 
result was inertia: for the proposal made by Donovan was shelved. 
The Inland Revenue’s views on the codification of the entirety of income tax law 
were set out once again in the early 1950s.  Under a plan adopted in the late 
1940s, consolidation of the income tax legislation was to precede the 
codification of income tax law;401 and it was now time to turn from consolidation 
to codification.  The view of the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue (now 
Sir Eric Bamford), however, was that ‘codification in one piece is too big a job 
ever to be carried through in this work-a-day world, so that we can only hope to 
proceed by stages’.402  Bamford still held that same belief one year later.  When 
soundings were taken about the codification of income tax law, he took the view 
that, with work to be done for the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits 
and Income, and also on Excess Profits Tax, there would be no staff available 
for any substantial piece of codification.  He also felt that, with the prospects of 
important changes in income tax, both immediately and as a result of 
recommendations made by the Royal Commission, it would be unwise to start 
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402
  TNA file T 273/267.  Letter, Bamford to Bridges, 27 February 1951. 
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even upon such an essential piece of codification as the income tax provisions 
relating to husband and wife.403  Bamford, therefore, took the view that the 
codification of the entirety of income tax law was so vast a project as to be quite 
unrealistic – with the consequence that a suggestion to undertake such a 
project should be opposed.  It followed that codification of a limited area of 
income tax law was the most that could realistically be attempted.  In Bamford’s 
view, however, the codification of even a limited area of income tax law should 
only be pursued if that work was not crowded out by other constraints – such as 
a shortage of staff or different work considered to be of greater operational 
importance.  By the mid 1950s, the views held by the Inland Revenue – that the 
codification of the entirety of income tax law was unrealistic and that codification 
of particular areas of the subject, as circumstances permitted, was all that could 
usefully be attempted – were held by all those who considered the future of the 
entirety of income tax law, taken as a whole; and discussion of this subject 
faded away.404  Inertia and not change had prevailed.  
The Inland Revenue may again be observed to be a determinant producing 
inertia in the form of the income tax legislation during a period from 1955 until 
the early 1960s when the department had to deal with the proposal that the 
administrative provisions relating to income tax should be codified.  On two 
occasions the department caused a retreat from the proposal that such a 
codification should take place.  The Final Report of the Royal Commission on 
the Taxation of Profits and Income, dated 20 May 1955, had concluded by 
considering the question of codification.405  The Commission was not satisfied 
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  TNA file T 273/267.  Note, Eady to Bridges, 5 February 1952. 
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  Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Final Report (Cmd 9474, 1955) 
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The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
133 
 
that a full codification of income tax law was either feasible, or, if feasible, 
valuable enough to justify the vast labour involved.  It thought, instead, that the 
best that should be looked forward to was the possibility of some separate 
branch of the law being codified without any attempt to link it with a general 
codification.  For instance, if some substantial change of law was to be made in 
new legislation, there was much to be said for trying to make that change the 
occasion to bring into existence a single comprehensive code which covered 
the whole branch of the subject, instead of patching or reshaping the existing 
structure.  In 1952, the administrative provisions relating to income tax had 
been identified as an area where a codification of the law might be carried out; 
and it was envisaged that such an opportunity might arise if suitable 
recommendations were made by the Royal Commission.406  Those 
recommendations were made: for the Final Report took the view that the power 
to make income tax assessments should not remain with General and Special 
Commissioners, but should be exercised, instead, by officers of the Inland 
Revenue Department.407  The Inland Revenue then proposed a course of action 
involving change in the form of the income tax legislation.  A minute sent to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Butler) on 9 August 1955 began by indicating the 
recommendations on the subject of the administration of income tax made by 
the Royal Commission.  These recommendations would bring the law into line 
with modern conceptions and practice: ‘but to graft new legislation on the 
outworn stock of the Act as it stands would be a difficult and unrewarding 
process’.408  The department thought, therefore, that ‘it would be far better to 
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  Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Final Report (n 405) 282, para 
943. 
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  TNA file IR 40/13351 (Part 1).  Minute, Hancock to Chancellor of the Exchequer [Butler], 9 
August 1955. 
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start afresh to disentangle the archaic administrative provisions and rewrite 
them in a separate Act to accord with modern needs and practice’.  The new 
code would be shorter than the provisions it replaced; and would be in line with 
the views of the Royal Commission that, if any substantial change in a particular 
branch of the law were to be projected, the opportunity should, if possible, be 
taken to codify the surviving parts of the old law.409  The codification of a 
specific part of the income tax legislation (the part relating to the administration 
of the tax) was therefore explicitly envisaged.  
After work had been undertaken on the preparation of a Bill, however, the 
department changed its approach.  By 1957, it wished to abandon a 
comprehensive Bill and to substitute a more limited (and shorter) Bill making 
specific administrative reforms: 
The Bill we envisaged in 1955 was to be a comprehensive one, 
which would not merely carry out specific recommendations of the 
Royal Commission but would generally reform and codify the law 
governing the assessment, collection and administration of 
income tax and surtax; and it was to be uncontroversial.  
Preliminary work on the Bill has, however, revealed a major snag, 
which is that a comprehensive Bill would have to deal with the 
question of penalties for income tax offences (failure to make 
returns, incorrect returns, fraud, etc.), and this question would be 
controversial.  The existing penalty code is untidy, but highly 
effective for its main purpose – which is to discourage evasion and 
to enable satisfactory settlements to be made with evaders who 
are found out.  But the maximum penalties are extremely high and 
the code does not discriminate very markedly between different 
degrees of offence (the necessary discrimination is achieved 
administratively by the exercise of the Board’s statutory power to 
mitigate penalties).  Both these features are of great importance to 
our ‘back duty’ work, and both would come under fire in 
Parliament.  Any weakening, however, might have serious effects 
on the back duty work and we do not think the risk should be run.  
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In any case the Management Bill is not attractive if it is to be 
controversial.410 
The passage quoted shows the relative importance attached by the Inland 
Revenue to features determining the form of income tax legislation.  On the one 
hand, there was the existing legislation.  That legislation could admittedly be 
amended and improved – but it was nevertheless ‘highly effective for its main 
purpose’.  On the other hand, there was the prospect of new legislation 
providing a general restatement of the law on the topic.  If that legislation were 
to be enacted in the form proposed, the new legislation would be a most useful 
improvement on the old – but that legislation might not be so enacted.  The Bill 
might be so controversial that it failed to pass; the Bill might be so amended in 
Parliament that the restatement was not an improvement on the existing law; 
and, finally, the Bill might be so amended that it jeopardised the highly effective 
penalty code.  It was this last consideration that was decisive in prompting the 
department to take the view that the risks involved in proceeding with the Bill as 
originally envisaged should not be run.  The restatement of a part of income tax 
law should not endanger the efficacy of the existing income tax legislation: and 
if that proposition had, as a corollary, that the possibility of codifying a particular 
area of income tax law had to be abandoned, then so be it.  In such a situation, 
the determinants producing inertia were to be preferred to those producing 
change.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer decided not to take legislative action 
in 1958; and the question of a Management Bill lapsed.411 
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Following the decision of the House of Lords in IRC v Hinchy,412 new provisions 
relating to penalties were enacted in the Finance Act 1960;413 and, against the 
background of those new provisions, the question of an Income Tax 
Management Bill could be re-examined.  A draft of a new Bill began to be 
prepared; and that draft contained provisions dealing with all aspects of income 
tax administration. 
There was then an intervention at a high level from within the department.  On 3 
September 1962, the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue (Sir Alexander 
Johnston) wrote to the departmental official in charge of the Bill stating that he 
had no objection to the draft being sent round for comments on the basis that it 
was not the Bill as it would be introduced, but a statement of the legislation as it 
might ultimately look when it had been consolidated.  Johnston did not think, 
however, that the department should put existing statutory provisions into 
jeopardy by including them in the proposed Bill.  There was all the difference in 
the world between administrative provisions in a Finance Bill, piloted by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer on the floor of the House of Commons, and often 
containing controversial fiscal proposals to which time and attention were 
primarily directed, and, on the other hand, a Management Bill dealt with in a 
committee and under the charge of a junior Treasury minister.  When it was 
said that there was no reason to be afraid of what would happen on a particular 
controversial topic, an official was simply expressing a view (with very little to go 
on) how an unspecified junior minister would react to pressure in which the 
party whip was weak and the minister might have no support from other 
members of the committee.  The question the department should ask itself was 
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why it needed to run those risks – and Johnston was clear that those risks 
should not be run.  The course to be followed was to proceed with an Amending 
Bill (a programme Bill), and then to consolidate.414 
The department’s official position accordingly became that consideration of a 
tentative draft of a Codification Bill had led the Board to the view that it would 
involve unnecessary and prolonged parliamentary discussion of provisions 
which were quite satisfactory in their present form; and that it might place in 
jeopardy some existing provisions of advantage to the department and 
accepted generally through long usage.  Those provisions were possibly open 
to criticism in principle – though not in application.  The Bill being prepared 
would therefore be confined to those parts of the administration code which 
would enable worthwhile administrative economies to be made or were 
otherwise in need of early reform.  Consolidation of the other administration 
provisions could await the general consolidation of income tax law.415 
In 1962, therefore, as in 1957, the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue 
took the view that the introduction into Parliament of a Bill codifying the 
provisions relating to the administration of the income tax might endanger 
existing legislative provisions (which worked satisfactorily in practice) – and that 
the risks associated with such a course of action should not be run.  It was, 
accordingly, the Management Bill in its revised form that was introduced and 
enacted during 1964 – a programme Bill and not a Codification Bill.  The 
determinants producing inertia (as represented by the wish to preserve effective 
administration) had again prevailed over those producing change (as 
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The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
138 
 
represented by a wish to carry out a general restatement of one branch of 
income tax law). 
(2) The department as a determinant producing change 
The evidence presented has shown the Inland Revenue acting as a determinant 
producing inertia in the form of the income tax legislation.  The department, 
however, also acted as a determinant producing change in that form.  One of 
the contexts in which the department acted in this way (the sequence of events 
that ended with the making of the PAYE Regulations) is investigated 
elsewhere;416 but two other contexts in which the department acted to produce 
change in the form of the income tax legislation are now considered further. 
The Inland Revenue acted as a determinant producing change in the form of 
the income tax legislation in the case of the consolidation statute enacted as the 
Income Tax Act 1918.417  The manner in which the department acted, however, 
was unexpected: for, within the Inland Revenue, the Board of Inland Revenue 
itself was involved neither in the original initiative to produce a draft Bill, nor in 
the decisive championing of the proposed legislation. 
The original initiative for the production of a draft consolidation Bill may be 
traced, not to the actions of the Board of Inland Revenue, but to those of HB 
Cox, who had become Solicitor of Inland Revenue in 1911; and this initiative 
presents a striking example of the actions of a particular individual constituting a 
determinant of the form of income tax legislation.  On becoming Solicitor of 
Inland Revenue, Cox, according to his own account, was greatly impressed by 
the urgent necessity for consolidation, and soon began to devote any spare 
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time he could find to preparing a draft Bill.418  There is no reason to doubt the 
truth of this account; but it may be permissible to wonder whether it is the whole 
truth.  A Consolidation Act would be of great help to any Committee charged 
with considering the fundamental structure of income tax; and, during the first 
world war, there were good grounds for believing that such a Committee would 
be set up (as Cox was well aware)419 – although this task was necessarily 
postponed until after the war had ended.  The preparation of such an Act could 
accordingly reflect credit on those preparing it – including Cox himself.  It was 
also the case that Cox had had little or no contact with revenue law before 
becoming Solicitor of Inland Revenue.  The preparation of a draft Consolidation 
Bill would be one route to master one area of the law relevant for his new post. 
It was also the case that the Board of Inland Revenue was not involved in the 
decisive championing of the proposed Consolidation Bill.  Cox mentioned what 
he was doing to Finlay;420 Finlay mentioned it to Carson (then the Attorney-
General); Carson mentioned it to Montagu, the Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury; and Montagu announced in the House of Commons that 
consolidation was proceeding.  The department was already at work.421  As 
Nott-Bower, the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue observed to Montagu 
a few months later, ‘you surprised the official gallery by your intimate 
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Chancellor from 1916 to 1918.  The younger Finlay had been Junior Counsel to the Treasury 
from 1905 to 1914; and the material in TNA file IR 75/91 permits the inference that Finlay and 
Cox were on good terms. 
421
  HC Deb 30 September 1915, vol 74, col 1103. 
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acquaintance with our Solicitor’s activities!’422  It was only after Montagu’s 
announcement that the initiative to consolidate the income tax legislation made 
steady progress.  A departmental committee was set up; and that committee 
recast Cox’s original draft Bill.  At a crucial moment, however, the progress of 
one of the most important statutes affecting the form of income tax legislation 
during the first half of the twentieth century had depended not on intelligent 
planning by the Board of Inland Revenue, but on casual conversation among 
members of the establishment. 
There is also evidence that the Board of Inland Revenue had no particular wish 
that the income tax legislation should be consolidated.  On 13 November 1917, 
Cox had an interview with the Lord Chancellor (Finlay), who asked if the Board 
of Inland Revenue were very anxious for the immediate introduction of the Bill.  
Cox’s record of his reply does not permit easy paraphrase; and is therefore set 
out in full.  Cox replied that: 
the Board had prepared and completed a bill the demand for 
which came not from them, (for their staff thoroughly understood 
and worked with complete efficiency the existing acts) but from the 
Judges and the public; that they now left the bill in the hands of 
ministers who would judge when it was most expedient to pass it 
[and] consequently the Board had no wishes to express in the 
matter.423 
If, during the first world war, Cox had applied internally to the Board of Inland 
Revenue for help in developing his draft Bill with a view to its ultimate 
enactment, he might have been given the reply (no doubt an entirely truthful 
reply) that, at a time when a war of unprecedented scale was being waged, the 
resources of the department were already more than fully committed – so that 
                                            
422
  TNA file IR 75/91.  Letter, Nott-Bower to Montagu, 6 March 1916.  Nott-Bower’s letter is also 
the source for how information about Cox’s preparation of a draft Bill became more generally 
known. 
423
  TNA file IR 75/87.  Memorandum by Cox, 14 November 1917. 
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further action on this initiative would have to be deferred.  The conclusion to be 
drawn is that, in this case, the department acted as a determinant producing 
change in the form of the income tax legislation not because of its wish to 
promote change, but because its own preference for inertia was trumped by the 
actions of others. 
The Inland Revenue also acted as a determinant producing change in the form 
of the income tax legislation at the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964, 
when the department exerted itself to deal with others in order to secure the 
introduction of the Income Tax Management Bill.  That Bill did not form part of 
the government’s legislative programme for the 1963-64 Session of Parliament; 
the Lord Chancellor (Dilhorne) had objections to provisions in the Bill; and 
Dilhorne also thought it ‘most unlikely’ that the Bill would be selected if the 
opportunity to present additional government Bills should arise.424  Against this 
unpromising background, departmental officials showed energy and 
resourcefulness – not only in dealing with problems arising on the contents of 
the Bill, but in helping to ensure that those responsible for the government’s 
legislative programme caused the Bill to be introduced into the Commons.  
Departmental officials suggested that the Leader of the House of Commons 
(Selwyn Lloyd – a former Chancellor of the Exchequer) would be well disposed 
towards the Bill and urged the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Maudling) to deal 
with him (which Maudling did).  The department received information from the 
Office of Parliamentary Counsel, which, in its turn, passed on information 
received from the government whips.  The Chairman of the Board of Inland 
Revenue (Johnston), acting on his own initiative, drafted letters for Maudling to 
                                            
424
  TNA file IR 40/13351 (Part 4).  Letter, Dilhorne to Green, 6 November 1963. 
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send to Dilhorne and to Selwyn Lloyd – and those letters were sent.425  The 
introduction of the Income Tax Management Bill into the House of Commons 
surprised the press;426 but, for their part, departmental officials were entitled to 
be pleased with a successful conclusion to a campaign carried out within 
government.  On 13 February 1964, the day following the Second Reading 
Debate in the House of Commons, Alan Green, the Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury and the government Minister in charge of the Bill, wrote to the 
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, to let him know how greatly he 
appreciated the department’s ‘careful and prescient’ briefing on the Bill.  ‘It 
would be difficult for a Minister to ask for more both before and during the 
Debates’.427 
At one level, the Inland Revenue’s wish to see the Bill enacted is completely 
comprehensible: for the Bill would confirm the department’s principal role in the 
administration of income tax in law as well as fact – and so enable the 
department to accomplish one of its private cargoes and destinations.  The 
question nevertheless arises why the department wished to exert itself to carry 
on such a campaign at this particular juncture.  No evidence directly addressing 
this topic is known: but it may readily be conjectured that the department took 
the view that there was a conjuncture of circumstances that made such an effort 
worthwhile.  The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Green) was keen to 
promote the Bill.428  A general election was to be held during 1964; and it was 
completely foreseeable that, after that election, the existing conservative 
                                            
425
  TNA file IR 40/13351 (Part 4).  Note, [Corlett] to Mitchell, 19 November 1963; note, Johnston 
to Mitchell, 5 December 1963; letter, Maudling to Dilhorne, 9 December 1963; note, Johnston to 
Mitchell, 10 January 1964.  TNA file IR 40/13351 (Part 3).  Letter, Maudling to Selwyn Lloyd, 13 
January 1964. 
426
  TNA file IR 40/13351 (Part 4).  Press cuttings for 5 February 1964. 
427
  TNA file IR 40/13351 (Part 3).  Letter, Green to Johnston, 13 February [1964].  
428
  For Green’s role see chapter 5, section 3(2) below. 
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administration might be replaced by a labour one (which it was).  That incoming 
administration could be expected to have its own legislative priorities – which 
would be most unlikely to include the reform of the administrative provisions 
relating to income tax.  At the end of 1963, departmental officials were fully 
entitled to take the view that there was no time like the present – and to exert 
themselves accordingly. 
Conclusion 
The Inland Revenue administered the direct taxes; its essential concern, 
therefore, was with an existing state of affairs.  The department, furthermore, 
administered those taxes with a general approach, which, whilst accepting that 
income tax law and practice were large and complicated subjects, also included 
the views that the basic structure of income tax was good and that the tax was 
well administered. 
This general approach had the consequence that, for operational reasons, the 
department was unlikely, in practice, to favour initiatives for the making of major 
changes to the form of the income tax legislation.  Faced with the prospect of 
changes being made to that form, the department might argue that the changes 
proposed did not constitute a sufficient improvement to justify their adoption as 
they stood (the approach taken in response to the draft Bill produced by the 
Codification Committee);
429
 that the changes involved risks that should not be 
run (the approach taken to the proposal that the provisions relating to the 
administration of the tax should be codified);430 that the operational problems 
involved in making the changes were so severe that the changes should not be 
                                            
429
  See text around ns 385-95 above. 
430
  See text around ns 405-415 above. 
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made (the approach to codification taken by Bamford in the early 1950s);431 or 
that the changes to the form of the income tax legislation that should actually be 
undertaken should be more modest than those proposed (the approach taken 
by Gregg in 1945).432 
The commendation of the Inland Revenue by the Royal Commission that 
reported in 1920 may have caused the department to bask in the favourable 
glow of that commendation for longer than was safe.  The possibility that the 
Inland Revenue might be adapting to changing circumstances to an insufficient 
extent certainly occurred to some contemporaries.  In 1955, Sir Edward 
Bridges, the Head of the Civil Service, consulted Lord Radcliffe, the Chairman 
of the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, about the 
progress which the Commission was making.  Bridges ‘took the opportunity of 
getting Lord Radcliffe to say what he felt about the Inland Revenue’.  ‘As to the 
shooting match as a whole’, Radcliffe said that he was not sure that he had 
seen the Inland Revenue at their best, as he had generally seen them when 
they were asked to defend some practice which the Commission did not like.  
Radcliffe did say, however, that he thought that the department ‘showed a lack 
of adaptability and resilience’.  Even when they sent in a five page 
memorandum in defence of some arrangement and were given a broad hint that 
the Commission wanted an alternative proposal, the invariable reply was a 
twenty page memorandum reaffirming their previous views.433  Bridges had 
earlier arrived at a similar conclusion for himself, recording in 1951 that ‘[t]he 
impression left on my mind was ... that the Revenue are too much wrapped in 
                                            
431
  See text around ns 401-3 above. 
432
  See text around ns 396-400 above. 
433
  TNA file T 273/101.  Confidential note for record made by Bridges and dated 24 January 
1955. 
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their own affairs’.434  By the end of the 1960s, however, the favourable verdict of 
1920 was well in the past; and the civil service, as a whole, was faced instead 
with the Report of the Fulton Committee in 1968.435 
The Inland Revenue’s concern to administer an existing state of affairs, 
however, did not prevent the department from having views about how that 
administration might be improved.  The department had its own private cargoes 
and destinations – but these related to the administration of the taxes for which 
it was responsible.  In the case of income tax, the department had two major 
projects.  One project was the deduction of income tax at source from the 
earnings of employees; and this project was accomplished during the second 
world war in conjunction with an extension of the scope of subordinate 
legislation.436  The other project consisted of changes so that the department 
played the leading role in law as well as in fact in the administration of income 
tax; and, in 1964, the department’s objective was secured by the enactment of a 
programme Act.437  In the events that happened, therefore, both projects 
involved significant changes in the form of the income tax legislation.  The 
promotion of those changes, however, was grounded, very firmly, in operational 
priorities.  The changes in the form of the income tax legislation were not 
pursued as ends in themselves: they were by-products of changes that were 
being pursued to accomplish other, different, operational objectives. 
It was shown in chapter 2 that, so far as the enactment of income tax legislation 
was concerned, the United Kingdom polity operated with a default setting.  This 
                                            
434
  TNA file T 273/101.  Note for record by Bridges, 31 July 1951. 
435
  The Civil Service, Report of the Committee 1966-68 (Cmnd 3638, 1968).  For the history of 
the civil service during the years of the Fulton Report, see generally R Lowe, The Official History 
of the British Civil Service: Reforming the Civil Service: Volume 1: The Fulton Years 1966-81 
(London, Routledge, 2011). 
436
  See further on this in chapter 7, section 3, below. 
437
  The Income Tax Management Act 1964. 
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chapter has shown that the Inland Revenue had no general wish to override 
that default setting.  For the purpose of achieving its private objectives relating 
to the administration of income tax (its private cargoes and destinations), the 
department was willing to promote courses of action that happened also to 
involve changes in the form of the income tax legislation – but that was all.  
Subject to the adjustments needing to be made to take account of the securing 
of those operational objectives, the default setting of the United Kingdom polity 
remained in place. 
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CHAPTER 4: DETERMINANTS WITHIN GOVERNMENT: THE OFFICE OF 
THE PARLIAMENTARY COUNSEL 
‘... the drafting of Bills is done by persons called Parliamentary 
Counsel, who are seldom seen and never heard, and whom ... 
[most practising members of the legal profession] imagine to be 
rather queer creatures engaged in molelike activities beneath the 
surface of the legal world’.438 
 
Introduction 
The principal responsibility for drafting government primary legislation, during 
the period from 1907 to 1965,439 was that of the Office of the Parliamentary 
Counsel.440  This office had been set up in 1869.  A Treasury minute stated that 
it had been deemed expedient to create a department to be called the Office of 
Parliamentary Counsel for the purpose of providing for the preparation of 
                                            
438
  Sir G Ram, ‘The Improvement of the Statute Book’ [1951] Journal of the Society of Public 
Teachers of Law, 442.  Ram was First Parliamentary Counsel from 1937 to 1947. 
439
  ‘The Parliamentary Counsel Office exists of course primarily for the purpose of drafting 
Government Bills’.  Ram (n 438) 443.  The extent to which that responsibility was less than total 
is specified later in this chapter (text around ns 481-9 below). 
440
  Given its low profile, accounts of the office and of its work may be regarded as unexpectedly 
plentiful.  Members of the office themselves provided a considerable number of substantial 
accounts.  These include the memorandum ‘The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel to the 
Treasury’, dated 23 November 1898, and with the initials ‘C.P.I.’ [i.e. CP Ilbert] (subsequently 
cited in this chapter as ‘Ilbert’s 1898 memorandum’) (TNA file T 162/655 (E 4000)); Sir CP Ilbert, 
The Mechanics of Law Making (New York, Columbia Press, 1914) (based on lectures delivered 
at Columbia University during October 1913 and subsequently cited in this chapter as ‘Ilbert, 
Mechanics’); Sir WM Graham-Harrison, ‘An examination of the main criticisms of the statute 
book and of the possibility of improvement’ [1935] Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of 
Law 9; Sir HS Kent, In on the Act: Memoirs of a Lawmaker (London, Macmillan, 1979); ‘Statute 
Law Reform: Memorandum by the Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury’ [ie Sir Granville 
Ram], dated 30 January 1946, (subsequently cited in this chapter as ‘Ram’s Statute Law 
Reform Memorandum’) (TNA file T 162/911 (E 17496/1)); and Sir G Ram, ‘The Improvement of 
the Statute Book’ [1951] Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 442 (subsequently 
cited in this chapter as ‘Ram’).  See also generally AG Donaldson, ‘The High Priests of the 
Mystery: A Note on Two Centuries of Parliamentary Draftsmen’ in F Wilson, CMG Himsworth, 
and N Walker (eds), Edinburgh Essays in Public Law (Edinburgh UP, 1991); Sir G Engle, ‘The 
Rise of the Parliamentary Counsel’ (1996) 16 Parliament, Estates & Representation 193; R 
Cocks, ‘The Mysterious Origin of the Law for Conservation’ Journal of Planning and 
Environment Law [1998] 203; R Cocks, ‘Ram, Rab and the Civil Servants: A Lawyer and the 
Making of the “Great Education Act 1944”’ (2001) 21 Legal Studies 15; and R Cocks, ‘Enforced 
Creativity: Noel Hutton and the New Law for Development Control, 1945-47’ (2001) 22 Journal 
of Legal History 21. 
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government Bills; and Henry Thring (later Lord Thring) became the first head of 
the new department.441 
The aim of this chapter is to ascertain the role played by the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel in determining the form of the income tax legislation.  In 
order to ascertain that role, three questions will be addressed: how far the office 
had the capacity to act as a determinant of the form of the income tax 
legislation; how far the office wished to be a determinant of that form; and the 
extent to which the office achieved success in pursuing its wishes. 
There is evidence to suggest that the office’s role might have been a major one.  
In the early years of the second world war it was said that ‘[o]ne might fairly say 
of these draftsmen that they are, in fact and of necessity, the key men of 
Whitehall, the hardest worked, the most severely tried’.442  In another study,443 
Cocks expressed the view that if any one individual in particular might be said to 
have created the modern law of development control, it was Noel Hutton, the 
drafter of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947;444 and Cocks ended that 
study by stating that ‘the experience of producing the legislation of 1947 
suggests strongly that legal historians need a full and systematic study of the 
                                            
441
  This statement is made on the basis of a later printed document, which gives the date of the 
minute as 12 February 1869.  (TNA file T 162/655 (E 4000)).  Original material dating from 1869 
is in TNA file T 29/614, fos 276-80.  There is an account of the arrangements for drafting 
government Bills in the years before 1869 in H Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy (London, 
George Allen & Unwin, 1969) 172-8.  Information about the early history of the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel is given in G Drewry, ‘Lawyers and Statutory Reform in Victorian 
Government’ in R Macleod (ed), Government and Expertise: Specialists, administrators and 
professionals, 1860-1919 (CUP 1988) 36-8.  The arrangements made in 1869 were made 
permanent by a later Treasury minute of 31 January 1871 – and were claimed to have resulted 
in greater economy; in better control over government legislation as respects policy and finance; 
and to an improvement in the form of statutes.  (Ilbert’s 1898 memorandum (n 440) paras 4 and 
6.) 
442
  CT Carr, Concerning English Administrative Law (New York, Columbia UP, 1941) 171. 
443
  R Cocks, ‘Enforced Creativity: Noel Hutton and the New Law for Development Control, 
1945-47’ (2001) 22 Journal of Legal History 21, 48. 
444
  10 & 11 Geo 6 c 51. 
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important work and influence of the Parliamentary Counsel Office in the 
twentieth century’.445 
1. The office’s capacity to determine the form of income tax legislation 
The capacity of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel to determine the form of 
income tax legislation did not remain static during the period from 1907 to 1965.  
It increased.  New arrangements, which increased the office’s effectiveness, 
were introduced in 1947; and, in the discussion that follows, the earlier part of 
the period is examined before the later. 
During the earlier part of the twentieth century, up until 1947, the office’s 
capacity to determine the form of income tax legislation was very limited.  There 
were three major reasons for this, all of a general nature: the resources of the 
office were insufficient; there was misdirection of activity within government; 
and, from time to time, there were difficulties relating to the enactment of 
consolidation legislation. 
As regards the first reason – insufficient resources – the office was at all times 
small.  In 1913, Sir Courtenay Ilbert446 stated that the constitution of the office 
had not undergone any material alteration since its foundation in 1869.  The 
office consisted of the Parliamentary Counsel and his Assistant (now called the 
First and Second Parliamentary Counsel), three shorthand-writing clerks, an 
office keeper and an office boy.447  Then, during the twentieth century, the office 
grew – but only slowly.  A third Parliamentary Counsel was added in 1917; a 
                                            
445
  Cocks (n 443) 49. 
446
  Sir Courtenay Ilbert had been First Parliamentary Counsel from 1899 to 1901. 
447
  Ilbert, Mechanics (n 440) 65.  Ilbert went on to mention that two barristers usually attended 
the office regularly as assistants to the two Parliamentary Counsel.  However, their attendance 
was voluntary; they were under no permanent engagement; they were paid by fees in 
accordance with the work they did; and they had their own chambers and were allowed to take 
outside work. (ibid.)  This type of help was later phased out; and had certainly disappeared by 
the end of the second world war.  (TNA file T 165/425.  Treasury and Subordinate Departments, 
April 1950, paras 127-31.) 
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fourth in 1929; and a fifth in 1934.448  During the inter-war period, established 
posts at a more junior level were also created for qualified lawyers;449 and, in 
1945, the legally qualified establishment of the office was fixed at seven 
Parliamentary Counsel, two Deputy Parliamentary Counsel, three Senior 
Assistants and three Assistants – making 15 qualified lawyers in all.450  In 1946, 
total staff numbered 47,451 suggesting slightly more than 30 support staff; and 
the professional complement of the office seems to have remained at this 
general level until at least 1965.452 
The small size of the office had a completely foreseeable, but very important, 
consequence: there were insufficient drafters to do all the work that could be 
done.  Several different individuals, all ideally qualified to know, made 
statements to this effect.  According to Ilbert, during the period of Liberal 
government before the first world war, the time of ‘that overworked official’, the 
Parliamentary Counsel, ‘has been fully occupied and more than occupied by 
current legislation, and he has had no leisure to devote to the preparation or 
supervision of legislative measures not arising out of immediate political 
necessities’.453  Graham-Harrison, First Parliamentary Counsel from 1928 to 
                                            
448
  TNA file T 165/425.  Treasury and Subordinate Departments, April 1950, paras. 127 and 
129. 
449
  Among those who entered the office during these years was Harold Kent, whose later 
memoir gives much information about the office and those who worked in it during the 1930s 
and 1940s.  It seems that Kent held an established post only some time after beginning work at 
the office.  See Kent (n 440) 21 and 51-2. 
450
  TNA file T 165/425.  Treasury and Subordinate Departments, April 1950, paras 130-1. 
451
  TNA file T 165/425.  Treasury and Subordinate Departments, subsidiary document, October 
1953, Table B. 
452
  In an article published in 1961, Sir Noel Hutton, First Parliamentary Counsel from 1956 to 
1968, stated that the office then consisted ‘of some sixteen members of the Bar, working full-
time for the Government, with supporting staff’.  Sir N Hutton, ‘Mechanics of Law Reform’ (1961) 
24 Modern Law Review 18, 19. 
453
  Ilbert, Mechanics (n 440) 41.  At the end of this period, Sir Edward Playfair recounted that ‘I 
knew one of the survivors of the team which helped Lloyd George with the Finance Bill of 1909.  
He told me that the bottleneck at that time was Parliamentary Counsel, who was an old 
gentleman to whom Lloyd George’s ideas were anathema.  He was also an honest man, 
resolved to serve his new master.  The struggle in his heart found a curious outlet: he said it 
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1933, and speaking of the period of the first world war, commented that those 
involved in working the system ‘continued, it may be unwisely, but at least with 
commendable public spirit, to attempt to carry on the task after it had become 
impossible to do so owing to the staff being too small’.454  When he joined the 
office in 1919, Ram, First Parliamentary Counsel from 1937 to 1947, recalled 
many years later, it ‘consisted of three members of the Bar, one of whom was 
then absent on a long period of sick leave and the other two working under 
tremendous pressure day and night’.455  ‘You know what a bottle-neck this 
Parliamentary Draftsmen Office is proving’ the Lord Chancellor (Jowitt) wrote to 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Dalton) in 1947.456 
Two First Parliamentary Counsel took the view that one consequence of the 
office’s insufficient resources was underperformance in the production of 
consolidation legislation.  Graham-Harrison, in the 1930s, considered that 
understaffing had a great deal to do with the failure to produce a proper amount 
of legislation of this type;457 and, of the years from 1920 to 1945, Ram, the First 
Parliamentary Counsel from 1937 to 1947, wrote that ‘[t]here is not the faintest 
doubt that during this period the greatest obstacle to the progress of 
consolidation has been lack of draftsmen’.458  This sentiment was echoed in an 
                                                                                                                              
was impossible to cast these ideas into statutory form and, as no-one else could do it, the work 
was held up for months’.  Sir E Playfair, ‘Who are the Policy Makers?’(1965) 43 Public 
Administration 260, 266.  The individual referred to was presumably the then First Parliamentary 
Counsel, Sir Arthur Thring (1860-1932) – although Thring, at this time, might be regarded as 
‘middle aged’ rather than ‘old’.  It may be conjectured that this anecdote, as printed in 1965, no 
longer had any great correspondence with the events of Edwardian times. 
454
  Graham-Harrison (n 440) 41.   
455
  Ram (n 440) 443. 
456
  TNA file LCO 2/3816.  Letter, Jowitt to Dalton, 4 March 1947. 
457
  Graham-Harrison (n 440) 42. 
458
  Ram’s Statute Law Reform Memorandum (n 440) app I, para 27.  In that same 
memorandum, Ram also stated that ‘the main obstacle to progress in the work of consolidation 
has, in recent years, been the difficulty of getting the necessary Bills drawn by Parliamentary 
Counsel’ (ibid, para 10). 
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address given by Jowitt in 1951.459  ‘At the present time’, Ram reported in 
November 1945, ‘the arrangements of the office for making progress with 
consolidation work have had to be suspended by reason of the urgency of the 
government’s programme of current legislation’.460  It may be considered 
strange that the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel continued to be unable to 
draft Consolidation Bills even though it was increasing in numbers.  The 
explanation, according to Ram, was that each increase in the office’s staff was 
intended to provide a reserve to be employed on consolidation work except 
during periods of emergency; but ‘what has happened is that legislative activity 
has so developed that the office has been in a continuous state of emergency 
and no reserve has therefore been available’.461  ‘Pressure from Departments’, 
members of the office had written earlier, ‘will always absorb the whole strength 
of the office in current legislation unless there is some Minister to put his foot 
down and say that the needs of statute law reform are sacrosanct’.462 
The second major reason for the office’s limited capacity during the first half of 
the twentieth century was that the enactment of legislation in general, and of 
consolidation legislation in particular, suffered from the absence of 
                                            
459
  ‘There can be no doubt that the slow progress [in consolidation] made during this period [i.e. 
1922 to 1947] was mainly due to the lack of Parliamentary draftsmen’.  Viscount Jowitt, Statute 
Law Revision and Consolidation (Address to the Holdsworth Club of the University of 
Birmingham, 1951) 12.  TNA file LCO 2/5681 reveals that this address was written by Ram with 
a few additions by Sir Cecil Carr.  After the lecture, Jowitt wrote to Ram that ‘[i]t is a very 
shameful thing that I should thus have stolen your property and received the credit for this 
lecture’.  He wrote to Carr that ‘I reap all the credit and you and Ram did all the work.  It is an 
unfair division but that is what life is like’.  (TNA file LCO 2/5681.  Letters, dated 13 March 1951, 
from Jowitt to Ram and Carr respectively.) 
460
  TNA file IR 40/8554.  ‘Simplification of income tax law: Memorandum by the Parliamentary 
Counsel’ [Sir Granville Ram], 1 November 1945, para 6. 
461
  Ram’s Statute Law Reform Memorandum (n 440) para 11. 
462
  TNA file LCO 2/3816.  ‘Observations by Parliamentary Counsel with respect to a projected 
memorandum to the Lord Chancellor on the subject of the statute book’, 3 November 1941, 
para 7 (subsequently cited in this chapter as ‘1941 Observations’).  The 1941 Observations may 
safely be attributed to Ram and Stainton (then the First and Second Parliamentary Counsel) on 
the strength of a remark to this effect made in a letter by Somervell to Schuster.  (See TNA file 
LCO 2/3816.  Letter, Somervell to Schuster, 6 November 1941.) 
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arrangements for dealing, in an orderly manner, with the preparation of 
government Bills and with the subsequent introduction of those Bills into 
Parliament.  According to Ram, difficulties constantly arose in regulating the 
flow of instructions to the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel in such a way as 
to enable the office to draft the Bills that the government finally decided to 
introduce at the times at which those Bills were wanted.463  Graham-Harrison, in 
the mid 1930s, also had strong feelings on this subject.  From the time of the 
first world war, governments had lived from hand to mouth as regards their 
legislation.  There had been emergencies to be met and demands for legislation 
to deal with the ever-widening sphere of public activities in social matters: but 
there had been no effective attempt to co-ordinate the demands of different 
departments for legislation.  It had been ‘a case of “Pull devil, pull baker,”464 with 
continual pressure upon the Parliamentary Counsel for an output of Bills quite 
beyond his powers’.  Many of those Bills, Graham-Harrison thought, would 
probably never be introduced into Parliament at all.465  The Parliamentary 
Counsel, he said a little later,466 ‘has many masters, all crying out 
simultaneously like the daughters of the horse-leech “More, More!”’.467 
The absence of arrangements for the orderly preparation of government Bills 
had implications for the actual production of those Bills.  Ram wrote that there 
was strong pressure on the office from individual government ministers to get 
their Bills drafted so that they might obtain a place in the session’s legislative 
                                            
463
  Ram (n 440) 447, who states that traces of these difficulties appeared as early as 1875. 
464
  One account of this expression is that it is the crux of a folk story in which the baker’s wife 
found her husband in a tug-of-war with the devil.  Obviously she wanted her husband to win, but 
she was also scared to offend the devil so she cried ‘pull devil, pull baker’.  This account permits 
the deduction that the general meaning is that the encouragement of one side incurs the 
hostility of the other – a result that fits the context here. 
465
  Graham-Harrison (n 440) 43-4. 
466
  ibid 45. 
467
  ‘The horseleach hath two daughters, crying, Give, give’.  Proverbs 30:15. 
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programme for them: for the best way of obtaining such a place was to be able 
to say that the Bill was ready or nearly ready.  The consequence was that many 
Bills were drafted (or partly drafted) which never saw the light of day at all.  The 
time in the Session at which a Bill was introduced depended chiefly on when the 
Parliamentary Counsel could get the Bill ready – and that, in turn, depended 
partly upon chance and partly upon the office’s being able to make reasonably 
good guesses about what the government would want.468  In emergencies, Ram 
admitted, Bills could sometimes be produced with astonishing speed – ‘but a 
tour de force of this kind disturbs the progress of other Bills in the programme, 
and involves an almost intolerable strain upon all who are called upon to co-
operate in producing it’.469  The more experienced the minister, however, the 
more likely it was that the minister ‘will have seen Bills spring into being in this 
way and – well – watching a conjuror produce rabbits out of a hat is not the best 
training in midwifery’.470 
This absence of arrangements for an orderly production of government Bills 
affected the enactment of consolidation legislation in particular.  The question of 
the order in which the various groups of Acts were to be taken in hand, 
Graham-Harrison thought, was left very much to the whim of the Parliamentary 
Counsel, who was pulled this way and that by the government departments and 
any other persons who took an interest in the matter.471  There was 
unquestionably a considerable amount of consolidation legislation that was 
prepared, but was not enacted.  According to the figures given in Ram’s major 
memorandum on Statute Law Reform of January 1946, during the period from 
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  TNA file CAB 21/2140.  Letter, Ram to Murrie, 13 June 1946. 
469
  Ram (n 440) 452.  (Italics in original.) 
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  ibid. 
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1870 to 1885, 19 Consolidation Acts were passed – but another 20 
Consolidation Bills were prepared but not enacted.  For the period from 1885 to 
1900, the corresponding figures were 30 and 52; and for 1901 to 1915, 30 and 
11.472  Ram went on to say that, during the period from 1920 to 1945, almost 
the sole motive power for consolidation had come from government 
departments.  Some, such as the Ministry of Health, had formulated long-term 
programmes and had sufficient perseverance and importunity to get the 
Parliamentary Counsel to devote the time required for carrying them out: 
‘others, whose law is no less in need of reform, have either been less fortunate 
or less energetic and have achieved little or nothing’.473 The Inland Revenue 
could undoubtedly be placed in this latter category during the inter-war period.  
Indeed, that department could be implicated in the general misapplication of 
effort.  Ram and Stainton (the Second Parliamentary Counsel) stated in 1941 
that the ‘abortive Income Tax Bill ... threw away work which occupied almost the 
whole time of two members of the office for about a year’.474  The 
accomplishments of the office in preparing consolidation legislation, they 
admitted, fell ‘far short of what is required’.  The chief reasons why no more had 
been achieved were ‘shortage of staff in this office and the constant diversion of 
its members from half-baked consolidation Bills to current legislation’.475  The 
lack of progress with consolidation, Ram wrote a few years later, was not due to 
difficulties in getting Consolidation Bills passed by Parliament so much as to 
‘the constant pressure of other work, which has made it impossible for the 
                                            
472
  Ram’s Statute Law Reform Memorandum (n 440) app I, paras 22, 23 and 25.  These same 
figures also appear in Jowitt (n 459) 9, 10 and 15.  
473
  Ram’s Statute Law Reform Memorandum (n 440) app I, para 27. 
474
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Parliamentary Counsel and the Departments to find the necessary time for 
preparing them’.476 
The third major reason for the office’s limited capacity during the first half of the 
twentieth century was that the enactment of consolidation legislation sometimes 
gave rise to difficulties.  This matter has already been considered.477  By the 
middle of the twentieth century, however, those difficulties had led to the 
realisation that the enactment of Consolidation Bills could be handled more 
productively.  It had become clear that Parliament should entrust the production 
of the detailed text to some outside body (for this was not a task that 
Parliamentarians could carry out themselves).  It was gradually established that 
the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel should be that outside body; and more 
is said about this development below.478  It had also become clear that the 
outside body should know how the task entrusted to it should be performed – 
and here it was possible to learn from experience.  The text provided should 
neither make more changes than were absolutely necessary nor reproduce the 
existing legislation in an over-faithful manner.  ‘Consolidation Bills are now 
drafted on the view that pure consolidation is no use, [and] that there must be 
re-arrangement of subject-matter, alteration of language and such amendment 
of errors as does not amount to any substantial alteration of the law’ said 
Graham-Harrison in 1935.479  It had also become clear, finally, that Parliament 
should enact a Bill with little ado if the Bill had been prepared according to these 
criteria, and approved by the Parliamentary Committee set up to examine it; and 
this last condition appears to have been met from the early twentieth century 
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  Ram’s Statute Law Reform Memorandum (n 440) para 6. 
477
  Chapter 2, section 2(3), above, text around ns 273-81. 
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onwards.  Ram, in 1946, after noting that the difficulty of getting Consolidation 
Bills passed by Parliament had earlier been one of the main obstacles to 
progress in the work of consolidation, went on to say that, after receiving a 
satisfactory report from the Joint Committee, ‘both Houses are usually willing to 
allow the Bill to pass through its remaining stages without debate’.480  By the 
middle of the twentieth century, the problem was not the parliamentary handling 
of Consolidation Bills: it was the production of Consolidation Bills for Parliament 
to handle. 
In view of the difficulties that the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel 
encountered as a result of its own insufficient resources, the misdirection of 
activity within government, and the problems relating to the enactment of 
consolidation legislation, it is surprising that the role of the office – and with it, 
accordingly, its capacity to determine the form of the income tax legislation – 
expanded significantly between 1869 and 1947.  There was nevertheless an 
expansion of that role.  There was an increase in the range of the work that the 
office undertook and in the role of the office in relation to consolidation 
legislation. 
The Treasury minute of 1869481 provided for two classes of exception to the 
general rule that government Bills would be drafted in the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel.  The first class related to Bills concerning Scottish and 
Irish matters; and this exception continued.482  There was, however, no 
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  Ram’s Statute Law Reform Memorandum (n 440) para 5. 
481
  Text around n 441 above. 
482
  Ilbert’s 1898 Memorandum (n 440) para 13.  A separate Office dealing with Scottish 
legislation existed in Edinburgh; and a separate Office dealing with Irish legislation in Dublin 
(and then, later, in Belfast).  So far as Irish legislation was concerned, however, there were very 
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specifically Scottish or Irish legislation relating to income tax during the 
twentieth century – and this class of Bills is not considered further.  The second 
class of exception arose out of the final paragraph of the 1869 minute.  Where 
there was a solicitor or other salaried legal officer attached to a department who 
had been in the habit of preparing parliamentary Bills for the department, the 
Bills were, as before, to be prepared in the department.483 
The revenue departments had been in the habit of preparing their own Bills 
before 1869; and continued to do so afterwards.  A crucial change, however, 
took place during the first half of the 1890s: for, during these years, the Office of 
the Parliamentary Counsel replaced the revenue departments in the drafting of 
the annual statute whose short title, from 1894 onwards, was the Finance 
Act.484  By 1913, Ilbert thought that it might be taken that, under the 
arrangements then in existence, the Parliamentary Counsel’s Office was 
responsible for the preparation of all government Bills, with a very few 
exceptions.485  In 1928, the Ministry of Health raised the possibility that the 
terms of the 1869 minute ‘would appear to suggest that the Parliamentary 
Counsel was not to be used where a department had a Solicitor who could 
himself draft the necessary Bills’; but the reply from the Treasury official dealing 
with the point was that ‘Parliamentary Counsel confirms my understanding that 
it is not the practice for departmental solicitors now to prepare Parliamentary 
Bills’.486  The expansion in the work undertaken by the Office of the 
                                            
483
  ‘It was to be understood that those departments which were in the habit of preparing their 
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  The evidence for this change is set out in detail in JHN Pearce ‘The Rise of the Finance Act: 
1853-1922’ in P Harris and D de Cogan (eds), Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 7 
(Oxford, Hart, 2015) 80-86. 
485
  Ilbert, Mechanics (n 440) 67. 
486
  TNA file T 162/655 (E 4000).  Letters, Bailey to Parker, 24 April 1928, and Parker to Bailey, 
9 May 1928. 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
159 
 
Parliamentary Counsel was accordingly confirmed: for the second class of 
exception specified in the 1869 minute was now considered no longer to exist. 
Those departments (including the revenue departments) which had been in the 
habit of preparing their own consolidation legislation before 1869 continued to 
do so for some years afterwards.  During this period, the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel had no monopoly as regards the preparation of Bills of 
this type.  A document prepared in 1898 listed the Consolidation Acts passed 
during the period from 1870 to 1896 in a manner permitting those in which the 
Office of the Parliamentary Counsel had been involved to be distinguished from 
those drawn independently of that office.  There were 35 Acts in the first 
category and 11 in the second.487  Of the Acts drawn independently of the 
office, seven related to revenue matters; and one of those Acts (the Stamp Act 
1891) was the most recent Act to fall into this category.488  The drafting of 
consolidation legislation in any location other than the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel, however, then faded away; and, following the failure of 
the draft Bill relating to fraud in 1922,489 no further instance of any such Bill 
being drafted outside the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel is known. 
                                            
487
  Ilbert’s 1898 memorandum (n 440) app III.  These are figures that need to be treated with 
considerable caution.  In a footnote in that Appendix it is stated that ‘It is not always easy to 
determine what should be treated as a Consolidation Act.  Perhaps the best test is to consider 
whether the main object is to improve the form or the substance of the law’.  In the list as 
printed, the Short Titles Act 1892 (55 & 56 Vict c 10) and the Short Titles Act 1896 (59 & 60 Vict 
c 14) have been excluded from the totals stated in the text on the ground that those Acts were 
not Consolidation Acts.  
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  The statutes in question were the Stamp Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict c 97), the Stamp Duties 
Management Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict c 98), the Customs Consolidation Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict c 
36), the Taxes Management Act 1880 (43 & 44 Vict c 19), the Inland Revenue Regulation Act 
1890 (53 & 54 Vict c 21), the Stamp Duties Management Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict c 38) and the 
Stamp Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict c 39).  On this point see also TNA file AM 2/54, fos 38-51, ‘Duties 
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The Consolidation Bill ultimately enacted as the Income Tax Act 1918490 was 
therefore prepared in a manner that was, by that time, already unusual: for the 
Bill was not prepared within the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel.  It derived 
from an initiative taken by the then Solicitor of Inland Revenue, HB Cox, with 
the involvement, later on, of an Inland Revenue Departmental Committee.491  
However, once the Bill, so prepared, had been presented to Parliament, 
members of the Joint Committee which would be examining it wished to have 
‘expert drafting assistance’;492 and ensured that the Office of the Parliamentary 
Counsel was also involved.  Loreburn told Cox ‘that it was necessary to have 
some outside authority to give an “imprimatur” to the bill and that he would 
propose that the draft should be referred to the Parliamentary Counsel for 
examination and report’.493  Documents were accordingly sent to Liddell at the 
Office of the Parliamentary Counsel.  It would appear, however, that Liddell did 
not consider the involvement of the office to be absolutely essential: for he told 
Cox that ‘[i]t is with the greatest reluctance that I have been dragged into the 
matter, but we could not very well refuse the L[ord] C[hancellor]’.494 
In 1935, however, Graham-Harrison stated that the practice of the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee had lately been not to accept Consolidation Bills 
drawn outside the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel unless they had been 
submitted to examination there and pronounced satisfactory;495 and, in 1947, 
Ram was able to go further.  For the successful working of the existing 
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  8 & 9 Geo 5 c 40. 
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procedure relating to the enactment of Consolidation Bills it was ‘practically 
essential that official responsibility for the drafting of Consolidation Bills should 
rest upon the Parliamentary Counsel ... , and that such Bills should be drafted 
with the close co-operation of the Government Departments concerned’.496  The 
creation of the separate Consolidation Branch within the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel in 1947497 was a recognition that the office had 
established a monopoly position over the production of Consolidation Bills.  A 
document dating from April 1950 stated that ‘[t]he Parliamentary Counsel have 
a special responsibility in regard to Consolidation Bills, for it is only with their 
assistance that the Joint Committee set up annually by Parliament for the 
consideration of such Bills is able to satisfy itself that the existing law is being 
correctly reproduced’.498 
During the later part of the period from 1907 to 1965 – the period from 1947 to 
1965 – the capacity of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel to determine the 
form of the income tax legislation increased.  This change followed the 
implementation of two initiatives: Morrison’s initiative for the more detailed 
planning of parliamentary Sessions;499 and Ram’s initiative for statute law 
reform.500  Both initiatives had been implemented by the summer of 1947.  The 
increased capacity of the office may be gauged by considering the three major 
reasons that had acted, previously, to ensure that the Office’s capacity had 
been limited. 
The resources of the office increased.  More drafters were in place after the 
second world war than before it; and it was Ram’s opinion in 1951 that the 
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office’s ‘cadre’ was now ‘adequate for the work it has to do but no more than 
adequate’.501  Even during these years, however, the capacity of the office was 
barely adequate – if that.  In 1951, the First Parliamentary Counsel, Sir Alan 
Ellis, wrote to the head of the civil service, Sir Edward Bridges, for advice on the 
extent to which the resources of the office ought to be applied to legislation for 
war.  (The Korean war was then being waged.)  The office, Ellis explained, had 
immediately in prospect more work than it could handle; and ‘you will remember 
that Rowlatt is not available because of the income tax consolidation’.502  Later, 
in 1953, Ellis told the House of Commons Select Committee on Delegated 
Legislation that, having regard to the strength of the Parliamentary Counsel’s 
Office and to the pressure of legislation upon the Parliamentary Counsel, it was 
‘not practicable’ for members of the office to undertake more than a small part 
of the drafting of subordinate legislation.503 
The misdirection of activity which had previously reduced the government’s 
ability to enact its Bills was largely eliminated.  Under the initiative promoted by 
Morrison, the preparation of the government’s legislative programme received 
more systematic attention than it had done earlier; and, from the office’s point of 
view, these new arrangements were exceedingly useful.  In June 1946, Ram 
wrote that the introduction of the new system had saved the office much 
abortive work.  The office was not now called upon to draft any Bill until it had at 
least a provisional place in the programme for the Session (or the next 
Session); and, so far as government Bills were concerned, the government itself 
controlled the flow and fixed the dates, taking into account the office’s estimates 
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of what was likely to be practicable.  There could be no doubt whatever that the 
efforts which had been made to regulate the legislative programme and 
timetable had been of the very greatest assistance to the office, and it was not 
too much to say that, without them, the office could not have got through the 
present heavy Session as well as it had, or have any reasonable prospect of 
getting through the next session without many shipwrecks.  Ram wished it was 
possible to demonstrate this statistically; but, although the transformation was 
most striking to anyone who had experienced the chaos that used to prevail (as 
he had), it was very difficult indeed to show exactly how the transformation had 
been effected.  Ram could only pray that the new machinery would continue to 
work in the future as it had during the present session.504  Ram’s prayers could 
be regarded as effectual: for the new arrangements were continued under the 
Conservative governments in power from 1951 onwards.  ‘Bills must of course 
be produced in accordance with the requirements of the Government as worked 
out for each Parliamentary Session’ said Hutton in 1961.505  The problem of the 
misdirection of activity, which had given rise to substantial difficulties previously, 
was now being much more intelligently managed. 
Arrangements for the preparation of Consolidation Bills improved.  Under the 
initiative promoted by Ram, a separate Consolidation Branch within the Office of 
the Parliamentary Counsel was brought into existence; and, by the spring of 
1951, 25 Consolidation Acts had been passed.506  Carr, writing a little later, 
considered that these new arrangements ‘in large measure countered’ one of 
the ‘natural enemies’ of consolidation: ‘the shortage of available experts’.507  It 
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was later recorded that about 100 Consolidation Acts were passed between 
1947 and 1966 (when responsibility for consolidation was assumed by the Law 
Commissions).508 
In the case of the form of the income tax legislation, however, the creation of 
the new Consolidation Branch did not solve a significant problem involving the 
office’s capacity to determine that form.  In November 1945, Ram had been 
clear that only two of the Parliamentary Counsel had sufficient knowledge of 
income tax law to undertake the drafting work involved in its clarification; and 
one of these was Sir John Stainton who would soon retire.  ‘It seems clear, 
therefore, that the task must devolve upon Mr. Rowlatt’ – and it was desirable 
that it should: for Rowlatt would be drafting the income tax clauses for the 
annual Finance Bill.509  A plan to rewrite the income tax legislation was 
accordingly liable to give rise to operational difficulties in the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel.  The consolidation of the income tax legislation could 
not be prepared in the office’s newly-created Consolidation Branch, but would 
have to be entrusted to Rowlatt who did Finance Bill work and who worked in 
the ‘main’ part of the office.  It followed that, if a plan to consolidate the income 
tax legislation was to be concluded successfully, it might well be necessary for 
the government to give priority to the Income Tax Consolidation Bill over other 
new legislation that the government might have in mind.  Ellis raised these 
points with the Cabinet Office;510 his letter was shown to the Lord President 
(Morrison);511 and, on 31 January 1949, Morrison wrote to the Lord Chancellor 
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(Jowitt) asking him what he had in mind about the consolidation and codification 
of income tax law: for there appeared to be the danger of a clash between the 
needs of current legislation and those of consolidation.512  Jowitt’s reply stated 
that ‘[w]ith regard to the codification of the income tax law, I am afraid that this 
does mean the whole time services of Sir John Rowlatt’.  He was advised that, 
as a first step, it would be necessary to consolidate the income tax law.  The 
reply then indicated that Jowitt would welcome the opportunity to discuss the 
matter at a meeting with officials present.513  This meeting took place on 16 
February 1949; and (in addition to Morrison and Jowitt) Bridges, Ellis, Ram and 
Rowlatt were also present.514  Bridges made his own private note of this 
meeting.  After recording that Rowlatt was ‘obviously ready to get on with the 
job’, he stated that ‘I was merely rude, and said that the present position was a 
scandal; but if Ministers were not prepared to get started with the job and go 
ahead with it, they had better say so and leave the existing confusion to stand’.  
‘In the end’ he recorded ‘it was decided to get ahead with the business’.515  At a 
meeting held on 1 March 1949, the Cabinet Legislation Committee finally 
approved proposals for the rewriting of the Income Tax Acts;516 and, 
accordingly, arrangements to undertake a task with major implications for the 
form of income tax legislation were made.  The making of those arrangements, 
however, had involved a special meeting, attended by two cabinet ministers and 
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a number of senior civil servants, to decide how the highly finite capacity of the 
Office of the Parliamentary Counsel should be deployed. 
The capacity of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel to determine the form of 
legislation in general and of income tax legislation in particular was certainly 
greater during the period from 1947 to 1965 than it had been earlier.  The 
evidence demonstrates, however, that overall capacity advanced from the 
inadequate only as far as the barely adequate – if as far as that. 
2. The office’s wish to determine the form of income tax legislation 
The question how far the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel wished to be a 
determinant of the form of the income tax legislation during the period from 
1907 to 1965 is addressed in two different ways.  It is addressed, first, by 
investigating whether the office held views relevant for the form in which 
legislation should be enacted.  The question how far the office wished to be 
such a determinant is then also addressed by investigating the aims of one of 
the First Parliamentary Counsel, Sir Granville Ram. 
(1) The office’s views on forms of legislation 
The question whether the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel held views 
relevant for the form of legislation in general and of income tax legislation in 
particular is addressed by investigating three matters: the relationship that 
should exist between primary and subordinate legislation; the desirability of 
consolidation legislation; and the desirability and feasibility of the codification of 
income tax law.  On the first and second matters, the office may be shown to 
have had its own consistent viewpoint. 
A succession of First Parliamentary Counsel supported the growth of powers to 
make subordinate legislation – and made statements to that effect.  In a 
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memorandum written in 1870, Thring stated that subordinate legislation was a 
class of legislation which ‘is increasing, and ought to increase, year by year, as 
it is quite impossible that Parliament can do more than lay down the principles 
of bills and leave their practical details, if necessary, to be worked out by 
efficient practical officers’.517  Later, in 1877, Thring expressed the view that 
matters of procedure and detail should either be enacted in a schedule to a 
statute ‘or, what is far better, (where possible) be left to be prescribed by a court 
or department of the Government’.518  He then went on to set out his views on 
this subject exceedingly clearly: 
The adoption of the system of confining the attention of Parliament 
to material provisions only and leaving details to be settled 
departmentally, is probably the only mode in which parliamentary 
government can, as respects its legislative functions, be 
satisfactorily carried on.  The province of Parliament is to decide 
material questions affecting the public interest, and the more 
procedure and subordinate matters can be withdrawn from their 
cognisance, the greater will be the time afforded for the 
consideration of the more serious questions involved in 
legislation.519 
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...  Year by year the subordinate Government of England is becoming more and more important.  
The new movement set in with the Reform Bill of 1832: it has gone far already and assuredly it 
will go farther.  We are becoming a much governed nation, governed by all manner of councils 
and boards and officers, central and local, high and low, exercising the powers which have been 
committed to them by modern statutes’. (FW Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 
(CUP 1908) 415, 417 and 501.  Maitland’s book prints lectures delivered in 1887 and 1888 (ibid 
v-vii).)  It may be observed that, while Thring welcomed the rise of subordinate legislation, 
Maitland’s outlook was much more ambivalent.  However, while Maitland is rightly praised for 
his prescience in discerning this trend as early as 1887 or 1888, his remarks were made at least 
ten years later than those of Thring. 
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Ilbert, in his 1898 Memorandum, described subordinate legislation as a class of 
legislation ‘of great and growing importance’.520  He discussed this class of 
legislation in a work published in 1901;521 and repeated the points made in a 
later work published in 1913.522  The tendency of modern parliamentary 
legislation in England had been to place a few broad general rules or 
statements of principles in the body of an Act, and to relegate details either to 
schedules or to statutory rules.  Ilbert believed that MPs scrutinised these 
matters jealously: so, unless the temper of Parliament changed materially, 
attempts to confer powers in unduly wide terms would produce a reaction ‘which 
would have a mischievous and embarrassing effect on the form of 
parliamentary legislation’.  If, however, the delegation of legislative powers was 
kept within due limits and accompanied by due safeguards, it facilitated both 
discussion and administration.  Public opinion was a very powerful safeguard 
against any serious abuse of statutory powers.523 
Graham-Harrison, in 1931, had ‘no doubt ... that the system of delegation must 
continue, and that for three reasons’.  It was necessary to provide for 
emergencies; it was difficult to enact legislation unless Acts of Parliament could 
be confined to material provisions; and a system of subordinate legislation could 
secure an improvement in the form of the law, because more time could be 
devoted to the preparation of subordinate legislation than to the preparation of 
statutes.524  Giving evidence to the Committee on Ministers’ Powers in 1930, he 
                                            
520
  Ilbert’s 1898 Memorandum (n 440) para 28. 
521
  Sir CP Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms (OUP 1901) 36-42 (ch 3, ‘Subordinate 
Legislation’). 
522
  Ilbert, Mechanics (n 440) 144-8. 
523
  Ilbert, Legislative Methods (n 521) 36-42.  The passage quoted directly is at 40. 
524
  Sir WM Graham-Harrison, Notes on the Delegation by Parliament of Legislative Power, with 
a Particular Examination of the Case of the Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood and some 
Considerations with respect to the Future Granting, Exercise and Control of Such Powers 
(privately printed, 1931) 118-21. 
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stated that his 27 years’ experience of getting legislation through Parliament 
had convinced him that it would be impossible to produce the amount and kind 
of legislation which Parliament desired to pass, and which the people of the 
United Kingdom were supposed to want, if it became necessary to insert in the 
Acts of Parliament themselves any considerable portion of what was now left to 
subordinate legislation.525 
No occasion is known where one of the Parliamentary Counsel explicitly argued 
the case for the making of subordinate legislation during and after the second 
world war.526  This state of affairs, however, is considered to reflect a general 
acceptance that subordinate legislation was necessary.527  In his evidence to 
the House of Commons Select Committee on Delegated Legislation in 1953, 
Ellis confined himself to dealing with matters where the office could make a 
particular contribution.  He did not argue the general case for the existence of 
subordinate legislation; and was not asked about this matter in his oral 
examination.528  The Committee, in its report, accepted that subordinate 
legislation was necessary; but chose to highlight statements to that effect made 
by three politicians.529 
                                            
525
  Committee on Ministers’ Powers: Volume 2: Minutes of Evidence (London, HMSO, 1932) 
35.  This Committee (often called ‘the Donoughmore Committee’) is considered in more detail in 
chapter 7, section 1, below. 
526
  It may be borne in mind that the Office’s records for the period following the second world 
war have not yet been made generally available at the National Archives – and that those 
records may contain such an explicit argument. 
527
  ‘The twentieth century, in relation to delegated legislation, was a century of two halves.  In 
the first half, the battle for the legitimacy of delegating legislative power was fought and won.  
The second half was dominated by the attempt to enhance parliamentary safeguards against 
potential and actual “abuses” of these delegated powers’.  M Taggart, ‘From “parliamentary 
powers” to privatization: The chequered history of delegated legislation in the twentieth century’ 
(2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 575, 624. 
528
  Select Committee on Delegated Legislation (n 503) 31-9. 
529
  ibid vi (paras 15-17).  The politicians were Morrison, Crookshank (then the leader of the 
House of Commons) and Bevan. 
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The second matter relevant for the form of legislation on which the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel had a consistent viewpoint was support for the 
enactment of consolidation legislation.  On this matter, too, a succession of First 
Parliamentary Counsel made statements supporting the enactment of such 
legislation.  In his 1870 Memorandum, Thring stated that one or more 
Consolidation Bills were then usually brought in each Session; he went on to 
say that, assuming that any effective reform of the law were to take place, 
consolidation must be carried on to a much greater extent, with numerous 
Consolidation Bills being introduced.530  ‘Now about the advantages to be 
derived from the consolidation of statute law, there can be no question’, said 
Ilbert in 1913.  He went on to refer to the need to search for the law in a dozen 
or more statutes scattered over several volumes: ‘What is more maddening to 
the professional lawyer, to the official, and to the ordinary citizen ... ?’531  
Graham-Harrison, speaking in 1934, and after referring to the legislation relating 
to insurance and to ‘my experience of fifteen years in amending the Income Tax 
Acts’, could ‘say with all sincerity that no-one has a greater interest in 
consolidation than the Parliamentary Counsel who is thereby relieved from the 
task of drafting amending legislation of this kind’.532  It ‘really does seem to me 
important to keep consolidation going all the time’, Rowlatt wrote in 1955, ‘it is 
at the lowest the least unhopeful of the ways of keeping the Statute Book in 
some sort of order and the machinery for doing it must not ever be allowed to 
get rusty’.533 
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  This information is taken from Ilbert’s 1898 Memorandum (n 440) para 29. 
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  Ilbert, Mechanics (n 440) 37. 
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  Graham-Harrison (n 440) 29. 
533
  TNA file T 199/671.  Letter, Rowlatt to Hankey, 4 November 1955.  (Underlining in original.) 
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The office’s general wish that consolidation legislation should be enacted, 
however, did not lead, automatically, to a particular wish that the income tax 
legislation should be consolidated.  In the official memoranda he wrote shortly 
after the second world war, Ram was intentionally unspecific as to how a 
programme for improving the form of the income tax legislation might best be 
undertaken.  In his memorandum on the simplification of income tax law, dated 
1 November 1945, he wrote that when work upon the clarification of income tax 
law was once again put in hand, the first question would be whether codification 
should be attempted or whether people should be content, in the first instance, 
with mere consolidation.  Codification would almost certainly be preferable if it 
could be achieved; but it was open to question whether, in the long run, better 
progress might not be made by consolidating the statute law before attempting 
a new code.  The question should be thoroughly considered by those whose 
business it was to prepare the new Bill.534  The form of the income tax 
legislation was also mentioned in Ram’s major memorandum on statute law 
reform, dated 30 January 1946.  The two subjects where clarification of the law 
was then most urgently demanded were probably those dealt with by the 
Income Tax Acts and by the Rent Restriction Acts.  ‘Of the first it need only be 
said that although “pure” consolidation might perhaps be useful as a first step 
towards a more thorough investigation of the whole subject it could do no more 
than this’.535  The plan for the rewriting of the income tax legislation that was 
                                            
534
  TNA file IR 40/8554.  ‘Simplification of Income Tax Law: Memorandum by the Parliamentary 
Counsel’ [Sir Granville Ram], 1 November 1945, para 7.  The circumstances in which this 
memorandum was written are considered below, text around ns 599-601. 
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  Ram’s Statute Law Reform Memorandum (n 440) para 19. 
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finally adopted, however, envisaged the consolidation of the income tax 
legislation as its first major step.536 
By contrast, on the third matter relevant for the form of legislation in general and 
of income tax legislation in particular (the desirability and feasibility of the 
codification of income tax law), the office did not hold one single view 
consistently over a long period – although it certainly held views.  Ram, in his 
memoranda written shortly after the end of the second world war, believed that 
codification was likely to be a desirable ultimate objective.
537
  On the other 
hand, a later First Parliamentary Counsel, Sir John Rowlatt, the drafter of the 
1952 Act, reached a more pessimistic conclusion: for he came to hold the view 
that codification of income tax law was simply not feasible.  Asked by Bridges to 
deal with a question that had arisen on the Income Tax Acts, Rowlatt stated that 
he was converted to the view that ‘wholesale codification is quite impossible’ 
and that it was simply a waste of time and money to try it on.  ‘The necessary 
Bill would never get finished, if it did get finished it would never get passed, and 
if it did get passed it could never be brought into operation.  If one codifies at all, 
one must codify in much smaller mouthfuls’.538  Bridges replied, referring to 
Rowlatt’s remark that ‘wholesale codification is quite impossible’ – and ending 
with the question ‘[w]here, then, does our hope of progress lie?’539  Rowlatt sent 
his substantial reply to Bridges on 11 January 1952.540  The first paragraph 
recorded that the question posed in Bridges’s letter had also been discussed 
with Ellis (the First Parliamentary Counsel), Bamford (the Chairman of the 
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  For the forming and adoption of this plan see JHN Pearce, ‘The Income Tax Law Rewrite 
Projects: 1907-56’ in J Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 6 (Oxford, Hart, 
2013) 162-4. 
537
  Text around ns 534-5 above. 
538
  TNA file IR 40/14566.  Letter, Rowlatt to Bridges, 14 November 1951. 
539
  TNA file IR 40/14566.  Letter, Bridges to Rowlatt, 10 December 1951. 
540
  TNA file IR 40/14566.  Letter, Rowlatt to Bridges, 11 January (1952).  (In the letter itself, the 
year is specified as ‘1951’, but that is clearly an error, with ‘1952’ being intended.) 
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Board of Inland Revenue) and Verity (another Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue).  ‘I am afraid our conclusions are extremely depressing’.  Codification 
of income tax law ‘all in one lump’ was dismissed.  The possibility of ‘piecemeal 
clearings up of particular subjects’, as occasion offered, in Finance Bills, was 
much nearer sense and reality; but the outlook at that time was unpromising: 
legislation of this type would require extra space in an annual Finance Bill; and 
the space in question was simply not there.  Legislation outside the Finance Bill 
also presented difficulties: for programme Bills were likely to take up more time 
and energy than the government would probably be prepared to agree to spare; 
and, even if a Bill were to be prepared, it might be so handled in Parliament 
‘that if it is passed at all (there was a Revenue Bill in 1921 which dropped) the 
last state of the subject dealt with might easily be worse than the first’.  In one of 
the general observations with which he ended his letter, Rowlatt returned to 
Bridges’s question as to where the hope of progress might lie.  ‘The only true 
answer to this question is that there is no question of progress but only, at the 
best, of delayed regress.  What is most wrong with the Income Tax Acts is that 
there is more of them than anybody can possibly absorb, and this is quite 
certain to get worse every year’.  After a time, it was agreed that the opportunity 
should be taken to codify areas of income tax law as occasion offered; and 
discussion of this subject came to an end.541 
Although Rowlatt opposed codification ‘all in one lump’, he nevertheless 
continued to support codification ‘in much smaller mouthfuls’: and, in 1955, he 
urged the codification of a limited area of the income tax legislation.  The final 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income had 
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made recommendations for the administration of income tax; and, while the 
Royal Commission was sceptical of the value of a general codification of 
income tax law, it was favourable to the codification of a particular branch of 
that law if substantial legislative change was being undertaken for other 
reasons.542  The Inland Revenue considered the possibility of legislation relating 
to income tax administration during the summer of 1955; and, on 5 July, Rowlatt 
spoke to Hancock (the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue).  According to 
Hancock, Rowlatt said that ‘a propos in particular of the last item in our 
proposals – assessments by officers of the Inland Revenue Department – he 
wished to trot out his King Charles’s head for my personal edification’.  Rowlatt 
wished to ask whether the Inland Revenue could cover a comprehensive range 
of the Commission’s recommendations on administration, believing, as he did, 
that the department should take advantage of the possibility of an autumn 
Revenue Bill to carry out a useful codification measure.  Rowlatt was ‘prepared 
to throw in all the necessary resources of Parliamentary Counsel’s Office to 
help’.543  ‘Parliamentary Counsel, though they usually had no time for 
speculative drafting, thought it was a special case which they could fit in’.544  It 
was Rowlatt’s view, therefore, that, while the codification of the entirety of 
income tax law was not feasible, the codification of part of that law (its 
administrative provisions) could be accomplished.  On this matter, therefore, the 
office was willing to be a determinant of the form of the income tax legislation.   
In the short term, it may well be that Rowlatt’s advocacy of a codification 
measure had the effect he wished: for this was what was recommended in the 
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  Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Final Report (Cmd 9474, 1955).  
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submission made soon afterwards, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.545  In 
the longer term, however, Rowlatt’s advocacy of codification legislation did not 
produce the result he wished: for the Inland Revenue, for reasons of its own, 
caused plans for codification legislation to be abandoned.546 
(2) Sir Granville Ram’s programme of statute law reform 
The office’s willingness to be a determinant of the form of legislation in general 
and of the form of the income tax legislation in particular may also be 
demonstrated in a second way.  Sir Granville Ram, the First Parliamentary 
Counsel from 1937 to 1947, had a programme for statute law reform – a 
programme that was implemented after the second world war.  The 
implementation of this programme, however, depended upon the active assent 
of a sufficiently powerful political patron: and an examination of Ram’s quest for 
such a patron accordingly precedes an examination of the programme itself. 
An opportunity appeared to be arising in 1941.  On seeing a draft Memorandum 
which the Attorney-General (Somervell) proposed to submit to the Lord 
Chancellor (Simon) on the subject of the statute book, Ram and Stainton sent 
Somervell substantial ‘Observations’ on the subject.  The observations began 
with the statement that ‘[t]he shocking state of the statute book, and the 
magnitude of the task of reforming it’ were well known both to the Attorney-
General and to the Parliamentary Counsel.  The observations went on to refer 
to a report dating from 1938 ‘which stated that the Acts relating to no less than 
forty-four different subjects were ripe for pure consolidation’.547  If there were 
added to this list subjects such as distress and fraud, which the Statute Law 
                                            
545
  TNA file IR 40/13351 (Part 1).  Minute, Hancock to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 9 August 
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Committee had frequently put aside because consolidation without amendment 
was impossible and any amendment would be controversial, ‘it will be apparent 
that more than half of the statute book requires reconstruction’.  The 
‘Observations’ then concluded with a strong statement of the office’s wish to be 
a determinant of the form of statute law: 
The more one is familiar with the statute book the more one is 
conscious of its scandalous condition; and no-one will be more 
pleased than members of this office to do everything possible to 
help you to succeed in solving problems which have baffled so 
many others for so long.
548
 
The ‘Observations’ welcomed Somervell’s suggestion that the Lord Chancellor 
should seek a Cabinet decision that the reform of the statute book was to be 
regarded as a matter of urgency and given a high place among the projects for 
post-war reconstruction; but ‘[h]aving got a Cabinet decision, someone must be 
made responsible for seeing that it is carried out; otherwise it will be nobody’s 
business’.  Ram and Stainton thought that many years would be needed to 
carry out the far reaching programme of statute law reform which Somervell 
contemplated.  They were also agreed that, in order to carry out this 
programme, some further expansion of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel 
would be necessary.  They would be able to put into practice their long 
cherished plan of having two or more of the members of the office exclusively 
allotted to statute law reform work.549 
Ram and Stainton might outline their potential plan of campaign – but there 
were no significant results.  Somervell undoubtedly supported statute law 
reform in general550 and the reform of the income tax legislation in particular.  It 
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was reported that he was strongly of the view that codification or consolidation 
of the law relating to income tax was one of the most urgent tasks to be 
undertaken in the post war period; and that he had raised the matter at a 
ministerial conference during the first half of 1945.551  To judge from a general 
absence of evidence, however, Simon cared little for these things; and nothing 
perceptible was accomplished while he was Lord Chancellor. 
A further opportunity to advance Ram’s programme of statute law reform arose 
in 1945 when Jowitt succeeded Simon as Lord Chancellor.  Jowitt invited Ram 
to prepare a comprehensive memorandum on statute law reform, dealing with 
its history, explaining the present situation, and making recommendations for 
the future.552  The result was the very comprehensive memorandum prepared 
by Ram, and dated 30 January 1946.553  The memorandum began with the 
statement that ‘[t]he chaotic condition of the Statute Book has been the subject 
of complaint for at least five hundred years’, and then acknowledged that the 
long history of the intermittent attempts made to improve its form and 
arrangement was mostly a history of failure.554  According to Ram, experience 
had abundantly proved that no great progress in the task of producing a well 
ordered and concise statute book was to be expected ‘until a definite place is 
made for such work among the duties of Parliament and of the Executive 
Government’ – and he believed that such a definite place should be made.555  
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Ram was told by an official that Jowitt was ‘particularly pleased’ with his 
memorandum; and that he was ‘more than anxious to play his full share in this 
project’.556  That same official told another civil servant that Jowitt had, in effect, 
accepted Ram’s recommendations ‘lock, stock, and barrel’; and that Jowitt was 
most anxious to get the proposals approved as soon as possible so that the 
office could be re-arranged to accommodate the separate branch which would 
be necessary to do consolidation work.557  The interval between Ram’s 
submission of his memorandum (on 30 January 1946) and the announcement 
of the government’s programme (on 30 July 1947) was nevertheless 
substantial.  One of Ram’s recommendations was that a strengthened Statute 
Law Committee should have the general superintendence of consolidation and 
codification; and a meeting of officials, held on 28 March 1946, took the view 
that the Statute Law Committee should be reconstituted in the summer of 1947, 
with a view to the new scheme becoming operative in October 1947.  ‘The 
reason for this delay is that the pressure of legislation next year will make it 
impossible to launch the new scheme effectively before that date’558 – a reason 
that once again demonstrated the office’s limited capacity to determine the form 
of primary legislation. 
The summer of 1947, however, saw progress.  The Cabinet approved a 
memorandum by Jowitt which began with the statement that ‘[t]he present 
chaotic condition of the Statute Book is a public scandal; it is urgently necessary 
to set about reducing it to order, by a systematic programme of consolidation 
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and codification Bills’;559 and the new arrangements were announced by Jowitt 
in the House of Lords on 30 July 1947.560  A study of the long history of 
previous endeavours in the field of statute law reform, Jowitt said, showed that 
no real improvement could be accomplished ‘until the business of statute law 
reform receives a definite place among the duties of Parliament and of the 
Executive Government of the day.  This Government is determined to give it 
such a place’.  Ram’s programme for statute law reform, therefore, was going to 
be implemented. 
In the final paragraph of his major memorandum, Ram had made four 
recommendations for achieving his objective of statute law reform.561  One 
recommendation was that a separate Consolidation Branch should be 
established in the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel.  This recommendation 
was implemented; and Ram, who retired as First Parliamentary Counsel in 
1947, became the first head of the new branch.  A second recommendation was 
that legislation should be introduced to facilitate the preparation of 
Consolidation and Codification Bills by enabling corrections and minor 
improvements to be made as part of the same overall process: and the 
Consolidation of Enactments (Procedure) Act 1949562 later received the Royal 
Assent.  The provisions of that Act, however, have never been used in the 
context of income tax legislation – and the provisions and impact of that Act are 
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not considered further.563  A third recommendation was that a reconstituted 
Statute Law Committee should have the general superintendence of 
consolidation and codification (including the preparation and revision of a long-
term plan).  The Committee was duly reconstituted; and oversaw the 
programme for consolidation legislation.   More specifically, so far as income tax 
was concerned, in December 1948, this Committee approved a plan which 
provided for the consolidation and then the codification of the income tax 
legislation.564  The fourth and final recommendation was that, as part of the 
legislative programme for each session, the government’s Legislation 
Committee should decide what Consolidation or Codification Bills were to be 
introduced and passed during the Session.  This recommendation fitted very 
well with the initiative promoted by Morrison.565  Once the separate 
Consolidation Branch had been established, it became possible to anticipate 
the orderly production of Consolidation Bills; and, in the address he delivered in 
March 1951, Jowitt was able to report that 25 Consolidation Acts had been 
passed during the previous three years ‘some of them of great size and 
importance’.  He was also able to hint that a Bill to consolidate the income tax 
legislation might be imminent.566 
The implementation of Ram’s programme of statute law reform constituted a 
significant achievement.  By the time that the Attlee government left office in 
1951, all four of Ram’s recommendations had been implemented: and the 
cause of statute law reform was advancing.  ‘It delights me greatly’, Ram wrote 
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to Jowitt in March 1951, ‘that the movement which you inaugurated in 1947 has 
made such good progress so far’.567 
The arrangements made were considered and confirmed in 1955, following the 
submission of a memorandum, in substance the work of Rowlatt, which, in its 
tone, was exceedingly cool towards the programme of statute law reform.568  
Jowitt was shown the memorandum and delivered a ‘counterblast’.  ‘The 
simplification of our Statute Law and the elimination of waste material from it is 
a great task’.569  The Lord Chancellor (Kilmuir) assured Jowitt that he was 
equally concerned to keep up the pressure which Jowitt had initiated for the 
modernisation of the statute book; and that he had come to the conclusion that 
consolidation was of the essence of this business.570  A later memorandum, 
which went out over Kilmuir’s name, but which had been drafted by Bridges and 
had Jowitt in mind as an individual to be placated, started from the point of view 
‘that nothing more important had been achieved in the whole field of the 
administration of law in this country’ than the reforms set on foot by Jowitt for 
the consolidation of statute law.  Kilmuir regarded it as his duty while Lord 
Chancellor, to do all that he could to carry on this all-important work and to see 
that the government did not lose the impetus which Jowitt’s reforms had given 
to the work of cleaning up the statute book and making it more easily 
intelligible.571  The Lord Chancellor was committed to seeing that there should 
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be ‘an intensification and not a relaxation of the attempt to improve the form of 
the Statute Book’, Rowlatt wrote in November 1955.  ‘The Parliamentary 
Counsel Office generally, and the consolidation branch in particular is therefore 
expected by him to produce results’.572  It was estimated in 1966 that between 
one-fifth and one-sixth of the total of living statute law was contained in the 
Consolidation Acts passed during the years since 1947.573  Sir Granville Ram’s 
programme of statute law reform had produced results. 
3. The office’s ability to determine the form of income tax legislation 
The ability of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel to determine the form of 
income tax legislation during the period from 1907 to 1965 is addressed by 
considering policy initiation, policy development and policy implementation.  The 
office’s actual ability to determine that form was subject to major constraints. 
The ability of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel to initiate policy was 
constrained by its limited capacity.  During the period from 1907 to 1947, when 
the office’s ability to determine the form of income tax legislation was 
particularly limited, no evidence is known that the office took any initiatives so 
far as the form of income tax legislation was concerned.  During the period from 
1947 to 1965, by contrast, the office may occasionally be seen taking the 
initiative in making proposals relating to the form of revenue legislation and to 
the form of income tax legislation in particular.  In January 1953, Ellis proposed 
to Croft, the Chairman of the Board of Customs and Excise, that the legislation 
relating to purchase tax might be consolidated.  As far as Ellis and a colleague 
(Hutton) could see, there were very few difficulties about it as a technical 
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  TNA file T 199/671.  Letter, Rowlatt to Hankey, 4 November 1955. 
573
  Committee appointed by the Lord President of the Council, The Preparation of Legislation 
(Cmnd 6053, 1975) 8, para 2.16.  
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matter.  The consolidation of the purchase tax legislation, however, was not 
pursued.574  In the summer of 1955, Rowlatt may be seen taking the initiative in 
making proposals for the codification of the provisions relating to the 
administration of income tax.575  The codification of those administrative 
provisions, however, did not take place. 
The development of policy might be expected to be an area where the office’s 
ability to play a role increased during the twentieth century.  The evidence, 
however, does not reveal any such trend: but it does disclose that the office 
might acquire influence if others wished, or were obliged, to consult it. 
The office was consulted in November 1912,576 on the day following the delivery 
of the judgment in Bowles v Bank of England.577  Two of the Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue consulted the First Parliamentary Counsel (Arthur Thring) about 
the legislation that had become necessary.  One of the points discussed was 
that ‘it would be advisable that the Bill should only deal with the specific point for 
which it was introduced, as the Chancellor desires to avoid other revenue 
matters being brought up for discussion in connection with it’.  On this point, 
Parliamentary Counsel ‘thought that the Bill now proposed should not be a 
Revenue Bill.  This would preclude amendments being put down which had 
nothing to do with the result of the Gibson Bowles case’.578  It was on this basis 
that the Provisional Collection of Taxes Bill (a specific programme Bill) was 
prepared – and enacted.  The evidence, therefore, is that, on this occasion, the 
office’s opinion was sought, but did not transform the situation.  The course of 
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  T 273/268.  Letter, Ellis to Croft, 5 January 1953.  See further at text around n 604 below. 
575
  Section 2(1) above, text around ns 542-6. 
576
  The matter dealt with in this paragraph was also considered in chapter 2, section 2(2), text 
around ns 253-5. 
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  [1913] 1 Ch 57; (1912) 6 TC 136 (Ch).  
578
  TNA file IR 63/18.  Note by Sir Matthew Nathan, ‘Memorandum of Interview’, 6 November 
1912. 
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action undertaken was already favoured by the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(Lloyd George); and it seems clear that the Inland Revenue, if not actually 
favouring that course as well, was completely content to accept it.  The opinion 
of the First Parliamentary Counsel cannot itself be said to have determined the 
decision taken. 
The office influenced the making of a decision much more obviously in 1918, 
while the Bill enacted as the Income Tax Act 1918579 was considered in 
Parliament.  That Bill had been prepared by Cox (the Solicitor of Inland 
Revenue) and an Inland Revenue Departmental Committee; but, after it had 
been presented to Parliament, members of the Joint Committee who would be 
examining it ensured that it should also be examined by the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel.580  Lord Muir-Mackenzie, one of the members of the 
Committee, was recorded as saying ‘that he rather thought that questions of re-
arrangement were likely to be brought forward’; but proposals for re-
arrangement were deferred until the Committee had dealt with the contents of 
the Bill in the form presented.581  It is clear that Muir-Mackenzie, starting from 
the fact that the charge to income tax was expressed in the form of a charge 
under Schedules A to E, believed that the material relating to the charge should 
be placed in a Schedule to the consolidating statute.582  At the eighth meeting of 
the Joint Committee, on 19 June 1918, the arrangement of the Bill was finally 
addressed; and the Committee decided ‘that the charging sections of the Bill be 
placed at the end instead of the beginning of the Bill’.583  It was at this meeting, 
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  8 & 9 Geo 5 c 40. 
580
  Section 1 above, text around ns 490-4. 
581
  TNA file IR 75/91.  Note initialled by Cox, 21 March 1918. 
582
  TNA file IR 75/91.  Letter, Muir-Mackenzie to Cox, 17 May 1918. 
583
  Joint Select Committee on Consolidation Bills 1918, Report on the Income Tax Bill (1918, 
HC 95) xii. 
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therefore, that the decision was taken to abandon the arrangement proposed by 
the Inland Revenue in favour of the arrangement to be found in the legislation 
as enacted.  It may be assumed that Muir-Mackenzie favoured the ‘new’ 
arrangement.  Cox favoured the ‘old’ arrangement.584  AM Bremner, a barrister 
who assisted the Joint Committee and who was also present at the meeting on 
19 June 1918, gave evidence to the Royal Commission on the Income Tax that, 
on the subject of the arrangement of the Bill, ‘a long contest arose because the 
Parliamentary draughtsman thought that you could have a schedule only in a 
schedule, and it was impossible to persuade him to the contrary’.585  Against the 
background of a major division of opinion, the evidence, such as it is, permits 
the inference that the influence of Liddell, of the Office of the Parliamentary 
Counsel, determined the decision reached.586 
Another major division in opinion arose during the period following the 
publication of the Report of the Income Tax Codification Committee in 1936.587  
It was clear that both the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel and the Inland 
Revenue would be involved in decisions on how the draft Bill produced by the 
Codification Committee should be handled.  It soon also became clear that the 
text of a Codification Bill that had the support of the Inland Revenue would differ 
very significantly from the text of the draft Bill prepared by the Codification 
                                            
584
  This was Cox’s evidence to the Royal Commission on the Income Tax set up in 1919; and 
he handed in a copy of the Bill as originally presented in general support of his opinion.  Royal 
Commission on the Income Tax, Minutes of Evidence (London, HMSO, 1919-20) 1319, para 
26,631. 
585
  ibid 800, para 16,027.  Bremner also said that the arrangement in the Bill as originally 
presented ‘was the same arrangement as I should have made’.  (ibid.) 
586
  Although Cox gave much information on the process of the enactment of the 1918 Act in his 
published article, he provided no information on this particular point.  See HB Cox, ‘Origin and 
Growth of Income Tax’ (1919) 1 Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation and 
International Law 42. 
587
  The history of the draft Bill produced by the Income Tax Codification Committee after the 
publication of that draft Bill in 1936 is considered in chapter 6, section 1 below, and Pearce (n 
536) 154-9. 
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Committee.  There was potential for a dispute about the rival merits of the draft 
Bill produced by the Codification Committee and of a later Bill dealing with the 
additional points raised subsequently by the Inland Revenue.  The tensions 
between the office and the Inland Revenue were discussed at a meeting in July 
1937; and it was agreed that, when the Inland Revenue had completed its final 
review of the draft Bill, the matter should be referred to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Simon).588  Papers were prepared;589 and when, early in 1938, 
Simon considered this matter for himself, he had material contributed by the 
Office of Parliamentary Counsel, the Inland Revenue and the Departmental 
Treasury.  The Inland Revenue wanted to proceed with the Codification 
Committee’s draft Bill, but in an altered form – and took an optimistic line about 
the Bill’s Parliamentary prospects.590 
The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel took a very different view.591  The 
material contributed by the Office included a letter from Stainton (the 
Parliamentary Counsel engaged on the draft Bill), written on the basis that he 
thought it ‘essential that Ministers should recognise the Parliamentary difficulties 
which the Bill is likely to present’.592  The Bill was ‘not a pure Consolidation Bill, 
and therefore will not be subject to the convenient procedure which enables 
such a Bill to be passed without taking up any Parliamentary time’.  Stainton 
                                            
588
  TNA file IR 40/5274.  Note (by Canny) of meeting held on 21 July 1937.  The Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel viewed the passing of time with disquiet.  It was the view of the First 
Parliamentary Counsel (Gwyer) that ‘experience shows that Consolidation Bills put into cold 
storage deteriorate very rapidly, with the result that a very large amount of work is thrown away’.  
TNA file IR 40/5274.  Letter, Gwyer to Forber (Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue), 28 
May 1937. 
589
  TNA file T 172/1860 is the file presented to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, together with 
the Chancellor’s own memorandum. 
590
  TNA file T 172/1860.  Submission, Canny to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 17 December 
1937.  The Inland Revenue’s approach was considered in chapter 3, section 2(1), above, text 
around ns 386-8. 
591
  The Departmental Treasury also thought that the Inland Revenue underestimated the 
Parliamentary difficulties involved in its preferred course of action.  (TNA file T 172/1860.  
Memorandum by JHE Woods, 10 January 1938.) 
592
  TNA file T 172/1860.  Letter, Stainton to Canny, 8 December 1937. 
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went on to point out that it would be clear that any Bill presented to the 
Commons differed significantly from the draft Bill produced by the Codification 
Committee: and thought it virtually certain that the House of Commons would 
wish to investigate why those differences existed.  Proceedings in the 
Commons could therefore become protracted – and (among other things) 
involve Ministers in detailed explanations of highly technical matters.  The 
material contributed by the office also included a memorandum by Ram.  The 
first part dealt with the office’s drafting resources; and, after referring to the 
government’s ordinary legislative programme and to ‘no less than 48 projected 
Bills’ which might be needed at short notice to deal with wartime conditions,593 
Ram’s conclusion was that consolidation work must be postponed until after the 
Emergency Bills had been disposed of, and that the carrying out of the Inland 
Revenue’s programme would involve some risk that his office might be unable 
to meet its obligations either in respect of the Emergency Bills or in respect of 
the ordinary legislative work of the Session.  The second part of Ram’s 
Memorandum expressed his general views on the whole subject.  He was in 
general agreement with Stainton; and thought that the Inland Revenue was too 
optimistic in its estimate of the Parliamentary difficulties likely to be encountered 
in the passage of the Bill.594 
Simon’s own Memorandum, dated 18 January 1938, was pessimistic – but 
indecisive.  Simon did not decide that work on the Codification Bill should 
cease, promising instead to study the main points on which the Inland Revenue 
felt it necessary to depart from the Codification Committee’s 
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  Some details of the preparation of this emergency legislation are given in Kent (n 440) 107-
11, who mentions the preparation of one main enabling Bill and 42 other emergency Bills (ibid 
109). 
594
  TNA file T 172/1860.  Memorandum by Ram, 10 January 1938. 
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recommendations.595  In early 1938, therefore, work on the draft Bill continued – 
and so did the dispute.596  However, at the beginning of March 1938,597 Ram 
was able to obtain a decision from Simon that ‘owing to the other demands 
upon Parliamentary Counsel’s time’, it was not practicable ‘to go full steam 
ahead with the Codification Bill’; and that its introduction early in the next 
parliamentary Session was no longer possible.  Further work on the Codification 
Bill was to be downgraded, and Stainton would not work on the Bill in the 
foreseeable future.598  Time passed; and the decision that there should be 
‘some postponement’ of the Bill gradually moved towards becoming a decision 
that the Bill would be abandoned.  The second world war broke out; there was 
no question of work on the Codification Bill being undertaken during the war; 
and, by 1945, the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel and the Inland Revenue 
were both quite clear that the draft Codification Bill was a text that was not of 
practical use. 
In this dispute it was the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel that obtained the 
decision that work on the draft Codification Bill should be put to one side: a 
state of affairs that led, in practice, to the later abandonment of that Bill – an 
outcome which the office clearly foresaw.  The office may be regarded as 
having done better in this dispute than the Inland Revenue (which wished to 
continue to prepare the Bill).  The decision reached, however, was not governed 
by a ministerial decision on the merits of competing Bills to codify income tax 
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  TNA file T 172/1860.  Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir John Simon), 
18 January 1938.  Simon’s memorandum appears to point clearly to the conclusion that the 
Codification Bill would have to be abandoned, but then to stop short of the implied conclusion. 
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  For this dispute see chapter 3, text around ns 391-2. 
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  TNA file IR 40/5274.  Letter, Ram to Canny, 1 March 1938.  This letter refers to a meeting 
which had taken place ‘this afternoon’. 
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  TNA file IR 40/5274.  Letter, Canny to Woods, 10 March 1938.  The wording of this letter 
permits the conjecture that – to some extent at least – Ram outmanoeuvred Canny.  Kent says 
of Ram that ‘[w]hen conducting a war against another department, he was full of resource and 
never lost his nerve, and was a doughty champion of the office’.  Kent (n 440) 73. 
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law: it was governed by a ministerial decision on competing priorities for 
inadequate drafting resources – for it was unsafe to assume that the Office of 
the Parliamentary Counsel had the capacity to undertake all the tasks that could 
ideally be put in hand. 
The office was also invited to contribute to the development of policy shortly 
after the second world war.  Towards the end of 1945, Donovan, a Labour MP, 
supported by the Attorney-General (Shawcross), pressed for work to be 
resumed on the abandoned Income Tax Codification Bill.  The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Dalton) asked the Inland Revenue to state its views: but the 
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue (Gregg) was clear that the Chancellor 
should also obtain the views of the First Parliamentary Counsel.599  When 
Dalton came to consider the matter for himself, therefore, he had before him 
substantial contributions from both Ram and Gregg.600  Both opposed the 
proposal that work on the Codification Committee’s draft Bill should be 
resumed.601 
Ram’s memorandum stated that the clarification of income tax law was a project 
upon which much effort had been expended in the past; and the causes which 
had hitherto led to disappointment were probably more apparent in his office 
than elsewhere.  ‘I therefore conceive it to be my duty to mention frankly certain 
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  TNA file IR 40/8554.  Letter, Gregg to Trend, 2 November 1945; and Report, Inland 
Revenue (Gregg) to Chancellor of the Exchequer (Dalton), 2 November 1945. 
600
  TNA file IR 40/8554.  Report, Inland Revenue (Gregg) to Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(Dalton), 2 November 1945, ‘Simplification of Income Tax Law: Memorandum by the 
Parliamentary Counsel’, 1 November 1945.  Gregg’s memorandum was considered in chapter 
3, section 2(1), above, text following n 399. 
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  In a letter to Gregg, Ram stated of his own memorandum that it was outspoken but that the 
situation required the utmost frankness; and that, in the circumstances, outspokenness on this 
subject probably came better from his office than from the Inland Revenue.  There was no doubt 
that Gregg and he were in complete agreement over this and it would be well that the two of 
them should speak with the same voice.  TNA file IR 40/8554.  Letter, Ram to Gregg, 1 
November 1945.  ‘”Great Stuff – This Bass”!’ was Gregg’s view of Ram’s Memorandum.  TNA 
file IR 40/8554.  Letter, Gregg to Ram, 2 November 1945. 
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mistakes which should be avoided this time in order that success may be 
attained’.  Ram highlighted two mistakes (as he saw them) made by the 
Codification Committee: the Committee had attempted to undertake the actual 
drafting of the Bill;602 and there had been only occasional consultations with the 
Inland Revenue.  He went on to urge that a draft Bill should be prepared by one 
of the Parliamentary Counsel on the instructions of the Inland Revenue; and 
that only when that stage had been completed should the draft Bill be examined 
by a Committee.  It would also be necessary, in due course, to consider the 
conflicting claims of new legislation (on the one hand) and consolidating and 
codifying legislation (on the other hand); of the place to be taken by the 
rewriting of the legislation governing income tax law vis-a-vis the rewriting of the 
legislation governing other areas of the law; and, in the case of income tax, of 
the relative merits of the consolidation and codification. 
The decision then made did not depend upon the arguments advanced in the 
documents produced.  Dalton stated that he discounted a good deal of the 
material submitted: ‘[b]ut we can’t spare Parliamentary Counsel just yet’.603  
Work on the draft Codification Bill was accordingly not resumed (the outcome 
that Ram and Gregg wished to see) – but this result did not derive from their 
advocacy.  It was a corollary of a state of affairs in which the entire resources of 
the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel were being devoted to the Attlee 
government’s current legislative programme.  The decision that the form of the 
income tax legislation should not be changed (for the moment at any rate) had 
been taken by reference to the limited capacity of the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel. 
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  ‘Same old Song!’ was Dalton’s marginal comment on this passage. 
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  TNA file IR 40/8554.  Note, Dalton to Trend, 11 November 1945. 
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After the coming into operation of the new arrangements for the office in 1947, it 
might perhaps be expected that its role in policy development would increase: 
but it is not possible to discern any change from the state of affairs existing 
earlier.  Thus, in 1953, although the office took the initiative in proposing that 
the legislation relating to purchase tax might be consolidated, both Customs 
and Excise and the Treasury were clear that the proposal should not be 
implemented.  Consolidation would imply the indefinite continuation of an 
unpopular tax; and there was also the prospect of legislation modifying the tax’s 
character.  The consolidation of the purchase tax legislation was not further 
pursued.604  Similarly, in 1955, although the office had advocated the 
codification of the administrative provisions relating to income tax, there was no 
such codification measure.  In 1957, the Inland Revenue retreated from the idea 
of a Codification Bill to that of a programme Bill confined to making the 
necessary amendments to the law; and, it was a programme Bill of this kind that 
was ultimately enacted.605 
Another area where the office made only a limited contribution to policy 
development after 1947 was in the devising of a new plan for rewriting the 
income tax legislation.  In June 1948, after being told that the Inland Revenue 
was in favour of consolidation of the income tax legislation,606 Ram had to 
accommodate himself to the situation.  He was surprised to learn that the Inland 
Revenue was now inclined to favour consolidation of the income tax legislation 
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  TNA file T 273/268.  Letter, Ellis to Croft, 5 January 1953; note, [Gilbert] to Bridges, 7 
January 1953; letter, Bridges to Ellis, 8 January 1953; letter, Croft to Ellis, 12 January 1953.  ‘As 
you know’, Bridges wrote to Ellis, ‘I am a whole-hogger for consolidation.  But in this particular 
instance, there are, I think, some fairly good reasons why it would be inadvisable to introduce a 
consolidatory measure in this field at the present moment’.  (TNA file T 273/268.  Letter, Bridges 
to Ellis, 8 January 1953.) 
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  Chapter 3, section 2, above, text around n 410.  The statute ultimately enacted was the 
Income Tax Management Act 1964. 
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  TNA file T 273/263.  Letter, Bridges to Ram, 18 June 1948. 
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because he had always been led to believe that consolidation would, in itself, 
effect very little.  However, if this were wrong and the truth was that 
consolidation was a necessary or useful preliminary, his office would have to 
arrange accordingly; ‘but it would be a very big job and I should be loath to 
undertake it “unadvisedly, lightly, or wantonly” particularly at this moment’.607  
During June and July 1948, the Treasury, the Inland Revenue and the Office of 
Parliamentary Counsel co-operated in producing a Joint Memorandum for the 
Statute Law Committee.608  The memorandum proposed that there should be a 
consolidation of the existing income tax legislation, to be followed by an attempt 
at codification.  This was a programme linked to the preferences of the Inland 
Revenue rather than those of the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel.  It was 
this programme, however, that was approved by the reconstituted Statute Law 
Committee and led, eventually, to the 1952 Act. 
In addition to policy initiation and policy development, the actual ability of the 
Office of the Parliamentary Counsel to determine the form of income tax 
legislation is also addressed by investigating policy implementation.  Here the 
office had a real role to play, even if only in a negative sense – for if it failed to 
produce the text of a Bill which it was envisaged that it would draft, the initiative 
in question would obviously not make progress.  Although there is one case 
requiring examination, Bills which the office had been instructed to produce did 
not have to be abandoned because the office had failed to produce text.  There 
was, admittedly, an indication that the drafting of the Revenue Bill of 1921 was 
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  TNA file T 273/263.  Letter, Ram to Bridges, 21 June 1948. 
608
  TNA file IR 40/14566.  Statute Law Committee; Consolidation of Income Tax Acts; Joint 
Memorandum submitted by the Secretary to the Treasury on behalf of the Treasury, the Board 
of Inland Revenue and Parliamentary Counsel, 6 July 1948.  In a letter written to Bridges during 
November 1951, Rowlatt referred to this Memorandum as ‘your Memorandum’.  TNA file IR 
40/14566.  Letter, Rowlatt to Bridges, 14 November 1951. 
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delayed, to a certain extent, by the illness of the drafter (Graham-Harrison): but 
this indication occurs in a letter written by a Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
and in a context in which it was convenient for the writer to be able to attribute a 
delay to another government department;609 and the failure of the Revenue Bill 
of 1921 cannot be attributed to drafting delays. 
The case requiring examination is that of the legislation ultimately enacted as 
the Income Tax Act 1952.610  This legislation may be regarded as exceptional 
because the drafter, Sir John Rowlatt,
611
 argued for the abandonment of the 
earlier decision that legislation consolidating the Income Tax Acts should be 
prepared; and because the task was of such a size that its successful 
completion was by no means guaranteed. 
Ram, in November 1945, had already expressed the view that the task of 
drafting must devolve upon Rowlatt – and so it did.612  At the meeting held on 
16 February 1949, to discuss the rewriting of the Income Tax Acts, Bridges had 
noted that Rowlatt was ‘obviously ready to get on with the job’; and a 
programme for the rewriting of that legislation was approved on 1 March 1949.  
Rowlatt, however, was soon unenthusiastic.  In the spring of 1949, he 
expressed the grudging view that a ‘stuffy, almost paste-and-scissors, 
Consolidation Act would not be very satisfactory, but it might perhaps be 
reasonable to prepare it and pass it reasonably quickly’.  Such a statute ‘might 
perhaps avoid throwing doubt on most of the existing case law’ and be of ‘some 
utility to persons who wanted to see, rather more easily than is possible at 
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  TNA file T 171/195.  Letter, Thompson to Gower, 10 February 1921. 
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  15 & 16 Geo 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c 10. 
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  Rowlatt’s role is considered more generally in the conclusion to this chapter, text around ns 
637-43 below. 
612
  These events were considered above, text around ns 509-15. 
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present, where the income tax as a whole has got to’.613  By November 1949, 
however, Rowlatt had advanced to outright opposition – and despatched a 
memorandum arguing at length that ‘whatever can or cannot be done about the 
Income Tax Acts, the idea of consolidating them is misconceived and should be 
abandoned’.  Consolidation was impracticable: and, even if it should be 
practicable, it was ‘worse than useless’.614  A meeting to discuss the situation 
was held on 2 December 1949, with Bridges in the chair.615  Bridges felt 
strongly that, in view of the previous failure to deal with the subject, ‘they would 
have to have a satisfactory alternative if they were to drop the Consolidation 
Bill’.  It was agreed, however, that it was not practicable to work directly on a 
Codification Bill; and that the preparation and enactment of a Consolidation Bill 
was necessary before codification.  The decision, therefore (the reverse of the 
decision that Rowlatt had been seeking), was that the preparation of the 
Consolidation Bill should continue. 
The drafting of the Consolidation Bill was eventually completed: and, to 
contemporaries, the Bill was remarkable for its size.  At the time it received the 
Royal Assent, it was the longest statute ever to be enacted.616  To 
contemporaries, the Bill was also remarkable for its quality.  On one occasion 
Rowlatt allowed himself to say that ‘[m]iracles apart, it is broadly speaking as 
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  TNA file IR 40/14566.  Letter, Rowlatt to Bamford, 14 April 1949.  (Underlining in original.) 
614
  Papers in the Office of Parliamentary Counsel on the Income Tax Act 1952, vol 13, fos 
1504-8.  Income Tax Consolidation; Memorandum by Parliamentary Counsel, 14 November 
1949.  The author has seen and taken a copy of this document.  It is understood that this 
volume is to be transferred to the National Archives where (it is assumed) it will become 
available, in due course, in the ‘AM’ series. 
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  A note of this meeting prepared by Bligh (Bridges’s Private Secretary) is on TNA file T 
273/267.  A note of this meeting prepared by Rowlatt is in the papers in the Office of 
Parliamentary Counsel on the Income Tax Act 1952, vol 13, fos 1548-9.  As regards this latter 
document, see the comment made in the previous note. 
616
  Chapter 1 above, n 19.  
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good and uncontroversial as any Consolidation Bill is ever going to be’;617 and 
Coldstream, of the Lord Chancellor’s Office, recorded the view that ‘most of us 
think that Rowlatt’s work on this Bill is a tour de force.’618  Coldstream had been 
told by Ellis, the First Parliamentary Counsel, that the Bill could hardly have 
been done at all except by Rowlatt; and only then because the Parliamentary 
Counsel’s work in the last two years had been comparatively slack.  ‘But for the 
coincidence of Rowlatt’s exceptional ability and the slack period I imagine that 
we should never have got the consolidation done at all’.619  On 5 February 
1952, when the Income Tax Bill completed its passage through the House of 
Lords, Lord Radcliffe, Lord Schuster and the Lord Chancellor (Simonds) all 
praised Rowlatt by name.  ‘The successful preparation of the Bill was an effort 
such as Hercules might have made’.620  The enactment of the Income Tax Act 
1952 changed the form of income tax legislation; but this Act only came into 
existence at all because one particular member of the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel had the ability, drive, stamina and time to draft it.621 
Conclusion 
The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel wished to be a determinant of the form 
of legislation in general.  The office favoured the use of subordinate legislation 
and the undertaking of consolidation legislation.  One of the Parliamentary 
Counsel, Sir Granville Ram, had a programme for statute law reform; and that 
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  TNA file LCO 2/3818.  Letter, Rowlatt to Bamford, 25 October 1951. 
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programme was implemented.  Its implementation led, among other things, to a 
greater enactment of consolidation legislation; and, as part of that programme 
the income tax legislation was consolidated in 1952.622 
The evidence nevertheless demonstrates that role played by the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel in determining the form of the income tax legislation was 
exceedingly limited.  The office’s role may have been less important than Cocks 
surmised.623  There were two major reasons for this limited role: the general 
requirement for the lawyer to act in accordance with the client’s instructions; 
and the limited capacity of the Office. 
The requirement for the lawyer to act in accordance with the client’s instructions 
restricted the office’s ability to bring about change.  The office could – and did – 
propose; but the clients (whether in the form of political ministers or government 
departments) could – and did – dispose.  Rowlatt, in 1955, ‘wished to trot out 
his King Charles’s head’ and proposed the codification of the law relating to 
income tax administration – but the Inland Revenue later abandoned that 
proposal.624  Earlier, in 1949, the wish of the clients that work on the 
consolidation of the income tax legislation should continue had prevailed over 
Rowlatt’s wish that this consolidation work should be abandoned.625  The office 
had its own private cargoes and destinations626 – but was not well placed to 
cause its plans to be implemented.  Ram, during the second world war, wished 
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to improve the ‘shocking state of the statute book’ but could accomplish nothing 
while Simon was Lord Chancellor.627 
The limited capacity of the office had an impact upon the preparation of 
government legislation in general and upon the preparation of legislation 
relating to income tax in particular.  In 1938, work on the codification of income 
tax law was put to one side because the office needed to be able to give priority 
to other work.628  There was no resumption of that codification work, shortly 
after the second world war, because the office’s resources were fully committed 
to implementing the Attlee government’s programme of current legislation.629  In 
both these cases, the limited capacity of the office had the consequence that 
plans to change the form of the income tax legislation were postponed – and 
there was inertia and not change.  The limited capacity of the office also had the 
consequence that major negotiations, featuring two Cabinet ministers, were 
necessary to ensure that Rowlatt was made available to draft the 1952 Act.630 
The limited capacity of the office had a further consequence.  Given that the 
office could have played a larger role within government than its limited capacity 
enabled it to play, the abilities and personalities of its leading members were 
capable of being of considerable significance.  Different First Parliamentary 
Counsel concentrated on different tasks – and the concentration on different 
tasks produced different results.  This may be demonstrated by comparing and 
contrasting the actions and views of two of the First Parliamentary Counsel 
during the middle third of the twentieth century: Sir Granville Ram and Sir John 
Rowlatt. 
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Ram’s particular contribution related to administration and not to drafting.  
Kent’s view was that ‘Ram was intensely proud of the Office, which was largely 
his creation’.631  He had a programme for statute law reform; and, when Jowitt 
became Lord Chancellor, he took his opportunity to make progress.  In 
formulating and implementing that programme, the two men were undoubtedly 
key allies.  Ram’s letter to Jowitt, written in March 1951, has already been 
quoted.632  Jowitt, for his part, once referred to ‘the work upon which Ram and I 
embarked with such high hopes’.633  The credit for the programme was ‘almost 
entirely due to Ram.  All I had to do was to give him support and 
encouragement – How I wish we could see his like again’.634  Ram’s 
programme of statute law reform has obvious points of resemblance with 
nineteenth century developments studied by MacDonagh:635 an official within 
central government was advocating the extension of the part of central 
government in which he himself was operating.  Kent’s nickname for Ram was 
‘the Maestro’; his nickname for his successor, Sir Alan Ellis, was ‘the Fish’.636 
Rowlatt’s particular contribution related to drafting and not to administration.637  
By the common consent of his contemporaries, Rowlatt was a drafter of 
outstanding ability; and the role he played as the drafter of the 1952 Act was 
vital.638  Rowlatt’s interest in statute law reform, however, was exceedingly 
limited.  By the end of 1951, he had despaired of the possibility of codifying 
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income tax law.639  A later memorandum, dated 8 February 1955, took a very 
unenthusiastic view of statute law reform in general and consolidation in 
particular.640  The aim of reducing the bulk of the printed volumes of the statutes 
had ‘definitely failed to produce the results which were hoped for when it was 
adopted’.641  The subject of consolidation was also dealt with coolly.642  
Compared with the issue of new editions of the Revised Statutes, ‘consolidation 
is incomparably the better method of improving the form of the law’; 
consolidation gave practitioners and government departments ‘what they really 
want, which is a new view of any particular aspect of the law’; and so long as 
there was scope for reasonable progress with a consolidation programme (and 
on the whole it would appear that there was such scope) ‘it is not necessary to 
give up all idea of improving the form of the statute book’.  However, it was 
‘easy to exaggerate both the possible scope and the utility of consolidation 
Bills’.  They caused a good deal of work; there were areas of the law which 
were unsuitable for consolidation; and, in dealing with consolidation ‘it must be 
emphasised that there is no prospect whatsoever of spectacular results’.  This 
was a general attitude was attacked by Jowitt, who had the highest regard for 
Rowlatt’s ability and integrity.  ‘On the other hand, his mind is purely destructive.  
He will give you a thousand and one reasons against any project of law reform: 
the one may be good, but the thousand will probably be bad’.643  A great deal of 
Jowitt’s criticism may be accepted – but not all of it.  Rowlatt was clearly willing 
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for consolidation legislation to be enacted; and, in 1955, he may be observed 
proposing the codification of a limited area of income tax law.  Beyond this, 
however, Rowlatt’s views that any improvement in the form of income tax 
legislation was likely to be hard-won and unspectacular, and that the overall 
tendency of income tax law was towards regress and not progress, cannot be 
dismissed as unreasonable.  On the contrary: it may be argued that those views 
were right. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE ROLE OF THE TEMPORARY DIRECTING ELEMENT: 
POLITICAL MINISTERS 
‘Those of us who have had the honour of holding office for a 
series of years know how strong are the forces that tend to 
inaction and how great is the vis inertiae in the Government 
machine’.644 
 
Introduction 
It was Amery’s view that government should be understood in terms of two 
components: a permanent administrative element (the civil service) and a 
temporary directing element (political ministers).645  The last two chapters have 
investigated the role played by parts of the civil service in determining the form 
of the income tax legislation: this chapter is concerned with the second of 
Amery’s components. 
The aim of this chapter is to ascertain the role played by government ministers 
in determining the form of the income tax legislation.  Three questions will be 
addressed in order to achieve this aim: whether ministers had the capacity to 
determine the form of the income tax legislation; how far (if at all) ministers 
actually wished to give effect to such capacity as they had in determining that 
form; and how far (by their acts and omissions) ministers actually determined 
the form of that legislation. 
1. Ministers’ capacity to determine the form of income tax legislation 
The question whether ministers had the capacity to determine the form of the 
income tax legislation reveals a very sharp contrast between theory and 
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practice.  In theory, it was completely clear that ministers had the capacity to 
determine that form: for, during the first half of the twentieth century, there was 
a generally accepted view as to how ministers and civil servants should work 
together.646  Civil servants looked to ministers to take decisions reasonably 
quickly (the department’s business had to be despatched);647 to win battles in 
cabinet; and to defend the department from parliamentary criticism.  Ministers 
looked to civil servants for ‘loyal implementation of ministerial or party objectives 
and programmes in cases in which these have been publicly stated and 
reasonably clearly specified’;648 for advice on a range of alternative objectives, 
priorities and programmes in cases in which firm commitments had not been 
made in advance of taking office; and for expert advice (advice based on up-to-
date specialised knowledge) on the probable and possible problems and 
consequences of implementing alternative policy programmes.  According to Sir 
Edward Bridges, the Head of the Civil Service from 1945 to 1956, the minister 
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knew the broad lines upon which his party or the cabinet had decided to 
proceed.  The advisers contributed practical knowledge such as no minister 
could be expected to possess unless he happened to have exceptionally long 
experience in that field.  The relationship between minister and adviser thus 
comprised the essential feature of good partnership, namely that the 
contribution brought by each partner was different in kind.649 
One feature of this partnership was particularly important.  It was for the 
minister to make the final decision. ‘It cannot be too often repeated that it is the 
politicians who make policy and are responsible for the laws which are 
made’.650  Both politicians and civil servants were quite clear on this point.  ‘The 
arguments have been admirably deployed in a number of papers by our 
officials, but the great decision remains with us Ministers to take’, Macmillan 
recorded, in September 1956, of the discussion before the setting up of the 
Common Market.651  On the civil service side, Parliamentary Counsel recorded 
that the decision whether a Bill should be prepared was one for the minister;652 
and that it was ‘for the Minister to ordain what he wants in his Bill’.653  In theory, 
the power – indeed the responsibility – of government ministers to determine 
policy undoubtedly included the power to determine the form of the income tax 
legislation. 
                                            
649
  Sir E Bridges, Portrait of a Profession: The Civil Service Tradition (CUP 1950) 19-20. 
650
  Lord Home, The Way the Wind Blows (London, Collins, 1976) 195.  ‘The decision, or the 
recommendation, is unequivocally the responsibility of the Minister ... , but all manner of things 
may have been said by the officials before they are arrived at’.  (Sisson (n 648) 130.) 
651
  H Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959 (London, Macmillan, 1971) 81. 
652
  Sir G Ram, ‘The Improvement of the Statute Book’ [1951] Journal of the Society of Public 
Teachers of Law 442, 446. 
653
  ‘One of the Parliamentary Counsel to the Treasury’, ‘The Making and form of Bills’ (1949) 2 
Parliamentary Affairs 175, 176.  The author may have been Sir Alan Ellis, who was then the 
First Parliamentary Counsel.  
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
204 
 
In practice, however, the workings of the United Kingdom polity made it very 
difficult for government ministers to have the capacity to determine that form.  
The demands placed on ministers (both those of a general nature and those 
involved in the running of their departments) were very great; and it was difficult 
for ministers to respond effectively to those demands. 
The general demands placed upon ministers were both numerous and 
various.654  Ministers were members of a political party; they needed to attend 
to party work, liaising with party members in Parliament and the country.  
Ministers were also members of the House of Commons; they needed to attend 
to constituency work.  Government ministers needed to attend to parliamentary 
duties.  Ministers who were members of the cabinet had to participate in cabinet 
meetings and might wish to take part in the general development of policy within 
government.  Ministers were members of ministerial committees.  Government 
ministers also had meetings with interested groups whose concerns were 
affected by their policies (or lack of them). 
In addition to general demands, ministers also had to deal with the more 
specific demand of running their own departments.  This specific demand was 
formidable.  Lord Salisbury, in 1929, replying to the toast of ‘His Majesty’s 
Ministers’, thought that business had enormously increased.  Papers mounted 
higher and higher, so that, even if ministers had nothing else to do, it was with 
the greatest difficulty that they could get through the detailed business, and 
keep their heads above water.  It was only by not getting rattled that ministers 
could get through their business at all.  ‘Therefore they could not do better than 
give their best wishes to the Government, and it did not matter whether the 
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Government of the future was Conservative, Liberal or Labour, the same sort of 
difficulties would arise’.655  Herbert Morrison, a leading member of Attlee’s 
cabinet, worked exceedingly hard during the years from 1945 to 1947 – and had 
many engagements.  One visitor, seeking appointments, recalled being shown 
Morrison’s diary ‘and for weeks on end it was completely full from morning till 
late at night and often impossible to fit anything in even for five to ten minutes.  
Nobody could grasp the terrible pressure on a leading Cabinet minister without 
seeing his diaries which are a vivid memory to me’.656  Beveridge, dealing with 
the situation shortly after the first world war, thought that ‘[n]o Minister could 
possibly do one thousandth of the things that he is personally supposed to do.  
The better the Minister the fewer of those things does he in fact do’.657  
Beveridge also thought that if the minister was to become again the political 
head of his department, in constant attendance on Parliament and the 
constituencies, he would find it ‘all but impossible’ to be the domestic head as 
well.  ‘If he is further to be a member of a Cabinet discussing policy generally, 
he will find it quite impossible.  The two or three tasks are quite beyond one 
man’.658 
Departmental duties could swamp departmental chiefs.  Margaret Bondfield, on 
taking office in the Labour Government of 1924, referred to ‘a gigantic mass of 
papers to be read’.  ‘The enormous mass of detail in the Department made it 
almost impossible to keep in touch with what was going on in connection with 
                                            
655
  Lord Salisbury speaking at the Royal Academy Banquet on 4 May 1929, as reported in 
Times (London, 6 May 1929) 21, col c. 
656
  B Donoughue and GW Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London, Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1973) 372. 
657
  W Beveridge, The Public Service in War & in Peace (London, Constable, 1920) 39. 
658
  ibid 54. 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
206 
 
other Departments dealing with social services’.659  Richard Crossman, on 
assuming office in 1964, realised ‘the tremendous effort it requires not to be 
taken over by the Civil Service.  ...  I’ve only to transfer everything that’s in my 
in-tray to my out-tray without a single mark on it to ensure it will be dealt with’.660  
In similar vein, MacDonald, when Prime Minister in 1924, wrote in his diary that 
he was beginning to see ‘how officials dominate Ministers.  Details are 
overwhelming & Ministers have no time to work out policy with officials as 
servants; they are immersed in pressing business with officials as masters’.661  
‘I am sorry that I just have not had a moment to look at these’, Cripps 
commented to his Private Secretary on one set of papers in February 1948.  
‘Somehow or other I must try & get time ... [during the next four days].  Please 
try to arrange’.662 
Departmental demands rose – and the ability of ministers to give personal 
attention to departmental legislation fell.  The instructions for the Bill enacted as 
the Irish Land Act 1870663 were, to a great extent, given verbally during 
conferences held at Gladstone’s house and attended by Gladstone (the Prime 
Minister) and Thring (the drafter).664  Chalmers,665 writing in the 1920s, thought 
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that the most conscientious minister he had worked under was Joseph 
Chamberlain, for whom Chalmers had drafted the Bill enacted as the 
Bankruptcy Act 1883.666  Before the Bill was introduced, Chamberlain had gone 
carefully through it with three members of his staff and the drafter; and, when 
the Bill was in committee, before the committee sat, he went through every 
amendment that was likely to come on that day.667  Graham-Harrison, reflecting 
on the situation in the mid 1930s, thought that, during his working lifetime, there 
had been a deplorable alteration in one respect from the drafter’s point of view – 
a very considerable diminution of the amount of time which even ministers who 
were keen about their Bills found themselves able to devote to the preparation 
of them.  No doubt a minister had much more to do than he could properly 
manage – ‘to do all that he has to do he must be a superman’ – but a drafter 
could not reasonably be expected to carry out a minister’s wishes unless he had 
reasonable access to him, heard his criticisms of a draft at first hand, and had 
the opportunity of making his defence of his draft to the minister himself.668  
Finally, Hutton, reflecting on the situation in the early 1960s, stated that, at that 
time, ministers were usually content to settle the policy of the proposed Bill and 
to master the finished article, leaving the business of instructing the drafter and 
working out the details which arose in the process of drafting to their legal 
advisers and administrative officials.  Indeed, he thought, ministers scarcely had 
any option in that respect.669 
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The demands placed on ministers had consequences for ministers themselves: 
for ministers were placed under strain.  Herbert Samuel, speaking in the House 
of Commons in 1917, considered that the burdens of a great office of state were 
already overwhelmingly heavy.  ‘The health of Ministers is continually breaking 
down’.  That had been true in times of peace, and it was even more so in times 
of war, when ‘there is hardly any time to think or to plan’.670  Boyd-Carpenter, 
writing of the Conservative administrations from 1951 to 1964, considered that 
the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer ‘had become a killer’;671 and that the 
burden of the office was such that Thorneycroft and Heathcoat Amory both 
became less effective.672  Hailsham, writing in 1962, identified as the second of 
his three major shortcomings of government ‘the increasing physical and moral 
strain on Ministers which drains them more and more of vitality and converts 
them progressively into administrative machines’.673 
Government ministers could be overwhelmed by the tasks confronting them.  It 
might be difficult for decisions to be made at all: for the transaction of 
government business was affected by the ‘terrific pressure of the democratic 
machine’ on ‘over-driven ministers’.674   It was simply not possible for ministers 
to transact the entirety of the business to which they could usefully give 
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attention.  ‘As usual, every day was so filled with interviews, speeches, 
Parliamentary Questions, committees, Cabinet meetings, boxes of papers and 
the like that there was not enough time for reflection’, Macmillan noted early in 
1956 when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer.675  Ministers could make a 
major contribution only in the case of a few of the tasks confronting them.  
According to Enoch Powell, a minister could ‘only take personal control and 
initiative on very few fronts at once’.676  It was highly unlikely that those few 
fronts would include the form of the income tax legislation. 
Not only, however, was the capacity of ministers to determine the form of the 
income tax legislation limited by the extent of the demands placed upon them: it 
was also difficult for ministers to respond to those demands.  The effectiveness 
of the response was limited by the highly finite supply of ministers, and by the 
qualities actually demanded from them.  The ‘pool’ of individuals from which 
ministers could be selected was small.  Qualification for office was restricted to 
members of the governing party (or parties) in the two Houses of Parliament; 
and, in the case of Treasury ministers, it was restricted to members of the 
House of Commons.  This limitation on qualification for office certainly affected 
Labour governments during the inter-war period.  In 1924 only two ministers 
had ever sat in a cabinet before.  Haldane (one of the two) told Beatrice Webb 
that the trade unionists in the government ‘simply accept everything that officials 
tell them’.  ‘Fortunately’, he continued, ‘we have a first rate and progressive Civil 
Service’.677  Neville Chamberlain was told by Baldwin that, when he spoke in 
the House of Commons, he gave the Prime Minister the impression ‘that I 
looked on the Labour Party as dirt’.  In a letter to his sister, written in 1927, he 
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then continued with the remark ‘[t]he fact is that intellectually, with a few 
exceptions, they are dirt’.678  During the second MacDonald government, from 
1929 to 1931, there were complaints that JH Thomas and Margaret Bondfield 
were entirely in the hands of their principal civil servants; and MacDonald told 
his principal private secretary in 1929 that few of his team were up to the job of 
directing their departments.  ‘The truth is that we have not got the men’.679 
As regards the qualities demanded from ministers, one civil servant took the 
view that ‘[t]o be a major Minister today, a man should have extraordinary 
capacity and versatility, to say nothing of energy; and in the ordinary Party there 
are simply not enough men of this calibre to go round’.  The author also thought 
that ministers fell into three categories.  In the lowest grade were those who 
could barely be trusted to explain and defend what was being done, let alone to 
initiate any activity on their own account.  In the next grade were ministers who 
were good at explanation and defence, but did not initiate.  Finally, however, 
and in the highest grade, there was the man who was the master of his 
ministry.680 
The office of Chancellor of the Exchequer was most certainly one to be filled by 
an effective minister.681  Attlee was advised by Dalton, on the appointment of a 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to succeed Cripps, that a crucial factor in the 
appointment would be the minister’s ability to exhibit not only ‘quick intelligence, 
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or bright ideas, or diligence or methodical administration, but power to resist 
high-powered advice’.682  Attlee, for his part, believed that the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer ‘must ... be of strength and standing in the party, able to influence 
his spending Ministers and tell them where to get off’.683  He also held the view 
that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should have ‘considerable technical 
economic knowledge’ – and that this knowledge had been possessed by Cripps 
and Gaitskell.  ‘This is not because the technical knowledge is all that important, 
but because unless Chancellors have it, they will be in the hands of their 
permanent officials’.684 
An absence of this technical knowledge may well have placed Churchill at a 
disadvantage when Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1924 and 1929.  
Boothby remembered Churchill once saying to him, after a conference of senior 
Treasury officials, bankers and economists, that ‘I wish they were admirals or 
generals.  I speak their language and can beat them.  But after a while these 
fellows start talking Persian.  And then I am sunk’.685  Churchill later expressed 
the view that, although he had been Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1924 to 
1929 ‘I never understood it’.686  All British Chancellors of the Exchequer, 
Churchill wrote, had yielded themselves ‘some spontaneously, some 
unconsciously, some reluctantly, to [the] compulsive intellectual atmosphere’ of 
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the Treasury.687  It was also Churchill’s view that Treasury officials’ ‘high 
abilities and immense knowledge of matters very difficult to be understood, 
requiring a lifetime to master, give them a real power’.688  Boothby once asked 
Churchill’s private secretary (Grigg) why, with all his gifts, Churchill was 
apparently so impotent at the Treasury.  Grigg replied that there was only one 
man who had ever ‘made the Treasury do what it didn’t want to do.  That was 
Lloyd George.  There will never be another’.689 
Government ministers were more likely to be effective, so far as the form of the 
income tax legislation was concerned, if they possessed a certain amount of 
knowledge of income tax law and practice.  Expert knowledge of those subjects, 
however, was likely to require a major expenditure of time; and, in the case of a 
government minister, it was highly arguable that the time in question would be 
more advantageously spent in the acquisition of other knowledge and skills.  On 
the other hand, an absence of detailed knowledge of income tax law and 
practice could make a minister’s ideas more difficult to deal with – and impede 
the minister’s capacity to determine the form of the income tax legislation.690 
The answer to the question whether government ministers had the capacity, in 
practice, to determine the form of income tax legislation during the first half of 
the twentieth century, therefore, is that the workings of the United Kingdom 
polity made it very difficult for a minister to determine that form.  On the one 
hand, the demands upon ministers – both generally and those emanating from 
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their departments – were very great.  On the other hand, there were difficulties 
in responding to those demands. 
Against this background, it may, perhaps, be considered surprising that there 
were ever any effective ministers at all – but it is quite clear that effective 
ministers did exist.  PJ Grigg, who served in the Treasury in the 1920s, before 
becoming Chairman of the Board of Customs and Excise and then Chairman of 
the Board of Inland Revenue, was lavish in his praise of Philip Snowden, the 
Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer: 
Of all the Ministers I have ever known, he was easily the most 
popular with the Civil Servants who worked for him.  This is not 
very surprising.  In the first place he was the ideal of what a 
Minister should be in that he gave a clear lead on all questions of 
policy, interfered rarely, if at all, in matters of administration, gave 
decisions quickly and unequivocally, and then defended his 
decisions against all comers with confidence and vigour – and 
nearly always with success.  Civil Servants, in fact, knew exactly 
where they were with him and could rely absolutely on his courage 
and good faith to defend his own actions and theirs.  When there 
is added personal charm, humour and real kindliness and, to his 
subordinates, gentleness as well as strength, can it be wondered 
that he is the most beloved of all the many Ministers I have served 
or known?691 
The man who was the master of his ministry existed – and had the capacity to 
determine the form of the income tax legislation. 
2. Ministers’ wish to determine the form of income tax legislation 
An effective Treasury minister had the capacity to determine the form of the 
income tax legislation, but a further question still arises – how far (if at all) 
ministers might actually wish to give effect to that capacity.  Action might be 
taken in two different ways: ministers might take action themselves – or they 
might authorise others to take action.  Furthermore, if Treasury ministers 
themselves wished to take action to determine the form of income tax 
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legislation, they could do so in two different contexts: in the context of the 
devising of the Budget (and the annual Finance Act) or in the context of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer’s overall running of the Treasury departments. 
To the extent that there was a ‘grand design’ for the fiscal system as a whole, 
an official wrote in 1958, it was thrashed out by the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
in close consultation with the two junior Treasury ministers during the months 
before the Budget.  It could be argued that there was a need for a more regular 
and comprehensive study of fiscal policy than ever took place; but the Budget 
was bound to be very much the personal concern of the Chancellor – and it 
seemed likely that any ‘grand design’ would always be settled in something like 
the present manner.692  The Budget, however, whatever its additional content, 
was always and necessarily concerned with the next financial year: it was very 
easy, therefore, for any ‘grand design’ to relate to one financial year only.  
Churchill, in 1928, repeated formally to senior officials that ‘the first immediate 
objective of Treasury policy must be to prevent a deficit in the current year’.  
This objective was to have priority over all other considerations until such time 
as officials were satisfied that all danger had passed away.693  Thorneycroft, in 
1957, wrote a note about that year’s Budget starting from the proposition that a 
Budget must have a theme.  Consideration should be given to what the theme 
for the coming year should be.  In 1956 there had been a ‘Savings Budget’; and, 
for 1957, ‘what I should really like would be a Productivity Budget’.694 
The devising of a Budget for the next financial year implied a relative neglect of 
long-term objectives for the tax system.  This matter was one of those 
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considered in a note by Brooke (then the Financial Secretary to the Treasury) 
and written during the autumn of 1956.695  Brooke was ‘passionately convinced’ 
that levels of taxation, which had been inherited from the war, were too high.  
‘Some seem to do no great harm.  Others are cruelly changing the life of our 
country, much for the worse’.  Specific measures forming part of the 
Conservative party platform were taken as firm objectives to be achieved in the 
lifetime of a Parliament; but tax changes came ‘to be a sort of residuary legatee 
when everybody else’s requirements have been met’.  There is no reason, 
however, to believe that these thoughts received any significant further 
consideration.  Four months later, both Brooke himself and Macmillan, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to whom his note had been addressed, had moved 
onwards (and upwards) to other posts.  Matters relating to the form of income 
tax legislation were classifiable as long-term matters: and, accordingly, were 
very likely to disappear from immediate attention in the context of ministers’ 
devising of the Budget. 
In the context of the devising of Budgets and Finance Acts, matters relating to 
the form of income tax legislation were also likely to disappear from immediate 
attention for another reason.  The same official who wrote of the budgetary 
‘grand design’ had earlier written that ‘[t]he administration and policies of each 
Revenue Department in their respective fields of direct and indirect taxation are 
very largely self-contained’.696  In the absence of special circumstances, 
therefore, it followed that there was no particular reason for matters relating to 
the form of income tax legislation to form any part of a Chancellor’s ‘grand 
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design’.  Only rarely were matters relevant for the form of the income tax 
legislation mentioned in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Budget speech.697 
It was also unlikely that Treasury ministers would wish to make any major 
impact on the form of the income tax legislation in the context of their overall 
running of the Treasury departments.  The evidence demonstrates that 
ministers were subject to a great number of different demands; and, in relation 
to the limited number of issues where they could take the initiative, there was no 
incentive for Treasury ministers to give any priority to statute law reform in 
general or to the making of changes in the form of income tax legislation in 
particular.  It was Graham-Harrison’s view that ministers, as a rule, took only a 
faint interest in the form of their Bills.  Whatever they said to the contrary, they 
would always demand compression and also such an arrangement of subject 
matter as would secure the easiest passage for their Bills through Parliament 
‘but beyond this they take little interest in form, except at those times when 
public opinion calls for more intelligible Acts of Parliament’.698 
There is evidence which points strongly to the conclusion that the pressures on 
Treasury ministers were such that they might decide not to proceed with 
proposals involving change in the form of the income tax legislation.  One such 
decision was taken in 1957 after the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue 
(Sir Henry Hancock) had sent the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Thorneycroft) a 
submission699 in which he advocated the preparation of a separate Taxes 
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Management Bill – a programme Bill – which would decentralise the operation 
of surtax and carry out a number of administrative reforms recommended by the 
Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income.700  Hancock’s 
submission, however, did not lead to a Taxes Management Bill on the lines that 
he had advocated.  A note written several years later recorded that ‘[t]he 
Chancellor decided, however, without disputing the merits of the main 
proposals, that he would prefer not to take legislative action in 1958’.701  
Another later account recorded that ‘[i]n the end it was decided not to 
decentralise surtax and the question of a Management Bill lapsed’.702  Nothing 
further about this particular decision is known: but the obvious inference is that, 
in circumstances where ministers could attend to some, but not all, of the 
matters placed before them, this particular matter was not considered to 
deserve priority. 
Evidence exists that Treasury ministers were also prepared to defer a matter 
relevant for the form of income tax legislation because they were uninterested.  
In 1931, Grigg, the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, was keen that the 
Income Tax Codification Committee should be reorganised.  It had been 
suggested that a Law Lord should become the chairman of the committee; but 
the Lord Chancellor (Sankey) was opposed to this course.  Grigg was then sent 
a letter by the private secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Snowden).  
A letter that Grigg had written had been shown to Snowden, but there was no 
chance that Snowden would seriously fight Sankey – at any rate in the first 
instance or until the present position became really embarrassing for him 
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politically.  This was, admittedly, an unsatisfactory reaction to Grigg’s letter ‘but 
the Chancellor is not at present really interested and obviously does not mind 
letting the thing drift on for the time being.  ...   [And] unless he becomes more 
interested in the matter than he is at present ... it will be difficult to get him to 
take any serious action’.703  The evidence, therefore, is that it was unlikely that 
government ministers would themselves wish to use such capacity as they had 
to act as a determinant producing change in the form of the income tax 
legislation. 
In addition to (or as an alternative to) taking action themselves, government 
ministers might wish to give effect to their capacity to determine the form of the 
income tax legislation by authorising others to take action – with the action of 
those others having an impact on the form of the income tax legislation.  Jowitt’s 
patronage of Ram’s scheme for statute law reform has already been 
considered.704  There is also a second example, dating from the early 1960s, 
and relating to Treasury ministers.  It was said of Reginald Maudling, Chancellor 
of the Exchequer from 1962 to 1964, that he was always able and willing to 
delegate his work to junior ministers, only stepping in when they ran into 
trouble.  ‘Unless you make a complete ass of yourself, I’ll back you’, he told a 
junior minister in the early 1970s when he was Home Secretary.705  Having 
regard to this background, it may be inferred that Maudling was quite content for 
Alan Green, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, to champion the Income 
Tax Management Bill in 1963 and 1964 – and, accordingly, to help to make a 
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change in the form of the legislation relating to income tax.706  The evidence, 
however, is that ministers’ authorisation of others to take action could play only 
a supplemental role in determining the form of the income tax legislation.  The 
success of such a course of action depended upon particular ministers being 
prepared to authorise others, who, in their turn, had an impact upon the form of 
income tax legislation.  The actions of particular individuals were all-important – 
and favourable conjunctures of individuals could not be relied upon. 
3. Ministers’ ability to determine the form of income tax legislation 
It was difficult – but not impossible – for ministers to exercise the capacity to 
determine the form of the income tax legislation.  It was also unlikely – but not 
impossible – that ministers would wish to give effect to that capacity.  It was 
possible, therefore, that, in determining the form of the income tax legislation, 
there might be occasions when the role played by a government minister was 
decisive.  The third question addressed in this chapter is whether there were 
such occasions.  The making of such a decisive contribution is to be expected 
to reveal a course of action pursued over an appreciable period.  In 
investigating the occasions when the role played by a government minister 
might be decisive in determining the form of the income tax legislation, 
furthermore, the four types of primary legislation examined in chapter 2 
(Finance Bills, programme Bills, Consolidation Bills and Codification Bills) did 
not present ministers with equal opportunities for playing a decisive role.  It was 
overwhelmingly probable that a Finance Bill would be introduced and enacted 
each year.  Ministers did not take decisive action by permitting the annual cycle 
to continue.  So far as Consolidation Bills were concerned, ministers did not 
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play a decisive role in the events leading to the decision that the 1952 Act 
should be prepared.707  In the case of the 1918 Act, a single remark made by 
Montagu, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, in the House of Commons, 
admittedly transformed the prospects for the draft Bill produced by Cox, the 
Solicitor of Inland Revenue.708  A single remark, however, should be viewed as 
a single remark.  There is no evidence that Montagu had any particular interest 
in the consolidation of the income tax legislation – let alone that he wished to do 
all that he reasonably could to advance a Consolidation Bill.  Decisive action 
from ministers must accordingly be sought in courses of action pursued in 
relation to programme Bills and Codification Bills. 
Ministers might play a decisive role in relation to these Bills in two very different 
cases.  The first case was where the minister wished such a Bill to be 
introduced; and had success in causing progress to be made with the 
preparation and enactment of legislation.  The second case was where the 
minister wished such a Bill to be introduced; but did not have success in 
causing progress to be made – for the Bill was not enacted.  In this latter case, 
the reasons why the Bill was not enacted are capable of providing important 
information about the determinants of the income tax legislation.  There is, 
accordingly, an investigation of his second case, followed by an investigation of 
the first. 
(1) Government ministers and failures to enact legislation 
There were three occasions, during the period from 1907 to 1965, when 
government ministers wished to enact legislation relating to income tax – only to 
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find that no statute was enacted.  The Bills introduced were all programme Bills 
of a general nature – the Revenue Bills of 1913, 1914 and 1921.709  In 1913 and 
1914, Lloyd George was the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and, in 1921, Austen 
Chamberlain was the Chancellor while the Bill was prepared.  It is the role of 
these two ministers that is now investigated. 
In 1913, in his Budget speech, Lloyd George announced a government initiative 
consisting of an explicitly formulated intention to aim at enacting both a Finance 
Act and a programme Act (in the form of a general Revenue Act) in each 
parliamentary session.710  In that year, however, the text of the Revenue Bill 
became available for MPs to study only during the second half of July:711 and, 
by this time, the Bill had 15 clauses only (one earlier draft had contained 50 
clauses).712  By this time, also, the ambit of the provisions contained in the Bill 
had contracted; and the Bill now dealt only with the land taxes introduced in the 
Finance (1909-10) Act 1910.713  On 22 July, the Prime Minister (Asquith) hoped 
that the Revenue Bill might go through by consent as an agreed measure;714 
and, on 1 August, Lloyd George invited the co-operation of MPs on both sides 
of the House of Commons ‘in helping us to get the Bill’.  The government could 
not give the Bill very much time; ‘and looking at the amendments carefully it 
would be quite impossible if they were discussed at any length, to find time to 
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get the Bill through’.715  No agreement, however, could be reached on the 
contents of the Bill; and, on 12 August 1913, it was withdrawn.716 
In 1914, the actions of Government ministers may be described as still more of 
a shambles.
717
  During the summer of 1913, Lloyd George had announced the 
government’s intention to bring in a more comprehensive Revenue Bill early in 
the next session;718 but no early Revenue Bill materialised.  On 4 May 1914, 
Lloyd George delivered his Budget speech; but, once again, there was delay 
before the text of the Revenue Bill became publicly available.  The government 
had parliamentary difficulties with its financial proposals; changed its plans; and, 
in doing so, altered the balance of the material to be placed in the Finance and 
Revenue Bills.  By early June it had been decided that the vital Finance Bill 
would be given priority; the Revenue Bill would have to be lightened and 
possibly postponed.  On 5 June 1914, Edwin Montagu, the Financial Secretary 
to the Treasury, sent a letter to the First Parliamentary Counsel to tell him that 
he would be asked by the Chancellor of the Exchequer for a list of the clauses 
in the draft Revenue Bill which were pledges from last year and those which 
were essential.  He would be asked to cut out all the rest.  This was the decision 
of the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.719  When, on 18 
June 1914, the text of the Revenue Bill was finally available for MPs to study, it 
had 21 clauses only (although two earlier drafts had each contained 61 
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clauses).720  The government’s parliamentary difficulties continued; and, among 
other matters, the members of the cabinet realised that they had misunderstood 
the timetable for which the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1913721 provided.  
The Finance Bill had to be enacted by 5 August and not 5 September (as had 
been believed).  Asquith wrote to a correspondent, on 18 June, that it was 
impossible to enact both the Finance Bill and the Revenue Bill by that earlier 
date.722  The Finance Bill was enacted;723 but, on 17 July, Asquith told the 
House of Commons that the Revenue Bill would be dropped.724  In 1914, 
therefore, as well as in 1913, Lloyd George’s initiative failed to produce a 
Revenue Bill that was actually enacted. 
It is clear that one reason for the failure to enact a Revenue Act in 1913 and 
1914 was that Lloyd George gave inadequate attention to the preparation of the 
Bills in question – and, in particular, to the contents of those Bills.  ‘We shall 
never get the ChofEx to go into the [Revenue] Bill’ the First Parliamentary 
Counsel lamented to the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue early in 
1914;725 and, in that year, it was only in mid April that Lloyd George gave 
priority to the contents of his budget.726  Another official wrote of Lloyd George’s 
difficulties in 1914 that it ‘all springs from the besetting sin of the creature that 
he will not work at his business beforehand & betimes, and it serves him 
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perfectly right that he has got it “in the neck”’.727  CFG Masterman, a Liberal 
politician, who, as Financial Secretary to the Treasury from 1912 to 1914, 
worked closely with Lloyd George in these years, wrote that he considered 
himself of some use to Lloyd George in ‘mazes of technicalities – the details of 
which he does not greatly concern himself with’: only those who had worked 
intimately with ‘our brilliant friend’ could know how much it meant to be in 
possession of detail, when dealing with ‘a man who never reads an official 
paper and allows his mind to revolve around big questions to disregard of detail 
altogether’.728  The initiative, announced in 1913, to enact both a Finance Bill 
and a Revenue Bill during the same parliamentary Session was exceedingly 
optimistic: but, even if so, that can act as a limited excuse only in Lloyd 
George’s case.  The initiative announced in 1913 was designed to deal with the 
government’s inability to enact all the financial legislation that it wished.  It could 
therefore be said that it was incumbent upon Lloyd George to do all the work 
that he reasonably could to ensure the initiative’s success – and that Lloyd 
George did far less work than could usefully have been done. 
What may be said in Lloyd George’s favour, by way of mitigation, on the subject 
of the failure to enact these two Bills, is that he had too much to do – and was 
overstretched.  In 1913, during the early summer, Lloyd George was concerned 
to defend himself against the allegations made during the Marconi scandal.  At 
the end of 1913, Lloyd George’s own priority was a project to achieve land 
reform;729 but he was unable to pursue this priority consistently.  During most of 
a period of six weeks beginning in the middle of December 1913, he was almost 
                                            
727
  Quoted in A Offer, Property and Politics 1870-1914: Landownership, Law, Ideology and 
Urban Development in England (CUP 1981) 399.  The official was Sir Robert Chalmers. 
728
  Quoted in E David, ‘The New Liberalism of C.F.G. Masterman, 1873-1927’ in KD Brown 
(ed), Essays in Anti-Labour History (London, Macmillan, 1974) 27 and 347. 
729
  Bentley (n 717) 117. 
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continually occupied by a dispute with Churchill at the Admiralty over the naval 
estimates – a dispute that ended with victory for Churchill at a cabinet held on 
11 February 1914.  Almost immediately afterwards, Lloyd George was again 
diverted from his project for land reform by the growing crisis in Ireland.  Then, 
of the early summer of 1914, it has been noted that ‘it was typical of the intense 
pressure of these days’ that, on the day of the 1914 Budget (4 May), ‘before a 
long speech at three that afternoon for which he was woefully unprepared’, 
Lloyd George invited CP Scott, the editor of the Manchester Guardian, to lunch 
with him in order to learn his views about the Chancellor’s old project of Home 
Rule ‘All Round’.730  In the early summer of 1914, Masterman described the 
Chancellor as ‘jumpy, irritable, overworked, and unhappy’.731  Lloyd George’s 
priorities in 1913 and 1914 never included the detailed contents of Revenue 
Bills: and one consequence of the Chancellor’s overload of work was that the 
two Revenue Bills were underprepared – and unenacted. 
In the period shortly after the end of the first world war, a government minister 
again made a decision to introduce a general Revenue Bill – but again found 
that no legislation was enacted.  Austen Chamberlain was the Chancellor whilst 
the Revenue Bill of 1921 was being prepared; and the primary purpose of this 
programme Bill was to give effect to some of the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission on the Income Tax, which had reported in 1920.732  Those 
recommendations included proposals that assessments to income tax should 
be made, not by General Commissioners, but by inspectors of taxes. 
                                            
730
  Gilbert (n 717) 131. 
731
  ibid 135. 
732
  Royal Commission on the Income Tax, Report (Cmd 615, 1920).  The Report was signed on 
11 March 1920 (ibid 141). 
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Progress on the drafting of the Revenue Bill was slow.  The Royal 
Commission’s report had been signed shortly before Chamberlain delivered his 
Budget speech; and in that speech Chamberlain stated that he had decided that 
the general reform of income tax was a matter calling for a separate Bill – to be 
introduced as soon as possible.  Chamberlain went on to say, however, that he 
might well not be able to bring in a Revenue Bill at a very early date as both he 
and Inland Revenue officials were ‘pretty fully occupied just now’.733  On 16 
February 1921, Chamberlain told a deputation from the Federation of British 
Industries that he had hoped to introduce a Revenue Bill the previous year – but 
that had not been possible.  Both he and his officials were very hardly worked, 
and it had not been possible for him to find the time to get that Bill drafted in 
time.  Even if the Bill had been drafted, he could not have hoped to make 
progress with it in so crowded a Session.  He was hoping, however, to introduce 
the Bill early in the present Session and to get it through.734  On 22 February 
1921, the Revenue Bill was still due to appear; and Chamberlain was asked 
whether it would be taken on the floor of the House of Commons.  He replied 
‘No.  I shall ask the House to send it upstairs.  That is the only hope of passing 
it.  If the House treats it as a contentious measure it will not be proceeded with’.  
He also added, a little later, that ‘the House must understand that if it is to be 
                                            
733
  HC Deb 19 April 1920, vol 128, col 92. 
734
  TNA file T 171/198.  Transcript of the shorthand note made of a meeting between a 
Deputation from the Federation of British Industries and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 16 
February 1921, 20-1.  Earlier, on 22 July 1920, one official had written to another that there was 
‘no immediate hurry so far as the Revenue Bill is concerned, as the Chancellor does not now 
anticipate the introduction of the Bill during the Autumn Session’.  (TNA file T 171/201.  Note, 
[Gower] to Niemeyer, 22 July 1920.)  At a meeting held on 29 September 1920, according to 
another official, Chamberlain ‘said he saw very little prospect of getting a Bill this Session and 
appeared to view without much favour a suggestion to introduce one early next year for 
passage in the first part of the Session’.  (TNA file IR 63/99, fos 1-2.  Note by Hopkins, dated 2 
October 1920, of meeting held on 29 September 1920.) 
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treated as a contentious measure I cannot possibly hope to make progress with 
it this Session’.735 
The Revenue Bill was finally presented to Parliament on 6 April 1921.736  The 
Bill faced hostile criticism, being the subject of resolutions passed by bodies of 
General Commissioners and of a campaign in the press.737  On 22 April 1921, 
the Times, which was opposed to the Bill, reported that Sir William Joynson-
Hicks proposed to move, on the Second Reading in the Commons, that the 
House ‘declines to give a second reading to a Bill which increases the powers 
of Government officials and reduces the safeguards provided by the 
Constitution for the taxpayers of the country’.738  The Revenue Bill was 
accordingly due to be treated as a contentious measure – a state of affairs likely 
to be fatal for its enactment.  With opposition both inside and outside 
Parliament, the Revenue Bill was withdrawn.739 
The role played by Austen Chamberlain in the failure to enact the Revenue Bill 
of 1921 is difficult to assess.  At one end of the spectrum of possibility is the 
view that Chamberlain was a keen supporter of the Bill.  This view, however, 
has difficulties: because, if so, Chamberlain may be accused of incompetence – 
first for an absence of zeal in causing the Bill to be prepared and then for a 
display of poor judgment in Parliament.  (Those opposed to the Bill were told 
precisely what they had to do to cause the Bill to be abandoned.)  At the other 
                                            
735
  HC Deb 22 February 1921, vol 138, cols 760 and 761.   
736
  HC Deb 6 April 1921, vol 140, cols 279-80.  For further details on the contents of the 
Revenue Bill of 1921 and on its fate see JHN Pearce, ‘The Role of Central Government in the 
Process of determining liability to Income Tax in England and Wales: 1842-1970’ in J Tiley (ed), 
Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 3 (Oxford, Hart, 2009) 341-3. 
737
  Evidence of hostility from General Commissioners may be found in TNA file IR 40/2622 and 
TNA file IR 74/36.  There is a collection of press cuttings relating to the Bill in TNA file IR 74/36.  
The roles of the General Commissioners and the press are considered further in chapter 6, 
sections 3 and 4 below. 
738
  Times (London, 22 April 1921) 10, col g. 
739
  HC Deb 4 May 1921, vol 141, cols 1045 and 1188. 
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end of the spectrum of possibility, it may be argued that the absence of zeal in 
the preparation of the Bill and Chamberlain’s parliamentary performance should 
lead to the view that Chamberlain did not wish the Bill to make progress.  This 
view, however, also has difficulties: for Chamberlain clearly indicated that he 
would like a Revenue Bill to be enacted.740 
Chamberlain, ideally, would have liked the Revenue Bill to be enacted.  On the 
other hand, he is likely to have been acutely conscious (probably much more so 
than the civil servants advising him) of the difficulties in the way of that ideal 
outcome.  It may be taken as certain that Chamberlain was exceedingly 
conscious that the parliamentary timetable might not accommodate a general 
Revenue Bill – especially if it were to be opposed.  Chamberlain would also be 
able to recall the failure to enact a Revenue Bill in 1913 and 1914: he had been 
the principal opposition Treasury spokesman at that time.  There is also 
evidence that Chamberlain knew that the proposal to enable inspectors of taxes 
to make income tax assessments was dangerous terrain politically.  In October 
1919, having learned that a member of the Royal Commission, who was a 
General Commissioner, had become ill, Chamberlain wrote to the Chairman 
(Lord Colwyn) saying that he thought that the recommendations of the 
Commissioners, in so far as they might deal with the machinery of assessment 
or collection, would be very much strengthened if they were concurred in by an 
experienced Income Tax Commissioner.  ‘You may remember that on two or 
three occasions, notably under Mr. Gladstone and Lord Goschen, attempts 
were made to withdraw a large part of the powers of the Commissioners, but 
                                            
740
  See, for example, his remarks to the Federation of British Industries on 16 February 1921 
(text around n 734 above). 
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met with so much opposition in the House of Commons that they had to be 
withdrawn’.741 
The evidence is consistent with the view that, as Chamberlain saw the matter, 
the enactment of the Revenue Bill was not a matter for which any significant 
sacrifices should be made.  The surviving government records permit the 
conjecture that Chamberlain was careful to have no political or emotional capital 
invested in the Revenue Bill’s successful enactment.  On this view, the delay in 
preparing and presenting a Revenue Bill may readily be placed in a context 
where it may be taken as certain that Chamberlain, as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, would have had many other matters to which he wished to give 
priority.  The remarks made by Chamberlain in the House of Commons, 
however, cannot be explained away so easily.  It may certainly be urged that 
those remarks may be considered to be unexceptionable as a statement of the 
government’s position vis-a-vis its own legislative programme.  It is 
nevertheless possible to take the view that it was not good judgment to specify, 
in such explicit detail, how those opposed to the Bill could defeat it.  It was more 
difficult for governments to enact programme Bills (including Revenue Bills) 
than to enact Finance Bills.  The overall result, in the case of the Revenue Bill of 
1921, was that the Bill’s prospects of being enacted were reduced so far that 
the Bill had to be abandoned.  Whether this state of affairs may be attributed to 
Chamberlain’s remarks in the House of Commons is a matter on which the 
surviving evidence does not permit an unequivocal view to be taken one way or 
                                            
741
  TNA file T 172/985.  Letter, Chamberlain to Colwyn, 17 October 1919.  For the events 
alluded to, see M Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914 
(CUP 2001) 196-7.  In the House of Commons in 1913, Chamberlain had said that ‘I think you 
will have to consider very carefully before you change the system of having District 
Commissioners.  ...  [A]lthough the District Commissioners may be unpopular as long as the 
present system exists, they begin to become popular when you propose to put others in their 
place’.  (HC Deb 2 June 1913, vol 53, cols 676-7.) 
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the other.  It may certainly be said, however, that Chamberlain’s remarks can 
only have made the government’s situation more difficult. 
The evidence does not permit an unequivocal view to be taken on whether 
government ministers played a decisive role in the failures to enact Revenue 
Acts in 1913, 1914 and 1921.  Revenue Bills were likely to be victims if the 
general insufficiency of parliamentary time caused the government’s legislative 
programme to be truncated.  On the other hand, the evidence demonstrates 
that neither Lloyd George nor Austen Chamberlain played the government’s 
hand as well as it could have been played.  Lloyd George, in 1913 and 1914, 
did much less work than could usefully have been done; and the introduction of 
the Bills into the House of Commons was accordingly delayed.  Austen 
Chamberlain, in 1921, indicated precisely how those opposed to the Bill could 
defeat it.  The forces opposed to the 1921 Bill went into action accordingly; and 
the Bill was abandoned.  Government ministers were certainly implicated in the 
failures to enact these Bills. 
(2) Government ministers and successes in enacting legislation 
Government ministers might also play a decisive role in determining the form of 
the income tax legislation by causing progress to be made with the preparation 
and enactment of programme Bills and Codification Bills.  During the period 
from 1907 to 1965 three government ministers played major roles in advancing 
such legislation: and the actions that will be investigated are those of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Kingsley Wood, during the second world war, in 
encouraging the development of the legislation which enabled the PAYE 
scheme to be made; the actions of the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, Alan 
Green, in encouraging the development of the legislation enacted as the Taxes 
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Management Act 1964; and the actions of Winston Churchill, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer from 1924 to 1929, in devising plans to produce a Bill to codify 
income tax law. 
In 1942 and 1943, Kingsley Wood, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, promoted 
developments which resulted in changes to the form of the income tax 
legislation: the enactment of two programme Acts742 and a major extension of 
subordinate legislation.743  The developments were those leading to the 
introduction of the PAYE scheme;
744
 and Kingsley Wood promoted change in 
the form of income tax legislation by ensuring that alternatives to the existing 
system of compulsory deductions from the earnings of employees were 
investigated and developed.  By the end of 1942 it was clear that the existing 
system was operating in circumstances where there had been a major 
expansion in the number of taxpayers – and significant administrative 
arrears.745  It was also the case that the existing system was viewed differently 
in different parts of government.  The Inland Revenue appears to have believed 
that existing arrangements were working well and had full ministerial support.  
The Chancellor of the Exchequer and the departmental Treasury, however, 
were perfectly willing to consider other possibilities.  On 1 February 1943, the 
Treasury asked for draft paragraphs for inclusion in the Chancellor’s Budget 
speech;746 and the Inland Revenue submitted a draft which included the 
                                            
742
  The Income Tax (Employments) Act (6 & 7 Geo 6 c 45) and the Income Tax (Offices and 
Employments) Act 1944 (7 & 8 Geo 6 c 12). 
743
  The Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1944 (SR & O 1944/251). 
744
  For the development of the PAYE system, see generally RS Sayers, Financial Policy 1939-
45: History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil Series (London, HMSO and 
Longmans, Green and Co, 1956) 99-111; and JHN Pearce, ‘The Road to 1944: Antecedents of 
the PAYE Scheme’ in J Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 5 (Oxford, Hart, 
2012). 
745
  The system of compulsory deductions had been created in 1940.  For the events mentioned 
in the text, see Pearce (n 744) 200-4.   
746
  TNA file T 171/363.  Note, Proctor to Gregg, 1 February 1943. 
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statement that ‘the modifications which were made in the machinery of 
collection last year have proved to be successful and have contributed to a 
smooth collection of the tax’.747  Kingsley Wood, however, also received other 
information.  On 6 March 1943, he was sent a note by a Treasury official who 
thought that he ought to consider the inclusion of some short statement relating 
to wage-earners’ income tax in his Budget speech.  On this point, the author 
thought that the real testing time was going to be the first year after the war, 
when overtime and high piece-work rates had come off.  It was absolutely 
essential to post-war finances that the government should be able to maintain 
wage-earners’ income tax as a permanency; but if, when the first year of lower 
earnings came, wage-earners had to pay tax on the previous year’s income 
when earnings were right at their peak, there would be such an outcry that the 
whole wage-earners’ tax system might collapse altogether.  The only chance of 
carrying on wage-earners’ income tax into the post-war period, the author 
thought, was to get it on to a current earnings basis before the drop in earnings 
came.  The author also believed that the Inland Revenue only needed a little 
encouragement and a little more time to work out such a system; and that it 
would be an enormous help if the Chancellor could give some pointer in his 
Budget speech to say that he was looking ahead to the problem that would 
arise when earnings fell, and was closely examining the possibility of shifting on 
to a current earnings basis before that time came.748 
Kingsley Wood’s Budget statement in 1943 contained some material capable of 
being linked with the Inland Revenue draft – and other material capable of being 
linked with the Treasury note.  As regards the latter, the Chancellor said that he 
                                            
747
  TNA file T 171/363.  ‘Income Tax – Wage Earners’, 27 February 1943. 
748
  TNA file T 171/363.  Note, PD Proctor to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 6 March 1943.  
Proctor was an Under Secretary at the Treasury. 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
233 
 
had not overlooked the suggestions that had been made to levy the tax on the 
basis of current earnings.  He had described the difficulties the previous year, 
and there had been general agreement that no scheme had so far been 
produced which would be equitable and practicable.  The different situation that 
might arise on the return to peace-time conditions, however, should also be 
considered: for a considerable change-over in employment might be expected 
to take place.  His advisers were now engaged in a close examination of this 
aspect of the matter and the consideration of a current earnings basis for the 
deduction of tax would not be ruled out of their deliberations.749  The Chancellor 
returned to this matter at the end of the Budget debate when he stated that ‘the 
Board of Inland Revenue are now looking into this matter again and are aware 
of the desires of the House, and that if there is any possibility of some sort of 
solution, they are the expert body to provide such a scheme’.750 
Kingsley Wood accordingly put the Inland Revenue under pressure to produce 
a scheme of this type.  An Inland Revenue departmental committee, appointed 
‘to examine the possibility of introducing a system of deducting income tax on 
wages on the current earnings basis’ considered that Sir Kingsley Wood’s 
remarks at the end of the budget debate left no doubt that the Chancellor 
‘regards the introduction of such a system as a necessity, if the Income Tax in 
post-war years is to continue to apply to wage-earning classes’.751  The report 
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  HC Deb 12 April 1943, vol 388, col 946. 
750
  HC Deb 21 April 1943, vol 388, col 1772. 
751
  TNA file IR 63/163.  ‘Report of the Committee appointed to examine the possibility of 
introducing a system of deducting income tax on wages on the current earnings basis’, 21 May 
1943.  In this piece, the Report is at 1-35 and the passage quoted is at 2 (para 1). 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
234 
 
then went on to outline a scheme that stands at the beginning of the direct road 
to the PAYE legislation.752 
Sir Kingsley Wood was unquestionably committed to the advance of the PAYE 
scheme during the period that ended with his collapse and death on 21 
September 1943; and, shortly before that date, he had set out his own priorities 
at a meeting with representatives of the British Employers’ Confederation.753  
The note of the meeting recorded that the Chancellor saw ‘two compelling 
reasons’ for the immediate introduction of a PAYE scheme.  The first reason 
related to the administration of income tax: if a scheme were not introduced, 
there would be problems with tax receipts, compliance and (perhaps) the extent 
to which the income tax system was accepted by taxpayers – and especially if 
the war came to an end without such a scheme being introduced.  Kingsley 
Wood’s second reason, however, was that wage-earners should continue to 
make a contribution, through direct taxation, to the affairs of the state.  The two 
reasons, taken together, produced results that involved important changes in 
the form of income tax legislation.  Kingsley Wood, however, did not promote 
those changes in the form of income tax legislation as ends in themselves.  The 
changes were part of a state of affairs that came into existence as the result of 
a course of action pursued for other operational reasons. 
A government minister also acted to promote change in the form of the income 
tax legislation in 1963 and 1964 when Alan Green, the Financial Secretary to 
the Treasury, championed the Bill enacted as the Income Tax Management Act 
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  For the events from the signing of the Inland Revenue report on 21 May 1943 to the making 
of the PAYE Regulations on 9 March 1944, see Pearce (n 744) 208-17. 
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  TNA file T 171/366, item 9.  Note on interview with representatives of the British Employers’ 
Confederation, 17 September 1943.  Kingsley Wood is recorded as saying that ‘he would speak 
frankly to ... the Confederation in a manner which might not be possible in a public speech’.  
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1964.  Green became Financial Secretary in the autumn of 1963 as part of the 
ministerial reorganisation following Home’s accession to the premiership; and 
found that the Inland Revenue were keen that an Income Tax Management Bill 
should be enacted.  He was introduced to the Bill shortly after his arrival at the 
Treasury;754 and wrote on 5 November that ‘I shall be glad to seek to push this 
forward’.755  
There can be no doubt that Green was keen to advance the cause of the 
Income Tax Management Bill.  He set out his approach in a note to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Maudling), dated 18 December 1963, and stated 
that he was convinced that the government should make every effort to get this 
Bill on to the statute book, not only because of its own intrinsic merits – which 
he personally thought were considerable – but also because it would establish 
and, he hoped, justify, the principle that detailed consideration of legislation on 
administrative matters which might otherwise only lengthen overcrowded 
Finance Bills was better removed from the floor of the House of Commons and 
taken upstairs in Committee.  If Maudling agreed, he proposed to continue to 
press for a place to be found for this Bill in the government’s legislative 
programme for that parliamentary session.756  It may be inferred that Maudling 
was content to let Green go ahead in the manner that he proposed.757 
Among government ministers, Green went on to take the leading role in the 
development and enactment of the Income Tax Management Bill.  He engaged 
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  TNA file IR 40/13351.  Part 4.  Note, [?Battishill] to [Financial Secretary], ‘The Income Tax 
Management Bill’, 25 October 1963. 
755
  TNA file IR 40/13351.  Part 4.  Manuscript note by Green, 5 November 1963 (on the note to 
him dated 25 October 1963). 
756
  TNA file IR 40/13351.  Part 4.  Note, Green to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 18 December 
1963. 
757
  On Green’s note, in red biro, there is a tick, the date ‘20/12’, and a squiggle which may be 
taken to be Maudling’s initials.  See also text around n 706 above. 
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in correspondence with the chairman of the Legislation Committee, the Lord 
Chancellor (Dilhorne), who was very reluctant to introduce the Bill.758  Green 
and the Inland Revenue, however, continued to persevere.  A note dated 19 
November 1963 recorded Green’s hope that the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
‘may feel that he can keep this simmering at least’.759  Maudling approached the 
leader of the House of Commons (Selwyn Lloyd) who was ‘entirely sympathetic 
towards the Bill’;760 and the Income Tax Management Bill was considered at the 
meeting of the Legislation Committee held on 17 December 1963, where Green 
was ‘invited to consider further important points of principle on the Income Tax 
Management Bill’.  Further work, however, resulted in the Bill being cleared by 
the Legislation Committee at a meeting held on 14 January 1964; and the 
Income Tax Management Bill was presented to the House of Commons on 4 
February 1964,761 and published.  On 12 February 1964, Green opened the 
proceedings on behalf of the government when the Bill had an unopposed 
Second Reading in the House of Commons;762 and, on 19 June, the Bill 
received the Royal Assent and became the Income Tax Management Act 1964.  
The manner in which Green and the Inland Revenue worked together on the 
Income Tax Management Bill constituted an excellent example of the 
partnership between government minister and civil service as that partnership 
was ideally conceived.763  The Inland Revenue supplied detailed knowledge and 
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  TNA file IR 40/13351.  Part 4.  Letters, Green to Dilhorne, 6 November 1963 and Dilhorne to 
Green, 11 November 1963. 
759
  TNA file IR 40/13351.  Part 4.  Note, Battishill to Caulcott, ‘Income Tax Management Bill’, 19 
November 1963. 
760
  TNA file IR 40/13351.  Part 4.  Note, Mitchell to Corlett, ‘Income Tax Management Bill’, 27 
November 1963. 
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  TNA file IR 63/229, prefatory page and 2. 
762
  HC Deb 12 February 1964, vol 689, cols 387-429. 
763
  See text around ns 646-53 above.  See also chapter 3 above, text around ns 424-7. 
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information; and Green successfully presented the case for the Bill, both to his 
colleagues in government and to the House of Commons.764 
Green’s championing of the Income Tax Management Bill was essential for its 
enactment: and it is quite clear from his note to Maudling, dated 18 December 
1963, that he took a personal interest in this Bill.  The question then arises why 
he did so.  The evidence does not establish that any one consideration was 
decisive: and the truth may be that, from Green’s point of view, a number of 
different considerations all pointed towards the same overall result.  There is no 
reason to doubt his statement that he believed in the considerable intrinsic 
merits of the Bill, or his statement that he wished to justify the principle that 
detailed consideration of legislation on administrative matters could be removed 
from Finance Bills and considered instead in committee.  Beyond that, however, 
Green must have been aware that, with a general election imminent, which the 
Conservative government might well lose, and as an MP for a marginal 
constituency,765 his ministerial career might end in the foreseeable future – with 
highly uncertain prospects of ever being resumed.  As a middle-ranking 
government minister, he may have welcomed a convenient opportunity, 
presented to him, of being able to make a distinctive contribution.766 
                                            
764
  On 13 February 1964, the day following the Second Reading debate in the House of 
Commons, Green wrote to the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue to let him know how 
greatly he appreciated the department’s ‘careful and prescient’ briefing on the Bill.  ‘It would be 
difficult for a Minister to ask for more both before and during the Debates’.  TNA file IR 
40/13351.  Part 3.  Letter, Green to Johnston, 13 February [1964]. 
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  At the general election in October 1964, Green was defeated in his Preston constituency. 
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  Green’s own papers relating to the Income Tax Management Bill have been preserved as a 
distinct part (Part 4) of the Inland Revenue’s principal collection of papers relating to that Bill 
(TNA file IR 40/13351).  A typed note at the top of one part of this collection, dated 7 September 
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A government minister also acted to promote change in the form of income tax 
legislation during the period from 1924 to 1929 when Winston Churchill was 
Chancellor of the Exchequer.  During these years, a committee was set up, 
charged with the task of drafting legislation to codify income tax law.  That 
codification, if successfully carried out, would make a fundamental change in 
the form of the income tax legislation: for there would be a new principal Act 
relating to income tax; and the preparation and enactment of such an Act would 
be a more ambitious undertaking than the enactment of a new consolidation 
Act.  Churchill’s sponsorship of the scheme which included the setting up of the 
Codification Committee accordingly constituted the most dramatic case in which 
the default setting within which the United Kingdom polity operated was 
overridden.767  The overriding of that default setting, however, was no easy 
matter.  It was only possible to bring the scheme that Churchill sponsored into 
operation at the end of a process which was protracted and fraught, and which 
had several stages. 
Churchill had indicated his interest in income tax simplification fairly soon after 
becoming Chancellor: for, on 27 October 1925, Sir Richard Hopkins, the 
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, sent Churchill ‘some observations as 
desired by you on the complexity of the Income Tax system and the 
practicability of remedial measures’.  Hopkins’s analysis was acute: but he 
nevertheless believed that little could be done.768  Churchill was unconvinced.  
A note dated 12 January 1926 indicated his unease about the expansion of 
                                                                                                                              
this source that the importance of Green’s own contribution may be gauged.  This feature of the 
surviving documentation was noted in chapter 1 (text around ns 116-7). 
767
  For the default setting, see the conclusion to chapter 2 above. 
768
  TNA file IR 63/114, fos 318-31.  Memorandum, with covering note, Hopkins to Churchill, 27 
October 1925.  Hopkins’s memorandum was considered in chapter 3, section 2(1), text around 
ns 376-9.  See also text around n 791 below. 
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central government.  ‘At the root of the whole of this matter lies the only 
possible remedy in a revolutionary alteration in the methods of Income Tax law 
and collection’; and Churchill, accordingly, was ‘determined to search 
continually during the present year for the means of effecting fundamental 
simplification’.769 
The devising of a scheme to simplify income tax – a scheme which included the 
plan to codify income tax law – began with the establishment of conditions 
permitting the devising of a viable scheme; and much time and effort had to be 
expended before those conditions were met.  Churchill had an undoubted 
general wish to simplify the income tax system – and that general wish gave 
rise to general ideas.  Inland Revenue officials, however, were obliged to 
examine each proposal separately and in detail – and to consider its 
administrative viability.  From the point of view of those officials, any particular 
proposal that Churchill advanced might have technical defects – which they 
then proceeded to specify.  Churchill, in his turn, was accordingly prompted to 
take the view that the officials’ attitude was unconstructive and obscurantist.  A 
report from an Inland Revenue departmental committee, dated 18 December 
1925, was opposed to a proposal that Churchill had advanced.770  On 27 
December 1925, Churchill replied in a minute, sharply critical of the 
departmental committee and its report.  The report was ‘disappointing’; and the 
committee was accused of holding the view that ‘a system of taxation so 
complicated and elaborate that very few tax payers can understand it ... is the 
                                            
769
  M Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Volume V, Companion Part I: Documents: The Exchequer 
Years: 1922-1929 (London, Heinemann, 1979) 631.  Note, Churchill to Hopkins and Hamilton.  
(Sir Horace Hamilton was the Chairman of the Board of Customs and Excise.) 
770
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 3-40. 
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last word in efficiency and simplicity’.771  During the early part of his 
chancellorship, therefore, not only was there tension between Churchill and 
Inland Revenue officials: relations between the two sides may be described as 
poor.  The evidence suggests that this state of affairs resulted from the inability 
of each side to communicate effectively with the other.  The overall outcome in 
the spring of 1926 was that Churchill had no significant progress to report.  He 
told the Attorney-General (Hogg) that an Inland Revenue committee had ‘up to 
the present ... not met with the success that I had hoped’.772  On 26 April 1926, 
in his Budget speech, Churchill stated that everyone sought the simplification of 
the income tax.  He had an expert committee sitting continuously under his 
personal direction, and trusted, some day, to be able to frame extensive 
proposals.  ‘All I can say at present is that the difficulties do not diminish with 
careful study’.773 
During the spring and summer of 1926, however, Inland Revenue officials and 
Churchill made major progress in reaching a common understanding about the 
features of plans for the simplification of income tax – and how those plans 
might be devised.  Churchill met the members of the Inland Revenue 
departmental committee on 22 March 1926;774 but no contemporary note of this 
meeting, made by an individual who was present, is known.775  The major report 
later submitted by the departmental committee recorded that, at this meeting, 
Churchill ‘expressed a wish that the Committee should, if possible, submit for 
                                            
771
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 109-14.  Minute, Churchill to Hopkins, 27 December 1925. 
772
  TNA file IR 63/114, fos 698-9.  Letter, Churchill to Hogg, 31 March 1926. 
773
  HC Deb 26 April 1926, vol 194, col 1704. 
774
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 171-2.  Note, Thompson to Churchill, March 1926.  See also 
Churchill’s minute on that document. 
775
  It would be interesting to know whether the ‘tone’ of the meeting was pleasant (constructive) 
or unpleasant (abusive) so far as the Inland Revenue representatives were concerned.  Either 
alternative appears possible.  It is possible that discussion was both informal and scattered – 
and that no systematic note of the meeting was ever made. 
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consideration their own constructive proposals for simplifying the Income Tax 
and Super-tax’.776  In forwarding that later report to Churchill, Hopkins’s own 
submission included the comment that, in earlier conversations, Hopkins had 
understood Churchill to say that, if the committee found it necessary to propose 
that effect should be given to the recommendations of the Royal Commission 
on the Income Tax for curtailment of the routine and administrative functions of 
the local Commissioners and their officers, then Churchill would be prepared to 
face the serious parliamentary opposition to which such proposals were likely to 
give rise.777  When there was an understanding that possible parliamentary 
opposition could be faced – but only when there was such an understanding – 
plans to simplify income tax could aim to accomplish a significant amount. 
The establishment of conditions permitting the devising of a viable scheme was 
accordingly followed by the devising of such a scheme: and, on this matter, the 
major report from the Inland Revenue departmental committee was dated 14 
October 1926.778  It was this report which proposed a plan to simplify income 
tax; and which included a proposal that income tax law should be codified.779  
The report proposed ‘the initiation of measures for the codification of the Income 
Tax statutes with a view to their re-expression in a simpler and more modern 
                                            
776
  ‘Report Of a [Departmental] Committee ... ‘ (n 778 below) para 3.   
777
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 222-37, 231.  Submission, Hopkins to Churchill, 27 October 1926, 
para 15. 
778
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 238-316.  ‘Report Of a [Departmental] Committee appointed to 
consider the Simplification of the Income Tax and Super-tax’. This Report is dated 14 October 
1926. 
779
  So far as the plan to simplify income tax was concerned, the departmental committee’s 
‘scheme of simplification’ consisted of proposals for changes both in the charge to income tax 
and in the administration of the tax.  The committee proposed a rationalisation of the charge to 
tax, with income taxed by deduction being charged on a current year basis and other income on 
a preceding year basis.  The committee also proposed that income tax and super-tax should be 
combined in a single tax, with super-tax (a tax that was legally distinct from income tax) being 
replaced by surtax, a deferred instalment of income tax.  As regards the administration of 
income tax, the committee envisaged that a taxpayer would complete a single return annually.  
This return would be issued by the Inland Revenue and would be returned to that department.  
(See, in particular, paras 22 and 23 of the Departmental Committee Report (n 778 above).) 
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and intelligible form’.780  This proposal, if successfully implemented, was 
obviously capable of being of the utmost importance for the form of income tax 
legislation. 
The departmental committee’s plan then needed to be accepted: and, on this 
matter, it may be inferred that Churchill’s initial reaction to the simplification 
scheme proposed in the departmental report was not particularly favourable.  In 
a submission to him a little later, Hopkins wrote that Churchill had asked for 
another proposal to be examined.
781
  That proposal was referred to the 
departmental committee; and was the subject of a report dated 22 November 
1926.782  The committee saw technical difficulties in this proposal and did not 
favour its adoption; and, in time, Churchill came to share this view.783  His 
minute to Hopkins, giving his official final verdict on the simplification scheme, 
was dated 26 January 1927.784   He had now read and re-read the whole of the 
income tax simplification papers.  ‘Let me first of all thank you and the 
Committee for the great care and thought they have given to this subject and 
                                            
780
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 222-37, 222.  Submission, Hopkins to Churchill, 27 October 1926, 
para 2. 
781
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 330-2.  Note, Hopkins to Churchill, 1 December 1926.  Churchill’s 
views at this point may be taken to be reflected in a document entitled ‘Rule of Thumb 
Principles (for consideration)’.  The document is undated and has nothing on its face to indicate 
authorship; but it has been typed, using a font often used for Churchill’s own documents, on the 
small sheets of paper which Churchill often used.  It is accordingly considered safe to infer that 
this document was produced by Churchill himself, or by someone else acting with his approval.  
(TNA file T 171/255, fos 317-9). 
782
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 320-9.  Report of the Departmental Committee to the Chairman of 
the Board of Inland Revenue, 22 November 1926.  The Report was transmitted to Churchill 
under cover of a submission to him from Hopkins dated 1 December 1926. (ibid fos 330-2.) 
783
  The departmental committee considered that the proposal was inapplicable to small 
incomes; that it presented great practical difficulties in relation to large incomes; that it was 
unfair in its operation in the case of fluctuating incomes; that it was more complex and difficult 
for the taxpayer to manage than the existing system; and that it involved a serious loss of tax 
with a consequent necessity to increase the scale of rates.  At the end of Churchill’s copy of the 
Report is his manuscript annotation ‘I agree.  W.S.C.  25.1[.1927]’. (TNA file T 171/255, fo 329.) 
784
  Churchill spent the end of 1926 and the beginning of 1927 abroad; and completed his study 
of the material relating to income tax simplification towards the end of that time.  M Gilbert, 
Winston S. Churchill: Volume 5: 1922-1939 (London, Heinemann, 1976) 222-9.  
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congratulate them upon the result, albeit modest, which they have achieved’.785  
The words ‘albeit modest’ may be noted.  They permit the inference that 
Churchill might ideally have wished to sponsor a larger simplification scheme 
than the one actually introduced.786 
The scheme devised was finally implemented.  The proposals comprised in the 
simplification scheme were enacted in the Finance Act 1927;787 and it is clear 
that both Churchill and Inland Revenue officials took trouble to ensure that 
these proposals reached the statute book safely.
788
  So far as the codification of 
the income tax legislation was concerned, Churchill told the House of Commons 
during his 1927 Budget Speech that he proposed to ask a body of experts to 
undertake this task.789  The Codification Committee was set up; and had its first 
meeting in 1927.790  ‘I approached this quest at the outset with only modest 
hopes of success’ Hopkins told Churchill during the autumn of 1926 – but the 
overall success of the initiative to simplify income tax obviously exceeded 
Hopkins’s expectations.791  Churchill could depart from office in 1929 able to 
say that, on this topic, at least, his work was done.  
Churchill’s achievement in causing the Income Tax Codification Committee to 
be set up was possible because a number of conditions were all met.  Churchill 
was an effective departmental minister.  ‘There is no more capable chief of a 
                                            
785
  The original of this document is in TNA file IR 40/15963.  There is a copy in TNA file T 
171/255, fos 333-5; and the document is printed in the Companion volume (n 769) 926-7. 
786
  The explanation given here as to how Churchill’s plans for income tax simplification came to 
be devised differs from that given in M Daunton, Just Taxes: The Politics of Taxation in Britain 
1914-1979 (CUP 2002) 111-2.  Among other matters, it is considered that Daunton exaggerates 
the Inland Revenue’s hostility to simplification and the extent to which Churchill himself devised 
the plans that were implemented. 
787
  17 & 18 Geo 5 c 10. 
788
  The steps taken to conciliate interest groups and the press are considered below in chapter 
6, sections 3 and 4 respectively. 
789
  HC Deb 11 April 1927, vol 205, cols 84-5. 
790
  The activities of the Codification Committee are considered in chapter 6, section 1, below. 
791
  TNA file T 171/255, fo 227.  Submission, Hopkins to Churchill, 27 October 1926, para 9. 
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department than he is’, Christopher Addison wrote of him during the period of 
the Lloyd George coalition.792  In the judgment of one present-day historian, in 
one sense Churchill was ‘a civil servant’s ideal minister: decisive, self-confident, 
industrious and battling hard for his policies at cabinet level’.793  It was also the 
case that Churchill himself wished action to be taken to simplify income tax.794  
More than that: it has been said that it ‘was not only that Churchill sought bold 
initiatives: he sought a theme or programme in which a number of different 
proposals were combined’.795  Neville Chamberlain’s less than ecstatic 
comment was that Churchill was a man ‘of tremendous drive and vivid 
imagination but obsessed with the glory of doing something spectacular which 
should erect monuments to him’.796 
Churchill also succeeded in making the transition from the capacity and wish to 
take action to the devising and implementation of a particular scheme.  This 
condition was not easily met.  Churchill had many ideas – but those ideas were 
of unequal value.  One comment, made by Lloyd George, was that ‘he’s got ten 
ideas and one of them is right, but he never knows which it is’.797  Of the ideas 
that Churchill did have, many were far from the state where they constituted 
viable administrative programmes.  Proposals considered by the Inland 
Revenue departmental committee fall into this category.798  In 1928, Churchill 
                                            
792
  Quoted in Theakston (n 687) 159. 
793
  ibid 155. 
794
  See above, text before ns 768-9. 
795
  P Addison, Churchill on the Home Front: 1900-1955 (London, Jonathan Cape, 1992) 128. 
796
  Gilbert, Companion volume (n 769) 264 (diary entry for 26 November 1924).   
797
  Quoted in R Toye, Lloyd George & Churchill: Rivals for Greatness (London, Macmillan, 
2007) 380.  According to Attlee, there was some truth in this comment.  (ibid.) 
798
  See above, text around ns 770-2 and 781-3.  This state of affairs had also been in existence 
earlier, in 1910 and 1911, when Churchill had been Home Secretary.  Sir Edward Troup, the 
Permanent Secretary at the Home Office, recorded that ‘[o]nce a week or oftener Mr Churchill 
came to the office bringing with him some adventurous or impossible projects; but after half an 
hour’s discussion something was evolved which was still adventurous but not impossible’.  
Addison (n 795) 128. 
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had ideas for the derating of business premises.  Neville Chamberlain’s less 
than ecstatic comment on Churchill’s plan was that it was ‘dangerous because 
as usual it is only the idea he has got.  He has nothing worked out but he gets 
so enamoured with his idea that he won’t listen to difficulties or wait until plans 
have been made to get over them.  It’s like Gallipoli again’.799  One present-day 
historian has written of Churchill that he was ‘impulsive, erratic, capricious, 
argumentative and domineering – he was never an easy minister to work for 
and at times he could be pretty impossible’.800  Neville Chamberlain’s less than 
ecstatic comment was that ‘not for all the joys of Paradise would I be a member 
of his staff!  Mercurial! a much abused word, but it is the literal description of his 
temperament’.801  In 1927, however, other characteristics of Churchill’s enabled 
a constructive outcome to be produced.  Churchill was able to reach the 
conclusion that one particular course of action was the best available – and 
then to go into action accordingly:802 his final response to the departmental 
committee’s report is an illustration of this trait.803  Churchill was also able to 
persist in a proposed course of action in circumstances in which others might 
have abandoned the struggle.  ‘Only someone with Churchill’s bloody-
mindedness and tenacity would have persevered’ is one verdict on Churchill’s 
actions in 1927.804 
                                            
799
  Addison (n 795) 278. 
800
  Theakston (n 687) 155. 
801
  Neville Chamberlain to Baldwin, summer 1925.  Quoted in Gilbert (n 784) 132. 
802
  Colville recalled that Churchill was open to persuasion, although it often needed courage to 
press the point.  ‘He did need restraining and one of his virtues was that pertinaciously though 
he might contest an issue, tirelessly though he might probe, he did not reject restraint once he 
had convinced himself that the arguments for caution were neither craven nor bureaucratic.  
Unless he was so convinced, he was not susceptible to influence even by his closest friends 
and advisers.  ...  Nevertheless ... however much Churchill was determined to make up his 
mind, he seldom refused to listen and he was always prepared to weigh a good argument from 
whatever source it came’.  Quoted in Theakston (n 687) 168. 
803
  See text around ns 784-6 above. 
804
  Daunton (n 786) 112. 
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The successful devising of the scheme to simplify income tax and to codify 
income tax law, however, is a matter that has received little attention and still 
less praise: and this relative neglect may be attributed to the contexts in which 
the initiative is likely to be placed.  One context is that of Churchill’s career as a 
whole: and, in that context, the view has been taken that ‘[in] home affairs the 
opening and closing phases of Churchill’s career – before 1914 and after 1940 
– were the most successful’.805  During the inter-war period, Churchill is often 
considered to have been less successful.  In the more immediate context of 
Churchill’s tenure of the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1924 to 
1929, Churchill’s record may also be regarded as far from perfect.  Much 
attention has been given to the decision, in 1925, to return the United Kingdom 
to the gold standard at the pre-war parity – and that decision has always had 
major critics.  In 1928, Churchill devoted energy to the subject of derating – but 
less was accomplished than had been hoped.806  Churchill’s actions in 1927 
were also viewed unenthusiastically by one knowledgeable contemporary.  
Writing of the 1927 Budget, PJ Grigg, Churchill’s Private Secretary during this 
period, viewed the ‘ambitious alteration’ in the structure of income tax as ‘a side 
dish’.  ‘Probably none of this was worth the administrative and legislative effort it 
absorbed’.807  The view taken here is much more favourable: but, even so, the 
scheme to simplify the income tax system (involving the codification of income 
tax law) may be regarded as being in the nature of an exception to an 
exception: an episode deserving of more praise within a period deserving of 
less praise. 
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  Addison (n 795) 433. 
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  ibid 278-80.  
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The other context in which Churchill’s plans to simplify income tax is likely to be 
placed is that of the history of income tax.  In this context, subsequent events 
may be described as unkind.  The Income Tax Codification Committee, 
although it finally produced a draft Bill to codify the law of income tax, did not 
produce a draft Bill that was enacted.808  Then, during the second world war, the 
overall approach to the charge to income tax contained in the 1927 
simplification scheme – that income received under deduction of tax should be 
taxed on a current year basis while other income was taxed on a preceding year 
basis – gained nothing in coherence, and quite possibly lost coherence, with the 
introduction of the PAYE system (which had its own different rationale).  The 
scheme for the simplification of income tax, which involved the codification of 
income tax law, was not therefore completed as envisaged; and then 
disappeared from view, obscured by later events. 
Conclusion 
The evidence demonstrates that it was very difficult for government ministers to 
determine the form of the income tax legislation.  The extent of the demands 
placed on ministers, and the extent of the qualities that effective ministers 
needed to display, made it very unlikely that ministers would have the capacity 
to be a significant determinant of that form.  Ministers could take the initiative on 
very few fronts at any one time: and the budget cycle and their general 
oversight of the Treasury departments made it very unlikely that they would 
wish to make the form of the income tax legislation one of those fronts.  It was 
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  The actions of the Codification Committee are considered in chapter 6, section 1, below. 
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very unlikely, in practice, that government ministers would override the default 
setting within which the United Kingdom polity operated.809 
Government ministers had too much to do.  Lloyd George was overcommitted in 
1913 and 1914; and it was easy for Austen Chamberlain to postpone serious 
consideration of the Revenue Bill in 1920.  The general Revenue Bills over 
which they presided were not enacted.  The burden of office could lead to a 
minister becoming less effective – as happened, perhaps, to Thorneycroft and 
Heathcoat Amory.
810
  Hailsham, in 1962, was concerned about ‘the increasing 
physical and moral strain on Ministers’, which converted them into 
‘administrative machines’.811  Even if they acted as ‘administrative machines’, 
however, there was insufficient time for ministers to undertake all the 
government business that could usefully be undertaken: and there were many 
matters – including the form of the income tax legislation – that received less 
attention than they could usefully have received. 
Despite all these difficulties, government ministers could still determine the form 
of the income tax legislation.  Kingsley Wood played a major role during the 
second world war; and Alan Green in 1963 and 1964.  Both these ministers, 
however, concerned themselves with business that was already in existence; 
and it is likely that they had a number of different reasons for acting as they did.  
In Kingsley Wood’s case, furthermore, the role played by the government 
minister did not have the making of any change in the form of the income tax 
legislation as a significant part of its overall purpose: changes in the form of the 
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  For the default setting, see, in particular, the conclusion to chapter 2 above. 
810
  See text around n 671-2 above. 
811
  See text around n 673 above. 
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income tax legislation were by-products of a course of action undertaken to 
accomplish other objectives. 
Churchill’s course of action in promoting and sponsoring the scheme for the 
simplification of income tax, which had a proposal to codify income tax law as 
one of its components, was, by contrast, totally exceptional.  There is no reason 
to think that either the general simplification scheme or the more particular 
codification proposal would have been given any significant attention had 
Churchill not been interested in making major changes to income tax law and 
practice – and taken action accordingly.  This was a very clear overriding of the 
default setting within which the United Kingdom polity operated, undertaken by 
a man who was the master of his ministry.  The enactment of a codifying statute 
would effect a complete transformation of the form of the income tax legislation.  
The successful devising of income tax law, however, depended not on actions 
taken within government, but on the actions to be taken by the Income Tax 
Codification Committee – a body belonging not to government, but to Amery’s 
‘nation’. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE PLAYED BY DETERMINANTS FORMING PART OF 
AMERY’S ‘NATION’ 
‘The one force which is irresistible in the country is the 
electorate’.812 
 
Introduction 
Amery viewed the United Kingdom polity in terms of a parley, taking place in 
Parliament, between the ‘government’ and the ‘nation’.813  The last three 
chapters have investigated the role played, in determining the form of the 
income tax legislation, by three important possible determinants within 
‘government’.  This chapter investigates the role played, in determining the form 
of the income tax legislation, by five important possible determinants, which, on 
Amery’s analysis, formed part of the ‘nation’: the Income Tax Codification 
Committee; Members of Parliament; interest groups; the press; and public 
opinion.  These possible determinants are considered in that order – an order 
reflecting travel away from central government.  A majority of them were 
mentioned in a note from the Prime Minister (Attlee), in 1946, which was clear 
that officials should be alive to the need to bring various features in subordinate 
legislation to the minister’s notice: the features in question included those ‘which 
might give rise to criticism by the public or in the press or to opposition in 
Parliament’.814 
                                            
812
  Memorandum, dated 29 March 1910, in the Elibank papers.  Quoted in AM Gollin, The 
Observer and J.L. Garvin 1908-1914 (OUP 1960) 183. 
813
  LS Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution (OUP 1947) esp ch 1.  See also chapter 1 above, 
text around ns 139-41. 
814
  TNA file PREM 8/153.  ‘Control of subordinate legislation by the Legislation Committee: 
Note by the Prime Minister’, 17 June 1946.  This piece also discloses that Attlee approved a 
draft document submitted to him; and, at this point, the document partly follows remarks made 
by Morrison at a meeting of the Legislation Committee on 4 June 1946. 
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It was explained in chapter 1 that the ascertainment of the determinants of the 
forms of income tax legislation would be carried out not only by investigating 
legislation that reached the statute book, but also by investigating legislation 
that was prepared but not enacted.  The latter possessed defects which 
prevented its enactment – and the ascertainment of those defects provides 
important information for ascertaining the determinants of the forms of income 
tax legislation.815  In this chapter, two Bills that were prepared but not enacted 
receive detailed investigation in order to ascertain those defects: the draft Bill 
produced by the Income Tax Codification Committee in 1936; and the Revenue 
Bill of 1921.  The latter throws much light on the roles played by Members of 
Parliament, interest groups and the press. 
1. The Income Tax Codification Committee 
The Income Tax Codification Committee (the ‘Codification Committee’) was one 
outcome of Churchill’s scheme for the simplification of income tax.816  In his 
1927 Budget speech, Churchill stated that an attempt should be made to rewrite 
the Acts governing the income tax in a clearer and more intelligible form; and 
that he proposed ‘to ask a body of experts of the highest qualifications to take 
the task in hand.  Their labours will be long, but I hope when they fructify the 
fruits will be found to be both rare and refreshing’.817  The Codification 
Committee was then set up to ‘prepare a draft of a Bill or Bills to codify the law 
relating to Income Tax’.818 
                                            
815
  See chapter 1 above, text before n 43. 
816
  For Churchill’s scheme, see chapter 5, section 3(2), above.  For an account of the activities 
of the Codification Committee and of the aftermath, see JHN Pearce, ‘The Income Tax Law 
Rewrite Projects: 1907-56’ in J Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 6 (Oxford, 
Hart, 2013) 148-59.  The contents of this section reflect that account. 
817
  HC Deb 11 April 1927, vol 205, cols 84-5. 
818
  Income Tax Codification Committee, Report: Volume 1: Report and Appendices (Cmd 5131, 
1936) 7, para 2.  The full terms of reference were ‘[t]o prepare a draft of a Bill or Bills to codify 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
252 
 
The Codification Committee was exceedingly well placed to make a contribution 
of the utmost importance to the determination of the form of the income tax 
legislation.  It was charged with the task of preparing the draft of a new principal 
Act relating to income tax; it obviously wished to prepare such a draft; and a 
draft Bill to codify income tax law was eventually produced.  The Codification 
Committee, under the chairmanship first of Sir Frederick Liddell and then of 
Lord Macmillan, finally reported in March 1936.  Lord Macmillan, in his 
autobiography, described the Report as ‘a formidable document in two parts’.819  
The first part820 ran to 541 pages and contained the report itself (consisting of a 
general introduction, a detailed discussion of special topics, and the 
Committee’s conclusion) followed by five appendices, one of which dealt, 
clause by clause, with the Committee’s draft Bill.  The second part821 contained 
the text of the Committee’s draft Bill, which, in 417 clauses and eight schedules, 
presented a complete recasting and codification of the whole of the existing 
income tax law. 
The draft Bill produced by the Codification Committee, however, was never 
enacted.  Presented with an open goal, the Codification Committee failed to 
score.  The question arising, therefore, is why the Codification Committee failed 
to take advantage of the obvious opportunity, placed before it, to make a major 
impact on the form of the income tax legislation. 
                                                                                                                              
the law relating to Income Tax, with the special aim of making the law as intelligible to the 
taxpayer as the nature of the legislation admits, and with power for that purpose to suggest any 
alterations which, while leaving substantially unaffected the liability of the taxpayer, the general 
system of administration and the powers and duties of the various authorities concerned 
therein, would promote uniformity and simplicity’.  (ibid.) 
819
  Lord Macmillan, A Man of Law’s Tale (London, Macmillan, 1953) 200-1. 
820
  Income Tax Codification Committee, Report: Volume 1: Report and Appendices (Cmd 5131, 
1936) (subsequently cited in this chapter as ‘Codification Committee Report’). 
821
  Income Tax Codification Committee, Report: Volume 2: Draft of an Income Tax Bill (Cmd 
5132, 1936). 
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It has been seen that if a Bill constituting a major restatement of the law on a 
particular topic – a restatement going beyond the consolidation of the existing 
legislation – was actually to be enacted by Parliament, it was essential for that 
Bill to be presented to Parliament in a form which had the support of all relevant 
major interests, both inside and outside government.  A Bill with such support 
could be enacted as it stood (or with minor amendments) and would not absorb 
much precious parliamentary time.822  A Bill without such support was virtually 
certain to require more parliamentary time than would be available – and, 
accordingly, would not be enacted.  The Codification Committee’s failure may 
be traced to a failure to produce a Bill that had the support of all major interests; 
and the explanation for that failure falls into two parts.  The Committee prepared 
a draft Bill that did not have the wide measure of support that was essential: for 
that draft Bill did not have adequate support from one all-important ‘consumer’ – 
the Inland Revenue.  The parliamentary prospects for an amended Codification 
Bill were then so uncertain that no such Bill was ever introduced. 
The Codification Committee consisted entirely of lawyers; and its members may 
be divided into those in private practice and those in government service.  The 
lawyers in private practice were AM Bremner, a barrister specialising in revenue 
law; RP Hills, the Junior Revenue Counsel; and EM Konstam, the author of a 
leading work on The Law of Income Tax.823  The lawyers in government service 
were Sir Frederick Liddell, the First Parliamentary Counsel (who was about to 
retire); Sir William Graham-Harrison,824 the Second Parliamentary Counsel; and 
                                            
822
  See chapter 2, section 2(4), above, text around n 303. 
823
  This work went through twelve editions between 1921 and 1952. 
824
  Sir William Graham-Harrison (knighted 1926) was Second Parliamentary Counsel from 1917 
to 1928 and First Parliamentary Counsel from 1928 to 1933 when he retired.  At that time he 
also retired as a member of the Codification Committee (see text following n 834 below). 
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Sir John Shaw,825 the Solicitor of Inland Revenue.  From the point of view of 
legal expertise, the Codification Committee was admirably served.  The 
Attorney-General (Sir Douglas Hogg), who had considered it very important that 
the private practice side should be represented,826 thought that ‘we are very 
fortunate indeed to have secured such a Committee’.827  Having regard to the 
identity of the six individuals appointed to be members of the Committee, 
therefore, an optimist could take the view that the final draft Bill produced would 
benefit from the combined wisdom of a balanced Committee.  A pessimist could 
take the view that the Committee would divide into two hostile camps. 
In its early meetings, the Codification Committee adopted an approach which 
kept the Inland Revenue at arm’s length.828  The Minutes of the Codification 
Committee’s first meeting recorded that ‘[i]t was agreed that written memoranda 
should be invited from responsible bodies interested in the codification and 
simplification of Income Tax law’.829  It may be inferred that one such invitation 
was sent to the Board of Inland Revenue: for the Board accepted an invitation 
‘to make suggestions as to the manner or direction in which the purposes for 
which the Committee has been appointed could best be accomplished’; and, 
during the first half of 1928, the Board submitted a number of memoranda to the 
Committee.  One of those memoranda discussed the question ‘whether the 
existing classification of income for assessment purposes under the five 
                                            
825
  Sir John Shaw (knighted 1927) was Solicitor of Inland Revenue from 1921 to 1939.  He was 
succeeded in that post by Mr WB Blatch (later Sir Bernard Blatch), who had been the secretary 
to the Codification Committee. 
826
 TNA file T 160/592 (F 10520/1).  Hogg’s endorsement, dated 26 May 1927, on Hopkins’s 
submission to Churchill, 17 May 1927. 
827
 TNA file T 160/592 (F 10520/1).  Letter, Hogg to Churchill, 18 July 1927. 
828
  Sir Richard Hopkins, the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, had taken the view that 
the text of the draft of the Codification Bill should be produced by the Inland Revenue and the 
Parliamentary Counsel serving on the Codification Committee (Liddell and Graham-Harrison).  It 
was implicit in this view that the Bill produced would have the Inland Revenue’s support in 
assisting with the further task of enacting the Bill as drafted.  See Pearce (n 816) 149. 
829
  TNA file IR 75/4, document 00001.  (Underlining in original.) 
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schedules should be retained’ – and took the view that it should.830  The 
Codification Committee, however, decided to discuss the subject of 
‘classification of income’ – and then did little else from 1928 to 1930. 
There is evidence that the Codification Committee was deeply divided.  The 
First Parliamentary Counsel (Sir Granville Ram) later wrote that it had soon 
become clear that some members of the Committee regarded the Inland 
Revenue and Sir William Graham-Harrison (who had drafted almost all the 
Finance Bills during the preceding 19 years) as the people mainly responsible 
for the existing tangle and accordingly regarded any suggestions they made 
with the utmost suspicion.  ‘Success could never have been attained in such an 
atmosphere’.831  During the period of the Macmillan chairmanship, furthermore, 
the ‘private practice side’ achieved a clear predominance over the ‘government 
service side’.  Macmillan’s own appointment, early in 1932, was followed by that 
of two more barristers in private practice (Fergus Morton KC and CL King) and 
by a Chartered Accountant in private practice (Sir Gilbert Garnsey).832  The 
Committee accordingly consisted of a senior Judge (Macmillan), three lawyers 
in government service (Liddell, Graham-Harrison and Shaw) and six individuals 
in private practice: five lawyers (Bremner, Hills, Konstam, Morton and King) and 
one accountant (first Garnsey, and then, after his death, DH Allan).833  This 
imbalance became still greater when, in December 1933, Graham-Harrison 
resigned – and was not replaced.834 
                                            
830
  TNA file IR 75/2 (BO 107), fos 302-4. 
831
  TNA file IR 40/8554.  ‘Simplification of Income Tax Law, Memorandum by the Parliamentary 
Counsel’, 1 November 1945, para 4. 
832
  Codification Committee Report (n 820) 6.  These appointments had been proposed in a 
letter from Macmillan to Neville Chamberlain dated 20 February 1932 (TNA file T 160/592 (F 
10520/2)).  
833
  Codification Committee Report (n 820) 6-7. 
834
  TNA file IR 75/8, document 476; Codification Committee Report (n 820) 6-7.  
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At the time of his resignation, Graham-Harrison told the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer’s Private Secretary that he had felt for a long time past that he had 
been altogether in a false position on the Codification Committee.  Almost all 
the members of the Committee had looked throughout with the greatest 
suspicion on everything he had said, and every suggestion which he had made 
– no doubt influenced by their preconception that he was the person mainly 
responsible for the state of confusion in which the income tax enactments found 
themselves.  He believed that there was evidence that the Committee did not 
mean to listen to anything that he said.835  In a supplementary letter, Graham-
Harrison made the further point that before the Codification Committee’s Bill 
was introduced, it should be examined carefully by someone familiar with the 
procedure of the House of Commons applicable to Finance Bills.  On two 
occasions, at least, he had pointed out that an alteration which the Committee 
proposed to make would or might affect procedure on Finance Bills; and, in one 
of the cases, might seriously embarrass the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
Committee on the Bill.  The only result of his protests had been that he had 
been told by the Chairman that the Codification Committee had nothing to do 
with questions of parliamentary procedure on Bills – ‘let the House of Commons 
look after its own procedure’.836  It may be inferred, therefore, on the basis of 
the point made in the supplementary letter, that, so far as the Codification 
Committee was concerned, the production of a draft Bill well designed to have a 
straightforward parliamentary passage (the only parliamentary passage 
                                            
835
  TNA file IR 40/8554.  Letter, Graham-Harrison to Fergusson, 29 December 1933.  ‘As some 
slight evidence of the attitude of the Committee, I may perhaps repeat to you in confidence an 
observation made by a member of the Committee to a friend of mine who passed it on to me; 
the remark was this “it is quite clear that the Committee does not mean to listen to anything that 
Graham-Harrison says”.’. 
836
  TNA file IR 40/8554.  Letter, Graham-Harrison to Fergusson, 1 January 1934. 
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available if the Bill was ever going to be enacted) was not an objective that had 
priority. 
Somewhat earlier, on 26 January 1933, Sir John Shaw, the Solicitor of Inland 
Revenue, had spoken to Lord Macmillan at the suggestion of the Chairman of 
the Board of Inland Revenue (Grigg).  Shaw told Macmillan that he had always 
assumed that when the Committee had prepared a Bill, the Board would be 
given the opportunity of considering the Bill as a whole, and of making such 
observations and suggestions with regard to it as occurred to them, and that the 
Committee would consider these observations and suggestions.  He had further 
assumed that his presence on the Committee would in no way restrict the 
Board’s freedom to make such observations and suggestions.  It was possible 
that the Board might desire to consult him with regard to the draft Bill, and he 
would be glad to know that he had a perfectly free hand to criticise the Bill as a 
whole.837  A note by Grigg, dated 16 June 1933, stated that, on reconsideration, 
he was not at all sure that it would be a good thing for the Committee formally to 
refer the draft Bill to the Inland Revenue for examination.  Such an examination 
would take at least six months ‘and it would probably involve the Inland 
Revenue too deeply in the ultimate fortunes of the Bill’.838   The Inland Revenue, 
therefore, was concerned to distance itself from the Codification Committee’s 
work long before that work was complete. 
                                            
837
  TNA file IR 40/8554.  Note, ‘J.H.S.’ [ie Shaw] to ‘Chairman’ (of the Board of Inland Revenue) 
[ie Grigg], ‘Income Tax Codification Committee’, 2 February 1933.  Macmillan told Shaw that he 
could feel assured that his freedom to criticise was in no way prejudiced by his membership of 
the Committee.  ‘He thought that the Board certainly ought to have an opportunity of consider ing 
the Bill as a whole, though he would deprecate suggestions tending to reverse large decisions 
of policy taken by the Committee’.  (ibid.) 
838
  TNA file IR 40/8554.  Note by PJG [ie Grigg], 16 June 1933. 
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The Codification Committee presented its report and draft Bill in March 1936.  
The Inland Revenue had many observations on the draft Bill produced.839  The 
department wished to proceed with the draft Bill, but considered that it was 
abundantly clear that many alterations were required;840 and, during a period 
beginning with the presentation of the draft Bill and ending during the spring of 
1938, both the Inland Revenue and the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel 
worked on the text of an amended Codification Bill to deal with the matters 
which the Inland Revenue considered required attention.  It became quite clear, 
however, that a Codification Bill that the Inland Revenue was prepared to see 
enacted would differ significantly from the draft Codification Bill produced by the 
Codification Committee. 
The parliamentary prospects for an amended Codification Bill were discussed in 
material written by two of the Parliamentary Counsel and considered by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Simon) at the beginning of 1938.841  Stainton, the 
Parliamentary Counsel who was dealing with the Codification Bill, thought it 
‘essential that Ministers should recognise the Parliamentary difficulties which 
the Bill is likely to present’.842  The Bill was ‘not a pure Consolidation Bill, and 
therefore will not be subject to the convenient procedure which enables such a 
Bill to be passed without taking up any Parliamentary time’.  Stainton went on to 
point out that it would be quite clear that any Bill presented to the Commons 
would differ very significantly from the draft Bill produced by the Codification 
Committee; and he thought it virtually certain that the House of Commons would 
                                            
839
  TNA files IR 40/19419 and 19420 are two bound volumes in which these observations are 
collected. 
840
  TNA file T 172/1860.  Submission, Canny to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 17 December 
1937. 
841
  TNA file T 172/1860 contains the material presented to Simon, together with Simon’s own 
memorandum.  The material presented by the Inland Revenue and the Office of the 
Parliamentary Counsel were also considered above in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. 
842
  TNA file T 172/1860.  Letter, Stainton to Canny, 8 December 1937. 
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wish to investigate why those differences existed.  Proceedings in the 
Commons could therefore become protracted – and involve ministers in detailed 
explanations of highly technical matters.  Ram, the First Parliamentary Counsel, 
supported Stainton’s analysis, and also stated that, from his office’s point of 
view, the thing most to be desired was that the Bill should be prepared, pressed 
forward, and passed without delay, for until it was either passed or finally 
abandoned it would be a constant source of embarrassment to his office, more 
particularly in impeding the vast amount of consolidation which was urgently 
required to be done.  He dared not, however, ask for authority for Stainton’s 
whole time employment upon the Bill without emphasising the need for a full 
appreciation of the parliamentary difficulties to which the passage of the Bill 
might give rise ‘for it would be a calamity if, after so much had been sacrificed to 
secure the preparation of the Bill, it had ultimately to be abandoned’.843 
Simon’s own formal Memorandum recorded that he had the gravest doubts as 
to whether a comprehensive Income Tax Bill could be enacted at a time when 
Parliamentary time was so much occupied.  If the Bill were a pure Codification 
Bill, and if the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Attorney-General were able 
to assure the House that the Bill’s passage would not change the law, that 
would be another matter.  The House of Commons, however, would want to 
know whether this enormous measure changed the law.  The answer, he 
understood (correctly), was that it did: and, if so, he would expect that the 
House of Commons would refuse to accept it on the certificate of Lord 
Macmillan or anybody else and would insist on examining and discussing the 
changes.  Simon therefore took a very unfavourable view of the chance of 
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  TNA file T 172/1860.  Memorandum by Ram, 10 January 1938. 
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passing a vast Bill of this character into law in any near Session, when 
Parliament was likely to be very busy.844 
In the spring of 1938, Ram was able to obtain a decision from Simon that further 
work on the Codification Bill should be downgraded and that Stainton should not 
work on the Bill in the foreseeable future.845 The Inland Revenue policy file 
dealing with the Codification Bill846 suggests that the text of the Codification 
Committee’s draft Bill ceased to receive attention after these developments; and 
Macmillan was informed that ‘some postponement is inevitable’.847  Time 
passed; and the decision that there should be ‘some postponement’ of the Bill 
gradually moved towards becoming a decision that the Bill would be 
abandoned.  A milestone along this path was reached in August 1939, when 
Simon stated in Parliament that ‘[s]o long ... as the present pressure of affairs 
continues, I can see no possibility of finding sufficient Parliamentary time to deal 
with legislation on this complicated subject’.848  The second world war began 
one month later.  There was no question of work on the Codification Bill being 
undertaken while the war was in progress; and, by 1945, the Inland Revenue 
and the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel were both quite clear that the draft 
Codification Bill was a text that was not of practical use.849 
                                            
844
  TNA file T 172/1860.  Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Simon), 18 
January 1938.  Simon’s memorandum appears to point clearly to the conclusion that the 
Codification Bill would have to be abandoned, but then to stop short of the implied conclusion. 
845
  TNA file IR 40/5274.  Letter, Ram to Canny, 1 March 1938.  For this decision, see chapter 4, 
text around ns 587-96. 
846
  TNA file IR 40/5274. 
847
  TNA file IR 40/5274.  Letter, Simon to Macmillan, 17 March 1938. 
848
  HC Deb 3 August 1939, vol 350, col 2631. 
849
  In a document dated 3 November 1941, Ram and Stainton expressed the views that ‘the 
abortive Income Tax Bill ... threw away work which occupied almost the whole time of two 
members of the office for about a year’; and that ‘the Bill prepared by the Income Tax 
Committee in 1936 was not acceptable to the Inland Revenue.  Much work was done on it by 
the department and Parliamentary Counsel, but it was far from ready when it had to be dropped 
owing to pressure of war legislation ... .  The legislation passed since will make another 
committee and another Bill almost inevitable’.  TNA file LCO 2/3816.  ‘Observations by 
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Jowitt, the Lord Chancellor in the Attlee Government, considered that the 
Codification Committee ‘approached the matter from the wrong point of view’.  
He thought the only chance of success was to get the Inland Revenue ‘much 
more responsible than they were in that Committee and much more determined 
to support and sustain the conclusions arrived at’.850  Jowitt’s point was valid.  It 
was very important for a statute codifying the law of income tax to be presented 
to Parliament with the support of all major relevant interests, both inside and 
outside government.  The draft Bill prepared by the Codification Committee did 
not have the necessary broad coalition of support (and, in particular, did not 
have the support of the Inland Revenue).  If, however, the draft Bill was 
amended so that it did have the support of the Inland Revenue, the amended 
Bill could not safely be assumed to have the support of the members of the 
former Codification Committee – and, once again, the broad coalition of support 
would not exist.  Without such a broad coalition of support, it was completely 
unsafe to assume that a Codification Bill could be enacted quickly.  On the 
contrary: the reasonable assumption was that the time needed to enact such a 
Bill would greatly exceed the amount of time that would be available; and, in the 
events that happened, no Codification Bill was ever introduced into Parliament – 
let alone enacted. 
It is a moot question whether the Codification Committee, as constituted, could 
ever have produced a Codification Bill capable of being presented to Parliament 
with good prospects for its speedy enactment.  There is evidence permitting the 
inference that the private practice side was interested, from the very beginning, 
                                                                                                                              
Parliamentary Counsel with respect to a projected memorandum to the Lord Chancellor on the 
subject of the Statute Book’, para 7 and app A; and letter, Somervell to Schuster, 6 November 
1941 (for the attribution of the ‘Observations’ to Ram and Stainton). 
850
  TNA file LCO 2/3818.  Letter, Jowitt to the President of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, 20 February 1948.   
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in proposing amendments to the law capable of going beyond those which the 
Inland Revenue would support – with the consequence that the all-important 
broad coalition of support for the text actually prepared would never be 
assembled.851  What can be stated with confidence, however, is that, in the 
events that happened, the Codification Committee did not in fact assemble the 
necessary broad coalition of support for its draft Bill – with the consequence that 
neither the Codification Committee’s draft Bill, nor any other Bill derived from it, 
was ever presented to Parliament or enacted. 
During the period from 1907 to 1965 the Codification Committee was unique in 
that it was an entity brought into existence for the purpose of providing for a 
transformation in the form of the income tax legislation.  There can be no doubt, 
too, that the Committee wanted such a transformation to occur – but no such 
transformation occurred.  The draft Bill produced by the Codification Committee 
was unenactable – and so was any recasting of that draft Bill that was 
acceptable to the Inland Revenue. 
It was demonstrated in chapter 2 that the necessity to enact primary legislation 
relating to income tax in Parliament imposed constraints on government.  It 
followed that primary legislation relating to income tax and involving changes to 
the form of the income tax legislation had to take account of those constraints if 
it was to be enacted.  The draft Bill produced by the Codification Committee did 
                                            
851
  Before the Codification Committee was formally constituted, the Attorney-General (Hogg) 
had written to Churchill and had told him that ‘[b]oth Konstam and Bremner came to discuss the 
matter with me separately as they felt a little doubtful whether we intended seriously to tackle 
the problem of re-modelling the whole existing Income Tax law, or whether it was intended only 
to patch up the present confused jargon of highly technical Statutes, and they were not willing to 
make the very considerable sacrifice of time and trouble which the acceptance of membership 
must involve unless they were satisfied that it was intended to tackle the whole problem.  I have 
assured them that our desire is to have the existing Income Tax law rewritten in simple and 
intelligible language, and that they need have no fear that criticism of the present sections and 
drastic alteration of the language in which they are expressed will be resented’.  TNA file T 
160/592 (F 10520/1).  Letter, Hogg to Churchill, 18 July 1927.   
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not take account of those constraints; and it was unsafe to assume that any 
amended Bill could be accommodated within them.  There was no codification 
of income tax law. 
2. Members of Parliament 
(1) General 
In theory, Members of Parliament (‘MPs’) could be of the utmost importance in 
determining the form of the income tax legislation.  All primary legislation had to 
be enacted in Parliament.  MPs, therefore, could, in theory, determine whether 
that legislation was enacted at all; its content; and the form in which it was 
enacted.  In practice, however, the position was likely to be very different.  MPs 
could be classified in various different ways and played various different roles; 
and, after taking those classifications and roles into account, the capacity and 
wish of MPs to determine the form of income tax legislation was slight. 
The leading classification of MPs was according to party.  On the one hand 
there was the governing party (or parties): on the other hand there were all the 
other parties (and, in particular, the official opposition).  The vast majority of 
legislation enacted was government legislation.  Opposition parties, accordingly, 
were likely to have little direct impact on enacted legislation in general and on 
the form of the income tax legislation in particular.  Another classification of MPs 
was into ‘frontbenchers’ and ‘backbenchers’.  Both government and opposition 
had their own backbenchers.  Of the two, it was the government backbenchers 
who were better placed to be an independent determinant of the form of 
legislation.  Government frontbenchers needed the support (or acquiescence) of 
government backbenchers if legislation was to be enacted.   
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So far as the roles played by MPs were concerned, Rush, in his book on 
Members of Parliament since 1868, took the view that parliamentary 
government imposed three major inter-linked roles on MPs:852 a partisan role 
(supporting the party under whose label they had been elected – and 
particularly as a supporter of the government or of the official opposition); a 
constituency role (looking after the collective and individual interests of those 
they represented); and a scrutiny role (acting as a parliamentary watchdog, not 
on behalf of their constituents in particular, but of the people in general).  An 
individual MP who was most suited to be an independent determinant of the 
form of the income tax legislation was accordingly a government backbencher 
who was willing to give priority to Rush’s scrutiny role.  For a number of different 
reasons, however, it was only exceedingly rarely that such an MP would be 
encountered. 
Within the House of Commons, the government increased in size.  Members of 
the government could be assumed to support government policy (or, at the very 
least, to be unwilling to depart from it); and, during the twentieth century, the 
opportunity for MPs to become government ministers increased significantly.  In 
1900, there were 60 ministerial posts of which 33 (55.0%) were held by MPs; in 
1970, there were 102 ministerial posts of which 85 (83.5%) were held by 
MPs.853  On these figures about 8% more members of the House of Commons 
were office-holders in 1970 than in 1900. 
The first half of the twentieth century was also part of a longer period during 
which the nature of the office of MP changed significantly.  As Rush noted, from 
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  M Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1868: From Gentlemen to Players 
(OUP 2001) 21-2 and 167. 
853
  ibid 136, table 5.9, where further figures are also given. 
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being an unpaid (and – for the overwhelming majority – part-time) job, the office 
of MP became fully-paid and full-time.854  When considering the position as it 
existed in 1961, Sir Edward Fellowes, Clerk of the House of Commons from 
1954 to 1961, believed that there were more ‘full time’ members than there had 
been 50 years earlier; and that, 40 years before, it was probable that more 
individuals had entered the House after they had become eminent in non-
political spheres.  The ‘country gentleman’ type of member had disappeared; 
and so had the trade union member.  ‘Neither group wanted or expected to get 
office’.855  On the other hand, in a full-time career as an MP, government office 
was the high point to be aimed at.  This evidence points to the conclusion that, 
during the period from 1907 to 1965, the number of ministerial aspirants among 
government backbenchers increased.  Since ministerial aspirants (as well as 
government frontbenchers) would be unwilling to depart from government 
policy, it may be assumed that there was also an increase in a second category 
of MP unwilling to depart from the wishes of the government. 
The three roles distinguished by Rush were, moreover, of unequal and 
changing importance.  Rush himself took the view that the partisan role might 
be said to be dominant.856  Party cohesion increased during the nineteenth 
century; was virtually complete by 1900; and, during the twentieth century, was 
very high.857  As Rush viewed the matter, the constituency role also increased 
in importance during the twentieth century, both in scale and in scope;858 he 
also noted that MPs had little choice but to fulfil the partisan role and the 
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  ibid 212. 
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constituency role.  The MP had the greatest choice when it came to the scrutiny 
role:859 but, since Rush took the view that, during the twentieth century, the 
partisan role was dominant and the constituency role increasing in scale and 
scope, his analysis led him to the conclusion that the scrutiny role 
correspondingly declined in importance.860  This decline was likely to be 
emphasised if – as knowledgeable contemporaries believed – MPs had too 
much to do and had to specialise.861  ‘Members of Parliament have no time to 
read all that is laid before their respective Houses’ Graham-Harrison 
commented in 1930 in his oral evidence to the Committee on Ministers’ 
Powers.862  After leaving the House of Commons, the Earl of Winterton, who 
had been an MP from 1904 to 1951, wrote that governments and MPs alike 
were overburdened.  They had all too little time to consider complex issues, 
and, afterwards, to explain those issues to the electorate.863  ‘Not only are 
Ministers over-worked, but Members of Parliament are over-worked’ wrote the 
former leader of the Liberal Party, Clement Davies, in 1957.864  If MPs had too 
much to do, and too little time in which to do it, the scrutiny role could certainly 
expect to suffer.  Indeed, the partisan and the scrutiny roles, Rush thought, 
were ultimately incompatible.865 
More specifically, before becoming an independent determinant of the form of 
the income tax legislation, an individual MP who did wish to devote 
considerable attention to the scrutiny role would also have to be willing, as part 
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of that role, to devote attention to the form of the income tax legislation.  This 
state of affairs would exist if the MP wished to scrutinise tax matters or the form 
of legislation generally.866  As regards tax matters, the MP most obviously of a 
scrutinising disposition was Sir Henry Buckingham.867  As regards the form of 
legislation, and according to Sir Donald Somervell, the Attorney-General during 
the second world war, complaints as to the state of the statute book were a 
commonplace to lawyers.  ‘They are occasionally made in Parliament, but, apart 
from the late Sir Arnold Wilson, no Member I think in my time has pressed the 
matter’.868 
As Ball has written, ‘[t]he control of the House of Commons by governments 
whose position was based on party loyalty led to the stifling of any attempts by 
MPs to lessen the power of the executive’.869  An MP, according to Balfour, 
‘may further party ends by his eloquence; he may do so even more effectively 
perhaps by his silences’.870  In 1945, experienced Labour MPs explained to 
those who had just been elected that their contribution was to be negligible: 
‘[k]eep mum, and let the Bills get through’.871  Sir Edward Fellowes took the 
view that, by 1961, the House of Commons was more business-like – but that it 
was also duller.  It seemed more concerned with detail and less with principle.  
                                            
866
  The MP who most obviously fits this description is Thomas Gibson Bowles, the plaintiff in 
Bowles v Bank of England [1913] 1 Ch 57, (1912) 6 TC 136 (Ch).  See also text around n 275 
above.  During the period from 1907 to 1965, however, Bowles was an MP only during the 
period from January to December 1910. 
867
  Buckingham was the Chairman of the Income Taxpayers’ Society.  For further details see 
section 3 of this chapter. 
868
  TNA file LCO 2/3816.  ‘The Statute Book’, Memorandum by Somervell, 6 November 1941.  
Sir Arnold Wilson (1884-1940) was the Conservative MP for Hitchin from 1933 to 1940.  Wilson 
was later described as ‘a valuable member of the S[tatute] L[aw] C[ommittee]; an enthusiast’.  
TNA file AM 4/252.  Letter, Carr to Ram, 30 January 1946. 
869
  S Ball, ‘Parliament and Politics in Britain, 1900-1951’ (1991) 10 Parliamentary History 243, 
259. 
870
  Quoted in R Rose, Politics in England: Persistence and Change (4th edn, London, Faber 
and Faber, 1985) 115. 
871
  Quoted in R Toye, ‘”Perfectly Parliamentary”? The Labour Party and the House of 
Commons in the Inter-war years’ (2014) 25 Twentieth Century British History 1, 29. 
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MPs were harder working, more professional, and in general better informed – 
although there were fewer with specialist expertise.  Individual MPs were less 
disorderly; but the parties were less tolerant because more doctrinaire.  In some 
ways MPs, drawn more widely from every layer of society, were more 
representative; in other ways less so, since the professional politician tended to 
rate his own views above those of his constituents.  ‘For that reason the House 
may be more statesmanlike but also less well fitted to curb the executive’.872  
During the twentieth century it was most unlikely that government backbencher 
MPs would wish to be independent determinants of the form of income tax 
legislation if such a course of action would involve significant conflict with the 
government. 
Governments, therefore, were in a strong position in the House of Commons – 
but that position was not impregnable.  Governments were not entitled to 
assume that MPs would automatically assent to all provisions placed before 
them for approval.  Sir Edward Boyle, who held a succession of posts in the 
Conservative governments between 1951 and 1964, was clear that the need to 
obtain the support – or at least the acquiescence – of their own backbenchers 
acted as a constraint upon government ministers.  This constraint was 
particularly explicit and clear-cut if a vote in the House of Commons was 
involved.  ‘What does matter is the really fearful business of getting your party 
through the division lobby on something they really do not want or do not mean 
to vote for’.873 
The necessity for all financial legislation to be passed by the House of 
Commons accordingly ensured that the government could never completely 
                                            
872
  Fellowes (n 855) 265. 
873
  Sir E Boyle, ‘Who are the Policy Makers?’ (1965) 43 Public Administration 251, 255. 
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ignore the capacity and wish of MPs to determine whether or not such 
legislation was enacted – and the contents and form of that legislation.  The 
ability of MPs to act as a determinant of the form of the income tax legislation, 
however, did not apply equally to the various categories of primary legislation 
distinguished in chapter 1.  It varied from category to category.  MPs had no 
opportunity to influence any Bill relating to the codification of income tax law: for 
no such Bill was ever placed before them.874  No evidence is known that MPs 
ever opposed the system under which there was a Finance Bill, every year, 
making general provision for the national finances.  So far as consolidation 
legislation was concerned, it was Chalmers’s opinion that if Parliament had a 
‘collective conscience’ it would insist on a Consolidation Act when an act of 
general importance had been amended seven times or more.  He went on to 
note, however, that there were many obstacles to consolidation – of which the 
first was that ‘there is no parliamentary push behind it’.875  No evidence is 
known that MPs played any significant role in advancing (or retarding) the two 
consolidations of the income tax legislation that took place in 1918 and 1952. 
(2) The impact of MPs on programme Bills 
In the case of programme Bills relating to income tax, however, MPs could, and 
did, have a greater impact.  The determinants of the form of the income tax 
legislation, it may be recalled, may be ascertained not only by investigating 
legislation that reached the statute book, but also by investigating Bills that were 
proposed but not enacted: for the reasons why those Bills were not enacted are 
                                            
874
  Although Terence Donovan, a newly elected Labour MP, urged, in late 1945, that work on 
the Income Tax Codification Committee’s draft Bill should be resumed.  See Pearce (n 816) 
159. 
875
  Sir MD Chalmers, ‘The English Statute Book’ (1924) 239 Edinburgh Review 332, 340-1.
 
 
The other obstacles that Chalmers mentioned were that skilled drafters might not be available 
and that government departments were seldom keen on consolidation Bills.  (The work was 
hard and thankless; and departments might not be keen to reveal their ‘mysteries’.)  (ibid.) 
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capable of helping to ascertain the determinants of the income tax legislation.  
During the first half of the twentieth century, there were two programme Bills, in 
particular, which show MPs acting as determinants of the form of the income tax 
legislation: the Revenue Bill of 1921 (which was not enacted) and the Income 
Tax Bill of 1945 (which was enacted). 
The underlying objective of the Revenue Bill of 1921 was the implementation of 
recommendations made by the Royal Commission on the Income Tax, which 
had reported in 1920;
876
 and, as part of that objective, the Bill was designed to 
give the Inland Revenue and its officials a greater role, in law as well as in fact, 
in the process of determining liability to income tax.877  On 22 February 1921, 
the Revenue Bill was still due to appear; and, in the House of Commons, 
Austen Chamberlain was asked what he was going to do about it, and whether 
it would be taken on the Floor of the House.  The reply was ‘[n]o.  I shall ask the 
House to send it upstairs.  That is the only hope of passing it.  If the House 
treats it as a contentious measure it will not be proceeded with’.878  He added, a 
little later, that ‘the House must understand that if it is to be treated as a 
contentious measure, I cannot possibly hope to make progress with it this 
Session’.879   Austen Chamberlain’s role in relation to this Bill has been 
considered elsewhere;880 but it is very difficult to approach these remarks on 
any basis other than that they may well have done the government more harm 
than good: for those opposed to the enactment of the Revenue Bill were told 
precisely what they had to do to cause the Bill to be abandoned.  The Revenue 
                                            
876
  Royal Commission on the Income Tax, Report (Cmd 615, 1920).  
877
  For further details on the background to the Revenue Bill, its contents and its fate, see JHN 
Pearce, ‘The Role of Central Government in the Process of determining liability to Income Tax 
in England and Wales: 1842-1970’ in J Tiley (ed) Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 3 
(Oxford, Hart, 2009) 341-3; and Pearce (n 816) 143-6. 
878
  HC Deb 22 February 1921, vol 138, col 760. 
879
  ibid, col 761.   
880
  See chapter 5, section 3(1), above, text around ns 732-41. 
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Bill was eventually presented to Parliament on 6 April 1921881 – and faced 
hostile criticism, being the subject of Resolutions passed by bodies of General 
Commissioners and of a campaign in the Press.882 
In this situation, MPs opposed to the Bill were able to take decisive action.  On 
22 April 1921, the Times, which was opposed to the Bill, reported that Sir 
William Joynson-Hicks proposed to move, on the Second Reading in the 
Commons, that the House ‘declines to give a second reading to a Bill which 
increases the powers of Government officials and reduces the safeguards 
provided by the Constitution for the taxpayers of the country’.883  The Revenue 
Bill was accordingly due to be treated as a contentious measure – a state of 
affairs likely to be fatal for its enactment.  From the government’s point of view, 
it had become clear that the administrative clauses of the Revenue Bill were 
going to cause controversy in the House of Commons ‘so much so, indeed, that 
in view of the congested character of this Session it would have been 
impossible to pass the Bill’.884  The Revenue Bill was accordingly withdrawn.885  
It was never reintroduced. 
There were many reasons why the Revenue Bill of 1921 was not enacted; but it 
was the opposition of MPs that constituted the sufficient condition for the Bill’s 
failure.  It may be asked, therefore, why Joynson-Hicks, and those who thought 
like him, chose to proceed as they did.  Joynson-Hicks may well have wished to 
preserve the local administration of the income tax.  It may be doubted, 
however, whether this was his only motivation: for he was a right-wing 
                                            
881
  HC Deb 6 April 1921, vol 140, cols 279-80. 
882
  For the hostility of General Commissioners and of the press see sections 3 and 4 of this 
chapter respectively. 
883
  Times (London, 22 April 1921) 10, col g. 
884
  HC Deb 25 May 1921, vol 142, col 219.  The speaker was Sir Robert Horne, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, speaking on the second reading of the Finance Bill. 
885
  HC Deb 4 May 1921, vol 141, cols 1045 and 1188. 
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conservative MP fiercely opposed, not only to policies pursued by the Lloyd 
George coalition, but also to the existence of the coalition itself.886  The 
Revenue Bill, which had encountered hostility outside Parliament, presented an 
excellent opportunity to demonstrate that opposition.887  The immediate cause 
of the failure to enact a programme Bill may accordingly be said to be the 
pursuit by some MPs of Rush’s partisan role – but a pursuit undertaken not in 
the interests of the governing Lloyd George coalition, but in the interests of a 
separate Conservative party.  The result was that, in this case, the opposition of 
some MPs was sufficient to defeat a programme Bill put forward by the 
government.888 
The Income Tax Bill of 1945889 revealed a change in approach by MPs so that a 
government Bill, which appeared to be heading towards failure, was enacted.890  
Despite its widely expressed short title, the Bill dealt with capital allowances – 
and derived from the government’s wish to help industry in the period 
                                            
886
  Joynson-Hicks is mentioned as one of ‘a distinct group of right-wingers who pursued the 
government at every turn’.  KO Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition 
Government 1918-1922 (OUP 1979) 240. 
887
  Thus Colonel Wedgwood stated in the House of Commons that ‘[m]y point is that these 
Revenue Bills are generally very carefully thought out by the permanent officials.  They are 
introduced.  Immediately some interested party or parties get hold of some Member of this 
House, such as the hon. Baronet the Member for Twickenham (Sir W. Joynson-Hicks), and he 
uses the opportunity to show the Government of the day the power that he wields both in the 
Press and in the House of Commons, particularly if he feels that he has not been treated 
properly by that Government.  He takes the opportunity of wrecking their Bill’. HC Deb 21 June 
1921, vol 143, cols 1258-9.  A little later Wedgwood said that ‘[i]n this case the clerks to the 
local commissioners were the backbone of the opposition which grew up under the leadership 
of the hon. Member for Twickenham and the “Times” newspaper.  They wrecked the Revenue 
Bill, not in the interests of efficiency and of economy, but solely in their own interests ... ’. (ibid 
col 1259.)  
888
  ‘Any opposition to any measure of any length or complexity has one weapon it can use – the 
consumption of time.  Any government is vulnerable to this.  For although there seems on the 
face of it a lot of time in the Parliamentary session, ... time for the Government’s programme of 
legislation is very limited’.  J Boyd-Carpenter, Way of Life (London, Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980) 
216. 
889
  This Bill was enacted as the Income Tax Act 1945 (8 & 9 Geo 6 c 32). 
890
  See generally the account of the parliamentary proceedings relating to this Act in BEV 
Sabine, British Budgets in Peace and War, 1932-1945 (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1970) 
265-8. 
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immediately following the second world war.891  Details of the government’s 
proposals were given in the budget speech made by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Sir John Anderson) on 25 April 1944;892 and the Income Tax Bill, a 
substantial programme Bill then containing 65 clauses and two Schedules, had 
its second reading on 14 March 1945.893 
The Income Tax Bill was first considered in committee on 27 April 1945.  So far 
as the parliamentary proceedings on this day were concerned, a contrast may 
be drawn between what MPs accomplished and what MPs needed to 
accomplish.  On the one hand, when, after nearly five hours, discussion came 
to an end, MPs had only reached clause 8 – a rate of progress that could be 
considered as both slow and disappointing.894  On the other hand, if the Bill was 
to be enacted, substantial progress with the committee proceedings needed to 
be made: for it was completely foreseeable that the war in Europe would soon 
be over; that the end of the war in Europe might be followed by the ending of 
the wartime coalition and a general election; that the general election would 
necessarily be preceded by a dissolution of Parliament; and that, on the 
dissolution of Parliament, all Bills not ready to receive the Royal Assent would 
fail.  It is therefore not surprising to find that Anderson, in one of his 
contributions during the committee proceedings on this day, submitted that MPs 
‘must really make up their minds whether they are prepared to have this [Bill], 
which everyone admits is good as far as it goes, and be content for the time 
                                            
891
  On the capital allowances background, see generally D de Cogan, ‘Law and Administration 
in Capital Allowances Doctrine: 1878-1950’ in J Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law: 
Volume 6 (Oxford, Hart, 2013). 
892
  HC Deb 25 April 1944, vol 399, cols 671-80. 
893
  HC Deb 14 March 1945, vol 409, cols 257-340.  The details of the contents of the Bill were 
stated at col 305. 
894
  HC Deb 27 April 1945, vol 410, cols 1113-1198. 
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being to stop there’ – or whether they were going to jeopardise the whole Bill by 
pressing for what he considered to be unjustifiable extensions.895 
Further committee proceedings took place on 15 May 1945.  By this date the 
war in Europe was over; and it had become highly probable that there would be 
an early general election – necessarily preceded by a dissolution of Parliament.  
On this occasion, during proceedings occupying slightly less than seven hours, 
the House of Commons worked its way through the remainder of the Bill from 
clauses 8 to 65, and then went on to consider seven new clauses and three 
Schedules.896  The way was accordingly open for proceedings in the Commons 
to be completed on 4 June 1945;897 and for the Bill to receive the Royal Assent 
before Parliament was dissolved.898  During the brief proceedings on third 
reading, Anderson thanked MPs in all parts of the House for the manner in 
which they had facilitated the passage of the Bill; and Pethick-Lawrence, a 
Labour MP who was not part of the government, was ‘very glad that in the 
massacre of the innocents this ewe lamb has escaped the general slaughter’.899 
The successful enactment of the Income Tax Act 1945 was partly dependent on 
good fortune – in that the Bill (which was not of crucial importance for the 
government) was introduced sufficiently far in advance of the ending of the 
hostilities in Europe to enable it to be enacted before Parliament was dissolved.  
The successful enactment of that legislation, however, was also partly 
dependent on the attitude taken by those MPs who were active in considering 
the Bill in committee.  Those MPs, faced with a choice between passing a Bill 
with only a limited number of amendments (even though some MPs certainly 
                                            
895
  HC Deb 27 April 1945, vol 410, col 1181. 
896
  HC Deb 15 May 1945, vol 410, cols 2311-2426. 
897
  HC Deb 4 June 1945, vol 411, cols 586-600. 
898
  The Income Tax Act 1945 (8 & 9 Geo 6 c 32) received the Royal Assent on 15 June 1945. 
899
  HC Deb 4 June 1945, vol 411, cols 600 and 599 respectively. 
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considered the Bill to be imperfect), or losing the Bill entirely because 
proceedings in committee had become unduly protracted, chose to take the 
former course.  The result was that the Income Tax Act 1945 reached the 
statute book. 
The evidence demonstrates, therefore, that, despite their theoretical powers, 
MPs were a determinant of the form of the income tax legislation whose role 
was marginal only.  It was unlikely that MPs would wish – or be able – to 
determine that form independently of the government.  On the other hand, it 
was not the case that MPs had no ability to determine that form.  Governments 
needed the support (or acquiescence) of their backbenchers – so MPs could 
not be taken entirely for granted.  MPs were best placed to exert their power in 
the case of programme Bills: and their opposition to, or support for, particular 
Bills of this type could here make the crucial difference between a Bill that went 
through all its parliamentary stages in the time that the government could allot 
to that Bill, and one that did not.  The difference was that between a Bill that 
was enacted and one that failed – and, accordingly, upon the corpus of the 
income tax legislation and the form in which that corpus was expressed. 
3. Interest groups 
The ascertainment of the role played by interest groups is an obvious candidate 
when investigating the role played by determinants forming part of Amery’s 
‘nation’ in determining the form of the income tax legislation.  The umbrella 
expression ‘interest groups’ nevertheless covers groups of many different types; 
and two main categories have been distinguished: ‘promotional’ groups, existing 
almost exclusively to further a particular policy; and ‘spokesman’ groups, with 
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the function of defending the interests of a section of the community.900  
According to Rose, government looked to interest groups to provide information, 
advice, support for decisions made and co-operation in administering the law.901  
In the case of income tax, however, interest groups could not assert an 
unquestioned supremacy in a particular area of expertise (as, for example, the 
medical profession could in its dealings with the Ministry of Health).  The Inland 
Revenue was well able to provide information and advice – and the department 
administered the tax.  These considerations obviously worked against the ability 
of interest groups to determine the form of the income tax legislation. 
Promotional groups that interested themselves in income tax matters during the 
first half of the twentieth century were few.  One of the witnesses who gave 
evidence to the 1919 Royal Commission was GO Parsons, the Secretary to the 
Income Tax Reform League.902  Parsons emphasised, however, that he was not 
giving evidence on behalf of the League;903 and, early in 1922, the League’s 
executive committee decided to dissolve it.904 
Another promotional group, with a higher profile, was the Income Taxpayers’ 
Society, set up in 1921, in the wake of the withdrawal of the Revenue Bill.  The 
‘sole object’ of the society was stated to be ‘the protection of the liberties and 
                                            
900
  SA Walkland, The Legislative Process in Great Britain (London, George Allen and Unwin, 
1968) 36. 
901
  ‘Government needs four things from pressure groups.  Information is the first of its needs.  
Groups accumulate from their members much information that does not otherwise come to 
Whitehall, and which is relevant in administering and reviewing policies.  Second, Whitehall 
wants advice, so that it can know what pressure groups think ought to be done and how they 
would probably react to various proposals that a department is considering.  Third, after a 
decision is made a department wants pressure groups to support what the government has 
decided.  Finally, when a policy has been embodied in an Act of Parliament, government looks 
to pressure groups to co-operate in administering the law’. Rose (n 870) 260-1. 
902
  Royal Commission on the Income Tax, Minutes of Evidence (London, HMSO, 1919-20) 
paras 1554-1863.  Parsons was described as an ‘Incorporated Accountant and Chartered 
Secretary’.  (ibid.) 
903
  ibid, para 1554.  
904
  Times (London, 23 February 1922) 18 col d.   
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rights of the taxpaying public’ – an object, in the society’s view, which involved 
the maintenance of the system of the local administration of income tax.905  In 
these circumstances, it is not surprising to find links between the society and 
those involved in the local administration of income tax.  Randle Holme, a 
solicitor whose firm went on to act for the society, recorded that he was 
consulted on the society’s formation by Copley Hewitt, the Clerk to the City of 
London Commissioners.906   
The Income Taxpayers’ Society could point to achievements.907  For example, 
in 1922, it was an initiative, taken by the society, which stood behind the setting 
up of a committee to consider the simplification of income tax forms.908  Later, in 
1927, Sir Henry Buckingham MP (the society’s chairman) was one of two 
individuals to whom the essence of Churchill’s simplification scheme was 
explained in advance ‘by way of insurance against the possibility of a mud-
slinging campaign’.909  These achievements, however, were of marginal 
significance only.  In 1922, the society’s original proposal for a committee to 
consider the simplification of income tax forms had been rejected by Horne, the 
                                            
905
  Times (London, 28 July 1921) 11 col d.  Further information about the society is given in 
Times (London, 9 January 1921) 11 col e.   
906
  R Holme, Some Things I have done (Hepburn & Sons Ltd, 1949) 101.  This volume of 
autobiography, which was privately printed when the author was in his 80s, contains factual 
inaccuracies; but no reason to question the statement in the text is known.  At a dinner given by 
the Income Taxpayers’ Society during July 1926, both Randle Holme and Copley Hewitt are 
listed as being among the guests.  (Times (London, 23 July 1926) 11 col c.)  (Prior to 1918, 
Randle Holme had produced his own version of a consolidated Income Tax Bill, which he 
placed at the disposal of Cox, the Solicitor of Inland Revenue.  He also attended the meetings 
of the Joint Committee which considered the Bill enacted as the Income Tax Act 1918 (8 & 9 
Geo 5 c 40).) 
907
  In addition to the matters discussed in the text, in 1926, the society claimed to have secured 
the adoption of four amendments to the Finance Bill.  (Times (London, 23 July 1926) 11 col c).  
No reason is known for believing that these amendments were of major significance. 
908
  The initiative took the form of a letter to the Press which was published in the Times 
((London, 14 September 1922) 6 col b).  In a letter to Horne dated 21 September 1922 (see 
TNA file IR 40/2705) Lord Decies, the director of the society, stated that the letter was published 
‘in the London Press’ on that day.  The letter was also published on that same day in the 
Yorkshire Post (see TNA file IR 75/65, fo 207).  
909
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 222-37.  Submission, Hopkins to Churchill, 27 October 1926.  The 
quotation is from para 19 (fo 234).  (The other individual was Sir Henry Seymour King (see text 
around n 926 below).) 
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Chancellor of the Exchequer.910  It was only after the accession to power of 
Lloyd George’s political opponents, that a later Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(Baldwin) reversed his predecessor’s decision.  The committee’s terms of 
reference were narrowly drawn;911 and the committee, when it reported, was 
‘unable to recommend any far-reaching or fundamental recasting of the 
forms’.912  In 1927, similarly, it may be said that the conciliation of the society 
merely made it somewhat easier for the government to enact proposals which, 
with its large parliamentary majority, it was unquestionably in a position to carry.  
Churchill’s comment, when asking Hopkins, the Chairman of the Board of Inland 
Revenue, to explain the government’s proposals to Buckingham, was that ‘[i]t 
will not be necessary to take him too seriously’.913  The Income Taxpayers’ 
Society then appears to have faded away.  In 1938, a casual allusion in a 
                                            
910
  TNA file IR 40/2705.  Letter, Horne to Decies, 16 October 1922. 
911
  Departmental Committee on the Simplification of Income Tax and Super-tax forms, Report 
(Cmd 2019, 1924).  The terms of reference of the Committee were ‘[t]o consider any 
simplifications which may be practicable under existing law in the return forms, claim forms, and 
notices of assessment issued in connection with income tax and super-tax; and to make 
recommendations in regard thereto’.  (ibid 1.) 
912
  ibid 4, para 6. 
913
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 342-3.  Memorandum, Hopkins to Churchill, 16 February 1927, with 
Churchill’s manuscript endorsement, 12 March 1927.  It was certainly the case that Buckingham 
did not impede the enactment of the scheme for the simplification of income tax.  The evidence 
is that, when the relevant clauses were discussed in committee, Buckingham was present but 
remained silent; and that, when those clauses were later discussed on Report, Buckingham was 
absent.  See HC Deb 30 June 1927, vol 208, cols 750-7 for the proceedings in Committee on 
the simplification scheme enacted in Finance Act 1927, pt 3; and, for the proceedings at Report 
Stage, see HC Deb 19 July 1927, vol 209, cols 359-74.  During the proceedings at Report 
Stage, Churchill stated that Buckingham had been present during the relevant part of the 
proceedings in committee.  ‘The House was so impressed with his presence and his silence that 
they proceeded rapidly to accord this Clause the measure of support which, I am certain, on full 
consideration it will be found thoroughly to deserve’.  (HC Deb 19 July 1927, vol 209, col 364.)  
On 30 June 1927, Buckingham had certainly been present earlier in the evening.  He had made 
a short speech shortly before these clauses began to be discussed.  See HC Deb 30 June 
1927, vol 208, col 744.  When, at the Report Stage, a division was forced on the proposed 
scheme, the government, with its large parliamentary majority, won easily – by 223 votes to 98.  
(HC Deb 19 July 1927, vol 209, cols 371-4.)  Buckingham’s name does not appear in the 
division list. 
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memorandum by Simon, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, showed him 
uncertain whether ‘the Income Tax Society’ (sic) still existed.914 
Of the spokesman groups, some had a direct interest in the administration of 
income tax: and, in the case of these particular groups, the introduction of the 
Revenue Bill of 1921 (which proposed to increase the powers of central 
government and to diminish those of local government in income tax 
administration) occasioned activity.  On the side of central government, and in 
favour of the enactment of the Bill, the Association of His Majesty’s Inspectors 
of Taxes had meetings with MPs and the Press; and claimed to have inspired 
action taken by others.915 
The interests of the local administration of income tax were defended by a 
number of different spokesman groups.  One of these was the National 
Association of Assessors and Collectors of Government Taxes, which gave 
evidence to the 1919 Royal Commission on the Income Tax.916  The Royal 
Commission, in its report, had expressed the opinion that the less important 
administrative matters relating to income tax (the machinery for assessment 
and collection of income tax for example) might be dealt with in a less 
particularised manner in a new Act rewriting the income tax legislation ‘leaving 
the details to be covered by statutory regulations’.917  The National Association 
recorded that it viewed this opinion ‘with considerable apprehension and 
                                            
914
  ‘If the Income Tax Society still exists, and I think it does, the [proposed Codification] Bill 
would provide the Society with many opportunities for displaying its usefulness’.  TNA file T 
172/1860.  Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Simon), 18 January 1938. 
915
  TNA file IR 40/2622.  Letter, Best to Hopkins, 9 May 1921.  The Association believed that its 
members had done ‘a great deal of useful work and will be bitterly disappointed’ at the 
withdrawal of the Bill.  The Association was also troubled that, following the withdrawal of the 
Bill, its members would ‘not work again for the Bill with anything like the same enthusiasm after 
this fiasco’. (ibid.) 
916
  For the evidence given by the Association, see Royal Commission on the Income Tax, 
Minutes of Evidence (n 902) paras 22,134-22,399.  
917
  Royal Commission on the Income Tax, Report (Cmd 615, 1920) 89, para 401. 
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uneasiness’ and sought guarantees that the claims of Assessors and Collectors 
would be secured before the introduction of legislation or the drafting of 
regulations.918  This is the only occasion known when an interest group put 
forward a view on a particular matter relevant for the form of income tax 
legislation.  No evidence is known that the Inland Revenue gave this view any 
attention; but, after the Revenue Bill of 1921 had been withdrawn, the point 
raised by the Association was not a live one. 
Another group that gave evidence to the 1919 Royal Commission was the 
National Association of Clerks to Commissioners, in the person of Copley 
Hewitt, the Clerk to the City of London Commissioners.919  Not everyone was 
impressed by this evidence.  One MP later stated his view that Copley Hewitt 
had been totally demolished in cross-examination by two members of the Royal 
Commission.920  On the other hand, it may be taken that it was Copley Hewitt 
who organised and co-ordinated the opposition to the Revenue Bill of 1921.  
One MP spoke of the activities of ‘one rather able gentleman in the City of 
London’;921 and this may be taken as a reference to Copley Hewitt.922  
Resolutions against the Bill were passed by bodies of General 
Commissioners;923 and hostility to the Bill was also displayed in the press.924  It 
                                            
918
  TNA file IR 63/96, fos 10-13.  ‘Note to the Board by the National Association of Assessors 
and Collectors on the report of the Royal Commission on the Income Tax’. 
919
  For this evidence, see Royal Commission on the Income Tax, Minutes of Evidence (n 902) 
paras 21,544-22,133. 
920
  Mr G Benson, after referring to the cross-examination of Copley Hewitt by Sir Josiah Stamp 
and Sir William McClintock, two members of the Royal Commission, went on to state that ‘[i]t 
was the most pitiful and painful exhibition I have ever read.  They treated Mr. Hewitt like a small 
boy treats a fly.  They pulled off his limbs one after the other until only the bleeding corpse was 
left.  I have never seen a more terrible cross-examination in my life’.  HC Deb 15 August 1940, 
vol 364, col 1016. 
921
  HC Deb 25 May 1921, vol 142, col 181. 
922
  Copley Hewitt was later mentioned by name by James Callaghan (who had earlier worked 
for the Inland Revenue) in proceedings in the House of Commons in 1946, when the office of 
assessor of taxes was abolished.  See HC Deb 24 June 1946, vol 424, col 865.   
923
  Evidence of hostility from General Commissioners may be found in TNA file IR 40/2622 and 
TNA file IR 74/36. 
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was stated in the House of Commons that an ‘agitation’ in the newspapers had 
been carried out ‘entirely at the instigation’ of the ‘rather able’ gentleman.925  
The Revenue Bill of 1921 was then withdrawn.  Those involved with the local 
administration of income tax, by playing a significant role in the events leading 
to the withdrawal of the Revenue Bill, had made a contribution (though of a 
negative nature) to the income tax legislation in existence.  It may be 
considered that the role taken by the City of London General Commissioners in 
1921 was implicitly recognised by Hopkins’s suggestion that the other individual 
to whom the essence of Churchill’s 1927 simplification scheme could be 
explained in advance should be Sir Henry Seymour King, the Chairman of the 
Commissioners of Income Tax (Schedule D) for the City of London – a 
suggestion that was carried out.926  No evidence is known, however, that the 
City of London Commissioners took any significant action in relation to the 
successful enactment of Churchill’s simplification scheme; and, after the second 
world war, features of the income tax administration which had been defended 
successfully in 1921 became the subject of change.927 
The spokesman groups which had no direct interest in the administration of 
income tax included the two pre-eminent spokesman groups: the Trades Union 
Congress (the TUC) and the Federation of British Industries (the FBI).  These 
spokesman groups might indeed be interested, at a very general level, in 
                                                                                                                              
924
  There is a collection of press cuttings relating to the Bill in TNA file IR 74/36.  For the role of 
the Press in 1921, see below in section 4 of this chapter. 
925
  HC Deb 25 May 1921, vol 142, col 181. 
926
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 222-37, at para 19 (fo 234).  Submission, Hopkins to Churchill, 27 
October 1926. 
927
  In 1946, the office of assessor was abolished by section 62 of the Finance Act 1946 (9 & 10 
Geo 6 c 64); and, in 1964, the Income Tax Management Act 1964 gave the Inland Revenue full 
legal control over the process of making assessments to income tax. 
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specific aspects of the income tax legislation.928  These groups might also have 
the opportunity to influence the content of new income tax legislation at a very 
specific level.929  The form of the income tax legislation, however, was a matter 
of indifference to them; and no evidence is known that these groups ever 
interested themselves in this topic.930 
The evidence discloses, therefore, that, during the first half of the twentieth 
century, interest groups did not determine the form of the income tax legislation 
to any major extent.  The withdrawal of the Revenue Bill in 1921 was the one 
and only occasion when interest groups may be observed to have participated 
to a major extent in a significant decision with implications for the form of the 
income tax legislation.  Even on this occasion, however, the argument for the 
importance of interest groups cannot be pressed too hard or too far: for the 
opposition of interest groups was only one element, among a number of 
elements, leading to the withdrawal of the Bill. 
4. The press 
The role played by the press also demands attention for the purposes of this 
chapter.  During the first half of the twentieth century, however, the press 
pursued a number of different objectives and was subject to constraints.  The 
                                            
928
  For example, during the second world war, the FBI were in favour of a more generous 
treatment of depreciation for income tax purposes (see M Daunton, Just Taxes: The Politics of 
Taxation in Britain, 1914-1979 (CUP 2002) 206); and effect was given to this wish in the Income 
Tax Act 1945 (8 & 9 Geo 6 c 32).  During that same period, the TUC were keen that a scheme 
for the deduction of income tax from current earnings should be developed.  (See TNA file T 
171/366, item 8.  Letter, Citrine to Wood, 29 July 1943.) 
929
  ‘The most successful consultation, from the point of view of pressure groups, is that which 
occurs at the fairly mundane level of administrative detail, or in the preparation of minor 
Departmental legislation, usually of an amending type’.  Walkland (n 900) 38.  In an income tax 
context, in the case of the new arrangements relating to deductions from earnings introduced by 
the Finance (No 2) Act 1940 (3 & 4 Geo 6 c 48), the FBI, the British Employers’ Confederation 
and the TUC were all consulted – and all three had detailed points that they wished to make.  
(See TNA file IR 40/7454.) 
930
  In the early 1950s, representatives from both the FBI and the TUC came to see the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Butler) before Budgets; but this was a formality and the content 
had been all but finalised before their visits.  A Seldon, Churchill’s Indian Summer: The 
Conservative Government, 1951-55 (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1981) 166. 
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overall result, so far as the form of the income tax legislation was concerned, 
was that it was only exceedingly rarely that the press made a significant 
contribution towards determining that form.  Bearing in mind, however, that the 
determinants of the forms of the income tax legislation may be ascertained not 
only by investigating statutes that were enacted, but also by investigating Bills 
that were proposed for enactment but which were not enacted, the press (like 
interest groups) nevertheless made a significant contribution to determining the 
form of the income tax legislation when it helped to prevent the enactment of 
the Revenue Bill of 1921. 
There were tensions between the various different objectives which the press 
pursued.  One objective was to report the news.  The view of Lord Beaverbrook, 
as expressed in a letter to the editor of the Daily Herald, was that ‘[w]hoever 
reads the newspaper must be convinced that its first object is to tell him the 
news of the day and that its other aims must be subordinate to this’.931  Another 
objective was to mould public opinion – very possibly in support of one 
particular political party.  The view of Lord Beaverbrook, the proprietor of the 
Daily Express, was that ‘I ran the paper purely for the purpose of making 
propaganda’.932  Another objective, capable of being stated in elevated terms, 
was that the press should play what it considered to be its proper role in the 
United Kingdom polity.  Williams, in a work published in 1946,933 referred to a 
leading article that had appeared in the Times in February 1852.  On that 
occasion, the Times had denied that the press was bound by the same duties 
                                            
931
  AJP Taylor, Beaverbrook (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1972) 250. 
932
  Quoted in Rose (n 870) 230.  Beaverbrook also believed that ‘I do not think a paper is any 
good for propaganda unless you run it as a commercial success’.  (ibid.) 
933
  F Williams, Press, Parliament and People (London, Heinemann, 1946).  The account of the 
leader appearing in the Times on 6 February 1852 has been taken from this work at 138-9.  The 
editor of the Times in 1852 was JT Delane. 
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as government ministers.  ‘The purpose and duties of the two powers are 
constantly separate, generally independent, sometimes diametrically opposite’.  
The first duty of the press was to obtain the earliest and most correct 
intelligence of the events of the time, and instantly, by disclosing them, to make 
them the common property of the nation.  ‘The Press lives by disclosures; 
whatever passes into its keeping becomes a part of the knowledge and the 
history of our times’.  In terms of Amery’s view of the constitution as a parley 
between ‘government’ and ‘nation’, the press’s ideal view of itself was as a force 
exercising power and influence on behalf of the ‘nation’.  A final objective 
pursued by the press was more mundane.  A newspaper needed to be 
commercially viable. 
This final objective leads to the constraints to which the press was subject: for a 
contrast has been drawn between ‘the solid late-Victorian press and the 
twentieth century popular press.  The one was highly political and linked 
financially to the party system; the other was broader in its range and based in 
the market economy’.934  ‘You left journalism a profession; we have made it a 
branch of commerce’, Kennedy Jones, Northcliffe’s collaborator in the founding 
of the Daily Mail, said to John Morley.935  Before Northcliffe’s journalistic 
revolution, it has been stated, ‘only one in person in six read a daily paper 
regularly; today [1980] only one person in six does not’.936 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, newspapers became 
large corporations needing to make profits on the large capital sums invested in 
                                            
934
 C  Seymore-Ure, ‘The Press and the Party System between the Wars’ in G Peele and C 
Cook (eds), The Politics of Reappraisal 1918-1939 (London, Macmillan, 1975) 232. 
935
  Quoted in Williams (n 933) 166. 
936
  H Cudlipp, The Prerogative of the Harlot: Press Barons & Power (London, Bodley Head, 
1980) 82. 
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them – and interested primarily in commercial success.937  One consequence of 
this development was that the subsidised press declined.938  Another 
consequence was that the press had to seek its commercial stability from the 
support of its readers.939  A newspaper, therefore, had to derive revenue 
sufficient to cover the very large costs involved in its production; and that 
revenue had to be derived through sales – either directly or indirectly.  That 
revenue, furthermore, had to be derived indirectly: for newspapers were 
‘dumped products’ – in that the actual price to the purchaser was substantially 
less than the cost of production.  The difference between net receipts from 
sales and production costs was met by revenue from the sale of advertising 
space.  Newspapers depended upon advertisements for a crucial part of their 
revenue;940 and a large advertising revenue could be secured in one of two 
ways.  It could be obtained by circulating to several million individuals whose 
aggregate purchasing power was large, even though a particular individual’s 
                                            
937
  Williams (n 933) 146. 
938
  At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Daily News, which supported the Liberal Party, 
was subsidised by the Cadbury family.  See SE Koss, Fleet Street Radical: A.G. Gardiner and 
the Daily News (London, Allen Lane, 1973) 41 and 66-7.  Lord Riddell noted in 1908 that Sir 
George Newnes’s ownership of the Westminster Gazette had involved him in substantial losses.  
Riddell considered that the Westminster Gazette, which supported the Liberal party, was most 
influential and that its leading articles ‘are religiously read by thinking people of all parties ... .  
The Westminster’s trouble is that the said thinking people don’t appeal to the advertiser, so that 
the revenue from advertising is inadequate’.  (Lord Riddell, More Pages from my Diary (London, 
Country Life, 1934) 14.)  During the inter-war period, the Daily News and the Westminster 
Gazette both ceased to have an independent existence.  Williams commented that with the very 
substantial expenditure involved ‘the amount of money that can be lost very rapidly in running a 
commercially unsuccessful paper whose revenue lags behind its costs is so huge that the 
subsidized newspaper, whether it obtains its subsidy from one or two rich sponsors or from a 
political organization, has ceased to be a practical proposition’.  (Williams (n 933) 147.)  
Williams also commented that ‘[i]ndividual control of national newspapers is ... still possible – 
although only to very rich men.  But even a rich man to-day cannot, in Britain, afford to run a 
commercially unsuccessful paper, as many did in the past, for the sake of the prestige and 
power accruing to him as a consequence or because he is deeply committed to particular 
principles for which he wishes to find a public platform’.  (ibid.) 
939
  The account given of the economic imperatives of the press and of the consequences of 
those imperatives follows that given by Williams (n 933) 146-50. 
940
  Northcliffe commented that ‘[i]t is not pleasant to think that ... newspapers are now for the 
first time in their history entirely subordinate to advertisers.  I see no way out of this impasse, 
other than by maintaining a great daily net sale and thus keeping the whip hand of the 
advertiser’.  Cudlipp (n 936) 82. 
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purchasing power was small.  Advertising revenue could also be secured by a 
‘quality’ circulation among the comparatively wealthy, who had means that 
made them worthy of the advertiser’s attention, both individually and in the 
aggregate.  Newspapers in the United Kingdom accordingly fell into two types.  
There were large circulation ‘popular’ newspapers of which, in the middle of the 
twentieth century, the Daily Express was the most striking example; and there 
was the small circulation ‘quality’ newspaper of which the Times was the pre-
eminent example. 
So far as ‘popular’ newspapers were concerned, the need to obtain a mass 
circulation was of crucial importance.  ‘What matters is the counting of heads 
not what is inside the heads’.941  Those managing a newspaper of this type took 
the view that its contents should deal with action and should be easy to read.942  
This view had consequences. 
Political, social, and economic analysis, the attempt to discover 
causes, to explain why men and women and nations acted in the 
way they did was not popular.  It was difficult reading.  It could not 
be put into half a column.  It required application and even 
concentration and these were things no popular paper felt it had a 
right to expect of its readers.  As a consequence the man or 
woman who depended for his understanding of the world upon his 
penny morning paper was likely to be as innocent of what was 
really happening in it as a child.943 
Those managing ‘popular’ newspapers also took the view that many things 
were more interesting to their readers than parliamentary debates and the 
                                            
941
  Williams (n 933) 150. 
942
  ibid 208.  So far as the manner in which the news should be presented, Williams considered 
that immediately before the second world war ‘[t]hose most successful in managing popular 
newspapers ... went on the assumption that the average reader wanted news presented in a 
bright, superficial and dramatic manner, written snappily in short sentences and brief 
paragraphs, no one story requiring more than a minute or so to read, and the whole thing being 
attractively dressed with catchy headlines and plenty of pictures’. (ibid 159.) 
943
  ibid 208-9. 
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United Kingdom’s politics.944  Newspapers, Williams believed, were ‘chiefly 
interested in politics when they produce sensations and crises.  A row will get 
headlines – a detailed discussion of an important new piece of administration is 
hardly likely to do so’.945  It followed that a ‘popular’ newspaper was most 
unlikely to take any interest in the form of income tax legislation. 
In the case of ‘quality’ newspapers, however, the position was different.  Its 
constituency was an educated public, which was better trained in giving 
sustained attention to matters of public importance.  A newspaper of this type 
could devote most of its space to serious reporting and to the consideration of 
serious events.  Indeed, it could be said that it was bound to do so: for its 
readers bought the newspaper primarily to be informed rather than 
entertained.946  A newspaper of this type, therefore, was likely to take a serious 
interest in public affairs.  A possible consequence – but not a necessary 
consequence – was that this interest would include income tax and the forms of 
its legislation. 
There was, however, a further constraint upon the press in addition to the 
economic imperatives with which it had to comply: for there were limitations on 
what the press could accomplish if it conducted a campaign.  ‘The assumption 
that newspapers form and control public opinion cannot be substantiated’, 
Cudlipp wrote in a book published in 1953; ‘newspapers sell as much in spite of 
their policies as because of them’.947  He considered that a press campaign 
                                            
944
  ibid 116. 
945
  ibid.  Macmillan considered the work of the press to be controversial, exaggerated and 
distorted – and often found it distasteful.  H Evans, Downing Street Diary: The Macmillan Years 
1957-63 (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1981) 63. 
946
  ibid 150. 
947
  H Cudlipp, Publish and be Damned! (London, Andrew Dakers, 1953) 225.  The proposition 
that the press had little influence over the political opinions held by the electorate is supported 
by the evidence.  The Labour party gained ground in 1929 and won an absolute majority of 
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would fail ‘[h]owever brilliantly or subtly it may be conducted’, if, for example, it 
dealt with ‘an aspect of life beyond the readers’ daily experience or interest’.  It 
followed that a press campaign explicitly directed to the subject of the form of 
the income tax legislation would not make progress – and no such campaign 
was ever mounted. 
A press campaign was nevertheless capable of flourishing if certain conditions 
were met.  Cudlipp considered that the press campaign should be in tune with 
public opinion which already existed; and should advocate a solution to a 
problem or scandal which was angering the average reader.  If these conditions 
were met, a newspaper might ‘successfully accelerate but never reverse the 
popular attitude which commonsense has commended to the public’.948  In the 
opinion of another writer the press ‘may be an inconsistent weapon, but, with its 
cutting edge towards the enemy, it can be very effective in a short sharp 
conflict’.949 
The press participated vigorously in the ‘short sharp conflict’ against the 
enactment of the Revenue Bill of 1921 – and participated on the victorious side.  
There was accordingly an impact on the form of the income tax legislation: for a 
programme Bill relating to income tax was not enacted.  Headlines such as 
‘Hunting the Taxpayer: Safeguards to be Withdrawn’, and ‘A Principle at Stake’ 
                                                                                                                              
seats in the House of Commons in 1945; but, in the general elections held in those years, 
newspaper support was given overwhelmingly to the Conservative party.  Detailed studies of 
the 1950 and 1951 general elections used identical words when describing the part played by 
the press.  Its ‘treatment ... was overwhelmingly partisan, relatively demure, and, so far as can 
be judged, politically ineffective’.  (Quoted in JP Mackintosh, The British Cabinet (London, 
Stevens, 1962) 507.) 
948
  ibid.  ‘The press was not a creative element in its own right, but a medium of expression for 
opinion formed elsewhere’.  S Ball, Baldwin and the Conservative Party: The Crisis of 1929-
1931 (New Haven [Connecticut] and London, Yale UP, 1988) 209. 
949
  PG Cambray, The Game of Politics: A Study of the Principles of British Political Strategy 
(London, John Murray, 1932) 168.  Cambray then added that ‘[i]n the long fight it is less 
valuable since its whole policy is founded upon “sensation” which makes continuous ... support 
impossible’.  (ibid.) 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
289 
 
were two of those that appeared.950  It is clear, however, that the campaign 
against the enactment of the Revenue Bill took place in circumstances in which 
the press was well placed to make an effective contribution.  Significant 
opposition to the Bill was already in existence from MPs and those concerned 
with the local administration of income tax; and the press could advocate a 
simple solution – the Bill’s withdrawal.  The campaign against the Bill was also 
easy to align with another objective being pursued by some sections of the 
press at that time: for Northcliffe, in his final years, pursued a vendetta against 
Lloyd George.951  A Bill introduced by Lloyd George’s government, which had 
aroused obvious hostility, and which was going to be opposed in the House of 
Commons by the government’s own backbenchers presented an obvious 
opportunity.  The Times (a ‘quality’ paper owned by Northcliffe) invited 
‘chambers of commerce or other representative bodies of citizens’ to send their 
criticisms to MPs hostile to the Bill ‘in order that the full weight of public criticism 
may be brought to bear’.952  The press could also claim the high ground on the 
basis that it was the guardian of the constitution.  The Daily Mail (a ‘popular’ 
paper owned by Northcliffe) published an article with the headlines ‘Squeezing 
you dry’ and ‘Taxpayers at mercy of officialdom’.953  The article included a 
statement made by a ‘prominent official’954 that the Bill ‘hands over to the 
control of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue the entire administration of 
income tax, and places the poor taxpayer entirely at their mercy with no body to 
                                            
950
  C Stebbings, The Victorian Taxpayer and the Law: A Study in Constitutional Conflict (CUP 
2009) 192. 
951
  Cudlipp (n 936) 134.  Northcliffe died in 1922, the year in which Lloyd George ceased to be 
Prime Minister. 
952
  Times (London, 22 April 1921) 10 col g. 
953
  Daily Mail (London, 20 April 1921) (quoted from a cutting in TNA file IR 74/36). 
954
  The ‘prominent official’ is not identified in the article; but it is possible to conjecture that it 
may have been Copley Hewitt or someone else connected with the City of London General 
Commissioners. 
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whom appeal could be made’.  (This statement was untrue.)955  The article 
ended with the official’s exhortation that every taxpayer ‘in his own interests 
should fight the Bill through his member of Parliament, write to him urging him 
to oppose it, and not give up the fight till the Bill ... has been dropped’.  The 
short press campaign concluded with the government’s withdrawal of the 
Revenue Bill.  To a considerable extent, however, this result may be said to be 
a by-product of a press campaign undertaken to achieve different objectives. 
Against the background of events such as these, it is not surprising to find that 
government treated the press with respect.  One element in government’s 
respect could be related to public opinion, on which depended the all-important 
matter of electoral success.  Information about public opinion was far from 
perfect; and government had less trustworthy information on this subject than at 
the end of the twentieth century.   Statements of opinion in the press might not 
reflect public opinion: but, on the other hand, they might – and, if they did, those 
statements needed to be taken seriously.956  Constant reiteration in the press 
might lead the government to believe that the opinion being voiced really was 
public opinion.957  Another element in government’s respect was demonstrated 
by the events of 1921.  The press’s vigorous opposition to the government 
                                            
955
  It was always envisaged that the taxpayer would have a right of appeal to the General or 
Special Commissioners. 
956
  Williams wrote of newspapers that ‘although their long-term influence in serious affairs is 
small and their effect on their readers’ political thinking negligible, they often exert a good deal 
of influence on Ministers and Government Departments.  Most Cabinet ministers are indeed 
almost excessively sensitive to newspaper comment.  During the war it was a constant source 
of wonderment, not merely to me but to many newspaper friends of mine who were temporarily 
holding high office in the Civil Service, to find the amount of attention paid by ministers and 
Heads of Departments to newspaper stories which our experience told us had no particular 
significance as an indication of general public feeling, but were merely the result of a not very 
bright idea by a harassed news-editor trying to keep a junior reporter busy.  Yet such stories 
would set Ministers in a fret’.  (Williams (n 933) 165.)  Williams went on to comment that ‘[t]hat is 
all to the good.  It is better that ministers should trouble themselves too much about newspaper 
criticism than too little.  Anything that keeps great Government Departments constantly aware 
that they are the servants of the public and are liable to a public reprimand if they do not do their 
work properly is an advantage’.  (ibid.) 
957
  I Gilmour, The Body Politic (London, Hutchinson, 1969) 408.  
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
291 
 
undoubtedly played a significant role in the withdrawal of the Revenue Bill.  In 
both world wars, Churchill’s approach to dealing with an obstreperous press 
was ‘square or squash’.958 
In 1927, this approach may be observed in operation.  Shortly before the 
Budget speech, the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue (Hopkins) 
suggested that Churchill should approach Beaverbrook and Rothermere about 
one aspect of the Budget proposals in order to prevent a press campaign of the 
type that had been seen in 1921.
959
  Such a campaign was also capable of 
destroying Churchill’s simplification scheme – a scheme which had the setting 
up of the Income Tax Codification Committee as one of its components.  It is 
not known whether Beaverbrook was approached, but Rothermere was: for, on 
5 May 1927, a letter from Ward Price,960 on Daily Mail headed notepaper, 
marked ‘Confidential’, and addressed to ‘The Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, P.C., 
C.H., etc., etc., etc.,’ stated that 
I spoke to Lord Rothermere last evening on the matter which you 
desired me to mention to him. 
His reply was that The Daily Mail has no wish to show itself 
querulous or captious.  There are so many matters of great 
importance to which The Daily Mail has to give its attention that, if 
you should decide to introduce the change of which you spoke, 
you may rely upon it that it would be made without comment on 
our part. 
I return herewith the document which you entrusted to me. 
I have the honour to be, 
With much respect, 
Yours obediently 
                                            
958
  Cudlipp (n 936) 117.  See also Taylor (n 931) 562. 
959
  TNA file T 171/255, fos 385-7.  Letter, Hopkins to Churchill, 6 April 1927. 
960
  Cudlipp described Ward Price as ‘a notably articulate journalist who was his [Rothermere’s] 
mouthpiece and frequently his “ghost” writer’.  (Cudlipp (n 936) 151.) 
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Ward Price961 
Despite the hubristic language, those in government who saw this letter were 
unlikely to have been totally dissatisfied.  Lord Rothermere had been squared; 
and the simplification scheme, announced in Churchill’s budget speech, was 
enacted without any difficulties from the press. 
The evidence discloses, therefore, that the press was a determinant of the form 
of the income tax legislation that was of marginal significance only.  The press 
had little interest in income tax or in the forms of its legislation; and it became a 
significant force only in 1921, when a press campaign had an impact on that 
form.   
5. Public opinion 
Public opinion could, in theory, be a most important determinant of the forms of 
the income tax legislation.  Where it existed, public opinion was of the utmost 
importance in determining the approach taken by politicians – and, accordingly, 
the actions taken by governments.  By the twentieth century the United 
Kingdom had a mass electorate; and, at a general election, that electorate could 
– and did – change the political party supplying the country’s ministers.  ‘The 
one force which is irresistible in the country is the electorate’.962  As a practical 
matter, therefore, it was essential for the government to be alert to the state of 
public opinion – and so, of course, it was.  ‘The climate of public opinion on 
people is overwhelming’, Churchill observed in late 1943.963  As Dicey argued 
                                            
961
  TNA file T 171/255, fo 394.  Letter, Price to Churchill, 5 May 1927. 
962
  Memorandum, dated 29 March 1910, in the Elibank papers.  Quoted in AM Gollin, The 
Observer and J.L. Garvin 1908-1914 (OUP 1960) 183. 
963
  Quoted in GK Fry, The Politics of Crisis: An Interpretation of British Politics, 1931-1945 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001) 187.  Churchill was considering Baldwin’s predicament in 
government in the 1930s. 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
293 
 
so forcefully over a century ago, public opinion had the capacity to determine 
the law;964 and, accordingly, the form of the income tax legislation. 
Public opinion might be all-powerful in theory: but, in the case of statute law in 
general and of the form of income tax legislation in particular, public opinion did 
not exist.  In 1956, it was Devlin’s opinion that the ordinary man might like or 
dislike the substance of legislation ‘but he does not ... much mind what form it 
takes’.965  In an earlier article, published in 1924, Chalmers had taken the view 
that ‘[a] Consolidation Act probably has never won a single vote at an election, 
and the public do not perceive its effect on their pockets’.966  More specifically in 
the context of the income tax legislation, in a memorandum to Churchill, written 
in the autumn of 1925, the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, Sir 
Richard Hopkins, noted that an attempt ‘to re-express the existing [income tax] 
legislation still has, no doubt, some attractions.  There is, however, practically 
no demand for it’.967  Public opinion, therefore, did not determine the form of the 
income tax legislation – the public had no views about the form that the income 
tax legislation should take. 
Public opinion on other matters, however, could, and did, have an impact on the 
form of income tax legislation.  It was public opinion that lay behind the 
enactment of the primary legislation enabling the PAYE Regulations to be made 
– and, accordingly, behind the making of the Regulations themselves.  The 
                                            
964
  AV Dicey, Lectures on the relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the 
Nineteenth Century (London, Macmillan, 1905).  See also chapter 1 above, text around n 61. 
965
  P Devlin, ‘The Common Law, Public Policy and the Executive’ (1956) 9 Current Legal 
Problems 1, 14. 
966
  Chalmers (n 875) 341. 
967
  TNA file IR 63/114, fos 318-31.  Memorandum, with covering note, Hopkins to Churchill, 27 
October 1925.  In that same memorandum Hopkins also pointed out that income tax 
adjustments were necessary to deal with the various different personal reliefs – but the 
existence of those reliefs was supported by public opinion ‘and no simplification in this respect 
appears to be within the range of practical politics’. 
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Inland Revenue Departmental Report, dated 21 May 1943, which stood at the 
beginning of the sequence of events leading directly to the making of those 
Regulations, began by stating that ‘[t]he public demand for a system of 
deducting tax on the current earnings or pay-as-you-go basis has reached the 
point at which it is hardly any longer a question whether such a system is or is 
not possible’.968  Later in that sequence of events, on the second reading of the 
Bill enacted as the Income Tax (Employment) Act 1943,969 one MP considered 
that the Bill met ‘a very real demand of the country.  This is a case in which the 
demand has produced the supply, which always seems to me the correct 
sequence of events’.970  There can also be no doubt that, by the end of the 
1950s, there was a general view that post-war credits had remained unpaid for 
too long.  The enactment of the Income Tax (Repayment of Post-War Credits) 
Act 1959971 may accordingly be viewed as a response to this grievance by the 
government of the day.  It is arguable whether or not the opposition to the 
Revenue Bill of 1921 (with its contested administrative provisions) constituted 
public opinion: for the view may be taken that opposition to that Bill was the 
work of vocal minorities, acting within a majority who were indifferent to the 
issues arising.  It may certainly be said, however, that there was a body of 
outside opinion opposed to the Bill – and that this body was much more visible 
than any body of outside opinion supporting the Bill.  On these occasions, 
                                            
968
  TNA file IR 63/163, fos 1-35, 2 (para 1).  Report of the Committee appointed to examine the 
possibility of introducing a system of deducting income tax on wages on the current earnings 
basis, 21 May 1943.  For the sequence of events leading to the enactment of the primary 
legislation enabling the PAYE Regulations to be made, see JHN Pearce, ‘The Road to 1944: 
Antecedents of the PAYE Scheme’ in J Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax Law: Volume 5 
(Oxford, Hart, 2012) 207-17.  See also chapter 7, section 3, below. 
969
  6 & 7 Geo 6 c 45. 
970
  HC Deb 14 October 1943, vol 392, col 1164. 
971
  7 & 8 Eliz 2 c 28. 
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therefore, outside opinion on matters not directly relevant for the form of income 
tax legislation became a determinant of the form of that legislation.   
Those in favour of statute law reform hoped that there would be a development 
of public opinion on this subject.  Birkenhead believed that, in order ‘[t]o 
facilitate the work of consolidation, it is highly desirable that public opinion 
should be stimulated in its favour’; but he also had to admit that ‘[at] present, the 
work excites no enthusiasm’.972  Hewart expressed optimism that public opinion 
could provide the remedy for the mischief he claimed to have identified in The 
New Despotism.  He considered it ‘tolerably safe’ to suppose that, at the time 
he was writing, only a small part of the electorate knew what was being done 
and that only a still smaller part had ‘any real appreciation of the meaning and 
effect of the statutory provisions which offer at once the occasion and the 
instrument of despotic power’.973  What was necessary to deal with the situation 
was simply a particular state of public opinion; and, in order that such a state of 
public opinion might be brought into existence, what was necessary was ‘simply 
a knowledge of the facts’.  Hopes for the development of public opinion were 
also displayed by the drafters of statutes.  Ilbert,974 in 1901, addressing himself 
to the subject of consolidation, thought that ‘[w]hat seems to be most needed is 
the formation of a body of public opinion which will encourage and stimulate the 
Government of the day in the introduction of Consolidation Bills’; and he also 
thought that ‘such an expression of public opinion ... would justify the Ministers 
                                            
972
  Viscount Birkenhead, Points of View (London, Hodder and Stoughton, no date but around 
1922) 176. 
973
  Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (London, Ernest Benn, 1929) 147-8.  This work is 
considered further in chapter 7, section 1, below. 
974
  Sir Courtenay Ilbert (1841-1928) was first Parliamentary Counsel from 1899 to 1901.  He 
was then the Clerk of the House of Commons from 1902 to 1921. 
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of the Crown in undertaking a troublesome task’.975  Half a century later, Ram, 
in an address delivered in 1951, concluded by observing that the Lord 
Chancellor (Jowitt) had given the business of statute law reform a definite place 
among the duties of Parliament and of the executive government.  ‘He has 
given it that place, but it must keep its place for many years to come and only 
the pressure of informed public opinion can secure that’.976  Such hopes as 
there may have been, however, for the development of public opinion on the 
subject of statute law reform in general, and the form of the income tax 
legislation in particular, were not fulfilled.  On another occasion, Ram described 
statute law reform as ‘a “hole and corner affair”, of little interest to anyone 
except a few despairing enthusiasts’;977 and there was no general development 
of public opinion in the manner that Ram, and others, hoped.978 
The effect of public opinion on the form of the income tax legislation, therefore, 
was a by-product of public opinion about specific aspects of the income tax 
system.  In the cases of PAYE and of the Income Tax (Repayment of Post-War 
Credits) Act 1959, further legislation came into existence; in the case of the 
Revenue Bill of 1921, proposed legislation was abandoned. 
The impact of public opinion was also confined to one of the four categories of 
primary legislation distinguished: that of programme Acts.  There was no impact 
of public opinion on the Finance Bill cycle (presumably silently acquiesced in on 
                                            
975
  Sir C Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms (OUP 1901) 116. 
976
  Sir G Ram, ‘The Improvement of the Statute Book’ [1951] Journal of the Society of Public 
Teachers of Law 442, 458.  Ram’s address was delivered on 28 September 1951. 
977
  TNA file LCO 2/3817.  Letter, Ram to Jowitt, 6 August 1948. 
978
  ‘[O]ther things being equal, the larger the number of individuals or firms that would benefit 
from a collective good, the smaller the share of the gains from action in the group interest that 
will accrue to the individual or firm that undertakes the action.  Thus, in the absence of selective 
incentives, the incentive for group action diminishes as group size increases, so that large 
groups are less able to act in their common interest than small ones’.  M Olson, The Rise and 
Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities (New Haven 
[Connecticut] and London, Yale UP, 1982) 31. 
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the basis that nothing could be done about it); and there was no impact of public 
opinion on Consolidation Bills or Codification Bills (presumably on the basis that 
the public knew – and cared – next to nothing for such things).  Programme Bills 
dealing with specific topics, on the other hand, offered matters on which it was 
much easier for the public to have an opinion – and, if the public had an opinion, 
there could be important consequences. 
Conclusion 
The evidence shows that determinants outside government were of minor 
importance in determining the form of the income tax legislation.  The Income 
Tax Codification Committee was brought into existence with a view to 
transforming the form of that legislation; but the Committee did not produce a 
draft Bill that had the assent of all relevant major interests (the essential 
precondition for the enactment of any Codification Bill) and there was no 
prospect of obtaining the support of those interests for a different Codification 
Bill.  No codification statute was enacted. 
The other determinants examined – MPs, interest groups, the press and public 
opinion – existed completely independently of the form of the income tax 
legislation.  The determination of that form was not, in any way, a priority for any 
of them.  Indeed, it is not possible to discern that there was any public opinion 
relating to the form of the income tax legislation.   Each of these possible 
determinants, however, had some influence on that form.  These influences 
were largely confined to programme Bills (the form of legislation that it was 
easiest for those outside government to influence) and those influences acted 
upon particular Bills to achieve particular objectives.  Public opinion was in 
favour of an income tax scheme which provided for deductions from current 
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earnings – and accordingly influenced the legislation enabling the PAYE 
scheme to be made.  MPs, interest groups and the press all acted in concert to 
oppose the Revenue Bill of 1921 – and that Bill was withdrawn.  In the cases of 
MPs and the press, however, the opposition was, to a significant extent, to 
Lloyd George and the Lloyd George coalition.  In the case of interest groups, 
the opposition took the form of the protection of the existing roles played in the 
administration of income tax.  Both in 1921 and in the second world war, during 
the period leading up to the making of the PAYE Regulations, therefore, the 
impact on the form of the income tax legislation was a by-product of campaigns 
waged, and climates of opinion existing, to achieve different objectives.  Even 
having regard to these ‘successes’, however, the overall impact of the possible 
determinants investigated in this chapter on the form of the income tax 
legislation during the period from 1907 to 1965 was slight.  The overall effect of 
the ‘default setting’,979 under which the form of the income tax legislation only 
received attention subject to the constraints of parliamentary procedure, was 
not overridden. 
  
                                            
979
  For the default setting, see, in particular, the conclusion to chapter 2 above. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE LIMITED AND UNEVEN ROLE PLAYED BY 
SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION 
‘The relation between Statutory Instrument and Statute has 
become one of the main parts of the law ... ’.980 
 
Introduction 
The use made of subordinate legislation981 increased greatly during the first half 
of the twentieth century.982  As early as 1920, when 82 Acts of Parliament 
received the Royal Assent, but 916 general statutory rules and orders were 
officially registered, it was remarked that ‘[i]n mere bulk the child now dwarfs the 
parent’.983  From 1896 to 1911, the average annual total of general statutory 
rules and orders was about 188.984  Then, during the first world war, there was a 
                                            
980
  Kenneth Pickthorn MP speaking in the House of Commons.  HC Deb 21 February 1951, vol 
484, col 1334. 
981
  Subordinate legislation has been described as a ‘rather technical and forbidding subject’ (CT 
Carr, Concerning English Administrative Law (New York, Columbia UP, 1941) 31); but the 
subject has been well investigated in academic writing.  See generally CT Carr, Delegated 
Legislation: Three Lectures (CUP 1921) (subsequently cited in this chapter as ‘Three Lectures’); 
Chih-Mai Chen, Parliamentary Opinion of Delegated Legislation (New York, Columbia UP 
1933); J Willis, The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments (Cambridge 
(Mass), Harvard UP 1933); CT Carr, Concerning English Administrative Law (New York, 
Columbia UP 1941) (subsequently cited in this chapter as ‘Administrative Law’); Sir C Carr, 
‘Delegated Legislation’ in Lord Campion and others, Parliament: A Survey (London, George 
Allen & Unwin, 1955) (subsequently cited in this chapter as ‘Delegated Legislation’); J Eaves, 
Emergency Powers and the Parliamentary Watchdog: Parliament and the Executive in Great 
Britain, 1939-1951, (London, Hansard Society, 1957); JE Kersell, Parliamentary Supervision of 
Delegated Legislation (London, Stevens, 1960); WH Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition: 
Volume 3: A Much Governed Nation: Part 2 (London, Methuen, 1987) 529-97; and M Taggart, 
‘From “parliamentary powers” to privatization: The chequered history of delegated legislation in 
the twentieth century’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 575.  The author is grateful 
to Dominic de Cogan for drawing his attention to Taggart’s article. 
982
  Statutory Rules and Orders and then, later, Statutory Instruments have been published for 
1890 and all subsequent years.  From 1894 onwards, following the enactment of the Rules 
Publication Act 1893 (56 & 57 Vict c 66), the volumes published distinguish between 
instruments of a general and a local character, with instruments in the former category only 
being printed and published in full.  It is nevertheless unexpected to find that the published 
volumes for each year provide no convenient statements of the number of instruments falling 
within each of these two major categories.  It is also unexpected to find that no comprehensive 
list of the number of instruments made each year appears to exist – although figures for various 
different years have been given on various different occasions.  (See also n 984 below.) 
983
  Carr ‘Three Lectures’ (n 981) 2. 
984
  Appendix 2 is a table setting out the numbers of Statutory Rules & Orders (from 1895 to 
1947) and the numbers of Statutory Instruments (from 1948 to 1958) as far as those numbers 
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great expansion, with 1,204 general instruments being made in 1918, and 1,091 
in 1919.  The 1920s saw fewer general statutory rules and orders being made, 
but more than in the years before the first world war.  The average annual total 
of general statutory rules and orders made during the period from 1920 to 1929 
was 503.  The second world war then saw another great expansion: 644 such 
instruments were made in 1937, but 1,901 in 1942.  More than 1,000 general 
statutory rules and orders (and then general statutory instruments)985 were 
made every year from 1939 to 1952 inclusive.  The 1950s then saw fewer 
general statutory instruments being made, but more than during the inter-war 
years.  The average annual total of general statutory instruments made during 
the period from 1953 to 1958 was about 717.  The two world wars may 
accordingly be said to have produced the same displacement effect in the case 
of subordinate legislation as that noted in the case of public expenditure by 
Peacock and Wiseman.986  The evidence considered in this chapter 
demonstrates that this is not a coincidence. 
The legislation relating to income tax, however, reflected this growth to a limited 
extent only: for, in this area, subordinate legislation remained comparatively 
rare.  Important income tax legislation was nearly always primary legislation.  
During the period from 1907 to 1965, only 80 statutory rules and orders or 
statutory instruments dealing with income tax matters, either in whole or in part, 
and not involving any foreign element, are known – a very small percentage of 
                                                                                                                              
are known.  The table sets out the number of instruments of a general character; the number of 
instruments of a local character; and the total number of instruments.  The paragraph in the text 
summarises the information set out in that Appendix. 
985
  The Statutory Instruments Act 1946 (9 & 10 Geo 6 c 36) repealed the Rules Publication Act 
1893 (56 & 57 Vict c 66) and made further provision as to the instruments by which statutory 
powers to make subordinate legislation were to be exercised, replacing statutory rules and 
orders with statutory instruments.  The Act came into operation on 1 January 1948 by virtue of 
Statutory Instruments Act, 1946 (Commencement) Order, SI 1948/3. 
986
  AT Peacock and J Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom 
(OUP 1961).  See chapter 1 above, text around n 67. 
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the number brought into existence.  Appendix 3 is a table setting out these 
statutory rules and orders and statutory instruments.  The first question 
addressed in this chapter, therefore, is why there was comparatively little 
subordinate legislation relating to income tax.  On the other hand, an 
appreciable amount of subordinate legislation relating to income tax was 
nevertheless made.  The second question addressed in this chapter, therefore, 
is why this limited, but significant, amount of subordinate legislation was brought 
into existence.  It was also the case that a very substantial amount of the 
subordinate legislation relating to income tax that was made was concerned 
with one particular subject: deductions on account of income tax from the 
earnings of employees.  By the end of the second world war, the legislation 
dealing with this subject was to be found in subordinate legislation – the PAYE 
Regulations.987   The third and final question addressed in this chapter, 
therefore, is why this particular subject received so much attention. 
1. The limited amount of subordinate legislation relating to income tax 
The question why there was comparatively little subordinate legislation relating 
to income tax is addressed by investigating two further questions.  Features of 
the United Kingdom polity that worked against the introduction of subordinate 
legislation relating to income tax are investigated.  There is then an 
investigation of the manner in which those features operated: for the features 
had a number of different consequences that operated to place different 
constraints on the making of subordinate legislation. 
                                            
987
  Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1944, SR & O 1944/251. 
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(1) Features of the United Kingdom polity 
Three features of the United Kingdom polity worked against the introduction of 
subordinate legislation relating to income tax.  The first feature was that the 
imposition of taxation was a matter where deeply entrenched constitutional 
understandings existed.  Following the constitutional conflicts of the 
seventeenth century, and well before the twentieth century, it had become very 
firmly settled that the legal basis of the right to tax and the liability to pay was 
parliamentary authority; that, within Parliament, the primary role in the 
imposition of taxation was that taken by the House of Commons; and that, 
within the House of Commons, the initiative in financial matters rested with the 
Crown.988  Against the background of those deeply entrenched understandings, 
the imposition of taxation by subordinate legislation would constitute a major 
departure of an unexpected nature – a departure that did not march well with 
those constitutional understandings.  Anything resembling such a departure 
could expect to be noticed as such – and this was the case, shortly after the first 
world war, both in the House of Commons and in the Courts. 
In the House of Commons, in December 1919, Lord Robert Cecil submitted that 
the Imports and Exports Regulation Bill was out of order: ‘it is a fundamental 
rule that this House does not delegate its power of taxation’.989   The Speaker, 
in his turn, took the view that it had been part of the unwritten law of Parliament 
that the goods upon which and the rates at which taxes were to be levied 
should be fixed and determined by the House of Commons itself.  He was not 
                                            
988
  For these matters, see chapter 1, text around ns 127-33. 
989
  HC Deb 2 December 1919, vol 122, cols 211-3.  The passage quoted directly is at 212. 
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prepared to say that the House could not delegate that power to some other 
body.  ‘I will only say that at present I am not aware of any similar case’.990 
In the Courts, in the case of A-G v Wilts United Dairies Ltd,991 the company 
argued that the Food Controller,
992
 when granting it a licence, had no power to 
impose a condition requiring payments to be made; and that the condition 
imposed amounted to a tax, which could not be imposed upon the subject 
without clear legal authority.  The Court of Appeal found in favour of the 
company.  Atkin LJ considered that, against the background of ‘the historic 
struggle of the Legislature to secure for itself the sole power to levy money upon 
the subject’, its complete success in that struggle, and the elaborate means 
adopted by the House of Commons to control the amount, the conditions and 
the purposes of the levy, the Food Controller’s powers did not authorise the 
condition, imposed upon the company, requiring payments to be made.993  
Scrutton LJ thought it conceivable that Parliament, which might pass legislation 
requiring the subject to pay money to the Crown, might also delegate its powers 
of imposing such payments to the executive: but, in his view, the clearest words 
would be required before the Courts would hold that such an unusual delegation 
had taken place – and there were no such words.994  The House of Lords 
upheld the Court of Appeal;995 and it was said, in a later case, that the decisions 
both of the Court of Appeal and of the House of Lords had been much 
influenced by the knowledge of the struggle to prevent the levying of taxes 
                                            
990
  ibid col 213. 
991
  (1921) 37 TLR 884 (CA). 
992
  The Food Controller had power, under the Defence of the Realm Acts enacted during the 
first world war, to make orders regulating the production, distribution, supply, sale and purchase 
of milk and milk products. 
993
  (1921) 37 TLR 884, 885. 
994
  ibid 886. 
995
  (1922) 38 TLR 781 (HL). 
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without the express sanction of Parliament – with a consequent disposition to 
interpret the Food Controller’s powers in the light of that history.996 
Legislation making provision for subordinate legislation affecting the ambit of 
taxation was nevertheless enacted during the inter-war period, and again during 
the second world war.  Following the financial crisis of 1931, the Abnormal 
Importations (Customs Duties) Act 1931,997 in force for six months only, 
empowered the Board of Trade, with the concurrence of the Treasury, to make 
orders imposing customs duties on certain articles in certain circumstances.  
The Import Duties Act 1932,998 which followed it, and was not restricted in the 
period for which it was in force, imposed a general customs duty of 10% on all 
goods imported into the United Kingdom other than exempted goods.  The Act 
then authorised subordinate legislation to vary the category of exempted goods; 
to impose additional duties in the interests of the United Kingdom’s economy; to 
grant exemptions and preferences to foreign goods; and to impose 
supplementary duties in the case of foreign countries which discriminated 
against British goods.  Then, at the beginning of the second world war, section 
2(1) of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939999 expressly authorised the 
Treasury to provide by order for the imposition and recovery, in connection with 
any scheme of control contained in or authorised by Defence Regulations, of 
such charges as might be specified in the order. 
The general constitutional understandings that worked against the imposition of 
taxation by subordinate legislation were not, however, displaced by the 
enactment of this legislation.  The 1939 Act was emergency wartime legislation; 
                                            
996
  A-G for Canada v Hallet & Carey Ltd [1952] AC 427 (PC) 451 (Lord Radcliffe). 
997
  22 & 23 Geo 5 c 1. 
998
  22 & 23 Geo 5 c 8. 
999
  2 & 3 Geo 6 c 62. 
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the content of section 2(1) of that Act has been attributed to the wish of the 
government to avoid the difficulties that had arisen after the first world war in the 
Wilts United Dairies case;1000 and the emergency legislation in force during the 
second world war was gradually repealed after its end. 
The 1932 Act, however, could not be reconciled so easily with these general 
constitutional understandings.  The Committee on Ministers’ Powers1001 
considered that this statute was ‘obviously one of the most important delegating 
enactments which Parliament has ever passed’;1002 and took the view that the 
1932 Act was a totally exceptional statute required for totally exceptional 
circumstances.  At a general level, the Committee’s report considered that 
‘instances of powers to legislate on matters of principle and even to impose 
taxation’ were exceptional instances of delegated legislative powers.  The 
Committee stopped short of recommending that such powers should never be 
conferred: but did state that it was ‘of the essence of constitutional Government 
that the normal control of Parliament should not be suspended either to a 
greater degree, or for a longer time, than the exigency demands’.1003  The 
provisions relating to subordinate legislation contained in the 1932 Act, 
however, did not have any limited existence.  The Act continued in force until it 
was repealed and replaced by the Import Duties Act 1958;1004 and section 1(1) 
of the 1958 Act gave power to the Treasury to impose protective duties by 
order.1005  The justification given for legislation of this type was that a tariff 
                                            
1000
  Carr ‘Administrative Law’ (n 981) 74. 
1001
  For this Committee see text around ns 1040-48 below. 
1002
  Committee on Ministers’ Powers, Report (Cmd 4060, 1932) 36. 
1003
  ibid 31, 52 and 58-9. 
1004
  6 & 7 Eliz 2 c 6. 
1005
  These powers were then augmented by those in Finance Act 1961 (9 & 10 Eliz 2 c 36), s 9, 
which enabled the Treasury to vary the main customs and excise revenue duties and purchase 
tax by order.  The maximum change was to be 10% in either direction.  Finance Act 1961, s 9, 
was in force for a few years only: for it was repealed by Finance Act 1964, sch 9. 
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system could not be operated without subordinate legislation: for it was 
considered essential to the success of such a policy that machinery should exist 
under which protective duties could be imposed (or removed) or increased (or 
reduced) more rapidly than was possible by enacting a statute.1006  The 
justification given, therefore, was specific to indirect and not to direct taxation. 
The deeply entrenched constitutional understandings, working against the 
imposition of direct taxation by subordinate legislation, accordingly remained.  
Shortly after the second world war, for example, the view was expressed that 
‘[s]uch a matter as imposing a charge upon the subject is one which according 
to sound constitutional theory ought to be kept in the hands of Parliament’.1007  
There is also evidence that, after the second world war, the general 
constitutional understandings against the imposition of taxation in subordinate 
legislation continued to be given effect.  The Select Committee on Statutory 
Rules and Orders, set up in 1944, was required to draw the special attention of 
the House of Commons to subordinate legislation on a number of grounds, of 
which the first was that the instrument imposed a charge on public revenues.  
By the end of the 1958-59 Session, only one instrument had been reported 
under this head.1008 
The second feature of the United Kingdom polity that worked against the 
introduction of subordinate legislation relating to income tax was that, for the 
majority of the period from 1907 to 1965, in times of peace, it was possible to 
discern what may be called a traditional instinctive hostility to government – with 
a hostility to the making of subordinate legislation as one of its components.  
                                            
1006
  Carr ‘Administrative Law’ (n 981) 40; Lord Hemingford, Back-Bencher and Chairman 
(London, John Murray, 1946) 164. 
1007
  H Molson, Delegated Legislation (reprinted in PM Briers and others, Papers on Parliament: 
A Symposium (London, Hansard Society, 1949) 105.) 
1008
  Kersell (n 981) 47 and 49 n 16. 
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The hostility to government (like the constitutional understandings relating to the 
imposition of taxation) had the events of the seventeenth century as its point of 
departure.1009  It was Bagehot’s view that the English had inherited the 
traditions of conflict and had preserved them in the fullness of victory.  They 
looked on state action ‘not as our own action but as alien action, as an enforced 
imposed tyranny from without, not as the consummated result of our own 
organised wishes’.1010  The connection between this traditional instinctive 
hostility to government and a hostility to the making of subordinate legislation 
appeared vividly in a speech made by Lord Banbury in 1929: 
[T]his Bill perpetuates a vicious principle which unfortunately has 
grown very much in the last few years.  It gives power to a 
Department to usurp the functions of Parliament, and to pass what 
they call regulations which have the effect of an Act of Parliament 
and deal with His Majesty’s subjects; in fact, this does what in 
days gone by caused a King to lose his head.  King Charles 
endeavoured to usurp the functions of Parliament and make laws 
himself.  The result was that he was beheaded and Parliament 
regained its old powers.  Now, in these days, we are asked to give 
powers to a Minister and a Department which we have always 
refused to give to a King.1011 
Hughes, in a work published in 1957, noted that, except from a socialist 
standpoint, a good defence of subordinate legislation was hard to find.1012 
Lawyers, in particular, exhibited this instinctive hostility to government.  In 1929, 
it was the view of Sir Claud Schuster, the Permanent Secretary in the Lord 
Chancellor’s Office, that, in recent years, ‘the weight of prejudice against the 
State in the minds of many members of the Court of Appeal and Judges of the 
                                            
1009
  The complexion of English constitutional law, according to Lord Chorley, had been very 
much coloured by the events of the seventeenth century ‘when the legislature triumphed over 
the executive which then had the judiciary very much in its pocket’.  Lord Chorley, ‘Law-Making 
in Whitehall’ (1946) 9 Modern Law Review 26. 
1010
  W Bagehot, The English Constitution (London, Chapman and Hall, 1867) 316. 
1011
  HL Deb 14 February 1929, vol 72, cols 932-3.  Lord Banbury was speaking during the 
second Reading of the Factory and Workshop (Cotton Cloth Factories) Bill. 
1012
  C Hughes, The British Statute Book (London, Hutchinson, 1957) 161.  
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
308 
 
High Court has been such as seriously to affect the Administration of 
Justice’.1013  The views expressed in Lord Hewart’s work The New 
Despotism1014 exemplified that prejudice (as Schuster viewed it); and, at the 
time of publication in 1929, it was considered that his view represented 99% of 
the opinion then held by the bench, the bar and the solicitors’ branch of the 
profession.1015 
In times of war, however, the traditional instinctive hostility to government did 
not apply.  ‘In the eternal dispute between government and liberty, crisis means 
more government and less liberty’.1016  War, according to Scrutton LJ, speaking 
shortly before the end of the first world war, could not be carried on according to 
the principles of Magna Carta – there had to be some modification of the liberty 
of the subject in the interests of the state.1017  ‘In a time of war’, Bonar Law told 
the House of Commons in 1917, ‘the executive Government must be given 
more rather than less power than in ordinary times, or it cannot carry out the 
work in which it is engaged’;1018 and the Economist summarised the Emergency 
Powers (Defence) Act 19401019 by stating that ‘the Government takes control of 
everybody and everything.  It is the complete conscription of persons, labour 
and capital’.1020  In terms of Amery’s analysis, times of peace saw a preference 
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  Quoted in Lord Nolan and Sir S Sedley, The Making and Remaking of the British 
Constitution (London, Blackstone Press, 1997) 20. 
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  Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (London, Ernest Benn, 1929).  See text around ns 1038-
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  DGT Williams, ‘The Donoughmore Report in Retrospect’ (1982) 60 Public Administration 
273, 281. 
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  Carr ‘Administrative Law’ (n 981) 92. 
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  Ronnfeldt v Phillips (1918) 35 TLR 46 (CA) 47.  The judgments in that case were delivered 
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  HC Deb 4 April 1917, vol 92, col 1395. 
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  3 & 4 Geo 6 c 20. 
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for the ‘nation’ over the ‘government’, but times of war a preference for the 
‘government’ over the ‘nation’.1021 
The real justification for the emergency Acts placed on the statute book at the 
beginning of the second world war, according to one Parliamentarian, was that 
‘they were essential for the prosecution of the War, or for preventing troubles 
and hardships at home which would otherwise have been bound to arise had 
the Acts not been passed – and that without any delay’.1022  The legislation 
consisted of emergency Acts of a temporary nature, and was only to be 
operative during the emergency period of the war.  The Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act 1939,1023 the Parliamentarian believed, could only be justified by 
the war.  That Act transferred authority and powers which properly belonged to 
Parliament to the government and to government departments; and Parliament 
ought not to have handed over those powers except in a time of emergency; 
but, in such a time, the powers had to be handed over if they were to be 
exercised effectively.1024 
Despite the hostility shown to government and subordinate legislation during 
peacetime, therefore, there was an increase in government during each of the 
world wars.  The increase in government led not only to an increase in 
subordinate legislation, but to entire codes of subordinate legislation, deriving 
from the Defence of the Realm Act 1914
1025
 (in the case of the first world war) 
and the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 19391026 (in the case of the 
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second).1027  The validity of this subordinate legislation derived from emergency 
wartime primary legislation: and, in each case, with the arrival of peace, the 
removal (or retention) of those codes was a matter requiring attention. 
The third feature of the United Kingdom polity that worked against the 
introduction of subordinate legislation relating to income tax was that, for a 
significant part of the twentieth century, both the making and the extent of 
subordinate legislation were matters of controversy.1028  That controversy was 
most acute in the years following the first world war. 
The view has been taken that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
subordinate legislation was not viewed as a controversial subject.1029  The first 
world war then transformed this situation.1030  Subordinate legislation was made 
on an unprecedented scale; but (as the matter was put later) was ‘built up 
haphazard without plan or logic’.1031  The subordinate legislation made under 
                                            
1027
  Carr ‘Administrative Law’ (n 981) 71. 
1028
  For this controversy, see, in particular, the accounts given in Greenleaf and Taggart (n 
981).  Taggart does not refer to Greenleaf. 
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constitutional; and the resulting legislation was not felt to be any more oppressive than that 
enacted by Parliament – while Parliament itself did not appear to be troubled by any 
apprehensions that it had improperly handed over its functions to the executive.  Sir WM 
Graham-Harrison, Notes on the Delegation by Parliament of Legislative Powers ... (n 524) 1.  
Although this book was published well after the first world war, Graham-Harrison stated that it 
was written with nearly 29 years experience in the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel (ibid 
117).  Even before the first world war, however, the increase in subordinate legislation was 
capable of being viewed with disquiet – and not least by lawyers.  In 1911, Cozens-Hardy MR, 
speaking extra-judicially, was reported as saying that Parliament had been in the habit of 
delegating very great powers to government departments in recent years.  The real legislation 
was not to be found in the statute book only: Rules and Orders might be made by some 
government department under the authority of the statute.  ‘He was one of those who regarded 
that as a very bad system and one attended by very great danger’ (Quoted in Hewart (n 1014) 
144-5. 
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  ‘The circumstances of the [first world] war made it necessary to confer on the Executive 
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“the bureaucracy”, not always fair-minded or well-informed, and in some cases the legality of 
the action taken by the Government has been successfully questioned in the Courts of law’.  AH 
Dennis, ‘The Place of the Official Lawyer in the Constitution’ (1925) 41 Law Quarterly Review 
378. 
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the Defence of the Realm Acts was particularly capable of attracting criticism.  
One possible ground of objection went to the extent of this legislation: it was not 
obvious that the war effort made it necessary to forbid people to hold dog shows 
or to whistle for a taxicab in London.1032  Another possible ground of objection 
went to the validity of much of the subordinate legislation: for regulations made 
under the Defence of the Realm Acts ‘brought forth a teeming progeny of 
subsidiary orders, so that the Act had not only children but also 
grandchildren’.1033  These were circumstances in which it could have been 
argued that the maxim delegatus non potest delegare (a delegate is not able to 
delegate) applied – so that all the subsidiary orders were ultra vires and void: 
but Carr, who noted this point, was not aware that any challenge along these 
lines was ever made.1034  More generally, executive action was taken without 
any legal justification at all.  ‘You must remember’, Schuster wrote in February 
1917, ‘that a good deal of the actions taken by the various Departments has 
succeeded because those who suffered were patriotic and still more because 
the departments bluffed with confidence’.1035  ‘Experience in the present war 
must have taught us all’, Lord Sumner opined in A-G v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel 
Ltd ‘that many things are done in the name of the executive in such times 
purporting to be for the common good, which Englishmen have been too 
patriotic to contest’.  He went on to note that ‘much was voluntarily submitted to 
which might have been disputed, and that the absence of contest and even of 
protest is by no means always an admission of the right’.1036 
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  Carr ‘Delegated Legislation’ (n 981) 244. 
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  ibid 245. 
1034
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After the first world war, accordingly, subordinate legislation attracted attention 
– and increased hostility.  According to one MP in 1919, ‘government by Order 
in Council is in war time excusable – or may be – but in peace time it is not to 
be endured’.1037  Finally, in 1929, The New Despotism1038 appeared: the book in 
which Lord Hewart, the serving Lord Chief Justice, attacked the use and extent 
of subordinate legislation; and the publication of that book has been described 
as ‘undoubtedly the high-water mark of the attack on delegated legislation’.1039 
The subsiding of criticism of subordinate legislation after 1929 had both short-
term and long-term causes.1040  In the short term, action centred upon the 
activities of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers, set up in 1929, and often 
known from the name of its first chairman as ‘the Donoughmore Committee’.  
The setting-up of that committee, as Greenleaf has shown, was a pre-emptive 
strike on the part of government.  Knowing that Hewart’s book was about to be 
published, it appeared to the Lord Chancellor (Sankey) to be ‘highly expedient 
that the Government should be beforehand in this matter and should have 
indicated their desire to investigate it before such a publication stirs up further 
public excitement on the question’.1041 The membership of the committee 
accorded with this government policy.  The committee included three leading 
civil servants1042 – but no one who could have been considered to have 
participated in the recent controversies on the ‘anti-delegation’ side.1043  The 
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  HC Deb 17 March 1919, vol 113, col 1826. 
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  Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (London, Ernest Benn, 1929). 
1039
  Greenleaf (n 981) 553. 
1040
  This paragraph derives from material to be found in Greenleaf (n 981) 557-63. 
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  Quoted in Greenleaf (n 981) 558. 
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  Sir Warren Fisher (then Permanent Secretary to the Treasury), Sir John Anderson (then 
Permanent Secretary at the Home Office and later Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Sir Claud 
Schuster (Permanent Secretary in the Lord Chancellor’s Office).  (Greenleaf (n 981) 558.) 
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  Hewart was invited to give evidence ‘but he replied that as we had read his book and he 
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The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
313 
 
committee’s terms of reference were to consider the powers exercised by 
Ministers of the Crown by way of both delegated legislation and judicial or 
quasi-judicial decisions and ‘to report what safeguards are desirable or 
necessary to secure the constitutional principles of the sovereignty of 
Parliament and the supremacy of the Law’.1044  These terms of reference 
carried within them an implicit invitation for the committee to consider (as one 
witness put the matter) ‘the whole philosophy and technique of modern 
government’.1045  The committee, however, did not tackle its terms of reference 
in this broad manner: its focus was more specific. 
The Donoughmore Committee did not consider that subordinate legislation was 
wholly bad.  The committee saw ‘definite advantages’ in it – although risks of 
abuse were incidental to it, and ‘we believe that safeguards are required, if the 
country is to continue to enjoy the advantages of the practice without suffering 
its inherent dangers’.1046  Parliament passed so many laws each year that it 
lacked the time to shape all the legislative details.  ‘The truth is that if 
Parliament were not willing to delegate law-making power, Parliament would be 
unable to pass the kind and quantity of legislation which modern public opinion 
requires’.1047  Greenleaf’s conclusion on the committee’s work is to be 
accepted: to an important degree ‘the committee met a good many of the 
particular points which the critics had raised, thus justifying some at least of the 
unease which had been expressed and which had led to the appointment of the 
                                                                                                                              
speculates that Hewart did not wish to give the committee – and especially Schuster – the 
opportunity to cross-examine him.  (Greenleaf (n 981) 560.) 
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  Committee on Ministers’ Powers, Report (n 1043) v.  The witness was Sir Maurice Gwyer, 
then the Treasury Solicitor. 
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inquiry in the first place’.1048  Even before the second world war, Lord Hewart 
had privately disowned The New Despotism because the welfare state ‘would 
never be born or live unless the powers that he had inveighed against were 
taken by the men entrusted with the task of making the new conception of 
welfare work’.1049 
In the longer term, there was a lessening of the controversy regarding the use 
of subordinate legislation as public attention came to concentrate on other 
matters.  During the second half of the 1930s, interest taken in domestic affairs 
fell relative to that taken in international affairs.  The second world war was then 
accompanied by another major expansion of subordinate legislation; and the 
Labour governments in power from 1945 used subordinate legislation 
extensively.1050  ‘There is now general agreement about the necessity of 
delegated legislation’, Aneurin Bevan wrote in 1953, and ‘the real problem is 
how this legislation can be reconciled with the processes of democratic 
consultation, scrutiny and control’.1051 
It has been said that, so far as subordinate legislation was concerned, the 
twentieth century ‘was a century of two halves’ – and this view of Taggart’s is to 
be accepted.  During the first half of the century, the battle for the legitimacy of 
subordinate legislation was fought and won.1052  Agreement that subordinate 
legislation was a necessity, however, might well be grudging, as opposed to 
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enthusiastic – and any such agreement did not lead, necessarily, to the 
enactment of subordinate legislation on all topics. 
(2) Consequences of the features investigated 
These features of the United Kingdom polity – the existence of deeply 
entrenched constitutional understandings relating to the imposition of income 
tax; the traditional instinctive hostility to government in times of peace; and the 
fact that the making of subordinate legislation was controversial – had a number 
of different consequences: and those consequences operated to place three 
different constraints on the making of subordinate legislation relating to income 
tax. 
A first constraint was a general prompting towards caution in those involved in 
the preparation of income tax legislation.  A proposal for a provision enabling 
subordinate legislation to be made deserved careful thought before being 
exposed to general view in a public Bill; and it was perfectly possible for a 
proposal of this kind to be abandoned or modified before its existence could 
become generally known.  Discretion could be the better part of valour – and, 
accordingly, determinants producing inertia could prevail over those producing 
change.  There is no method for identifying such proposals, and it may well be 
difficult to assess precisely why any particular proposal was abandoned or 
modified – but the evidence is that such proposals existed. 
One proposal for legislation, involving the enactment of enabling legislation, but 
which was subsequently abandoned, was considered for inclusion in the 
Finance Bill of 1928.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Churchill) wished to 
consider the rewarding of early payments of income tax and the penalising of 
late payments.  As far as the latter was concerned, the material sent by the 
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Inland Revenue to Churchill on 28 March 1928 included its own ‘lay draft’ of the 
proposed legislation; and one draft clause provided that: 
The Commissioners of Inland Revenue may make regulations 
generally with respect to the charge and collection of the penalty 
and to the procedure to be adopted for the purpose, and may, in 
particular, by those regulations provide for the charge of the 
penalty by the surveyor or by the Special Commissioners, as the 
case may be ... .1053 
There was, however, no such legislation along these lines in the Finance Act 
1928.1054  A number of different considerations, however, may have affected 
Churchill’s decision that the proposal should be abandoned.  There is evidence 
that Churchill wished to limit the size of the Finance Bill.  In January 1928, he 
had minuted on one Inland Revenue note ‘I approve.  But beware at this time of 
year of the temptation to put all sorts of handy little things into the Finance 
Bill’.1055  There is also evidence that Churchill was troubled at the increase in 
the powers of the Inland Revenue officials which the proposal would bring.  A 
passage in one document sent to him by the Inland Revenue stated that the 
scheme could not be worked ‘unless statutory power is given to Inspectors to 
determine, by agreement with taxpayers, in disputed assessments, the amount 
of liability not in dispute’.  Churchill’s manuscript marginal annotation was 
‘nasty’.1056  The Inland Revenue’s overall conclusion, in that same document, 
was that the operational advantages of the proposal were outweighed by its 
parliamentary difficulties.
1057
  Churchill’s final verdict was ‘[p]ut by for a rainy 
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  TNA file T 171/271.  Note, Gowers to Chancellor of the Exchequer [Churchill], ‘Penalty on 
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day’.1058  He did not want the Finance Bill, he wrote on another occasion, to be 
‘a Bill of Pains and Penalties’.1059  The proposal for a provision enabling 
subordinate legislation to be made accordingly disappeared.  The evidence 
does not permit a clear view to be taken on the reasons for that disappearance: 
but the fact that this proposal explicitly envisaged the making of subordinate 
legislation which gave powers to Inland Revenue officials at a time when the 
making of subordinate legislation was particularly controversial can only have 
counted against its introduction and not in favour of it. 
A proposal that was significantly modified dated from 1915 and related to the 
government’s proposals for the deduction and collection of income tax from 
employment income.1060  An early draft of the legislation ultimately enacted as 
part of the Finance (No 2) Act 19151061 included a provision providing that the 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue might make regulations for the purpose of 
carrying that particular section into effect, ‘and may by those regulations make 
such adaptations of the Income Tax Acts as appear to them necessary or 
expedient for the purpose’.1062  Further drafts, however, resulted in the enabling 
legislation being split into a number of different provisions and becoming longer, 
more detailed, and more restricted; and, in particular, the wording which 
explicitly envisaged adaptations of the Income Tax Acts disappeared.1063 
The second constraint on the making of subordinate legislation relating to 
income tax was that different areas of this subject were considered to be of 
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differing suitability as subjects for subordinate legislation.  The core of the 
distinction made was that the charge to income tax was completely unsuitable 
for subordinate legislation: but that the administration of income tax did not have 
to be treated in the same way.  Such a proposition, however, might well be 
easier to state in general than to apply in a particular case: for it was not always 
possible to assign all income tax provisions, unequivocally, to one category or 
the other – and, accordingly, matters of judgment arose. 
No suggestion that a charge to income tax might be placed in subordinate 
legislation is known.  The position as regards the administration of income tax, 
however, was very different.  In 1920, the Report of the Royal Commission on 
the Income Tax, stated that, while it considered it important that those portions 
of a new Act dealing with the liability of the taxpayer should be fully set out, ‘the 
less important administrative matters’ (the machinery for assessment and 
collection for example) ‘might with advantage be dealt with in the new Act in a 
less particularized manner than in the old, leaving the details to be covered by 
statutory regulations’.1064  The Revenue Bill of 1921, however, did not include 
any provision of this kind; and, following the failure to enact that Bill, no 
evidence is known that any government pursued the Royal Commission’s 
expression of opinion.  Emergency legislation relating to income tax, and 
providing for the making of subordinate legislation, was enacted in 1939, on the 
outbreak of the second world war: but the Income Tax Procedure (Emergency 
Provisions) Act 19391065 applied only to administrative matters and not to the 
charge to the tax.  No subordinate legislation was ever made under this statute; 
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and the Act itself was repealed in 1950.1066  The position in the middle of the 
century was summarised in a document which stated that the Board of Inland 
Revenue ‘have power under various Finance and other Acts to make 
Regulations.  These Regulations relate entirely to points of machinery and 
procedure’. The document then observed that this subordinate legislation 
differed markedly from that made by many other government departments 
which often created substantive law.1067 
The proposition that matters of judgment arose when considering the 
application of subordinate legislation to different areas of income tax law and 
practice may be demonstrated by examining the provision enacted as section 
11 of the Finance (No 2) Act 1940.1068  Having been asked to make legislative 
provision for a scheme which involved a great increase in the powers of the 
Inland Revenue to make regulations dealing with the deduction and collection of 
sums by way of income tax from employees’ earnings,1069 Parliamentary 
Counsel (Stainton) produced a draft clause with three subsections.  Subsection 
(1), Stainton commented in his covering letter,1070 conferred powers that would 
enable the Inland Revenue to make regulations covering the entirety of the area 
envisaged.  The regulations were to apply ‘notwithstanding anything in the 
Income Tax Acts’; and there was nothing to indicate that Stainton was in any 
way troubled by the extent of the powers conferred.  Subsection (2) of the draft 
clause, on the other hand, dealt with penalties: and on this subsection Stainton 
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commented that ‘I think we ought certainly to specify the penalties in the clause 
and not leave it to the regulations to impose what penalties you choose; that 
would be asking altogether too much from the House’.  Subsection (3) of the 
draft clause extended the time limit during which summary proceedings for the 
recovery of tax might be taken in England; and on this provision Stainton 
commented ‘I have no doubt at all that if you intend to extend the time limit for 
summary proceedings, this ought to be done by the clause and not by the 
regulations’.  This clause then went forward very much as Stainton had 
originally drafted it.  Many matters had been considered suitable for subordinate 
legislation – but some others had not. 
The third constraint on the making of subordinate legislation was that the 
Conservative and Labour parties had different approaches to the use of 
subordinate legislation – a rare instance where party political differences were 
significant determinants of the form of income tax legislation.  The party that 
was more sympathetic to the use of subordinate legislation was the Labour 
party. 
The Labour party supported the use of subordinate legislation, viewing it as a 
mechanism which was necessarily involved in the extensive social legislation 
which the party wished to enact.  The system of subordinate legislation, Laski 
wrote, was ‘an elementary procedural convenience essential to the positive 
state’.1071  This general approach may be seen in the views expressed by 
members of the Labour party who served on the Donoughmore Committee.  
The Labour MP, Ellen Wilkinson, produced a note on delegated legislation that 
appeared as an annex to the Committee’s report.  Some passages in the report 
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gave the impression that subordinate legislation was ‘a necessary evil, 
inevitable in the present state of pressure on parliamentary time, but 
nevertheless a tendency to be watched with misgiving and carefully 
safeguarded’; but Ellen Wilkinson felt that in the conditions of the modern state, 
which not only had to undertake immense new social services, but which might 
also become responsible for the greater part of the country’s industrial and 
commercial activities, the practice of granting powers to make subordinate 
legislation ‘instead of being grudgingly conceded, ought to be widely extended, 
and new ways devised to facilitate the process’.  Laski (another Committee 
member) was ‘in complete agreement’ with Ellen Wilkinson’s emphasis upon 
the desirability of subordinate legislation ‘as the only way to grapple with the 
functions now performed by modern governments’.1072 
In the early 1930s, individual members of the Labour party took this general 
approach to extremes.  In 1933, Sir Stafford Cripps, looking forward to the next 
election, declared that the first step of a future socialist government should be to 
call Parliament together at the earliest moment and to place before it an 
Emergency Powers Bill to be passed through all its stages on the first day.  This 
Bill, an Enabling Act, should be wide enough to allow all measures immediately 
necessary to be taken by ministerial orders.  Those orders were to be incapable 
of challenge in the Courts or in any way except in the House of Commons.1073  
‘The powers granted must be of the widest nature so that no loophole will be left 
                                            
1072
  Committee on Ministers’ Powers, Report (n 1043) 137.  Laski also saw a need ‘for a 
thorough revision of existing parliamentary procedure which was mainly devised for a quite 
different kind of state’.  That matter, however, was outside the Committee’s terms of reference – 
and Laski did not attempt to pursue it. (ibid.) 
1073
  S Cripps, ‘Can Socialism Come by Constitutional Methods?’ in C Addison and others, 
Problems of a Socialist Government (London, Victor Gollancz, 1933) 43. 
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open to capitalist attack’.1074  Cripps argued that ‘during the transition [to 
socialism] ... the temptation to dictatorship will be almost overwhelming’ and 
that this could be avoided only if power in Parliament and government was 
placed in the hands of a rigidly disciplined party cadre comparable with the 
Communist party in the Soviet Union.  ‘That should be for us the great lesson of 
the Russian experiment.  Once the party is in power it will have to be ruthless 
as regards individuals’.1075  It was never explained how, having regard to 
existing parliamentary procedure, such a controversial Bill could be enacted in a 
single day; and, as Pimlott has pointed out, no major national policy or decision 
between 1931 and 1939 ‘was made or prevented by anything any politician on 
the Left said, wrote or did’.1076 
By the end of the 1930s, however, the Labour party had views that were less 
spectacular and more realistic.  Toye has argued convincingly that, during the 
inter-war period, the Labour party came increasingly to view Parliament 
‘instrumentally’, ‘as the handmaiden to executive power, instead of being valued 
principally as a forum for discussion through morally forceful speech’.1077  The 
party, in Toye’s view, expressed admiration for the way that the National 
Government used Orders in Council extensively from 1931.  The substance of 
what had been done had been wrong – but the technique had been right.  The 
House of Commons, in Lansbury’s view, ‘is every day becoming more and more 
                                            
1074
  Quoted in W Frame, ‘”Sir Stafford Cripps and his Friends”: the Socialist League, the 
National Government and the Reform of the House of Lords 1931-1935’ (2005) 24 
Parliamentary History 316, 320. 
1075
  ibid. 
1076
  B Pimlott, Labour and the Left in the 1930s (CUP 1977) 1. 
1077
  R Toye, ‘”Perfectly Parliamentary”? The Labour Party and the House of Commons in the 
Inter-war Years’ (2014) 25 Twentieth Century British History 1.  The passage quoted directly is 
at 5. 
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like a machine.  And the House is not therefore getting more useless, it is daily 
becoming more and more efficient’.1078 
Herbert Morrison was one Labour politician who believed in the use of 
subordinate legislation;
1079
 and he made a major analysis of the legislative 
situation facing a post-war government in a speech in 1944.1080  In that speech, 
Morrison considered how Parliament was going to do its business in the post-
war period.  In his view, two great principles had to be kept in view; and the 
problem lay in reconciling them in practice.  The first principle was that there 
should be ‘the utmost possible freedom of discussion among the 
representatives of the people’ so that government by consent was real and full.  
‘But the second principle, which in form and to some extent in fact threatens to 
conflict with the first, is that amid the awful problems of the post-war period 
democracy must work fast if it is to survive’.  Even if full advantage were to be 
taken of existing techniques, ‘the fact still remains that the pressure upon 
Parliamentary time is going to be almost overwhelming’.  In this situation, in 
Morrison’s view, legislative methods needed to be conceived on lines of broad 
principles.  After that, Parliament had to be prepared to leave to the executive 
the task of working out the details, within the policy Parliament had approved, 
and implementing the details of that policy through subordinate legislation.  
                                            
1078
  ibid 26.  The party’s more detailed programme ‘For Socialism and Peace’, dating from 
1934, explained that the existing forms of parliamentary government ‘were devised to suit the 
purposes of the negative State in the nineteenth century, and are unsuited to the needs of the 
positive State in the twentieth’.  The ‘old-fashioned procedure of the House of Commons which 
facilitates obstruction and delay’ would therefore be rationalised to expedite government 
business.  (ibid 25.) 
1079
  ‘I am, quite frankly, an advocate of the proper and adequate use of delegated legislation, 
under proper conditions’.  Morrison speaking in the House of Commons (HC Deb 17 May 1944, 
vol 400, col 263).  When Minister of Transport between 1929 and 1931, Morrison had supported 
legislation of this kind.  See B Donoughue and GW Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a 
Politician (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973) 140. 
1080
  TNA file CAB 118/60 contains a transcript of this speech, which was delivered in Bradford 
on 5 March 1944.  From October 1942 until May 1945, Morrison was the Home Secretary and a 
member of the War Cabinet. 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
324 
 
‘This means, and we have to face the fact, that we may have to accept in 
peace-time rather more use of delegated legislation than we had before the 
war’.1081 
The approach taken by the Attlee government after 1945 was the approach 
indicated by Morrison in his 1944 speech.  Every twentieth century government 
had provided for subordinate legislation, Morrison told the House of Commons 
in August 1945.1082  ‘The tendency is for it to increase and it is bound to be so.  
What is the good of boggling at something which is bound to increase if the 
whole legislative process is to survive at all?’  The subject could be debated 
‘until we are blue in the face, but for this Government or any other Government 
delegated legislation has increased, will increase, and, in my judgment, ought to 
increase’.1083  Much subordinate legislation was made by the Labour 
government in office after the war.1084  ‘The truth is’, Morrison wrote in 1950, 
‘that the formidable number of instruments is the inevitable result of the 
complicated and detailed character of modern government’.1085 
                                            
1081
  One month later, at a meeting of the War Cabinet’s Committee on the Machinery of 
Government, Morrison was recorded as saying that ‘subordinate legislation was valuable not 
only as a means of lightening the legislative load confronting Parliament.  There was also the 
additional advantage that if administrative detail was embodied in subordinate legislation, it was 
a simple matter to make any detailed amendments that might be necessary from time to time.  If 
on the other hand administrative detail was embodied in the statute itself, amendments, 
however small, involved legislation by Bill’.  (TNA file CAB 87/73.  War Cabinet: Committee on 
the Machinery of Government, Minutes of meeting held on 20 April 1944.) 
1082
  Morrison was now leader of the House of Commons. 
1083
  HC Deb 24 August 1945, vol 413, col 1050. 
1084
  The position was such that, in the spring of 1950, the Cabinet’s Legislation Committee 
invited the Lord Chancellor to consider what steps could be taken to reduce the bulk of statutory 
instruments in force and currently being made.  Ram was consulted; and stated that the large 
number of Statutory Instruments made had resulted from the deliberate policy of the 
government that Bills should be drawn in a form that left as much detail as possible to be dealt 
with by subordinate legislation.  Had this not been the case, the vast majority of the Acts passed 
since 1945 could not have reached the Statute Book.  ‘Nothing short of re-enactment of these 
Acts in a different form (which is of course unthinkable) could do much to reduce the number of 
Statutory Instruments which are necessarily made under them’.  (TNA file LCO 2/4326.  Minutes 
of Legislation Committee, 7 March 1950; letter, Dobson to Ram, 12 April 1950; letter, Ram to 
Dobson, 19 April 1950.) 
1085
  TNA file LCO 2/4326.  Letter, Morrison to [Jowitt], 9 May 1950. 
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The Conservative party held views which contrasted strongly with those held in 
the Labour party.  It was to the Conservative party that politicians instinctively 
hostile to the use of subordinate legislation could be expected to belong.  Sir 
Frederick Banbury1086 and Sir John Marriott1087 were two such Conservative 
Parliamentarians in the period before the second world war; and, later, during 
that war, the group of MPs which was particularly active in scrutinising 
subordinate legislation, and which called itself the ‘Active Back-Benchers’, was 
a group of Conservative MPs.1088  This critical attitude was reflected in the 
general policy of the Conservative governments in power from 1951.  A 
parliamentary question in 1952 attracted the reply from the Prime Minister 
(Churchill) that it was the government’s ‘constant endeavour to limit as far as 
possible the number of Statutory Rules and Regulations’.1089 
This policy had an impact on the form of income tax legislation – as is 
demonstrated by events that took place during the 1950s.1090  On 25 July 1952, 
the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue (Bamford) sent a submission to 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Butler) hoping that there was no objection to 
the presentation of a memorandum to the Royal Commission on the Taxation of 
Profits and Income, which the department had prepared.  The submission 
                                            
1086
  Banbury was later ennobled as Lord Banbury of Southam; and for his hostility to the use of 
subordinate legislation see text before n 1011 above.  In January 1924, Banbury was so moved 
by the peril of a prospective Labour government that he offered to lead the Coldstream Guards 
into the House of Commons in order to save the constitution.  M Pugh, ‘”Class Traitors”: 
Conservative Recruits to Labour, 1900-30’ (1998) 113 English Historical Review 38. 
1087
  Greenleaf states that ‘Sir John Marriott, both in speeches in Parliament and in his published 
works, drew attention to “the curtailment of individual liberty” which had resulted not only from 
the greater volume of legislation but also from its character, since it was increasingly formulated 
under delegated powers by public departments’.  Greenleaf (n 981) 547. 
1088
  Greenleaf (n 981) 567-8 and 573. 
1089
  HC Deb 1 April 1952, vol 498, col 1409. 
1090
 This paragraph and the following paragraph have both been derived from material in TNA 
file IR 40/11166.  It appears safe to assume that the draft memorandum to be found in that 
piece accords with the memorandum as sent to the Royal Commission; but, in the National 
Archives, the piece containing the Board’s Memoranda to the Royal Commission (TNA file IR 
75/35) is (at present) closed for 75 years until 1 January 2031. 
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pointed out that there was nothing in the proposals made in the memorandum 
which committed ministers; and that, if the Royal Commission should see fit to 
endorse those proposals, they could only be brought into effect by legislation.   
The memorandum made three proposals, of which one was that ‘Statutory 
Regulations should be more freely adopted for the purpose of prescribing the 
details of the administrative machinery’.1091  It was thought that, with the power 
to deal with these matters in subordinate legislation, ‘the Board could more 
easily adapt their procedures to the changing needs of the times and could 
more easily adopt improved procedures which experience showed to be 
desirable’. 
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Boyd-Carpenter) thought it would be 
‘an admirable thing’ if the Revenue’s proposals were submitted to the Royal 
Commission; but recommended that this should be done with the express 
statement that those proposals set out the department’s views, but not 
necessarily those of the government.  The proposal relating to the use of 
subordinate legislation was ‘quite contrary to the general policy of H.M.G., in 
that it recommends conferring on [the] Revenue of greater power to act under 
delegated powers of legislation’.  Butler agreed that the Inland Revenue should 
submit their memorandum on that basis – and it may be inferred that this was 
done.  In its Final Report in 1955, the Royal Commission concurred in the 
Board’s view that a power to prescribe, by statutory instrument, the matters 
which the Board had specified would make it easier to adapt administrative 
                                            
1091
  The other two proposals were that the power of making income tax assessments should be 
vested in inspectors of taxes instead of the General Commissioners; and that the method of 
appointment and the property qualifications of General Commissioners should be amended.  
The administrative matters where the Inland Revenue now suggested that it should have the 
power to make subordinate legislation were the issue of return forms, the machinery of 
assessment, notices of assessment, the supervision of collection and accounting for tax, 
procedure for the submission of appeals, the disposal of appeals settled by negotiation and the 
boundaries of Divisions of General Commissioners. 
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provisions to the needs of the times – and made a recommendation 
accordingly.1092  During nearly all of the period from 1951 to 1965, however, 
Conservative governments were in office.  The policy of those governments was 
as Boyd-Carpenter had indicated; and the Inland Revenue’s proposal and the 
Royal Commission’s recommendation remained unimplemented.  A suggestion 
that would have produced change in the form of the income tax legislation did 
not give rise to action – and there was inertia and not change. 
In the overall result, therefore, comparatively little subordinate legislation 
relating to income tax was made.  A proposal that involved the making of 
subordinate legislation relating to income tax was (so to speak) taking part in an 
obstacle race in which it was necessary for the proposal to overcome a 
considerable number of different obstacles, any one of which could be fatal for 
the proposal’s implementation.  It is far from surprising that, in the case of 
income tax, comparatively little subordinate legislation was made.  Confirmation 
of this outcome is provided by the Report of the Select Committee on Delegated 
Legislation of 1953.  The Committee had invited and obtained evidence from 22 
government departments on the procedure followed in the department in 
connection with the drafting of a clause in a Bill giving power to make 
regulations and on the procedure followed in the department in making the 
regulations.  The 22 government departments consulted included neither the 
Treasury nor the Inland Revenue.1093 
                                            
1092
  Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, Final Report (Cmd 9474, 1955) 
291-2 and 340 (paras 976 and 1090(71)). 
1093
  Select Committee on Delegated Legislation, Report together with the Proceedings of the 
Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Appendices (1952-53, HC 310-1) ix and 170-183 (paras 
33-34 and Appendix B).  
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2. The subordinate legislation brought into existence 
The first section of this chapter addressed the question why only a 
comparatively small amount of subordinate legislation relating to income tax 
was brought into existence.  An appreciable amount of such subordinate 
legislation was nevertheless made; and this second section addresses the 
question why this limited, but significant, amount of subordinate legislation 
came into existence.  It was also the case, however, that a very substantial 
amount of this subordinate legislation related to one particular topic: to 
deductions on account of income tax from the earnings of employees; and the 
question of what determinants brought the subordinate legislation on this topic 
into existence is addressed separately in the third section of this chapter. 
The subordinate legislation relating to areas of income tax other than the 
earnings of employees, was concerned with a considerable number of 
miscellaneous topics.  The service of documents by post; post war credits; the 
specification of the nature of mineral deposits; and exemptions for visiting 
NATO forces – these were only some of the subjects dealt with in the 
subordinate legislation made.1094  The listing of these miscellaneous topics is 
quite sufficient, in itself, to make it clear that the coherence of the body of 
subordinate legislation relating to income tax formed no part of the thinking of 
those who caused some income tax legislation to be enacted in this form.  
There is an irresistible inference that this overall outcome was the aggregate 
result of a considerable number of different particular decisions, taken on a 
considerable number of different occasions. 
                                            
1094
  See Appendix 3 for a table listing the subordinate legislation relating to income tax and not 
involving any foreign element. 
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The evidence suggests that enabling powers were conferred, and that 
subordinate legislation relating to income tax was then made, as a result of 
decisions which may be placed in one of two categories.  Subordinate 
legislation might be made following general decisions taken earlier at a high 
level in government.  Those general decisions had an impact on the income tax 
system among their general consequences – and that impact was dealt with in 
subordinate legislation.  The decision, taken in the 1920s, to partition Ireland 
falls into this category: and three Orders were concerned, to a greater or lesser 
extent, with the adaptation of the Income Tax Acts to deal with the partition.1095  
The decision to go to war in 1939 also falls into this category: and the 
emergency legislation enacted included the Income Tax Procedure (Emergency 
Provisions) Act 1939,1096 which empowered the Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue, during the emergency occasioned by the second world war, to make 
orders providing for functions of officials concerned in the administration of 
income tax to be carried out by other officials instead.  No evidence is known, 
however, that the Inland Revenue ever contemplated making any order under 
this Act.  It may be conjectured that, although the department wished to make 
changes in the administration of the tax, it wished to do so not for the duration 
of the emergency, but permanently.  In the events that happened, therefore, the 
only item of subordinate legislation made under this statute was an Order in 
Council declaring that the emergency came to an end on 1 February 1946.1097 
                                            
1095
  The Government of Ireland (Adaptation of the Taxing Acts) Order 1922, SR & O 1922/80 
made under the Government of Ireland Act 1920, s 69 (10 & 11 Geo 5 c 67); the Irish Free 
State (Consequential Adaptation of Enactments) Order 1923, SR & O 1923/405, and the Irish 
Free State (Consequential Adaptation of Taxing Acts) Order 1923, SR & O 1923/453, both 
made under the Irish Free State (Consequential Provisions) Act 1922, s 6 (13 Geo 5 sess 2 c 
2). 
1096
  2 & 3 Geo 6 c 99.  This Act received the Royal Assent on 7 September 1939. 
1097
  The Income Tax Procedure (Emergency Provisions) Act (Expiry) Order 1946, SR & O 
1946/163. 
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Subordinate legislation might also be made following a decision that the 
legislation required was technical, and that subordinate legislation was 
appropriate having regard to the nature of the subject matter involved.  One 
early item falling into this category dated from 1914 and gave effect to the 
decision of the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Lloyd George) that, following the 
United Kingdom’s entry into the first world war, income tax rates should be 
doubled for the second half of the income tax year only.1098  Another item of 
subordinate legislation of a technical nature derived from enabling legislation in 
section 36(2) of the Finance Act 1926,1099 a provision which, in order to give 
effect to the provisions of Part IV of the 1926 Act (dealing with the basis of 
assessment for income tax), permitted amendments to be made to the forms of 
statements, lists and declarations contained in the Fifth Schedule to the 1918 
Act.   Subordinate legislation was made accordingly.1100  A further example 
falling into this category, and dating from 1956, consisted of the regulations 
dealing with purchased life annuities.  Long before any provisions appeared in a 
Finance Bill, it had been recognised that ‘the legislation would be somewhat 
complicated’.1101 
3. The deduction of income tax from the earnings of employees 
Although subordinate legislation relating to income tax was concerned with a 
considerable number of miscellaneous topics, much of that subordinate 
                                            
1098
  The subordinate legislation enacted was SR & O 1914/1863 (which did not provide for 
citation).   The background to the making of this instrument is described in Sir J Stamp, ‘Recent 
Tendencies Towards the Devolution of Legislative Functions to the Administration’ (1923) 2 
Journal of Public Administration 23, 33.   
1099
  16 & 17 Geo 5 c 22. 
1100
  See the Income Tax (Schedule V Amendment) Order 1927, SR & O 1927/81.  (The 
legislation amended by this Order was repealed by the Finance Act 1927 (17 & 18 Geo 5 c 10).) 
1101
  TNA file T 171/451.  Submission by [Bamford] to Chancellor of the Exchequer (Butler), 6 
December 1954.  The subordinate legislation consisted of the Income Tax (Purchased Life 
Annuities) Regulations 1956, SI 1956/1230).  Those Regulations were amended by the Income 
Tax (Purchased Life Annuities) (Amendment) Regulations 1960, SI 1960/2308; and also, later, 
by other statutory instruments made after 1965. 
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legislation was nevertheless concerned with one topic only: the deduction and 
collection of income tax from the earnings of employees.1102  The legislation 
relating to this subject – one of great operational importance – constituted a 
striking exception to the general rule that important income tax legislation was 
primary legislation.  Of the 80 items of subordinate legislation relating to income 
tax listed in Appendix 3, 38 were concerned with this topic.  This section of this 
chapter accordingly addresses the question why subordinate legislation on this 
subject was made.  That subordinate legislation, however, which culminated in 
the making of the original PAYE Regulations in 1944,1103 consisted of a process 
with three episodes, taking place in 1915, 1940 and 1943-4.  Each episode 
involved the advance of subordinate legislation relating to the deduction and 
collection of income tax from the earnings of employees.1104 
A number of questions are now investigated in relation to these episodes, with a 
view to ascertaining, in each case, why an initiative involving the making of 
subordinate legislation and not primary legislation was undertaken; which 
elements within government determined that the initiative should take this form; 
and how far (if at all) the initiative was altered during the later period beginning 
with its exposure to the public and ending with the making of the subordinate 
                                            
1102
  On the developments leading to the making of the PAYE legislation, see generally RS 
Sayers, Financial Policy 1939-45: History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Civil 
Series (London, HMSO and Longmans, Green and Co, 1956) 99-111 and JHN Pearce, ‘The 
Road to 1944: Antecedents of the PAYE Scheme’ in J Tiley (ed), Studies in the History of Tax 
Law: Volume 5 (Oxford, Hart, 2012). 
1103
  The original PAYE Regulations were the Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1944, SR 
& O 1944/251.  For later subordinate legislation on this subject see text around ns 1182-3 
below. 
1104
  The deduction and collection of income tax from employment income is, however, a subject 
where material relating to the enactment of the relevant primary legislation is plentiful, but 
material relating to the choice and enactment of the relevant subordinate legislation is sparse.  It 
may be inferred that those involved in the legislative process devoted most of their attention to 
primary, and not to subordinate, legislation. 
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legislation itself.  The roles played by different elements within the United 
Kingdom polity differed markedly from episode to episode. 
The undertaking of initiatives involving the making of subordinate legislation 
concerning the deduction and collection of income tax from the earnings of 
employees in 1915, 1940 and 1943-4 may be traced to the need to raise 
unprecedented revenue for central government.  In 1915 and 1940, the 
immediate context was the United Kingdom’s participation in the world war then 
being fought; and, in 1915, one consequence of the need to obtain increased 
receipts from income tax was that more people would be called upon to pay the 
tax.1105  The Inland Revenue, faced with the prospects of large increases in the 
number of income tax payers and in the rates of that tax, was concerned to 
ensure that it could obtain the tax now envisaged as becoming payable.  The 
proposals brought forward included one that employees should be assessed to 
income tax, and should pay income tax, each quarter, in respect of the income 
of quarterly periods; and it was intended that this change should be 
‘incorporated in the permanent structure of the income tax’.1106  The Chancellor 
of the Exchequer (McKenna) introduced a Budget on 21 September 1915; and 
his speech included the statement that, so far as income tax was concerned, 
one important change would be ‘that for employees of all descriptions, both 
assessment and collection will be quarterly’.1107 
                                            
1105
  It was the view of Reginald McKenna, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1915, that ‘[t]o 
enable us to cope with our colossal task, every section of the nation must be called upon to 
contribute and to make great sacrifices’. (HC Deb 21 September 1915, vol 74, col 348.) 
1106
  TNA file T 171/126.  ‘War Taxation’.  Note by McKenna, 10 September 1915. 
1107
  HC Deb 21 September 1915, vol 74, cols 347-64.  The passage quoted is at 353.  The 
Economist commented that ‘[t]hose who listened to Mr. McKenna opening his first Budget on 
Tuesday afternoon could not complain that he was enveloping them in a war mist, or trying to 
conceal the black truth by statistical jugglery or political rhapsodies.  It was a plain, unvarnished 
statement of an unparalleled revenue, an inconceivable expenditure, and an unimaginable 
deficit, followed by a list of fresh taxation which imposed, as he said, an unprecedented burden 
on the country’. (Economist (London, 25 September 1915) 81, 463-4.)   
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The responsibility for devising a detailed scheme for the quarterly assessment 
and collection of income tax was that of the Inland Revenue.  A Committee 
appointed by the Chief Inspector of Taxes produced a report1108 which, after 
dealing with the procedure recommended for the future, contained two further 
cross-headings.  The first was entitled ‘[p]oints on which legislation appears to 
be required’ and consisted of 15 short paragraphs, but with no indication 
whether each particular point should be dealt with in primary or subordinate 
legislation.  The second cross-heading was entitled ‘[a]dministrative details to 
be prescribed by Regulations of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue’ and 
specified six matters.  This report was known to a Departmental Committee 
which reported a little later.  The report from the Departmental Committee did 
not incorporate the report of the Chief Inspector’s Committee on any wholesale 
basis, but the major recommendations were the same.1109  The Departmental 
Committee took the view that if income tax on the earnings of employees was to 
be assessed and collected quarterly, as opposed to yearly, new and speedier 
methods of assessment and collection would have to be devised.1110  There 
was a heading stating that ‘[l]egislation on the following lines would be required 
to give effect to the foregoing proposals’ followed by 21 short paragraphs.  One 
of those paragraphs referred to ‘such cases as may be prescribed under 
Regulations to be made by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue’.  The 
demand for increased revenue from income tax in wartime, to be collected in 
                                            
1108
  TNA file IR 63/57 contains material relating to the Committee appointed by the Chief 
Inspector of Taxes and to the Inland Revenue Departmental Committee.  The Chief Inspector’s 
Committee’s Report was dated 17 September 1915. 
1109
  TNA file IR 63/57.  This Report, dated 27 September 1915, was printed; and, on 28 
September 1915, a copy of the printed Report was sent by the Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (TNA file T 171/119).  It may be noted the date of 
this Report was nearly a week after McKenna had delivered his Budget speech. 
1110
  TNA file T 171/119.  ‘Report of the Committee appointed by the Board of Inland Revenue to 
consider the legislative and administrative measures required by the Budget proposals’, 27 
September 1915. 
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new and speedier ways, had accordingly led the Inland Revenue to devise a 
detailed scheme involving the introduction of subordinate legislation as one of 
its features.  The Inland Revenue’s ‘Notes on Clauses’ explained the position by 
stating that ‘[t]he regulations to be made under this sub-clause arise out of the 
necessity of compressing the operations of assessment and collection, hitherto 
requiring a whole year, into the compass of three months’.1111 
The need to raise unprecedented sums resulting from the United Kingdom’s 
participation in a world war also lay behind the further initiative undertaken in 
1940.  Following the outbreak of the second world war, it was obvious that there 
was a need for greatly increased government expenditure and taxation; and 
there is evidence that, by the summer of 1940, the Inland Revenue was 
considering action of the type ultimately taken.  On 3 May 1940, in a letter 
apparently unrelated to any business immediately in hand, Gregg (at the Inland 
Revenue) wrote to Hopkins (at the Treasury) stating that if it should prove 
necessary to increase the income tax payable by small incomes, the question of 
practicability was whether the tax could be collected.  Any attempt to deal with 
individuals with small incomes through the income tax was only possible by the 
adoption of deduction at the source and giving the Inland Revenue powers to 
make compulsory a scheme of deduction on lines similar to that laid down in a 
voluntary scheme which was then in existence.1112  ‘Should we not arm 
ourselves accordingly?’1113   
The legislative form which a new scheme might take was a subject on which 
those concerned with the initiative said little in the early stages.  The Report of 
                                            
1111
  The Inland Revenue’s Notes on Clauses, as they existed at this time, are in TNA file T 
171/127. 
1112
  For details of this voluntary scheme see Pearce (n 1102) 198-200. 
1113
  TNA file T 160/927 (F 12728).  Gregg to Hopkins, 3 May 1940.  
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an Inland Revenue Departmental Committee, dated 8 July 1940, in which the 
initiative was considered, made no explicit statement or recommendation about 
the legal form in which its proposals should be enacted.1114  The obvious legal 
form for the scheme proposed in 1940, however, was the same as for the 
scheme, introduced in 1915, which applied to weekly wage-earners, and was 
embodied in regulations.  The obvious inference is that the limited number of 
experienced officials dealing with this matter all understood that the 
Departmental Committee’s Report would be implemented by subordinate 
legislation.  There is no evidence that senior Inland Revenue officials ever 
envisaged that the new arrangements would take any other legal form.  The 
department’s instructions to Parliamentary Counsel for the drafting of 
appropriate material for the Finance Bill consisted principally of a copy of the 
Departmental Committee’s Report.1115  Parliamentary Counsel, in response, 
produced the draft of a single clause to deal with this matter, and commented 
that, so far as he could see, the enabling powers conferred in the first 
subsection of the draft clause ‘will enable you to make regulations covering the 
whole of the document you gave me’.1116 
The Inland Revenue made a number of points in favour of the form to be taken 
by the scheme proposed in 1940 in the notes it prepared on the Budget 
                                            
1114
  TNA file IR 40/7454 contains the original report.  The scheme ultimately put forward by the 
Inland Revenue largely followed the Departmental Committee’s Report, but departed from it in 
certain details. 
1115
  Material relevant for the provision enacted as section 11 of that Act is at TNA file AM 6/49, 
fos 911-68. 
1116
  TNA file IR 40/7454.  Stainton to Gregg, 12 July 1940.  The ‘document you gave me’ was 
undoubtedly the Departmental Committee’s Report.  Although some changes were made to the 
wording of subsection (1) of the draft clause before the Finance Bill was printed, the changes 
made did not involve any point of principle.  Parliamentary Counsel’s response was considered 
above: see text around ns 1068-70. 
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Resolutions and on the clauses of the Finance Bill.1117  One point was that there 
was a relevant precedent: for the machinery of assessment and collection for 
income tax payable by weekly wage-earners was already prescribed by 
regulations.  With this as the starting point, the Inland Revenue felt able to 
advance to the statements that ‘[t]he power to make Regulations for carrying 
out this new method of collection accords with precedent’ and that there was 
‘nothing novel’ in what was proposed.  This point included a major element of 
advocacy.  There was an existing compulsory scheme (involving regulations) 
applying to some employees and there was an existing voluntary scheme (not 
involving regulations) with provisions similar to those proposed:1118 but there 
was no compulsory scheme involving regulations that applied to all employees 
– and the initiative now proposed would result in a major expansion in the ambit 
of subordinate legislation as it applied to employees’ earnings.1119  An initiative 
involving the making of subordinate legislation was accordingly brought forward 
because it was considered that the need for increased revenue in wartime 
demanded the amplification of the existing arrangements for the deduction and 
collection of income tax from the earnings of employees, which were already 
contained in subordinate legislation. 
                                            
1117
  TNA file IR 63/154 contains this material. The Inland Revenue also made the point that the 
regulations would deal only with matters of administration: neither the amount of tax payable by 
any employee, nor the existing rights of appeal against assessments would be affected; and this 
point was valid.  In addition, the department made the further point that details of the scheme 
could be amended more easily if those details were set out in subordinate legislation as 
opposed to primary legislation; and this point was also valid.   
1118
  For details of this voluntary scheme see Pearce (n 1102) 198-200. 
1119
  ‘Though the proposal to collect income-tax due on salaries and wages at the source has 
been hailed in some quarters as revolutionary, it is, in fact, only an extension of a system which 
has been introduced voluntarily by a number of concerns and local authorities, and applies to 
railway officials, civil servants and the fighting services.  That it is now to apply to the whole 
range of salary and wage earners is a wise move.  The burden of income tax is too often 
allowed to fall entirely on the month in which it is due, imposing a disproportionate strain on the 
taxpayer for a few weeks.  As income-tax has now risen to altogether unprecedented heights, 
the absolute necessity of spreading the burden can no longer be questioned.  It will, of course, 
mean more responsibility for employers and certainly more work for accountants’.  Accountant: 
Tax Supplement (London, 27 July 1940) 15, 281-2. 
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In 1943-44, by contrast, the initiative that extended the ambit of subordinate 
legislation relating to income tax had a somewhat different context.  The need to 
raise unprecedented sums during the current war was not the only matter 
requiring attention.1120  The collection of income tax from the earnings of 
employees during the post war period also needed consideration.1121  On 6 
March 1943, the case for a scheme based on current earnings, taking account 
of the public finances as they would exist after the war, was set out in a note 
sent by a Treasury official to the Chancellor of the Exchequer: 
... although things are pretty quiet at present the real testing time 
on wage-earners income tax is going to be the first year after the 
war, when overtime and high piece-work rates have come off.  It is 
absolutely essential to post-war finances that we should be able to 
maintain wage-earners’ income tax as a permanency, but if, when 
the first year of lower earnings comes they have to pay tax on the 
previous year’s income when earnings were right at their peak, 
there will be such an outcry that the whole wage-earners’ tax 
system might collapse altogether.  It seems to me that our only 
chance of carrying on wage-earners’ income tax into the post-war 
period is to get it on to a current earnings basis before the drop in 
earnings comes.1122 
The need, therefore, to obtain unprecedented revenue for central government, 
not only in the context of the current war but also in the context of the 
forthcoming peace, produced an initiative involving the further extension of 
subordinate legislation relating to the deduction and collection of income tax 
from the earnings of employees. 
                                            
1120
  By 1943, the existing arrangements for the deduction of income tax from the earnings of 
employees were encountering difficulties.  Further details are given in Pearce (n 1102) 204-7.  
1121
 As early as February 1942, Ernest Bevin, the Minister of Labour, stated his ‘conviction that 
the present system as it applies to the weekly wage earner must be modified’ and considered 
that ‘the real essence of the matter is that the wage earner budgets on the basis of his weekly 
earnings.  ...  Any system must be simple in its operation and must be related to current 
earnings’.  (TNA file T 171/360.  WP (42) 78, War Cabinet: Effect of Income Tax on the Weekly 
Wage-earner: Memorandum by the Minister of Labour and National Service, 13 February 1942.) 
1122
 TNA file T 171/363.  Note to Chancellor of the Exchequer by P D Proctor, 6 March 1943.  
Proctor was an Under Secretary at the Treasury.  (Underlining in original.) 
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An appendix to the Departmental Report, dated 21 May 1943, which stands at 
the beginning of the sequence of events leading directly to the making of the 
PAYE Regulations, listed ‘the main points upon which early legislation is 
necessary’.1123  The final matter listed was ‘[g]eneral power to Commissioners 
of Inland Revenue to make Regulations which would enable tax to be deducted 
on the proposed basis, if it is considered that the powers contained in Section 
11 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1940, are inadequate’.  This last matter 
demonstrates that in 1943-4, as in 1940, the new scheme was viewed as a 
development of existing arrangements.  The initiative undertaken in 1940 had 
been implemented by the making of subordinate legislation; and the PAYE 
scheme was to be implemented in the same way. 
The elements within government that determined on the initiatives extending the 
ambit of subordinate legislation (and, accordingly, affecting the form of the 
income tax legislation) differed greatly in 1915, 1940 and 1943-44.  In 1915, the 
evidence is that different elements within government worked together 
constructively and without friction.  All was in accordance with ideals of how 
government ministers and civil servants should work together.1124  Political 
ministers, headed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, set the guidelines; and 
                                            
1123
    TNA file IR 63/163. ‘Report of the Committee appointed to examine the possibility of 
introducing a system of deducting income tax on wages on the current earnings basis’, 21 May 
1943, 1, 19 (in appendix II to the Report).  The list was as follows: 
‘(1) The writing off of that part of the tax deductible on the old basis which would overlap the 
deductions on the new basis i.e. 10/12ths of the 1943/44 tax for manual wage-earners and 
7/12ths of the 1943/44 tax for other employees.  ... . 
(2) Alteration of basis of assessment under Schedule E to that of the current year ... with 
possible relieving provisions in certain cases. 
(3) Transfer of Schedule E assessing from Commissioners to Inspector, and abolition of 
half yearly assessment of manual wage-earners.  
(4) Alteration of basis of Life Insurance Relief ... .  
(5) General power to Commissioners of Inland Revenue to make Regulations which would 
enable tax to be deducted on the proposed basis, if it is considered that the powers contained in 
Section 11 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1940, are inadequate’. 
1124
  See chapter 5, section 1, above, text around ns 645-53. 
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the Inland Revenue and the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel devised 
detailed plans and provided for the legal form to implement those plans. 
In 1940, by contrast, the element advancing the initiative was the Inland 
Revenue.  Having suggested that the department should have power to impose 
a compulsory scheme from the earnings of employees,1125 the language of 
Inland Revenue officials became more forceful during the summer of 1940.  
One document stated that the only way in which the department considered that 
high rates of income tax could satisfactorily be collected from weekly and 
monthly wage-earners was to secure the spreading of payments over the whole 
year.  It was accordingly proposed that a scheme should be put into operation 
under which employers should be required to deduct an appropriate amount in 
respect of income tax from the payment of wages or salaries every week or 
month – and this scheme would apply to all earnings.1126 
The Inland Revenue acted in a context in which other individuals concerned 
with the formulation of tax policy were either well disposed to the initiative or 
were concentrating on other matters.  On 8 May 1940, Hopkins, at the Treasury, 
indicated support for ‘this large new departure’.1127  On the other hand, it may 
                                            
1125
  See text around ns 1112-3 above. 
1126
  TNA file T 171/354 (Part C).  ‘Deduction at source of the Income Tax due in respect of 
salaries and wages’, 10 July 1940.  An earlier note, dated 1 June 1940, had contained a 
passage stating that the increase in tax on all incomes and particularly on earned incomes 
would be very heavy.  The actual collection of these large amounts would be extremely difficult; 
and it was considered that if any increase of this magnitude was going to be made in the 
income tax payable by individuals under direct assessment, there must be instituted some 
machinery for spreading the burden and deducting it from salary month by month.  If action of 
this kind was to be taken, there must be statutory power for it that summer, as the system of 
collection at the source should commence in October next, and arrangements needed to be 
made in advance to get that system under way.  (TNA file IR 63/154.  ‘Note by Board of Inland 
Revenue on possible expedients for increased yield of Income Tax’.  The Note was signed by 
Gregg and dated 1 June 1940.) 
1127
  TNA file T 160/927 (F 12728).  Manuscript note, Hopkins to Padmore, 8 May 1940.   
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be inferred that the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood,1128 
was unaware of developments.  A manuscript endorsement, dated 4 June, on 
Hopkins’s note of 8 May, stated that ‘[w]hen the Chancellor is ready we had 
better mention it to him’.1129  By the beginning of July, the Chancellor had 
decided, for reasons that had nothing to do with the collection of income tax, to 
introduce an early supplementary Budget;1130 and, during the course of a 
discussion about this Budget, held on 5 July 1940, ‘[o]n points of detail it was 
mentioned to the Chancellor that the Inland Revenue would certainly press for a 
system of deduction of Income Tax from wages ...’.1131 
In 1940, therefore, senior Inland Revenue officials pressed vigorously for their 
initiative to be advanced: so the questions why they pressed so vigorously for 
this to be done and why they did so at this particular juncture both arise.  The 
Inland Revenue was undoubtedly keen to advance this initiative: for it would 
achieve the departmental objective of providing for income tax deductions from 
the earnings of employees.1132  There can be no doubt, also, that war 
strengthened the case for undertaking the initiative – and made it easier to 
accomplish.  It is also possible to go further.  The most important official in the 
Treasury (from the Inland Revenue’s point of view) was content for the initiative 
to succeed; the Chancellor of the Exchequer was new, inexperienced, and 
concentrating on other business.  The country’s situation was desperate: it was 
reasonable to hope that any initiative taken would not be wrecked by 
                                            
1128
 On 10 May 1940, Winston Churchill succeeded Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister; and, 
soon after that, Sir Kingsley Wood succeeded Sir John Simon as Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
1129
  TNA file T 160/927 (F 12728).  Manuscript note, Hopkins to Padmore, 8 May 1940.  
Manuscript annotation on note. 
1130
  The Chancellor’s priority was to be able to introduce purchase tax to which the Labour 
party (now part of the governing coalition) had earlier declared its opposition.  For an account of 
the events leading to the decision to introduce this supplementary Budget see Sayers (n 1102) 
48-50.  
1131
  TNA file T 171/354 (Part A).  Note, ‘Second Budget, 1940’, 5 July 1940. 
1132
  See chapter 3 above, text around ns 342-6. 
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employers, employees, and other groups within society.  It may be conjectured 
that senior Inland Revenue officials judged that the forces favouring their 
initiative were as strong, and that the forces opposing their initiative were as 
weak, as could ever reasonably be expected – and that those officials pressed 
forward accordingly.  The successful promotion of their initiative had the 
consequence that there was an expansion of the ambit of the subordinate 
legislation relating to income tax. 
In 1943-4, by contrast, it was different elements within government that 
advanced an initiative which involved the making of subordinate legislation 
relating to income tax.  On this occasion, the roles played may be said to be the 
mirror image of those played in 1940.  The Treasury and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer1133 were both looking for a scheme with different characteristics; 
and, accordingly, put pressure on the Inland Revenue, which believed that the 
existing arrangements were working satisfactorily.1134 
In the spring of 1943, Proctor, at the Treasury, believed that the Inland Revenue 
might be able to work out a system using a current earnings basis; and that it 
would help if the Chancellor could give some pointer in his Budget speech to 
say that he was looking ahead to the problem that would arise when earnings 
fell, and that he was closely examining the possibility of shifting on to a current 
earnings basis before that time came.
1135
  The Chancellor accordingly stated in 
his Budget speech that his advisers were now engaged in a close examination 
                                            
1133
  The approach of Kingsley Wood in 1943 to the introduction of PAYE was considered in 
more detail in chapter 5, section 3(2), above, text around ns 742-53. 
1134
  On 1 February 1943, the Treasury asked for draft paragraphs for inclusion in the 
Chancellor’s Budget speech; and the Inland Revenue produced a draft which included the 
statement that ‘the modifications which were made in the machinery of collection last year have 
proved to be successful and have contributed to a smooth collection of the tax’.  (TNA file T 
171/363.  Proctor to Gregg, 1 February 1943; and Note, ‘Income Tax – Wage Earners’, 27 
February 1943.) 
1135
  TNA file T 171/363.  Note, Proctor to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 6 March 1943. 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
342 
 
of this aspect of the matter and that the consideration of a current earnings 
basis for the deduction of tax would not be ruled out of their deliberations.1136  
The Chancellor also returned to this matter at the end of the Budget Debate 
with a statement that the Inland Revenue ‘are now looking into this matter again 
and are aware of the desires of the House, and that if there is any possibility of 
some sort of solution, they are the expert body to provide such a scheme’.1137 
The Inland Revenue accordingly believed itself to be under pressure – which it 
was.  A further Inland Revenue Departmental Committee, appointed ‘to 
examine the possibility of introducing a system of deducting income tax on 
wages on the current earnings basis’, reported on 21 May 1943; and began by 
stating that ‘[t]he public demand for a system of deducting tax on the current 
earnings ... basis has reached the point at which it is hardly any longer a 
question whether such a system is or is not possible’.  The authors of the 
Report also considered that Sir Kingsley Wood’s remarks at the end of the 
Budget Debate left no doubt that the Chancellor ‘regards the introduction of 
such a system as a necessity, if the Income Tax in post-war years is to continue 
to apply to wage-earning classes’.1138  It is this report, proposing that income tax 
should be deducted on a cumulative basis, which stands at the beginning of the 
sequence of events leading directly to the making of the PAYE Regulations.1139 
It is clear, however, that those devising the new scheme concentrated 
principally on the technical operation of the scheme and on the work that would 
be necessary if that scheme were to be brought into operation on 6 April 1944 – 
                                            
1136
  HC Deb 12 April 1943, vol 388, col 946. 
1137
  HC Deb 21 April 1943, vol 388, col 1772. 
1138
  TNA file IR 63/163.  ‘Report of the Committee appointed to examine the possibility of 
introducing a system of deducting income tax on wages on the current earnings basis’, 21 May 
1943.  In this piece, the Report is at 1-35 and the passage quoted is at 2 (para 1). 
1139
  For this sequence of events see Pearce (n 1102) 209-18. 
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the beginning of the next income tax year.  The Inland Revenue Departmental 
Committee paid less attention to legislative matters – and still less to the form of 
that legislation.1140  The Report stated that if, as was envisaged, the scheme 
was to come into force on 6 April 1944 ‘legislation before that date is absolutely 
essential and acceptance of the scheme would involve the introduction, at a 
very early date, of a special Bill, all the stages of which would have to go 
through within the next three or four months’.1141  In fact, two programme Bills 
were enacted in 1943 and 1944;1142 and the PAYE Regulations were then 
made.1143 
Not only were there major contrasts in the elements within government 
advancing the initiatives to make subordinate legislation relating to the 
deduction of income tax from the earnings of employees in 1915, 1940 and 
1943-44, there were also major contrasts in the alterations made to those 
initiatives during the later period beginning with the exposure of the initiative to 
the public and ending with the making of the subordinate legislation.  As a 
result, the ambit of the subordinate legislation and the form of the income tax 
legislation were both affected. 
In 1915, the version of the Finance Bill which became generally available in 
printed form contained four different provisions enabling subordinate legislation 
to be made.
1144
  Clause 24(2) gave the power to exclude any class of employed 
                                            
1140
  The view of the Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue (now Cornelius Gregg) was to 
the same effect: although there were ‘difficult issues that will require legislation they are soluble 
and the adoption of the scheme for current earnings cannot be said to depend upon their 
solution’.  (TNA file IR 63/163, fo 72 (para 2 of the covering Memorandum).) 
1141
  TNA file IR 63/163, fo 3 (para 6 of the Report). 
1142
  The Income Tax (Employments) Act 1943 (6 & 7 Geo 6 c 45) and the Income Tax (Offices 
and Employments) Act 1943 (7 & 8 Geo 6 c 12).  For the events that led to the enactment of two 
statutes, see text around ns 1174-82 below. 
1143
  Income Tax Employments Regulations 1944, SR & O 1944/251. 
1144
  These provisions had already been significantly altered before the text of the Bill became 
generally available: see text around ns 1060-3 above.  There is a copy of the Bill as it existed at 
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person from the operation of the new quarterly scheme.1145  Clause 25(1) 
referred to regulations in the context of the requirement for employers to make 
deductions from future earnings.  Clause 25(3) gave power to apportion yearly 
allowances and deductions.  Finally (and most controversially) clause 25(4) 
provided that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue might ‘make regulations 
generally with respect to the assessment and collection of income tax in the 
case of employed persons, and with respect to the procedure to be adopted for 
the purpose’. 
The government’s scheme could be contested.  That scheme affected both 
employers and employees – and the government was consequently vulnerable 
to any adverse reaction from those groups.  The government’s scheme also 
involved a major extension of the administration of income tax by central 
government at the expense of the existing system of local administration – and 
the proposals would encounter major difficulties if the existing system of 
administration should be defended energetically.  The government’s proposals 
encountered opposition from both groups of interests; and both caused 
amendments to be made to the Bill – with the result that the changes to the 
form of the income tax legislation were less extensive than had originally been 
proposed. 
In the case of employers and employees, conflict centred upon clause 25(1).  
On 26 October, the provision was much criticised when it was considered in 
Committee by the House of Commons; and McKenna ended by accepting a 
suggestion that he should obtain the views of the representatives of employers 
                                                                                                                              
this stage [Bill 145] in TNA file IR 63/55.  The Finance Bill only became generally available in 
printed form on 12 October, one day before its Second Reading.  (See HC Deb 26 October 
1915, vol 74, cols 1302, 1367 and 1403.) 
1145
  Similar arrangements were already in place for some classes of employees – notably civil 
servants.   
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and employees on the subject of the deduction of income tax from the 
payments of earnings.1146  A conference held to ascertain views reached the 
conclusion that the employer should not make income tax deductions in the 
circumstances envisaged in this subsection.1147  Clause 25(1) of the Bill in the 
form originally proposed was accordingly omitted. 
It does not appear that anyone in government had foreseen that difficulties 
would arise from those concerned with the local administration of income tax: 
but representatives of the General Commissioners were exceedingly active in 
opposing the government’s scheme1148 – with the Times newspaper in 
support.1149  It was the Inland Revenue’s view that, to a very significant extent, 
the agitation was not real and spontaneous, but stage-managed by the General 
Commissioners for the City of London – and, in particular, by their Clerk, Sir 
Thomas Hewitt.  The extant material suggests that many of the documents sent 
to the government made use of possible background and precedent material – 
and that the source of the material in question was the City of London General 
Commissioners.1150   
                                            
1146
 See HC Deb 26 October 1915, vol 75, cols 113-133 for the consideration of clause 25(1). 
1147
 TNA file T 172/222 consists of a transcript of the shorthand notes of this conference held on 
3 December 1915.  As one of the employees’ representatives put it ‘[t]here is enough trouble 
between employers and employed without any more being brought in’. (transcript 37).  The 
conference was sizable: five civil servants are listed as assisting the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and about 30 individuals attended from the employers’ side and about 20 from the 
employees’.  (Manuscript additions make it impossible to be sure about the exact numbers.) 
1148
 TNA file T 171/120 contains material relating to the actions taken on behalf of the General 
Commissioners. 
1149
  The Times printed a letter from three of the City of London General Commissioners, H 
Cosmo O Bonsor, John C Bell, and Arthur Hill, protesting against the government’s scheme 
(Times (London, 25 October 1915) at 9 col d). This matter was also the subject of two 
paragraphs of commentary in the financial section, in which the letter was described as ‘a 
protest ... very properly made’ and in which the first paragraph had the heading ‘A vicious 
proposal’.  (See ‘City Notes’ at ibid 14 col a.)  Statements in the commentary permit the 
conjecture that the Times had also been provided with background material (in addition to being 
lobbied). 
1150
  TNA file T 171/120 contains material relating to the actions taken on behalf of the General 
Commissioners.  A letter written by the Chairman of the City Commissioners, H Cosmo O 
Bonsor, to Austen Chamberlain began by stating that ‘I have been urged and reluctantly 
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The General Commissioners’ opposition nevertheless produced results.  On 26 
October, the relevant clauses of the Finance Bill were considered in Committee 
by the House of Commons,1151 and there was much hostility to clause 25(4) in 
the state in which it then existed.  McKenna admitted that he ‘could not press 
the clause in its present form’; and stated that he would communicate with the 
representatives of the General Commissioners before the Report Stage.  He 
would ‘endeavour to come to some definite arrangement as to the final form of 
the Clause’.  On the following day, therefore, McKenna presided at a meeting 
held with representatives of the General Commissioners, led by Sir Thomas 
Hewitt.1152  During this meeting McKenna expressed the view that the contents 
of the clause should be ‘a matter of agreement between us’ (meaning the 
representatives of the General Commissioners) and announced that the ambit 
of the clause would be limited to weekly wage earners.  A little later, on 5 
November, McKenna had ‘a prolonged interview with Sir Thomas Hewitt’ at 
which decisions were reached on the resolution of the dispute;1153 and matters 
were concluded accordingly.  The dealings between the government and the 
representatives of the General Commissioners may be regarded as a piece of 
‘horse trading’ – with the outcome being an untidy compromise.   
The legislation finally enacted accordingly differed from the legislation originally 
proposed; and the outcome had aspects that were disappointing for the 
                                                                                                                              
consented to write and call your attention’ to clause 25(4) of the Finance Bill.  (TNA file T 
171/120.  Letter, Bonsor to Austen Chamberlain, 25 October 1915.) 
1151
  See HC Deb 26 October 1915, vol 75, cols 133-153 for the consideration of clause 25(4).  
The remarks made by McKenna which are quoted are at cols 141 and 142. 
1152
  TNA file T 171/120 includes a transcript of the shorthand notes taken at this meeting; TNA 
file T 172/226 is another copy of that same transcript.  The body of the transcript records many 
remarks made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (i.e. McKenna), but the front sheet to the 
transcript states that the Deputation was to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury (i.e. 
Montagu).  However, remarks later made by Montagu in the House of Commons permit the 
inference that both were present: see HC Deb 6 December 1915, vol 76, col 1122. 
1153
  TNA file AM 1/50, fo 101.  Nott-Bower to Thring, 6 November 1915.  
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government.  Employers were not required to make deductions on account of 
income tax when paying employees.  The new scheme, furthermore, applied to 
the employment income of some employees only: the legislation was no longer 
applicable to ‘employees of all descriptions’ – the announcement made by 
McKenna in his Budget speech.  On the other hand, there were aspects of the 
outcome that the government could welcome.  The General Commissioners had 
defended their existing workload: but there was also additional new work to be 
done – and this new work was to be done by central government and not by 
local government.  At the meeting held on 27 October, the Chancellor told the 
General Commissioners’ representatives ‘you appreciate [that] all we are 
proposing now, we look upon as a permanent alteration’– and this statement 
went uncontested.1154  After this legislation had been enacted, central 
government was relatively stronger and local government was relatively weaker.   
The legislation finally enacted accordingly made changes to the form of the 
income tax legislation that were less extensive than those proposed earlier.  
The power to make regulations to exclude individuals from the new quarterly 
regime (which had been contained in clause 24(2) of the Bill as originally 
introduced) had now been omitted: the ambit of the new regime depended upon 
primary legislation only.  Clause 25(1), providing for compulsory deductions 
from earnings, had also gone – and the reference to subordinate legislation in 
that provision had gone as well.  On the other hand, the power to make 
regulations to deal with exemptions, reliefs and abatements under the new 
quarterly regime had survived (in what became section 28(2) of the Finance (No 
                                            
1154
  TNA file T 171/120.  Deputation from Representatives of the General Commissioners of 
Income Tax, transcript of the shorthand notes of the meeting, 5. 
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2) Act 1915);1155 and, more importantly, the Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
now had the power to ‘make regulations generally with respect to the 
assessment and collection of income tax under this Act in the case of weekly 
wage earners, and with respect to the procedure to be adopted for the purpose’ 
in section 28(3) of that Act.  The form of the income tax legislation had been 
affected: for the ambit of subordinate legislation had been increased.  
Regulations duly appeared.1156  Eight further sets of Regulations were later 
made on this subject, until, on 6 April 1944, the scheme for weekly wage 
earners was superseded by the PAYE scheme.1157 
In 1940, in contrast to 1915, no extensive changes were made to the legislation 
embodying the government initiative during the period beginning with its 
announcement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood, in the 
House of Commons, on 23 July 1940,1158 and ending with the making of 
regulations under the enacted legislation on 3 October 1940.1159  On the other 
hand, there was evidence of disquiet – from some MPs and also from the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer himself. 
Initial reaction in the House of Commons was favourable;1160 but, when the 
Finance Bill was in Committee, the government then found that it had to deal 
                                            
1155
  5 & 6 Geo 5 c 89. 
1156
  SR & O 1916/202.  These Regulations, made on 29 March 1916, did not provide for 
citation. 
1157
  The Regulations in question were SR & O 1916/887, 1920/1991, 1925/702, 1928/582, 
1931/827, 1940/1520, 1941/1379 (none of which provided for citation) and the Seasonal 
Employments (Income Tax) Regulations 1942, SR & O 1942/1970. 
1158
 For Sir Kingsley Wood’s financial statement in which the initiative was announced see HC 
Deb 23 July 1940, vol 363, cols 637-57. 
1159
  The Regulations in question were the Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) Regulations 
1940  (SR & O 1940/1776). 
1160
  One MP described the initiative as ‘one of the greatest reforms introduced within my 
memory in regard to Income Tax’ (HC Deb 23 July 1940, vol 363, col 699); and another as ‘an 
excellent piece of machinery which will be helpful to wage and salary earners, and it is a matter 
which those engaged in management for a long time have felt to be highly desirable’.  (HC Deb 
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with opposition – once again from those speaking on behalf of the local 
administration of income tax.1161  This opposition, however, was less formidable 
in 1940 than in 1915.  In 1940 there was evidence neither of any organised 
campaign of opposition to the government’s proposals nor of any support for 
that opposition from a leading newspaper.  There was also no sense that the 
general feeling in the House of Commons was in favour of the local 
administration of the income tax and hostile to the government’s proposals.  
The Chancellor of the Exchequer promised to have the wording of the clause 
re-examined in the light of the criticisms made.  Kingsley Wood himself then 
showed disquiet about the position, after an amendment had been drafted.1162  
At a meeting with officials on 14 August 1940, the Chancellor became ‘very 
excited’ and ‘re-acted very badly’ when the detail of what was proposed was 
considered.  A note of this meeting then recorded, however, that it was decided 
‘that the clause should stand as drafted, with the proviso as on the order 
paper’;1163 and the parliamentary proceedings were, in fact, concluded without 
any particular difficulty.1164 
                                                                                                                              
6 August 1940, vol 364, col 93).  Sir Kingsley Wood believed that the proposed new scheme 
‘has been generally welcomed’ (HC Deb 31 July 1940, vol 363, col 1285). 
1161
 For the proceedings in Committee see HC Deb 8 August 1940, vol 364, cols 474-7. 
1162
  The amendment consisted of a proviso to clause 11(1), which stated that the Regulations 
‘shall not affect the powers or duties of the general or other commissioners as respects the 
signing, allowance or rectification of assessments or determination of appeals’. (TNA file IR 
63/154.)  The wording of the proviso may also be found in HC Deb15 August 1940, vol 364, col 
1021. 
1163
  TNA file AM 6/49, fo 965.  The note, dated ‘14/8’ and addressed to ‘Sir John Stainton’ is 
handwritten; but an identification of the author has not proved possible.  The obvious working 
hypothesis is that the author was some other member of the Office of the Parliamentary 
Counsel.  This note of the meeting held on 14 August supports the view that it was the Inland 
Revenue, as opposed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who were pressing forward with this 
initiative. 
1164
  For the proceedings at Report Stage see HC Deb 15 August 1940, vol 364, cols 1011-
1021. 
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The initiative was accordingly enacted as section 11 of the Finance (No 2) Act 
1940;1165 and section 11(1) extended the ambit of subordinate legislation by 
conferring power on the Inland Revenue to make regulations ‘for the 
assessment and collection of tax chargeable under Schedule E, including in 
particular provision for requiring employers and other persons to deduct any tax 
so chargeable from any payments made by them’.  The form of the income tax 
legislation had again been affected: for the ambit of subordinate legislation had 
again been increased.  Regulations made on 3 October 1940 imposed duties on 
employers to deduct tax from payments made to employees and to pay the 
sums deducted to the Collector of Taxes.1166  Seven sets of amending 
Regulations were then made before the subordinate legislation made under 
section 11 of the 1940 Act was superseded by the PAYE Regulations.1167 
In 1943-44, in contrast to 1940, major changes were made to the legislation 
embodying the government initiative during the period beginning with the public 
announcement of the initiative and ending with the making of the PAYE 
Regulations.  In contrast to 1915, furthermore, the ambit of the subordinate 
                                            
1165
  3 & 4 Geo 6 c 48.  This Act received the Royal Assent on 22 August 1940. 
1166
  The Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) Regulations 1940, SR & O 1940/1776.  The 
duty to make deductions from earnings was imposed by regns 3(1) and 5(1); and the duty to 
pay the sums deducted to the Collector by regn 11(1).  The drafting papers for these 
Regulations have survived (in TNA file IR 40/7454); and are among those that show that, in the 
Inland Revenue, during the first half of the twentieth century, subordinate legislation was drafted 
in the Stamps and Taxes Division and not in the Solicitor’s Office. 
1167
  The amending regulations were Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) (Amendment) 
Regulations 1941, SR & O 1941/1378; Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) (Amendment No 
2) Regulations 1941, SR & O 1941/1667; Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) (Amendment 
No 3) Regulations 1942, SR & O 1942/1324; Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) 
(Amendment No 4) Regulations 1943, SR & O 1943/397; Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule 
E) (Amendment No 5) Regulations 1943, SR & O 1943/1024; Deduction of Income Tax 
(Schedule E) (Merchant Navy) Regulations 1943, SR & O 1943/1310; and Deduction of Income 
Tax (Schedule E) (Amendment No 6) Regulations 1943, SR & O 1943/1669. 
The determinants of the forms of income tax legislation 1907-65 
Their ascertainment and importance 
 
351 
 
legislation was enlarged and a second programme Act was added to the one 
the government proposed.1168 
The scheme announced to the House of Commons on 22 September 19431169 
was in accordance with the original decision of ministers: that the new scheme 
should apply to manual wage-earners and to other wage earners whose 
earnings were calculated weekly.  The proposed arrangements were favourably 
received;1170 but the restricted scope of the scheme was criticised.  A widely-
held view was that the new scheme should apply to all employees.
1171
  During 
the proceedings on the second reading of the Wage-earners’ Income Tax Bill 
(as it was called at that stage), the Chancellor of the Exchequer (now Sir John 
Anderson)1172 indicated his willingness to extend the scope of the Bill to 
individuals whose earnings did not exceed £600 per annum.1173 
Events of great importance for the PAYE Regulations took place on 20 October 
1943, when the House of Commons considered the Bill in Committee.1174  The 
amendment considered to clause 1 was a proposal to the effect that the new 
PAYE arrangements should be extended to all income charged under Schedule 
E; and 25 MPs contributed to the discussion.  No MP was overtly hostile to the 
extension; many were strongly in favour; and the mover of the amendment 
announced in his summing-up that he thought it would be a very long day 
before he moved any other amendment which was found to carry such support 
                                            
1168
  The statutes enacted were the Income Tax (Employments) Act 1943 (6 & 7 Geo 6 c 45) 
and the Income Tax (Offices and Employments) Act 1944 (7 & 8 Geo 6 c 12). 
1169
  HC Deb 22 September 1943, vol 392, cols 209-11. 
1170
  Sayers (n 1102) 108. 
1171
  One periodical, for example, regretted that the government ‘does not find it possible at the 
present time to make the scheme operative for all employees.  It seems quite impossible to 
argue that it is a good scheme for persons paid weekly but a bad scheme for persons paid 
monthly’.  (Taxation (London, 2 October 1943) 32, 3.) 
1172
  On 21 September 1943, Sir Kingsley Wood had collapsed and died. 
1173
  HC Deb 20 October 1943, vol 392, col 1107. 
1174
  For these proceedings see HC Deb 20 October 1943, vol 392, cols 1402-1480. 
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in so many quarters.1175  Another MP did not remember such unanimity on any 
other point of substance whilst he had been an MP; and thought that the 
Chancellor should give effect to the wishes of the House of Commons.1176  A 
third MP hoped that the Chancellor would think again; and was sure that if the 
previous Chancellor of the Exchequer (Kingsley Wood) had been present, he 
would have recognised that such strength of opinion could not possibly be 
resisted.1177  Anderson found, accordingly, that MPs wished him to reach 
decisions on the extension of the scheme more speedily than he had 
contemplated.1178 
The government, therefore, needed to deal with the state of feeling in the House 
of Commons.  One week later, Anderson reported to the War Cabinet, stating 
that, during the committee stage of the Bill, an unexpected demand had 
developed from all parts of the House of Commons that the new system should 
extend to all salaried persons without limit of income.  As the principle had 
already been admitted, it would be difficult to resist the extension now 
demanded; and the Whips advised that feeling in the House was so strong that, 
if the Government were unwilling to meet it, they might be defeated.  Subject to 
the War Cabinet’s approval, therefore, Anderson proposed to hold informal 
discussions with representatives of the various parties in the House of 
Commons, in which he would explain the position frankly, and would offer to 
extend the proposed arrangements to all employment income if he could be 
assured that MPs would be ready to accept the consequential anti-avoidance 
                                            
1175
  ibid, col 1451. 
1176
  ibid, col 1448. 
1177
  ibid, col 1419. 
1178
  ibid, col 1420. 
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provisions considered to be necessary.  The War Cabinet agreed that Anderson 
might go forward in this manner.1179 
Further events of great importance for the PAYE Regulations took place on the 
following day (28 October 1943) when Anderson held his informal meeting with 
MPs.  The Chancellor was recorded as saying that the pressure on the 
parliamentary timetable was such that it would not be possible to introduce the 
proposed anti-avoidance measures in the existing Bill, since those measures 
would require a resolution and would be of a character which the House would 
wish to examine carefully and debate.  It was, however, essential (Anderson 
said) that if the scheme as a whole was to be launched in time for its 
introduction, as planned, next April, the present measure should be put on the 
statute book without delay.  This being so, he thought that the most sensible 
and logical procedure would be to ask the House to pass the present Bill as it 
stood, subject to the amendments which had already been put down in his 
name, but that he should promise the House that he would introduce proposals 
to extend the scope of the scheme to the whole of Schedule E at a later stage.  
Those proposals would include the requisite anti-avoidance provisions.  A note 
made of this meeting recorded that ‘[t]his line of action appeared to be generally 
acceptable to the Members present’.1180  Matters were put in hand accordingly; 
and the Income Tax (Employments) Act 19431181 received the Royal Assent on 
                                            
1179
  TNA file CAB 65/36.  War Cabinet Conclusions 1943 (War  Cabinet 147 (43)) (27 October 
1943). 
1180
  TNA file IR 63/163, fos 142-3.  ‘Wage-Earners Income Tax Bill: Note of Meeting with 
Members of Parliament’. 
1181
  6 & 7 Geo 6 c 45. 
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11 November 1943; and the Income Tax (Offices and Employments) Act 
19441182 on 1 March 1944. 
During the debate on the Second Reading of the Income Tax (Offices and 
Employments) Bill, early in 1944, one MP described it as ‘unique’.  ‘It is a Bill 
which has been forced upon the Government by the House’.1183  No doubt the 
government might have put the matter differently: but it was MPs who 
compelled the PAYE scheme to be expanded, so that it applied generally to 
earnings from employments. 
The question accordingly arises why MPs wished to modify the government’s 
proposed legislation: and here two considerations worked towards producing 
the same result.  The first related to administration.  As one MP put it, the 
limited PAYE scheme originally introduced created a large number of anomalies 
which ought not to be created:1184 a comprehensive PAYE scheme could 
accordingly be supported on the grounds that it was an administrative 
improvement on the government’s own limited scheme.  The second 
consideration related to public opinion.  In so far as there was any public 
opinion on the subject of PAYE, and in so far as any public opinion on that 
                                            
1182
  7 & 8 Geo 6 c 12.  For a very clear statement that this legislation carried out the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer’s earlier undertaking, see the speech of Sir John Anderson on the Second 
Reading of the Bill.  HC Deb 10 February 1944, vol 396, col 1926. 
1183
  HC Deb 10 February 1944, vol 396, col 1955.  The speaker went on to say that ‘From the 
very beginning of the demand for Pay-as-you-earn the Government have resisted and the 
House has won a steady series of engagements against the Government.  We were told first of 
all that Pay-as-you-earn was quite an impossible and impracticable suggestion, and instead of 
having a Pay-as-you-earn scheme we were given the modifications of the weekly deductions.  
Then, rather, I think, to the surprise of many of us, the Board of Inland Revenue produced a 
very brilliant cumulative scheme.  Again it was limited in its operation, limited to manual workers 
and weekly wage-earners or rather earners who were paid within periods of less than a month.  
In the first Bill the Chancellor was compelled to extend its operation to all Schedule E earners 
up to £600.  As a result of further pressure it was extended to all Schedule E incomes 
irrespective of amount’. (ibid.) 
1184
  HC Deb 20 October 1943, vol 392, col 1448. 
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subject was capable of being discerned,1185 MPs understood that public opinion 
to be in favour of a comprehensive PAYE scheme.  A comprehensive PAYE 
scheme, therefore, could be presented as being in accordance both with good 
administration and with public opinion.   
The Income Tax (Employments) Regulations were made on 9 March 1944;1186 
and, on 6 April 1944, those Regulations and the PAYE scheme came into 
operation.  The PAYE Regulations were later consolidated in 1950, 1962, and 
1965;
1187
 and, during the period from 1944 to 1965 there were also 17 
amending instruments.1188 
The successful introduction and operation of the PAYE scheme was viewed as 
a great achievement, both at the time and subsequently.  It has been 
conjectured that the very success of the PAYE scheme may subsequently have 
operated to hinder reform of the structure of income tax.1189  Douglas Houghton, 
speaking many years later, called PAYE a ‘money-spinner’.  ‘Could any 
conceivable anti-evasion measures match the scale and effectiveness of this 
                                            
1185
  See the report of the Inland Departmental Committee, dated 21 May 1943, text before n 
1138 above. 
1186
  SR & O 1944/251.  In the National Archives, TNA file IR 40/9148B would appear from the 
description in the catalogue to be the drafting papers for the PAYE Regulations, but those 
papers were marked as being closed for 75 years.  Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, 
the author required this decision to be reviewed – but was told, in reply, that the file had been 
missing since 1998. 
1187
  Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1950, SI 1950/453; Income Tax (Employments) 
Regulations 1962, SI 1962/1003; and Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1965, SI 
1965/316. 
1188
  Income Tax (Employments) (No 2) Regulations 1944, SR & O 1944/1015; Income Tax 
(Employments) (No 3) Regulations 1945, SR & O 1945/365; Income Tax (Employments) (No 4) 
Regulations 1946, SR & O 1946/458; Income Tax (Employments) (No 5) Regulations 1947, SR 
& O 1947/582; Income Tax (Employments) (No 6) Regulations 1947, SR & O 1947/1295; 
Income Tax (Employments) (No 7) Regulations 1948, SI 1948/464; Income Tax (Employments) 
(No 8) Regulations 1948, SI 1948/1519; Income Tax (Employments) (No 9) Regulations 1948, 
SI 1948/1819; Income Tax (Employments) (No 2) Regulations 1951, SI 1951/836; Income Tax 
(Employments) (No 3) Regulations 1952, SI 1952/1004; Income Tax (Employments) (No 4) 
Regulations 1952, SI 1952/1758, Income Tax (Employments) (No 5) Regulations 1954, SI 
1954/1577; Income Tax (Employments) (No 6) Regulations 1955, SI 1955/835; Income Tax 
(Employments) (No 7) Regulations 1958, SI 1958/1166; Income Tax (Employments) (No 8) 
Regulations 1961, SI 1961/591; Income Tax (Employments) (No 9) Regulations 1961, SI 
1961/1596 and Income Tax (Employments) (No 2) Regulations 1963, SI 1963/1082. 
1189
  Sayers (n 1102) 111. 
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one-armed bandit?’1190  It was Houghton’s view that there could not be the 
slightest doubt that the retention of PAYE had enabled successive governments 
after the second world war to tax earnings far more heavily than would 
otherwise have been possible.  ‘If ever there was a gift handed to bureaucracy 
on a plate in wartime for permanent use thereafter, PAYE was certainly it’.1191 
Conclusion 
There was comparatively little subordinate legislation relating to income tax 
during the period from 1907 to 1965 because the United Kingdom polity had a 
number of features that worked against the introduction of such subordinate 
legislation.  The constraints placed on the making of subordinate legislation, 
furthermore, did not operate evenly across all areas of income tax law and 
practice.  The charge to income tax was agreed to be a subject totally 
inappropriate for subordinate legislation: income tax administration, however, 
could be – and was – very differently treated.  It was only to a limited extent, 
therefore, that the enactment of subordinate legislation could make good the 
shortfall in the enactment of primary legislation relating to income tax that was 
one of the characteristics of the default setting of the United Kingdom polity.1192 
A significant amount of subordinate legislation relating to income tax was 
nevertheless made during the period from 1907 to 1965; and, during that 
period, the quantity of that subordinate legislation increased.  That subordinate 
legislation dealt with a considerable number of miscellaneous topics; and, there 
is an irresistible inference that this overall outcome was the aggregate result of 
a considerable number of particular decisions, taken on a considerable number 
                                            
1190
  D Houghton, ‘The futility of taxation by menaces’ in A Seldon and others, Tax Avoision: The 
Economic, Legal and Moral Inter-relationships between Avoidance and Evasion (London, 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1979) 96. 
1191
  ibid 97. 
1192
  For the default setting, see the conclusion to chapter 2 above. 
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of different occasions.  The growth in the subordinate legislation relating to 
income tax – like the growth in subordinate legislation during the first world war 
– was haphazard.1193 
Of the subordinate legislation made, a significant proportion related to the 
deduction of income tax from employees’ earnings; and the investigation of how 
that subordinate legislation came to be made in 1915, 1940 and 1943-4 has 
shown that, on these three occasions, there were both points of contrast and 
common features.  One point of contrast relates to the elements within 
government advancing these initiatives.  In 1940, the Inland Revenue was in the 
lead, with the departmental Treasury and government ministers following.  In 
1943-4, the Inland Revenue was in the rear, responding to pressure placed 
upon it by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the departmental Treasury.  
Another point of contrast relates to the fortunes of the government initiatives 
after they were exposed to the public.  In 1915, the scope of the proposed 
scheme was curtailed; in 1943-4, it was enlarged.  On the other hand, one point 
of similarity was that, on all three occasions, there were MPs who took a real 
interest in the government’s initiative; and, in 1915 and 1943-4, in particular, 
MPs were unquestionably responsive to opinion outside the House of 
Commons.  Another point of similarity was the wartime need for unprecedented 
government revenues.  The United Kingdom’s participation in the two world 
wars included an expansion in the subordinate legislation relating to income tax 
as one of its results. 
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  See text around n 1031 above. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
‘For all their fabled devotion to fair play, the British ... have been 
profoundly uncurious about the rules under which the hugely 
important ‘national game’ of politics and government are 
played’.1194 
 
The aim of this investigation was to ascertain the determinants of the forms of 
income tax legislation during the period from 1907 to 1965 and to assess their 
importance. 
The investigation has found that the insufficiency of parliamentary time was a 
determinant of the utmost importance for the form of the income tax legislation 
during that period.  It was not possible for the government to enact all the 
legislation that it wished to enact; and the different forms of primary legislation 
distinguished could be used with different degrees of difficulty.  The 
insufficiency of parliamentary time constituted a constraint – and imposed a 
default setting upon the United Kingdom polity.  That default setting had two 
essential characteristics: the primary legislation that was actually enacted and 
which related to income tax used the different forms of legislation very 
unequally; and the primary legislation that the government wished to see 
enacted was not enacted in full.  
The investigation has also found that it was only rarely that the default setting 
was overridden.  The Inland Revenue’s aim was to administer income tax 
successfully: the department took an active interest in the form of the income 
tax legislation only when that form had implications for the achievement of 
departmental operational objectives.  The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel 
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  P Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring: Unearthing the British Constitution (London, Gollancz, 
1995) 7. 
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was interested in the form of primary legislation: but the capacity of that office 
was inadequate and it was dependent on the wishes of its clients.  Government 
ministers had many tasks confronting them: only the man who was the master 
of his ministry had the capacity to override the default setting.  Elements outside 
government hardly ever took any action relevant for the forms of income tax 
legislation – and then only because those forms happened to be implicated in 
other objectives, pursued for other reasons.  The investigation has further found 
that, in the case of the legislation relating to income tax, the enactment of 
subordinate legislation could have only a limited impact upon the default setting.  
The default setting, therefore, was overridden only rarely – for particular 
purposes on particular occasions.  Otherwise it remained in place.   
Six clear conclusions can be drawn from the evidence presented; and those 
conclusions will now be stated.  The ascertainment of the determinants of the 
forms of the income tax legislation and then, finally, the importance of those 
determinants will then be considered in the context of the statement of those 
conclusions. 
The first – and principal – conclusion is that, during the period from 1907 to 
1965, the business that the United Kingdom polity could usefully transact 
exceeded the polity’s capacity to transact that business.  Parliament could not 
enact all the legislation that the government would have liked to see enacted in 
the time available for the enactment of that legislation.  Government ministers 
could all too easily be overwhelmed by the quantity and variety of the tasks 
facing them.1195  Members of Parliament were also over-burdened.1196  The 
Office of the Parliamentary Counsel struggled to deal with its primary task of 
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  See chapter 5, section 1. 
1196
  See chapter 6, section 2(1), text around ns 862-4. 
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drafting current legislation.  The highly finite group of Inland Revenue officials 
who could make a useful contribution to matters relating to the enactment of 
income tax legislation had numerous other calls upon their time.  The pressure 
of time, it was stated in 1946, ‘must be expected to be a permanent feature of 
parliamentary government’.1197  The business of the United Kingdom polity was 
transacted in the context of an insufficiency of time. 
The second conclusion, which follows on from the first, is that some topics to 
which government could usefully give attention did not receive attention – or 
received only inadequate attention.  The topics that did receive attention were a 
selection from a longer list – and different individuals might well have made a 
different selection.  Brook reflected to Bridges in April 1950 that it was curious 
that, in modern times, the Cabinet, though it had always insisted on considering 
particular proposals for developments of policy and their cost, had never 
thought it necessary to review the development of expenditure under the civil 
estimates as a whole.  It was remarkable that the Attlee Government had never 
reflected upon the great increase in public expenditure, and the substantial 
change in its pattern which had come about during the past five years in 
consequence of their policies in the field of the social services.1198   
The third conclusion is that, in competing for an insufficient quantity of attention, 
some items of business were better placed to receive attention than others.  
The evidence is that a particular item of business was well placed to receive 
attention if it could be placed in at least one of two categories. 
                                            
1197
  TNA file T 162/911 (E 17496/1).  ‘Statute Law Reform’.  Memorandum by the Parliamentary 
Counsel (Sir Granville Ram), 30 January 1946, app 1, para 27. 
1198
  TNA file CAB 21/1626.  Note, Brook to Bridges, 21 April 1950. 
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An item of business was well placed to receive attention if it could be dealt with 
easily: that is to say, if it could be accomplished relatively successfully, in 
relatively little time, and with relatively little effort.  In February 1959, at a time 
when it was clearly foreseeable that there might be a general election soon, the 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Simon) sent a note to the Chancellor 
(Amory) stating that he took it that the Chancellor would wish that the Finance 
Bill, while embodying reforms, should give rise to the minimum of controversy 
and delay.  ‘It follows that we should, so far as possible, concentrate on non-
contentious and simple reforms and, again as far as possible, those which are 
agreeable to our supporters’.1199  As the time and effort involved in completing 
the item of business rose, and as the chances of success in completing that 
item diminished, so it became less likely that the item of business would be 
undertaken. 
An item of business was also well placed to receive attention if it was urgent.  
Cairncross received the advice from the first permanent civil servant with whom 
he worked ‘that no one bothered to decide important matters – what always 
received prior attention was what was urgent’.1200  This maxim may be a 
caricature; but it nevertheless highlighted the ability of urgent matters to receive 
disproportionate attention. 
The fourth conclusion – a conclusion on which there is a significant amount to 
say – is that, in the context of an insufficiency of time, decisions were often 
made on a short-term basis.  It might well be very difficult to decide how a 
                                            
1199
  TNA file T 171/499.  Note, Financial Secretary [Simon] to Chancellor [Amory], 17 February 
1959. 
1200
  AK Cairncross, ‘On being an Economic Adviser’ in Factors in Economic Development 
(London, George Allen & Unwin, 1962) 272, 277.  Cairncross went on to add, of the individual in 
question (Sir Piers Debenham), ‘that he was a very unusual civil servant, even when one 
applies the high standard of unusualness necessary in the British Civil Service, and that he 
proved to be no more permanent than I was’. (ibid.)  (Underlining in original.) 
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particular problem should be tackled in the long term – but if it was possible, 
without difficulty, to decide what should be done immediately, there was no 
need to decide anything further at that particular moment.  Lord Strang, writing 
during the 1950s, thought that, for a minister, ‘the next step he has to take is the 
important step; the long-term aim, however well thought out, will tend to be 
contingent and uncertain’.1201  The matter could then be considered further in 
due course: but, if and when that happened, the matter might well not have the 
same characteristics as when it had been considered previously. 
An extremely good example of a decision of this type, affecting the form of the 
income tax legislation, arose towards the end of 1945.1202  The Attorney-
General in the new Labour government (Shawcross) supported a proposal that 
the draft Codification Bill, prepared before the second world war, should be 
brought out of cold storage and enacted.  When the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer (Dalton) came to consider the position for himself, he was able to 
take into account the contents of two lengthy memoranda – one written by the 
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue and the other by the First 
Parliamentary Counsel.  These two memoranda were both quite clear that work 
on the draft Codification Bill should not be resumed.1203  Dalton told his Private 
Secretary that he discounted a good deal of the material submitted.  ‘But we 
can’t spare Parliamentary Counsel just yet’.1204  Dalton’s decision, therefore, 
was a decision made for the short term only: and was made not by reference to 
the proposal for government action that was under consideration, but by 
                                            
1201
  Lord Strang, Home and Abroad (London, Andre Deutsch, 1956) 16 n 1. 
1202
  For this episode see generally JHN Pearce, ‘The Income Tax Law Rewrite Projects: 1907-
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reference to the difficulties experienced by the Office of the Parliamentary 
Counsel in dealing with its heavy current workload.  In the immediate future, the 
drafting of other government Bills had a superior claim on the limited resources 
of that office.  In the short term, therefore, nothing happened; time passed; and, 
by the summer of 1947, the civil service had devised its own plan as to how the 
rewriting of the income tax legislation might be tackled.  When the rewriting of 
the income tax legislation was considered further in 1947, the context in which 
that matter came to be considered was no longer the same as in 1945. 
To a very great extent, therefore, the business actually transacted in the United 
Kingdom polity received attention in accordance with particular decisions, taken 
for particular reasons in particular contexts – and not in accordance with 
carefully considered long-term general plans.  The miscellaneous topics dealt 
with in the subordinate legislation relating to income tax provide a striking 
illustration of this point.1205  As a newcomer to the Budget Committee, Plowden 
wrote to Bridges in 1948 that two things stood out from his experience on the 
Committee.  The first of these was ‘[l]ack of time for the examination of 
fundamental issues’.1206  It was Woolton’s view in 1954 that the civil service 
gave devoted and competent service ‘but the chief officers of the Service, like 
the Ministers, are so encumbered with a host of problems that very few have 
time or energy left to sit back and think beyond the passing duties of the 
day’.1207  This same point was also made in the Fulton Report on the Civil 
Service, published in 1968.  The report stated that the operation of existing 
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  Chapter 7, section 2, above. 
1206
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Plowden thought stood out was ‘[l]ack of basic economic knowledge on which to frame policy’.  
(ibid.) 
1207
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policies and the detailed preparation of legislation (together with the associated 
negotiations and discussions) frequently crowded out demands that appeared 
less immediate.  Senior civil servants had to spend much time preparing 
explanatory briefs, answers to parliamentary questions and ministers’ cases.  
Almost invariably, there were urgent deadlines to be met; and, in this press of 
daily business, long-term policy planning and research tended to take second 
place.1208  It was Amery’s ‘profound conviction’ that a Cabinet consisting of 
overworked departmental ministers was quite incapable of either thinking out a 
definite policy or of securing its effective and consistent execution.  Government 
policy was hardly ever discussed in Cabinet meetings.  When there were so 
many urgent matters of detail always waiting to be decided, the result was that 
there was very little Cabinet policy, as such, on any subject.  ‘No one has time 
to think it out, to discuss it, to co-ordinate its various elements, or to see to its 
prompt and consistent enforcement’.1209 
An episode demonstrating the difficulties of dealing with these more general 
features of the United Kingdom polity began on 23 October 1962, when the 
Lord President of the Council (Hailsham) sent a memorandum to the Prime 
Minister (Macmillan).  Hailsham identified three main defects in the existing 
machinery of government: ‘the steady and cumulative backlog now mounting up 
in our programme of legislation in relatively uncontroversial matters’; ‘the 
increasing physical and moral strain on Ministers’; and ‘the relatively piecemeal 
way in which we handle great decisions, and the relative absence of long-term 
forecasting in defence, foreign and economic policy’.1210  ‘There needs to be 
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more regular consideration of the main fields of policy and their inter-relation, so 
that the decisions on vital matters are not taken, as now, in a rather piecemeal 
fashion’.1211  Macmillan considered Hailsham’s paper ‘very impressive’.1212 
The sequel, however, demonstrated how difficult it was, in practice, to deal with 
these defects.  When Macmillan sent his considered reply to Hailsham, the 
prospect of immediate action to reduce the backlog in legislation was ruled out.  
There was much to be said for seeking some new procedure; but ‘this is not the 
sort of reform that could be carried through in the last eighteen months of a 
Parliament’s life’.  The time for any government to take such a step was at the 
outset of a new Parliament when the government had a sizeable majority.1213  
Consideration of the suggestion was therefore postponed.  In the short term, the 
absence of parliamentary time became the reason for failing to deal with the 
problem of the absence of parliamentary time; and, in the longer term, 
Macmillan and Hailsham were both out of office after 1964.  No evidence is 
known that Hailsham’s memorandum received any further consideration: so a 
postponement which, on its face, was an initial postponement for a limited 
period only, became, in fact, a postponement until the Greek Calends. 
                                                                                                                              
this episode, Hennessy (n 1194) 166-7.  Hailsham’s full description of his second defect was 
‘the increasing physical and moral strain on Ministers which drains them more and more of 
vitality and converts them progressively into administrative machines, spending their days in 
committees, their evenings at public banquets and their nights reading telegrams’.  To deal with 
these shortcomings, Hailsham advocated the creation of an uncontroversial legislation 
committee, which would certify certain Bills for expedited procedure; an increased role for more 
junior ministers; and that ‘the Cabinet should from time to time examine various aspects of 
policy as a whole and in relation to one another’.  
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  ibid. 
1212
  TNA file PREM 11/4838.  Note, Prime Minister [Macmillan] to Lord President of the Council 
[Hailsham], 26 October 1963. 
1213
  TNA file PREM 11/4838.  Note, Macmillan to Lord President of the Council [Hailsham], 11 
January 1963.  As regards the other ‘main defects’ identified by Hailsham, Macmillan believed 
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The fifth conclusion is that the prospects for a particular item of government 
business receiving significant attention could be transformed if an influential 
individual took an interest in it.  Individuals mattered.  Given that government 
ministers and leading officials could not deal with all matters with a claim upon 
their attention, a choice to give time and attention to one matter rather than 
another could have significant results.  In the Inland Revenue, the sequence of 
events leading to the enactment of the 1918 Act had its origins in the fact that, 
before the first world war, Cox, the Solicitor of Inland Revenue, began, without 
specific instructions and in his own time, to prepare a consolidation of the 
Income Tax Acts.1214  In the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, Ram, the First 
Parliamentary Counsel from 1937 to 1947, had a programme for statute law 
reform.  A programme of this type did not interest Sir John Rowlatt, one of his 
successors.1215 
Initiatives originating within the civil service, however, needed ministerial 
approval or acquiescence before there could be legislation.  In 1915, the 
prospects for Cox’s initiative were transformed when it was mentioned in the 
House of Commons.  Ram’s programme for statute law reform made no 
progress during the second world war because the Lord Chancellor (Simon) 
took no interest in it.  The initiative was only able to make progress when, after 
that war, a different Lord Chancellor (Jowitt) took office and became the patron 
of Ram’s programme. 
Government ministers themselves could, of course, be the individuals who 
mattered.  Churchill’s tenacious pursuit of the goal of simplification, which had 
the setting up of the Income Tax Codification Committee as one of its results, 
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was the leading occasion, during the first half of the twentieth century, when the 
default setting of the United Kingdom polity was overridden.1216  Alan Green’s 
active support for the Income Tax Management Bill was of fundamental 
importance for the enactment of the Income Tax Management Act 1964.1217  
Lloyd George, by contrast, gave very little time and attention to the Revenue 
Bills promised for 1913 and 1914 – and those Bills were not enacted.1218 
The sixth and final conclusion, following on from the earlier conclusions, is that 
the determinants of the forms of the income tax legislation were located far from 
the law and practice of income tax.  That law and practice could – and did – 
present many problems worthy of legislative attention.  There were, however, 
constraints acting on the supply of legislation to deal with those problems; and, 
in the United Kingdom polity, those constraints lay elsewhere. 
The ascertainment of the determinants of the forms of the income tax legislation 
is now considered generally having regard to these conclusions.   
The form of the United Kingdom’s income tax legislation, during the period from 
1907 to 1965, was determined by the workings of the United Kingdom polity – a 
polity in which the business that could usefully be transacted exceeded the 
polity’s capacity to transact that business.  The form of the income tax 
legislation, furthermore, was not a strong candidate for the receipt of such 
attention as was available.  The subject was under-apprehended by those who 
had the power to give it significant attention.  It was not unknown for the subject 
to be given significant attention by a leading government minister or civil 
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servant;1219 but the giving of such significant attention was rare.  It could also be 
the case that events outside government (the development of opposition to the 
Revenue Bill of 19211220 or the extent of support for the proposed PAYE 
scheme during the second world war1221 for example) could affect the form of 
the income tax legislation; but these outside events were also rare.  With few 
exceptions, therefore, the default setting of the United Kingdom polity for the 
enactment of primary legislation remained in place; and the form of the income 
tax legislation was determined by that default setting. 
The default setting explains why the use made of the various forms of primary 
legislation distinguished was so unequal.1222  Finance Bills were urgent and 
virtually certain to be enacted; the government treated their enactment as a 
priority.  During the period from 1907 to 1965, 68 Finance Acts were enacted.  
Programme Bills, by contrast, were rarely given priority; and, if they were not 
given priority, it was very easy for such Bills to absorb more parliamentary time 
than was available.  This was particularly likely to be the case if the programme 
Bill was of a general nature (a Revenue Bill).  During the period from 1907 to 
1965, only eight programme Acts relating to income tax were enacted.  
Consolidation Bills were not viewed as urgent; but the parliamentary prospects 
for the enactment of a Consolidation Bill actually prepared were excellent.  The 
legislation relating to income tax was consolidated in the 1918 Act and then, 
again, in the 1952 Act.  A Codification Bill, also, was not viewed as urgent; and 
did not have the benefit of the advantageous parliamentary procedure available 
for Consolidation Bills.  In the events that happened, no Codification Bill relating 
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to income tax was presented to Parliament or enacted during this period.  A 
new principal Act relating to income tax would absorb so much Parliamentary 
time as to make the enactment of such a Bill a practical impossibility: and, 
during the period from 1907 to 1965, no evidence is known that the preparation 
of such an Act was ever seriously contemplated. 
The default setting of the United Kingdom polity also explains why that polity 
may be described as operating in a manner in which changes in the United 
Kingdom’s income tax legislation had an ambiguous and indecisive overall 
outcome.  It was likely that the principal Act relating to income tax would be 
replaced (infrequently) by a Consolidation Act – and so it was.  It was also likely 
that the principal Act (whether the Income Tax Act 1842, the 1918 Act or the 
1952 Act) would come to be supplemented, as time went on, by a larger 
number of Finance Acts and a smaller number of programme Acts – and so it 
was.  The legislation changed; but the mechanisms by which the legislation was 
changed and the overall form of that legislation from time to time remained the 
same.  There was inertia as well as change; and a cyclical process took place.  
After the enactment of a principal Act (in 1842, 1918 or 1952), the subsequent 
enactment of a large number of Finance Acts and a smaller number of 
programme Acts gradually brought about a state of affairs in which the 
enactment of a new principal Act became appropriate.  That was the situation in 
1907.  It was also the situation in 1965.  There was indeed a sense in which it 
was legitimate to say that everything had changed, but that everything was still 
the same.1223  So far as an overall statement of the United Kingdom’s income 
tax legislation was concerned, what could readily be accomplished did not effect 
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a transformation; and what would have effected a transformation could not 
readily be accomplished. 
In chapter 1, a statement by Rose and Karran was quoted: ‘[t]he more that 
critics of a tax system attack the alleged faults, the more it is made apparent 
that the forces accounting for this “unsystematic” system must be strong and 
only imperfectly understood’.1224  This thesis claims to have made a contribution 
towards the understanding of the strength of the forces accounting for this 
unsystematic system. 
The assessment of the importance of the determinants of the forms of the 
income tax legislation, it was stated in chapter 1, would be undertaken by 
considering the importance of those determinants when placed in wider 
contexts – and that three contexts would be considered.1225  The first of those 
contexts was the law and practice of income tax in the United Kingdom during 
the period from 1907 to 1965.  The understanding of the determinants of the 
forms of the income tax legislation is of importance because legislation would 
only be enacted if it took account of those determinants; and because those 
determinants had an impact on the content of the income tax legislation and on 
the manner in which that legislation was expressed.   
If legislation relating to income tax was to be brought into existence, those who 
prepared that legislation had to take account of the determinants of the forms of 
the income tax legislation if the proposed legislation was to be enacted.  Cox, in 
1917, had to consider the suggestion that the proposed Consolidation Bill might 
make amendments to the existing law – and rejected the suggestion.  ‘If we ... 
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started making sensible amendments the bill would cease to be a consolidation 
bill & would never have a chance of getting through’.1226  The Codification 
Committee, by contrast, did not work closely with the Inland Revenue; and, 
accordingly, did not produce a draft Bill which had the support of an 
overwhelming coalition of interests, both inside and outside government.1227   
Only a Bill which had the support of such a coalition would obtain a speedy and 
uncontroversial passage through Parliament – and only by obtaining such a 
passage could such a Bill be enacted.1228  In the events that happened, the 
Consolidation Bill presented to Parliament in 1918 became the new principal 
Act for the income tax legislation.  The draft Codification Bill published in 1936 
remained unenacted. 
The determinants of the form of the income tax legislation had an impact on the 
content of that legislation.  The income tax legislation was not fully stated: for 
the default setting of the United Kingdom polity operated to produce the result 
that not all the provisions available to be called could be chosen.  It did not 
follow, however, that all candidate provisions had an equal chance of being 
enacted.  A provision that was of political importance to ministers was better 
placed than one that was not; a provision that had a major effect on the tax yield 
was better placed than one that did not; a provision that was uncontroversial 
was better placed than one that was not; and a provision that could be stated 
briefly was better placed than one that could not.  ‘The pressure on the annual 
Finance Bill’, it was stated in 1952, ‘is almost always too great to allow room for 
any amendments which do not affect the year’s revenue and which in the 
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context of the Budget can only be regarded as of small importance’.1229  One 
year earlier, Rowlatt had pointed to a link between the overall parliamentary 
situation and the enactment of particular provisions.  The Conservative 
government, recently elected, had a small parliamentary majority; and it was 
therefore no good anybody thinking that in that Parliament anything whatever 
was going to be done by way of clarification of the income tax law in current 
Finance Bills.  ‘The need for brevity will dominate the position, and contrary to 
the general impression, provisions codifying and clarifying the law, whatever 
else they may be, cannot possibly be brief’.1230  ‘Experience over the years’, the 
Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue (Johnston) told the Chief Secretary to 
the Treasury (Boyd-Carpenter) in 1963, ‘... shows that competition for inclusion 
in a Finance Bill is almost invariably so great that administrative provisions, 
other than the most urgent or the very brief, are only too apt to be among the 
first to be deferred’.1231  The evidence is that, in the struggle for places in 
Finance Bills, provisions relating to income tax administration and provisions 
clarifying income tax law were highly likely to take particularly heavy casualties.   
The shortfall in the enacted legislation relating to income tax was the 
background for the major expansion in the use of Extra Statutory Concessions 
which took place during the first half of the twentieth century.1232  Extra 
Statutory Concessions were first reported to the Public Accounts Committee in 
1897; and 68 concessions were reported to that committee in 1915, 57 in 1928 
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and 57 in 1935.1233  Lord Radcliffe ‘never understood the procedure of extra-
statutory concessions in the case of a body to whom at least the door of 
Parliament is opened every year for adjustment of the tax code’;1234 but this 
dictum emphasises the theoretical and not the practical working of the United 
Kingdom polity.  The fact that such extra-statutory concessions had to be made 
to avoid hardships, Scott LJ remarked in Absalom v Talbot (HM Inspector of 
Taxes), ‘is conclusive that there is something wrong with the legislation’.1235 
The determinants of the form of the income tax legislation, which imposed 
constraints on the enactment of that legislation and which made it particularly 
difficult to enact provisions clarifying income tax law, had the further 
consequence that the income tax legislation was stated in an unsatisfactory 
manner.  This result was demonstrated by two events that took place in 1928.  It 
was not possible, the Attorney-General (Inskip) told the House of Commons 
during the committee stage of the Finance Bill, to take a group of sections in a 
Finance Act and to repeal them, re-enacting them from start to finish with the 
amendments that the government wished to see.  ‘That would give facilities for 
proposing Amendments which would probably make the passage of the Bill 
impossible’.1236  The ‘exigencies of Parliamentary time’ accordingly produced a 
situation in which the government proposed a series of limited amendments to 
the existing legislation, with a view to restricting the opportunities for proposing 
amendments liable to slow down the progress of the Bill.  In this way ‘difficulties’ 
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compelled the government to ‘adopt expedients’, which, in their turn, produced 
‘perplexities’.1237 
A few days earlier, Inskip had been speaking on the same topic in the Courts.  
In Lionel Sutcliffe Ltd v IRC1238 Rowlatt J was required to consider section 21 of 
the Finance Act 1922;1239 and reference was made in argument to section 31 of 
the Finance Act 1927.1240  His Lordship was not impressed: 
This Section 31 is a Section which in five pages introduces 
piecemeal amendments into Section 21 with the result that the 
latter section is made perfectly unintelligible to any layman or any 
lawyer who has not made a prolonged study with all his law books 
at his elbow, and it is a crying scandal that legislation by which the 
subject is taxed should appear in the Statute Book in that utterly 
unintelligible form.  I am told, and rightly told, by the Attorney-
General – he understands it as much as anybody – that it is only 
in this form that the legislation can be carried through at all.  Then 
all I have to say is that the price of getting this legislation through 
is that the people of this country are taxed by laws which they 
cannot possibly understand ... .1241 
Income tax law and practice, therefore, existed in a context in which the only 
course of action readily available was the management of an existing state of 
affairs.  Piecemeal legislative engineering was possible: wholesale legislative 
engineering was far more difficult.  The income tax legislation was enacted only 
in part.  However, that which was perfect did not come; and that which was 
enacted only in part did not vanish away. 
The second context in which the importance of the determinants of the forms of 
the income tax legislation may be assessed is that of the workings of the United 
Kingdom polity from 1907 to 1965.  In this context, the importance of these 
determinants remains to be established: but the conjecture may be advanced 
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that the ascertainment of the determinants of the form of the income tax 
legislation provides a framework for studying and understanding the law and 
practice of other areas of government activity in the United Kingdom in the 
twentieth century. 
The evidence presented in this thesis has demonstrated that the ascertainment 
of the determinants of the forms of the income tax legislation enables a number 
of statements to be made about the law and practice of income tax.  Legislation 
was enacted subject to the constraint of insufficient parliamentary time; that 
legislation was not fully enacted; the different forms of primary legislation were 
used very unequally; and it was not equally easy to enact primary legislation 
relating to the various areas of the subject.  The subject could be managed – 
but it was very difficult to transform. 
Income tax, however, was only one subject whose law and practice had 
become exceedingly large and complicated by 1965.  Town and country 
planning, public health and national insurance were other obvious examples.  
The possibility accordingly arises that the statements made in the last 
paragraph may also hold good for other areas of government activity.  It would, 
no doubt, be a bad pun to refer to the government of the United Kingdom in the 
mid twentieth century as having ‘overmighty subjects’ as one of its features 
(such an expression is better reserved for individuals in late medieval England); 
but, during the second half of the twentieth century, it may be possible to 
approach the United Kingdom polity on the basis that it had to manage – but 
could not dominate – a considerable number of overmighty topics. 
The validity and helpfulness of such an approach remains to be established.  It 
must be admitted that the enactment of the urgent annual Finance Act (which 
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was virtually certain to pass) was essentially a matter for the Treasury, the 
Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise only.  All other departments 
depended for their statute law upon the enactment of programme Bills.  The 
Inland Revenue, furthermore, did not depend upon outside bodies for expertise.  
There was no outside interest with a monopoly of important expertise – the 
position faced (for example) by the Ministry of Health in its dealings with the 
medical profession.  In the case of the law and practice relating to income tax 
the ‘government’ (to use Amery’s terminology) was very strong vis-a-vis the 
‘nation’.  In the case of the law and practice relating to health (for example), the 
relative strengths of these two components of the United Kingdom polity may 
well have been very different.  It is also highly possible that different 
government departments managed topics with differing degrees of 
competence.1242 
On the other hand, the pressure of time was expected to be a permanent 
feature of parliamentary government;1243 and the drafter of the Town and 
Country Planning Act 19471244 (Hutton) is on record as stating  that ‘the bill had 
been put together under the most intense pressure of time’.1245  In a most 
suggestive article on the antecedents of this statute Cocks also considered that 
‘[t]he unsystematic process by which important law reforms may come under 
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the control of a few particular civil servants in Whitehall can be relevant in 
determining the content of legislation’.1246   
Cocks has also expressed the view that there are ‘many books about twentieth 
century judges and their role in the making of case law.  In contrast, there are 
only a few detailed studies of how major statutes have come into being’;1247 and 
he went on to call for ‘studies of how intellectual and administrative traditions 
have determined the way in which this power of bill-making has been used in 
twentieth century Britain’.1248  Such studies might reveal (or might not reveal) 
that the determinants of the forms of the income tax legislation also acted to 
determine law and practice in other areas of government activity.  It is certainly 
the case, however, that the forces determining the form and contents of major 
twentieth century statutes as they came to be enacted is a subject on which 
there is more to be known than we know at present. 
The third context in which the importance of the determinants of the forms of the 
income tax legislation may be assessed is that of the history of the United 
Kingdom during the period from 1907 to 1965.  In chapter 1, three major 
developments (the expansion of the activities carried on by central government, 
the growth of public expenditure and the United Kingdom’s participation in the 
two world wars) were considered; and the views of Dicey, MacDonagh, 
Peacock and Wiseman and Rose were discussed.
1249
  The ascertainment of the 
determinants of the forms of the income tax legislation cannot – and does not – 
make a decisive contribution to the study of these historical developments: but 
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the evidence relating to the determinants of those forms accords better with 
some of the views advanced than with others. 
The evidence considered in this thesis does not offer strong support for the 
leading approaches to the expansion of the activities carried on by central 
government during the first half of the twentieth century when that subject is 
studied directly.  It was Dicey’s view that public opinion governed the 
development of the law.1250  The evidence considered in this thesis supports 
Dicey’s view in one very important respect: for it may certainly be said that, 
where public opinion was capable of being discerned, there was legislation in 
accordance with that public opinion.  In 1943, it is possible to discern that public 
opinion favoured a broadly based PAYE scheme – and legislation to enable the 
PAYE scheme to come into operation was enacted.1251  Not only that: the 
legislation was extended – with a second programme Act reaching the statute 
book, which widened the ambit of the first.1252  The problem with Dicey’s view, 
however, is that the further ‘mirror-image’ proposition – that, where there was 
an absence of public opinion, there was also an absence of legislation – must 
be rejected.  A very considerable amount of legislation relevant for the form of 
income tax legislation was enacted during this period – but that legislation was 
enacted without any particular relationship to public opinion.  On the material 
considered in this thesis, Dicey’s view that public opinion governed the 
development of the law applies only to a very small percentage of the income 
tax legislation enacted.  Public opinion, although of the utmost importance for 
the form of income tax legislation where it may be discerned, does not provide 
                                            
1250
  AV Dicey, Lectures on the relation between Law and Public Opinion in England during the 
Nineteenth Century (1905, London, Macmillan). 
1251
  See chapter 7, section 3, above. 
1252
  The Income Tax (Offices and Employments) Act 1944 (7 & 8 Geo 6 c 12) widened the 
ambit of the Income Tax (Employments) Act 1943 (6 & 7 Geo 6 c 45). 
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the golden thread through the labyrinth of the growth in the income tax 
legislation during the first half of the twentieth century. 
MacDonagh’s approach1253 is also vulnerable to the criticism that it gives a good 
account of only a small number of the developments considered.  Once again, 
there is no difficulty in identifying developments that work well with this 
approach: the ‘momentum of government itself’ may be observed in operation.  
The scheme relating to the deduction and collection of income tax from the 
earnings of employees which was contained in regulations and introduced in 
1915, was succeeded by a more far-reaching scheme introduced in 1940, 
which, in its turn, was superseded by the comprehensive PAYE scheme 
introduced in 1944.1254  The Office of the Parliamentary Counsel (and 
particularly during the period when Ram was the First Parliamentary Counsel) 
may be observed expanding its activities (or attempting to expand them).1255  
On the other hand, the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel had few employees 
when compared with the Inland Revenue – and the evidence does not suggest 
that the Inland Revenue was at all concerned to promote its own expansion.  
MacDonagh’s model may provide a better account of new government functions 
than of government functions that were already established.  The ‘momentum of 
government itself’, however, gives a good explanation only of a small 
percentage of the developments considered in this thesis. 
By contrast, the ‘displacement effect’ noted by Peacock and Wiseman1256 
provides a more satisfactory context for the questions investigated in this thesis.  
                                            
1253
  O MacDonagh, ‘The Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Government: A Reappraisal’ (1958) 
1 Historical Journal 52. 
1254
  See chapter 7, section 3, above. 
1255
  See chapter 4, section 2(2), above. 
1256
  AT Peacock and J Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom 
(OUP 1961).  See chapter 1, text following n 67. 
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The movements in the levels of public expenditure that those authors noted are 
the same as the movements in the quantity of subordinate legislation made.  It 
may nevertheless be objected that changes in the level of public expenditure do 
not explain changes in the form of income tax legislation (or vice versa).  The 
explanation, instead, is likely to be that similar movements of different indices 
both reflect some larger force affecting both. 
The conclusion is accordingly reached that, so far as the developments in the 
United Kingdom’s history during the first half of the twentieth century is 
concerned, it is Rose’s classification1257 of the functions and priorities of 
government that provides the most helpful context for the matters investigated 
in this thesis.  In particular, it is helpful to draw a strong contrast drawn between 
periods of war and peace.  During times of war, legislation could be enacted 
which could not be enacted in times of peace.  Taxation could be raised to 
unprecedented levels; subordinate legislation relating to the deduction and 
collection of income tax from employees could be introduced and then 
extended.  With the return of peace some of the wartime legislation would 
cease to exist: but some would be retained, so that the more limited changes to 
government possible during peace would be carried out in significantly different 
circumstances.  Peacock and Wiseman’s ‘displacement effect’ may accordingly 
be seen as one particular result obtained from Rose’s approach as it operated 
during the first half of the twentieth century.  The overall result is an 
endorsement of Greenleaf’s view that ‘[p]erhaps paradoxically, war may be the 
real paradigm of the welfare state and managed economy of peacetime’.1258  
                                            
1257
  R Rose, ‘On the Priorities of Government: A Developmental Analysis of Public Policies’ 
(1976) 4 European Journal of Political Research 247. 
1258
  WH Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition: Volume 1: The Rise of Collectivism (London, 
Methuen, 1983) 76. 
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Karl Marx, according to Aneurin Bevan, had declared ‘that war is the locomotive 
of history’.1259 
 
  
                                            
1259
  R McKibbin, Parties and People: England 1914-1951 (OUP 2010) 144 n 14. 
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APPENDIX 1: PRIMARY LEGISLATION RELATING TO INCOME TAX 
1. FINANCE ACTS 
1. Finance Act 1907    (7 Edw 7 c 13) 
2. Finance Act 1908    (8 Edw 7 c 16) 
3. Finance (1909-10) Act 1910  (10 Edw 7 c 8) 
4. Finance Act 1910    (10 Edw 7 & 1 Geo 5 c 35) 
5. Finance Act 1911    (1 & 2 Geo 5 c 48) 
6. Finance Act 1912    (2 & 3 Geo 5 c 8) 
7. Finance Act 1913    (3 & 4 Geo 5 c 30) 
8. Finance Act 1914    (4 & 5 Geo 5 c 10) 
9. Finance Act 1914 (Session 2)  (5 & 6 Geo 5 c 7) 
10. Finance Act 1915    (5 & 6 Geo 5 c 62) 
11. Finance (No 2) Act 1915   (5 & 6 Geo 5 c 89) 
12. Finance Act 1916    (6 & 7 Geo 5 c 24) 
13. Finance Act 1917    (7 & 8 Geo 5 c 31) 
14. Finance Act 1918    (8 & 9 Geo 5 c. 15) 
15. Finance Act 1919    (9 & 10 Geo 5 c 32) 
16. Finance Act 1920    (10 & 11 Geo 5 c 18) 
17. Finance Act 1921    (11 & 12 Geo 5 c 32) 
18. Finance Act 1922    (12 & 13 Geo 5 c 17) 
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19. Finance Act 1923    (13 & 14 Geo 5 c 14) 
20. Finance Act 1924    (14 & 15 Geo 5 c 21) 
21. Finance Act 1925    (15 & 16 Geo 5 c 36) 
22. Finance Act 1926    (16 & 17 Geo 5 c 22) 
23. Finance Act 1927    (17 & 18 Geo 5 c 10) 
24 Finance Act 1928    (18 & 19 Geo 5 c 17) 
25. Finance Act 1929    (19 & 20 Geo 5 c 21) 
26. Finance Act 1930    (20 & 21 Geo 5 c 28) 
27. Finance Act 1931    (21 & 22 Geo 5 c 28) 
28. Finance (No 2) Act 1931   (21 & 22 Geo 5 c 49) 
29. Finance Act 1932    (22 & 23 Geo 5 c 25) 
30. Finance Act 1933    (23 & 24 Geo 5 c 19) 
31. Finance Act 1934    (24 & 25 Geo 5 c 32) 
32. Finance Act 1935    (25 & 26 Geo 5 c 24) 
33. Finance Act 1936    (26 Geo 5 & 1 Edw 8 c 34) 
34. Finance Act 1937    (1 Edw 8 & 1 Geo 6 c 54) 
35. Finance Act 1938    (1 & 2 Geo 6 c 46) 
36. Finance Act 1939    (2 & 3 Geo 6 c 41) 
37. Finance (No 2) Act 1939   (2 & 3 Geo 6 c 109) 
38. Finance Act 1940    (3 & 4 Geo 6 c 29) 
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39. Finance (No 2) Act 1940   (3 & 4 Geo 6 c 48) 
40. Finance Act 1941    (4 & 5 Geo 6 c 30) 
41. Finance Act 1942    (5 & 6 Geo 6 c 21) 
42. Finance Act 1943    (6 & 7 Geo 6 c 28) 
43. Finance Act 1944    (7 & 8 Geo 6 c 23) 
44. Finance Act 1945    (8 & 9 Geo 6 c 24) 
45. Finance (No 2) Act 1945   (9 & 10 Geo 6 c 13) 
46. Finance Act 1946    (9 & 10 Geo 6 c 64) 
47. Finance Act 1947    (10 & 11 Geo 6 c 35) 
48. Finance (No 2) Act 1947   (11 & 12 Geo 6 c 9) 
49. Finance Act 1948    (11 & 12 Geo 6 c 49) 
50. Finance Act 1949    (12 & 13 Geo 6 c 47) 
51. Finance Act 1950    (14 Geo 6 c 15) 
52. Finance Act 1951    (14 & 15 Geo 6 c 43) 
53. Finance Act 1952    (15 & 16 Geo 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c 33) 
54. Finance Act 1953    (1 & 2 Eliz 2 c 34) 
55. Finance Act 1954    (2 & 3 Eliz 2 c 44) 
56. Finance Act 1955    (3 & 4 Eliz 2 c 15) 
57. Finance (No 2) Act 1955   (3 & 4 Eliz 2 c 17) 
58. Finance Act 1956    (4 & 5 Eliz 2 c 54) 
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59. Finance Act 1957    (5 & 6 Eliz 2 c 49) 
60. Finance Act 1958    (6 & 7 Eliz 2 c 56) 
61. Finance Act 1959    (7 & 8 Eliz 2 c 58) 
62. Finance Act 1960    (8 & 9 Eliz 2 c 44) 
63. Finance Act 1961    (9 & 10 Eliz 2 c 36) 
64. Finance Act 1962    (10 & 11 Eliz 2 c 44) 
65. Finance Act 1963    (1963 c 25) 
66. Finance Act 1964    (1964 c 49) 
67. Finance (No 2) Act 1964   (1964 c 92) 
68. Finance Act 1965    (1965 c 25) 
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2. PROGRAMME ACTS 
1. Revenue Act 1911      (1 Geo 5 c 21) 
2. Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1913   (3 & 4 Geo 5 c 3) 
3. Income Tax Procedure (Emergency Provisions) Act 1939   
         (2 & 3 Geo 6 c 99) 
4. Income Tax (Employments) Act 1943   (6 & 7 Geo 6 c 45) 
5. Income Tax (Offices and Employments) Act 1944 (7 & 8 Geo 6 c 12) 
6. Income Tax Act 1945     (8 & 9 Geo 6 c 32) 
7. Income Tax (Repayment of Post-War Credits) Act 1959  
         (7 & 8 Eliz 2 c 28) 
8. Income Tax Management Act 1964   (1964 c 37) 
 
3. CONSOLIDATION ACTS 
1. Income Tax Act 1918.     (8 & 9 Geo 5 c 40)
 (Referred to as ‘the 1918 Act’ in this thesis.) 
2. Income Tax Act 1952.   (15 & 16 Geo 6 & 1 Eliz 2 c 10)
 (Referred to as ‘the 1952 Act’ in this thesis.) 
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APPENDIX 2: NUMBER OF STATUTORY RULES & ORDERS (1895-1947) 
NUMBER OF STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS (1948 ONWARDS) 
 
Year General Local Total 
1895 246 706 950 
1896 197 1,032 1,229 
1897 168 818 986 
1898 200 951 1,151 
1899 223 777 1,000 
1900 174 821 995 
1901 156 886 1,042 
1902 161 819 980 
1903 170 1,026 1,196 
1904 143 1,756 1,899 
1905 162 1,217 1,379 
1906 165 821 986 
1907 231 827 1,058 
1908 256 1,093 1,349 
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Year General Local Total 
1909 205 1,323 1,528 
1910 218 1,150 1,368 
1911 172 1,164 1,336 
1912 342 1,577 1,919 
1913 414 992 1,406 
1914 522 1,392 1,914 
1915 406 835 1,241 
1916 508 433 941 
1917 753 630 1,383 
1918 1,204 621 1,825 
1919 1,091 1,150 2,241 
1920 916 1,559 2,475 
1921 727 1,383 2,110 
1922 430 1,020 1,450 
1923 366 1,258 1,624 
1924 426 1,175 1,601 
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Year General Local Total 
1925 466 995 1,461 
1926 448 1,297 1,745 
1927 445 904 1,349 
1928 415 717 1,132 
1929 391 871 1,262 
1930    
1931    
1932    
1933    
1934    
1935    
1936    
1937 644 597 1,231 
1938 831 830 1,661 
1939 1,336 610 1,946 
1940 1,626 596 2,222 
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Year General Local Total 
1941 1,590 567 2,157 
1942 1,901 1,036 2,937 
1943 1,333 455 1,788 
1944 1,028 455 1,483 
1945 1,179 527 1,706 
1946 1,291 996 2,287 
1947 1,387 1,531 2,918 
1948 1,508 1,350 2,858 
1949 1,382 1,086 2,468 
1950 1,211 933 2,144 
1951 1,166 1,170 2,336 
1952 1,029 1,283 2,312 
1953 829 1,108 1,937 
1954 706 1,057 1,763 
1955 657 1,350 2,007 
1956 722 1,402 2,124 
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Year General Local Total 
1957 705 1,545 2,250 
1958 685 1,595 2,280 
1959    
1960    
1961    
1962    
1963    
1964    
 
SOURCES 
Years from 1895 to 1929 (inclusive).  Committee on Ministers’ Powers, vol 2, 
Minutes of Evidence (London, HMSO, 1932) 204.  Evidence of CT Carr. 
Years from 1937 to 1945 (inclusive).  Select Committee on Procedure, Third 
Report (1945-46, HC 189) 243.  Evidence of Sir Cyril Carr. 
Years from 1946 to 1958 (inclusive).  JE Kersell, Parliamentary Supervision of 
Delegated Legislation (London, Stevens, 1960) 169.  Kersell supplies figures for 
general instruments and total instruments only.  For these years, therefore, the 
number of local instruments has been calculated arithmetically. 
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APPENDIX 3: SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION RELATING TO INCOME TAX 
AND NOT INVOLVING ANY FOREIGN ELEMENT 
 
SR & O   STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS 
1910/666 [Concerned with super-tax]  [No provision for citation] 
1914/1863 [Concerned with 1914-15]  [No provision for citation] 
1915/1222 [Concerned with deductions]  [No provision for citation] 
1916/202 [Concerned with weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 
1916/887 [Concerned with weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 
1917/422 [Service of documents by post]  [No provision for citation]  
1920/1991 [Concerned with weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 
1921/1699 [Concerned with superannuation funds]  [No provision for citation] 
1922/80 Government of Ireland (Adaptation of the Taxing Acts) Order 1922 
1922/1329 [Concerned with super-tax]  [No provision for citation] 
1923/405 Irish Free State (Consequential Adaptation of Enactments) Order 
1923 
1923/453 Irish Free State (Consequential Adaptation of Taxing Acts) Order 
1923 
1925/702 [Concerned with weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 
1927/81 Income Tax (Schedule V Amendment) Order 1927 
1928/582 [Concerned with weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 
1928/610 [Concerned with surtax notices]  [No provision for citation] 
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1931/638 [Concerned with superannuation funds]  [No provision for citation] 
1931/827 [Concerned with weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 
1936/1103 [Concerned with surtax notices]  [No provision for citation] 
1938/1637 [Concerned with service of documents]  [No provision for citation] 
1939/1292 [Concerned with service of documents]  [No provision for citation] 
1940/1520 [Concerned with weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 
1940/1776 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) Regulations 1940 
1941/1378 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) (Amendment) Regulations 
1941 
1941/1379 [Concerned with weekly wage-earners]  [No provision for citation] 
1941/1476 Tax Free Payments (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 1941 
1941/1667 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) (Amendment No 2) 
Regulations 1941 
1942/1111 Post-War Credit (Income Tax) Regulations 1942 
1942/1324 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) (Amendment No 3) 
Regulations 1942 
1942/1970 Seasonal Employments (Income Tax) Regulations 1942 
1943/397 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) (Amendment No 4) 
Regulations 1943 
1943/411 Ulster and Colonial Savings Certificates (Income Tax Exemption) 
Regulations 1943 
1943/1024 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) (Amendment No 5) 
Regulations 1943 
1943/1310 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) (Merchant Navy) 
Regulations 1943 
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1943/1669 Deduction of Income Tax (Schedule E) (Amendment No 6) 
Regulations 1943 
1944/251 Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1944 
1944/1015 Income Tax (Employments) (No 2) Regulations 1944 
1945/137 Ulster and Colonial Savings Certificates (Income Tax Exemption) 
Regulations 1945 
1945/365 Income Tax (Employments) (No 3) Regulations 1945 
1945/1687 Ulster and Colonial Savings Certificates (Income Tax Exemption) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1945 
1946/163 Income Tax Procedure (Emergency Provisions) Act (Expiry) Order 
1946 
1946/458 Income Tax (Employments) (No 4) Regulations 1946 
1946/1309 Post War Credit (Income Tax) Regulations 1946 
1947/582 Income Tax (Employments) (No 5) Regulations 1947 
1947/947 Income Tax (Mineral Deposits) Regulations 1947 
1947/1295 Income Tax (Employments) (No 6) Regulations 1947 
1947/1691 Post War Credit (Income Tax) Regulations 1947 
SI   STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS 
1948/464 Income Tax (Employments) (No 7) Regulations 1948 
1948/1519 Income Tax (Employments) (No 8) Regulations 1948 
1948/1819 Income Tax (Employments) (No 9) Regulations 1948 
1950/3 Income Tax (Applications for Increase of Wear and Tear 
Percentages) Regulations 1950 
1950/453 Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1950 
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1951/836 Income Tax (Employments) (No 2) Regulations 1951 
1952/89 Ulster and Colonial Savings Certificates (Income Tax Exemption) 
Regulations 1945 
1952/653 Income Tax (Service of Notices) Regulations 1952 
1952/1004 Income Tax (Employments) (No 3) Regulations 1952 
1952/1255 Post-War Credit (Income Tax) Regulations 1959 
1952/1758 Income Tax (Employments) (No 4) Regulations 1952 
1954/1577 Income Tax (Employments) (No 5) Regulations 1954 
1955/835 Income Tax (Employments) (No 6) Regulations 1955 
1956/715 Ulster and Colonial Savings Certificates (Income Tax Exemption) 
Regulations 1956 
1956/1149 Ulster and Colonial Savings Certificates (Income Tax Exemption) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1956 
1956/1230 Income Tax (Purchased Life Annuities) Regulations 1956 
1956/1295 Investment Allowances (Fuel Economy Plant) Order 1956 
1958/1166 Income Tax (Employments) (No 7) Regulations 1958 
1958/1548 Ulster and Colonial Savings Certificates (Income Tax Exemption) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1956 
1959/876 Post-War Credit (Income Tax) Regulations 1959 
1960/769 Post-War Credit (Income Tax) Amendment Regulations 1960 
1960/2308 Income Tax (Purchased Life Annuities) (Amendment) Regulations 
1960 
1961/580 Visiting Forces and Allied Headquarters (Income Tax and Death 
Duties) (Designation) Order 1961 
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1961/591 Income Tax (Employments) (No 8) Regulations 1961 
1961/1596 Income Tax (Employments) (No 9) Regulations 1961 
1962/1003 Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1962 
1962/2455 Post-War Credit (Income Tax) Amendment Regulations 1962 
1963/922 Ulster and Colonial Savings Certificates (Income Tax Exemption) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1963 
1963/1082 Income Tax (Employments) (No 2) Regulations 1963 
1964/562 Ulster and Colonial Savings Certificates (Income Tax Exemption) 
(Amendment) Regulations 1963 
1964/924 Visiting Forces and Allied Headquarters (Income Tax and Death 
Duties) (Designation) Order 1964 
1965/433 Income Tax (Surtax etc.) Regulations 1965 
1965/516 Income Tax (Employments) Regulations 1965 
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